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FOREWORD
It is my distinct pleasure to introduce the 2018
edition of the series on the Chinese People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) by the US Army War
College Strategic Studies Institute, in conjunction
with the National Bureau of Asian Research, and
US Indo-Pacific Command. This volume, The People
of the PLA 2.0, is a 10-year update to some of the key
themes addressed in the 2008 edition, The “People”
in the PLA: Recruitment, Training, and Education in
China’s Military.
The greater community of “China watchers”
understandably tends to focus on factors such as
the PLA’s military modernization, operations, and
force posture. Although these are critically important
aspects of the PLA’s readiness and worthy of
examination, they are insufficient for understanding
the evolving capabilities of the PLA as a near peer
competitor to the United States. As this volume
reflects, careful study of how the PLA recruits and
educates its people, treats its veterans, and institutes
personnel reforms gives us insight into how the
PLA thinks about problems and devises solutions.
Such careful study illuminates how the PLA behaves
in response to the internal political, cultural, and
educational dynamics within China and the external
demands of readying and preparing its personnel for
the conduct of joint modern warfare.
In addition, this in-depth analysis brings to light
some of the bounds within which the PLA will think
and act during crisis or conflict. Such insight on the
PLA will not come from counting its hypersonic
missiles, diagramming its organizational structures,
vii
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or even watching its exercises. Appreciating the
human aspects of the PLA will inform effective
engagement with the PLA by US military leaders
and can contribute to avoiding conflict with the PRC
in the future.

CAROL V. EVANS
Director
Strategic Studies Institute and
US Army War College Press
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INTRODUCTION
The 2018 Chinese People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) conference at Carlisle took place after a threeyear period of rapid and intense change for the PLA.
In November 2015 President Xi Jinping announced
another round of military reforms that promised
to inculcate the PLA with updated command and
control structures, reorient its focus externally, and
make progress toward becoming a more effective
warfighting organization and ultimately a “worldclass military” by mid-century. Chief among these
reforms were adjusting the membership of the Central
Military Commission (CMC), creating a service
headquarters for the PLA Army, breaking up the PLA
General Departments and making their constituent
elements directly subordinate to either the CMC or the
newly created PLA Army headquarters and Strategic
Support Force (SSF), renaming and consolidating the
seven ground-centric military regions into five joint
theater commands, elevating the Second Artillery
Corps to service level and renaming it the Rocket
Force, chartering the SSF to handle cyber and space
operations, creating the Joint Logistic Support Force
to build a modern logistics structure, eliminating the
division as a warfighting structure and replacing it
with a brigade-level structure, and cutting another
300,000 personnel from the PLA. At the same time,
Communist Party of China (CPC) control over the
PLA was bolstered by targeting corruption within
the leadership of the officer corps to ensure the PLA’s
fidelity to the party.
These developments took place against the
backdrop of a China that is increasingly assertive,
and even aggressive, vis-à-vis its neighbors while also
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presenting an alternative model for global leadership.
China has pressed forward with the Belt and Road
Initiative, signing long-term leasing deals for ports in
places such as Sri Lanka, Greece, and Australia. China
also has continued to apply pressure in its regional
territorial disputes with Japan in the East China Sea
and with numerous countries in the South China Sea
while at the same time conducting military operations
intended to achieve coercive effects on the people
and leadership of Taiwan. China also squeezed South
Korea economically for its decision to permit the
deployment of the US Terminal High Altitude Area
Defense system. In addition, the PLA officially opened
its first overseas military base in Djibouti while
accelerating and expanding its joint exercise program
at multiple levels.
At the same time, but less appreciated by
outside observers, was the mandate to revamp the
management and education of PLA personnel. As the
volume’s authors will make clear, this set of initiatives
is integral to the overall program of reform. China
understands that for the restructured forces of the PLA
to win a future war, it needs to elevate the quality of
its people. As such, the PLA seeks a corps of military
professionals who are better educated, younger,
and more technologically savvy; who can operate
jointly; and who are still completely loyal to the
party’s direction.
In preparation for the 2018 Carlisle Conference,
we sensed an important opportunity to examine this
topic, which had received relatively little attention but
is so central to understanding PLA modernization.
The opportunity came 10 years after our last study of
the people of the PLA. The time was right to assess
initial results and consider the implications of future
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developments. The authors of this volume provide
their very best insights into these matters, and we
sincerely hope their conclusions serve other studies of
China, the PLA, and its people.
THE PLA AND THE PARTY: STRUCTURAL
CHANGES AT THE BEGINNING OF THE XI ERA
In the first chapter of the opening section of the
volume, Morgan Clemens and Benjamin Rosen
assess the impact of recent political work reforms
within the PLA as Xi Jinping and the CPC look to
ensure the military’s compliance with approved
political thought and practices. The authors profile
the factors driving the effort to strengthen the PLA’s
political work and judge the policy implications. The
authors note that the reforms will increase the party’s
control of the PLA, but they question the operational
implications of further centralized decision-making
and restraints placed on a commander’s initiative in
an era in which the pace of warfare has dramatically
accelerated. Clemens and Rosen also analyze the
practical effects of creating the CMC Political and
Legal Affairs Commission (CMC-PLAC) to combat
corruption in the PLA when little is known about
the effectiveness of lower-echelon Political and Legal
Affairs Committees (PLACs) in doing so. The chapter
further considers whether the new political work
system can deal with the burden that comes with
having responsibility for personnel management and
talent development for the PLA. At their core, these
reforms seek to ensure military commanders do not let
their political awareness and responsibilities atrophy
because they focus solely on warfighting. In a similar
vein, the reforms encourage political cadres not to give
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up leadership responsibilities, by concentrating only
on managing resources or addressing soldier morale.
Ultimately, the party seeks to develop personnel who
are expert in both political and military matters.
Chapter two, by David C. Logan, profiles Rocket
Force personnel, as a case study of the impacts of
personnel reform more broadly. As noted, the slate
of PLA reforms in 2015 included the replacement of
the Second Artillery Corps with the Rocket Force
as the organization responsible for China’s landbased missiles, both nuclear and conventional.
China has sought to modernize and professionalize
simultaneously the Rocket Force while ensuring
resolute loyalty to the party. In the process, the PLA
has placed greater emphasis on recruiting women
and those with college educations for the force,
recognizing the technical demands that serving in
these units requires. This emphasis creates a special
problem. Better educated and more technologically
savvy soldiers entrusted with some of the PLA’s most
sensitive assets require more careful screening to
ensure these recruits to the Rocket Force are politically
suitable. Logan argues that prioritizing loyalty over
effectiveness might lead to a force that is less capable
and more aggressive in nature. Regardless of the longterm effects that emphasizing political reliability might
have on the PLA’s operational effectiveness, current
trends seem to show that the Rocket Force enjoys
something of a preferential status within the PLA. The
Rocket Force’s elevation to service level, expansion
of its structure, promotion rates of its personnel, and
appointment of its alumni to very senior positions
throughout the PLA and China’s defense enterprise
suggest the force is gaining in prestige and power.
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Eric Kiss concludes this section of the volume by
conducting a thought experiment that seeks to shed
light on how the PLA might manage the challenges that
come with operating bases in overseas locations. His
imagined scenario places PLA personnel deployed in
a foreign country on the horns of a dilemma in which
they must choose between protecting their forces and
not alienating the host-nation populace. Kiss examines
whether the PLA has the requisite foreign area
expertise, legal support, and contracting authorities
for managing the vast array of political, legal, and
economic issues with host-nation authorities that will
help define the legitimacy of the PLA’s presence in that
country. These questions are particularly relevant as
China has signaled that it may break with past practice
and seek an increased number of basing arrangements
with host nations. Eschewing multilateral mandates
for its additional foreign posture means China will
have to deal directly with the concerns this posture will
generate. With respect to foreign area expertise, the
PLA is hamstrung by its efforts to insulate its units and
leaders from contact with foreigners. Whether out of
concern for maintaining ideological purity or ensuring
positive control over personnel, this clear tendency
increases the difficulty of assessing the degree to which
skills such as foreign language expertise extend into
the ranks of the PLA. The PLA’s ability to deal with
complex problems while based in foreign countries is
inhibited by unclear and less developed legal regimes.
PLA regulations and laws do not have provisions that
signal intent to comply with international standards,
implement status of forces agreements or include
provisions for regulating the operations of overseas
bases. In particular, the process of local contracting
is likely to rely solely on private Chinese businesses
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for sustainment operations, irrespective of the
inefficiencies that such an approach might bring. Such
basic structural and procedural shortcomings would
seem to put forward-deployed PLA personnel in
difficult positions as they face challenging realities on
the ground at new overseas bases.
EDUCATION AND CIVIL-MILITARY
RELATIONS
This section of the volume undertakes a
critical examination of education and professional
development in the PLA. The authors of the three
chapters successively examine the general state
of PLA education and its drive to leverage better
China’s civilian education system, the challenges
of professional military education within the PLA,
and the struggles of PLA veterans after their service
has ended. American and partner-nation readers
will recognize in each of these chapters the familiar
issues that confront the PLA and the unique aspects
that are likely to constrain its continued development
and progress.
For about 20 years China and the PLA have
recognized that modern “informatized” war requires
soldiers who are more technologically savvy. China
and the PLA knew that improving human capital
was at least as important as fielding new, hightech equipment. In chapter four, Brian Waidelich
and Bernard D. Cole trace the PLA’s long march
to draw more of its servicemembers from civilian
educational institutions to achieve this end. In 1999
the PLA began to recruit more college graduates and
started a Chinese-style reserve officers’ training corps
program to commission officers from China’s best
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civilian universities. The PLA also revised many of
its policies to encourage college graduates to join the
PLA. By 2010 the PLA appeared to have achieved
much success: 80 percent of its officers had four years
of college education, compared to only about 25
percent in 1998. Building on this success, in 2010 the
PLA established a further goal of having 60 percent
of newly commissioned officers come from civilian
universities. But the PLA missed this target for many
years, and by 2017 had ended the primary national
program intended to commission officers from civilian
universities, turning instead to direct recruitment
of those already graduated. The ways in which the
PLA will deal with the many issues that led to the old
program’s demise or ensure civilian college graduates
are appropriately accessed and transitioned to military
service are not at all obvious, suggesting that further
refinements of the plan may be in store. The authors
also discuss the difficulties facing the PLA as it tries to
raise the professional profile of its noncommissioned
officers (NCOs) and civilian employees. In so doing,
the PLA must contend with a national culture that
tends not to value military service highly, especially
that of personnel other than officers. Moreover, the
PLA must also address how to ensure the political
reliability of graduates of civilian universities. All of
these factors make the future relationship between
civilian education and the PLA an uncertain one.
Kenneth Allen and Dr. Brendan Mulvaney of the
China Aerospace Studies Institute at the National
Defense University conduct a deep dive of the PLA’s
professional military education system in chapter
five. As they point out, the PLA does not use the
term “professional military education,” preferring
instead a term (with many variations) Allen and
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Mulvaney translate as “cultivation and training.”
Despite recognizing since 1999 that it needs a better
educated force, and even with additional emphasis
from Xi Jinping on military education reform, the PLA
still has much to do before it can claim a professional
education system on par with that of a “world- class
military.” Nearly all officers and enlisted personnel
are taught solely within their own specialty. Very few
members of another branch or career field are schooled
together, even within a single service. A similar lack of
joint education across the various services of the PLA
is also evident. Officers typically do not receive formal
joint education until they are quite senior, at the level
of deputy corps-level flag officers. Put together, this
lack of focus on joint education calls into question
the PLA’s professed commitment to establishing and
improving jointness. Until the PLA can break the
military education system out of its career specialty
confines, it will remain saddled with a significant
hindrance to creating a true joint force.
As the PLA struggles to bring in better-educated
people and to educate those already in its ranks, it also
struggles with how to treat those who have left the
military. In fact, veteran protests are a persistent and
widespread problem that typically does not garner
much attention outside China. In chapter six, Neil J.
Diamant examines the dynamics of veteran protests
in China and what this issue means for China. Until
2018 Beijing preferred to deal with veteran protests at
the local level. As China lacks laws that clearly spell
out veterans’ benefits, the CPC prefers to let provincial
and lower-level officials handle veterans’ concerns
by using a mix of repression and payoffs. In 2018,
however, with little explanation, China established
a veterans’ affairs ministry. Time will tell whether
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this ministry will be resourced to address veterans’
concerns in a meaningful way or whether it is just a
new tool for controlling the problem of disruptive
veterans. Diamant argues that veteran protests
counter the simplistic image of every Chinese citizen
as a nationalist and ardent follower of the CPC. He
concludes that the issue of veterans’ affairs actually
represents a possible area of common interest between
the United States and China where the United States
could offer productive lessons from its own experience
with veterans.
PREPARING TO FIGHT AND WIN
The authors of this section’s chapters examine
how the PLA is attempting to turn military education
reforms into concrete improvements in the readiness
of its people. Whether these attempts are for building
expertise in joint operations, sharpening skills for
information warfare, or preparing for the demands of
modern warfare, the PLA has charted an ambitious
course toward readying its personnel to fight and win
the next war.
Kevin McCauley examines military educational
reforms targeting the development of joint
commanders and staff as well as efforts to improve
joint training. Qualified joint officers and a welltrained joint force would be fundamental requirements
for transforming the PLA into a “world-class military”
by mid-century. The PLA intends to instill a general
level of joint knowledge throughout the entire military
as joint operation capabilities are pushed down to
the tactical level. Although the detailed outline of
these reforms is known, the full extent and quality
of implemented reforms is difficult to gauge. One
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such reform is a “triad” military education program
to reform military educational institutions and the
joint curriculum through three components: military
academy education, professional military education,
and unit training practice. The three components
are not new, but the current reform is attempting
to update and integrate the elements into a holistic
system of systems that would cultivate the necessary
personnel expertise in joint operations to achieve the
PLA’s fundamental transformation to a joint force.
Importantly, the PLA intends to closely integrate
military academic institutions with unit training,
believing that the interaction will benefit both areas.
The PLA also intends to improve joint training
through replicating realistic combat conditions and
by expanding simulation/war-gaming centers and
battle labs.
In chapter seven, John Chen and James Mulvenon
discuss another path the PLA is taking to build virtual
combat experience: personnel training exchanges
with foreign militaries. Such exchanges involve
sending personnel abroad to study in foreign military
institutions, sending personnel to participate in
foreign training exercises on an individual or small
group basis, or the participation of PLA units in
foreign exercises, also known as combined exercises.
The PLA seems to emphasize participation in foreign
training exercises, which provide exposure to highstress operating conditions that schools typically do
not provide. Participation in foreign exercises also
constitutes an important form of military diplomacy
for the PLA. In an exercise setting, PLA personnel
and units are more readily able to demonstrate their
military power, providing a shaping and deterrent
effect on other participating nations. As with any
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activity that brings it into contact with foreigners, the
PLA emphasizes party control and selects its best and
most politically reliable personnel for such exchanges.
Whether the PLA’s political work apparatus is up to
the organizational challenges posed by the PLA’s
growing desire for foreign training exercises remains
to be seen.
Joe McReynolds and LeighAnn Ragland-Luce
conclude this section by profiling the human capital
ecosystem that underlies the PLA’s development,
acquisition, and operational deployment of network
weapons in the PLA SSF. This profile offers an
opportunity to better understand China’s information
warfare capabilities. As of 2018, however, the
personnel ecosystem for information warfare
operations was in a greater state of flux than any
other segment of the PLA. The creation of the SSF
was only the start of a long series of organizational
reforms. China’s elevation of military-civil fusion to
the level of a national strategy has led to the launch
of new systematic initiatives that have broadened
the SSF’s access to civilian talent pools, while the
military’s technical academic institutions that have
historically focused on network and electronic warfare
research have been completely reorganized. At the
same time, the drive to ensure the SSF is younger and
more skilled than the traditional PLA services runs
up against the higher pay and prestige that China’s
civilian government and private sector can provide.
In short, the Chinese military is embarking on a
massive reordering of its human capital ecosystem for
information warfare while having to compete to retain
its top people.
The volume concludes with a special tribute to
Ellis Joffe, who passed away in 2010. As Dr. Cynthia
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Watson of the National Defense University notes,
Joffe’s work was foundational to the field. In addition
to his many seminal works on Chinese military and
politics, Joffe helped found this conference series.
Given his emphasis on understanding the people of
the PLA and their relationship to it, the party, and the
state, the inclusion of a tribute to him is only fitting. We
sincerely hope his example of persistence, expertise,
and scholarship will inspire the next generation
of China scholars to work hard to understand the
complexity of Chinese political-military affairs.
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1. THE IMPACT OF REFORM ON THE PLA’S
POLITICAL WORK SYSTEM
Morgan Clemens and Benjamin Rosen
This chapter examines major reforms in the People’s
Liberation Army’s (PLA) political work system since
2015, assessing the issues and concerns driving these
changes as well as the implications they carry for the
PLA’s future development and effectiveness.1
MAIN ARGUMENT
A key feature of the Xi Jinping era has been a focus
on strengthening and revitalizing political work in the
PLA, with the dual objectives of both enabling the PLA
to “fight and win” under modern conditions as well as
strengthening political control over the armed forces. A
key factor driving this effort is a broader concern over
the deleterious effect rampant corruption has upon the
PLA’s operational effectiveness, political loyalty, and
general reputation in society. In practical terms, the
attempt to curb this corruption has meant downsizing,
reorganizing, and consolidating the former General
Political Department (GPD) and distributing its
functional responsibilities across multiple new and
preexisting organizational structures. This effort
has also entailed renewed emphasis on assuring the
operational command and decision-making role of
party committees and on developing the professional
military skills of political cadres.
1. The authors would like to thank Susan Lawrence of the
Congressional Research Service for the many useful and insightful
comments she provided when reviewing the conference paper
upon which this chapter is based.
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POLICY IMPLICATIONS
•

•

•

Revitalizing the party committee’s role in
commanding units and organizations will serve
to strengthen the party’s control of the PLA, but
its impact on operations is less clear.
A strengthened system of Political and Legal
Affairs Commissions (PLACs) may provide a
useful means of combating corruption and other
malfeasance, but the effectiveness of the PLAC
in such a role has yet to be fully demonstrated.
Concentration of responsibility for personnel
management in the hands of the political
work system may prove beneficial to talent
development and cultivation, but only if the
political work system is adequately resourced
to handle the increased burden.

INTRODUCTION
Political work is essential to the nature of the
PLA, serving to hold the PLA true to its fundamental
role as the armed wing of the Communist Party of
China (CPC). Thus, the effectiveness of the PLA’s
political work system is of critical importance to the
CPC, directly affecting the reliability of the party’s
ultimate guarantee of its power. A key feature of Xi
Jinping’s tenure as chairman of the Central Military
Commission (CMC) has been a focus on revitalizing
the political work system within the PLA, via both
structural and practical reforms. Strengthening the
political work system is seen as a critical component
of strengthening the PLA overall, and has taken place
within the context of a series of broader structural
reforms intended to change fundamentally how the
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PLA fights and operates, with the dual objectives of
both enabling the PLA to fight and win under modern
conditions as well as strengthening political control
over the armed forces.
A major element of political work system reform
was the dissolution in January 2016 of the former
GPD, which had been responsible for directing and
overseeing the PLA’s political work system. The
dysfunction of the GPD was epitomized by the case
of General Xu Caihou, the disgraced former CMC vice
chairman and director of the GPD. Xu was prosecuted
for using his position within the GPD to solicit bribes
from PLA officers seeking promotion and for other
“serious violations of party discipline.” In discussing
Xu’s case, official propaganda focused on how
corruption in the upper echelons of the PLA affected
the rank-and-file’s faith in the CPC-led system, and
Xi Jinping specifically cited the case as evidence of the
need for reform in the PLA’s political work system.
(The present paper confines itself to an analysis of
the PLA proper, though many of its findings are
also applicable to the People’s Armed Police and the
broader armed forces.)
The demise of the GPD, however, is only one aspect
of the broader effort to revitalize party life within the
armed forces, which also encompasses the system of
unit party committees headed by political commissars
comprising the core and backbone of the PLA’s
command and leadership system. This strengthening
effort predates the 2016 military reforms and has its
most concrete origins in the 2014 Gutian Conference
on political work. The effort’s fundamental purpose
is to tighten CPC control over the PLA at all levels,
in part to combat rampant corruption but also to
use the party’s mechanisms of control as a means to
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develop the PLA’s operational capability and assure
its obedience to party commands. Accordingly, the
impact of this effort carries significant implications for
the PLA’s future effectiveness as both a fighting force
and a guarantor of the CPC’s continued hold on power.
This paper will first briefly lay out the issues and
concerns on the part of China’s political and military
leadership driving the reform of the political work
system during the Xi Jinping era, and then examine
how these concerns have been translated into concrete
reforms and other changes—in the context of both
the dissolution of the GPD as well as the current
status of the system of party committees and political
commissars which pervades all elements of the PLA.
The paper will end by discussing the implications
carried by these changes in the political work system.
MOTIVATIONS AND CONCERNS
Upon coming to power in 2012, Xi Jinping quickly
identified reform of the PLA and China’s broader
national defense structure as a key aspect of achieving
his and the party’s broader national development and
policy goals. He confronted a PLA which was not
ready to fight and win modern wars, which was rife
with corrupt client networks formed around leading
generals, which lacked “fighting spirit,” and in which
political/ideological work were seen as increasingly
ossified and outdated. Such conditions seriously
undermined the PLA’s perceived reliability as the
ultimate guarantor of the CPC’s rule, and the PLA’s
political work system was identified as both a source
of many problems as well as a tool for rectifying them.
The fall 2014 conference on political work held at
Gutian in Fujian Province, along with various policy
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directives and guidance documents which flowed
from it, identified and laid out many of the concerns
driving the reforms affecting the PLA’s political
work system.
Convened on October 30, 2014, the Gutian
Conference on military political work was deliberately
intended to evoke the 1929 Gutian Congress, which
had fully established the principle of the party’s
explicit command over the Red Army and emphasized
the importance of political work within Red Army
units.2 The explicit goal of the 2014 Gutian Conference
was to revitalize political work within the PLA.3 (Many
sources emphasize that the original Gutian Congress
sought to overcome a tendency for Red Army party
committees to not focus on military work, implying
that the modern Gutian Conference had to do much
the same.)4 Over a period of days, CMC chairman Xi
Jinping and others gave major addresses concerning
the status and requirements of political work in the
modern PLA to nearly 450 delegates, including the
full membership of the CMC and leaders, political
commissars, and political department directors from
the four General Departments and other major units
(大单位) down to the corps leader-grade, as well as
2. “古田会议 (1929年12月28-29日)” [The Gutian Conference
(28–29 December 1929)] in The People’s daily party history
encyclopedia, September 4, 2018, http://dangshi.people
.com.cn/.
3. Wang Shibin and Ou Shijin, “全军政治工作会议在古田召
开,习近平出席会议并发表重要讲话” [Whole-army political work
conference was held in Gutian, Xi Jinping attended the meeting
and delivered an important speech], 解放军报 [PLA daily],
November 1, 2014.
4. “党委要成为战斗力建设的领导中枢” [Party committees
must become the leading center of combat effectiveness
construction], 解放军报 [PLA daily], December 5, 2014.
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other relevant cadres (officers) and representatives
of the Ministry of Public Security.5 In his remarks at
the conference, Xi Jinping emphasized the continued
vitality and relevance of political work within the
PLA, summarizing its key role in sustaining the Eleven
Insists (十一坚持), a set of principles emphasizing the
PLA’s subordination to the party, discipline, and
fighting spirit, including
• the party’s command of the gun;
• serving the people;
• “seeking truth from facts” (实事求是);
• adhering to the mass line (群众路线);
• using scientific theory to arm the PLA;
• surrounding the core of the party and the
military with a guarantee of service;
• adhering to the fair and decent selection
of cadres;
• the egalitarian togetherness of officers
and soldiers;
• maintaining strict discipline;
• adhering to revolutionary spirit and sacrifice; and
• the leadership of party members and cadres.6
More broadly, the Gutian Conference and related
propaganda commentaries identified a number of
problems on which PLA political work (and reform
of the political work system) were to focus. These
issues include the “four firmly establishes” (四个牢固
立起来), which focused on fostering a good image on
the part of cadres, more clearly and fairly enforcing
5. Wang Shibin and An Puzhong, “全军政治工作会议在
古田闭幕” [All-army political work conference concluded in
Gutian], 解放军报 [PLA daily], November 2, 2014.
6. Wang Zihui, “强军，习近平最重视啥?” [In a strong army,
what does Xi Jinping value most?], 新华 [Xinhua], August 1, 2016.
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discipline and regulations, modernizing political work
to ensure its vitality and its relevance in a modern
military environment, and developing cadres who are
both professionally competent and politically reliable.7
Also identified were various outstanding problems
the PLA needed to resolve, including the presence
of cadres who only mouthed or feigned their loyalty
to the party, the perceived growth in Western and
liberal ideas about the non-political nature of armed
forces, poor implementation of the PLA’s system of
collective leadership within the unit party committee
structure, poor personnel selection and promotion
practices, and corruption contributing to abuses of
power and breakdowns in discipline (as in the case
of General Xu Caihou).8 Throughout early 2015, a
wide range of party and PLA publications featured
articles discussing ways of implementing reforms to
the political work system, typically referencing Xi’s
remarks at the Gutian Conference, and to advocate
for or justify specific changes or areas of focus. These
publications were accompanied by a raft of official
opinions, resolutions, and other policy guidance
which further delineated specific issues relating to the
reform and development of the political work system
post-Gutian.
In practical terms, Xi Jinping and the PLA
leadership were laying out their vision for what
the political work system should be and how it had
to change to achieve the overall goal they had laid
7. Wei
Liang,
“按照“四个牢固立起来”创新政治工作”
[Innovate political work in accordance with the “four firmly
establishes”], 解放军报 [PLA daily], May 19, 2015.
8. “军报刊文：以刮骨疗毒的勇气搞好整改” [PLA daily
article: Doing reform well by having the courage to scrape the
bones to treat the poison], 新华 [Xinhua], February 27, 2015.
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out for it—namely, supporting and fostering the
development of “a people’s army that listens to the
party’s command, can win battles, and has a good
work style” (建设一支听党指挥、能打胜仗、作风优良的
人民军队).9 This undertaking involves several key
elements, foremost among them increasing the party’s
authority within the PLA by improving the image and
reputation of its cadres, especially its political cadres.
These improvements mean attacking corruption that
undermines the reputation and authority of the party
structure within the military, while strengthening the
influence of political cadres at the grassroots level by
cultivating an image of integrity.10 Xi Jinping said in
April 2013 that this corruption, often referred to as the
“four winds” (四风), afflicts all elements of the party,
both inside and outside the military. The four winds
are formalism (形式主义), bureaucratism (官僚主义),
hedonism (享乐主义) and extravagance (奢靡之风).
Political cadres are required to act as models for
their fellow servicemen to follow and must be seen to
carry out the basic duties of being a soldier alongside
them. At the grassroots level in particular, political
cadres must actively seek to study, work, exercise,
and relax together with the men of their units,
thereby building up their own image and influence

9. Zeng Huafeng et al, “《关于新形势下军队政治工作
若干问题的决定》要点释义” [Key points of the resolution on
several issues concerning military political work under the new
situation], 解放军报 [PLA daily], February 19, 2015.
10. “习近平在同全国劳动模范代表座谈时的讲话(全文)”
[Speech by Xi Jinping during a discussion with representatives
of the national model workers representatives (full text)], 新华
[Xinhua], April 28, 2013.
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while keeping abreast of social and psychological
conditions.11
Related to rebuilding the political work
system’s prestige is the task of fostering rule of
law in management at all levels, necessitating the
strengthening of the PLA’s investigatory and discipline
inspection capacity so as to combat corruption
and clientelism and to ensure decisions related to
personnel selection, promotion, procurement, etc., are
made in accordance with established procedures.12 To
this end, the reporting system for unacceptable views
and actions must be strengthened to aid investigations
and prevent lying to authorities, the spreading
of rumors, attempts to bargain with authorities
(rather than simply submitting to lawful orders),
unauthorized determination of important matters,
and other activities which serve to undermine both
discipline and political reliability.13
Post-Gutian directives also make clear the
importance of improving the political work system’s
ability to function effectively during operations and
the ability of commissars and the party committees to
guide and direct operations. As stated by the CMC,
in the PLA “political organs are command organs
11. CMC, 关于建设对党绝对忠诚、聚焦打仗有力、作风形
象良好政治机关和政治于部队伍的意见 [Opinions on building
the ranks of political organs and political cadres with absolute
loyalty to the party, a focus on fighting, and a good workstyle
image] (Beijing: CMC, April 2, 2015).
12. Zhao Dongbin et al., “《中央军委关于新形势下深入推
进依法治军从严治军的决定》要点释义” [Explanation of the main
points of the Central Military Commission resolution on deeply
advancing the rule of law and strictly administering the Army
under the new situation], 解放军报 [PLA daily], April 22, 2015.
13. CMC, Opinions on building the ranks of political
organs.
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[and] political cadres are command cadres” (政治机关
是指挥机关、政治干部是指挥干部), and political workers
should measure their own contributions by how much
they aid combat effectiveness.14 At the personal level,
political cadres must develop their own operational
capacity by regularly participating in military exercises
alongside military cadres and developing their
fundamental military skills, which include “operating
equipment, communicating via networks, instructing
by means of technology platforms, organizing training
in the field, and commanding in battle.”15 This focus
on operational capability also extends to units as a
whole, as indicated by a GPD-issued opinion from
March 2015, requiring party committees at all levels
to make improving unit combat effectiveness a main
focus of their work.16
Finally, the overall quality of the political work
system, especially its practices, must be improved.
This improvement would mean, as noted above,
ensuring political cadres were proficient in their
duties as well as improving the tools at their disposal
for carrying out those duties, especially in regard to
informatization. In particular, the PLA and CPC are
highly aware of the fragmented and decentralized
nature of new media, which enables the dissemination
14.

organs.

CMC,

Opinions on building the ranks of political

15. Zhang Lianguo, “下大力提高政治干部队伍建设水平”
[Vigorously improve the level of construction of political cadres],
解放军报 [PLA daily], January 9, 2018.
16. “经习近平主席批准总政治部印发《关于在党委领导
工作中贯彻落实战斗力标准的意见》” [With the approval of Xi
Jinping the GPD issues opinions on implementing the combat
power standards in the leadership work of party committees], 解
放军报 [PLA daily], April 3, 2018.
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of a wider range of views, opinions, and ideas.17 The
ease with which information can be disseminated
constitutes a threat to the party-state’s ideological
and discourse dominance and makes relying solely
upon legacy propaganda mechanisms such as printed
materials and in-person study sessions very difficult.
In the PLA’s view, political cadres must expand the use
of political work information systems to modernize
ideological education, discipline inspection, and other
aspects of their work.18
Ultimately, these concerns and objectives are
guiding and directing the development of the PLA’s
political work system in the Xi Jinping era. The focus
is foremost on strengthening the image and reputation
of political cadres (and by extension that of the party),
but it also encompasses the capacity of the political
work system to enforce ideological conformity and
policy adherence, promote the development of the
PLA’s capabilities in all areas, and provide effective
leadership by means of the party committee system in
peace and war. In the wake of the Gutian Conference,
these concerns have been translated into substantive
action and reforms at all levels, encompassing a
restructuring and fracturing of the PLA’s top-level
political work components as well as more practical
changes within the party committee system at all
levels. The following two sections of the paper deal
with these changes and reforms, first examining
the fate of the former GPD and then analyzing how
17. Wang Xiaoyan, “新媒体的思想政治教育功能初探” [An
examination of the function of ideological and political education
in new media], 军事记者 [Military reporter], October 26, 2017.
18. CMC, Opinions on building the ranks of political
organs.
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political commissars and party committees have
been affected.
THE DEMISE OF THE GPD AND
ORGANIZATIONAL RESTRUCTURING
A key objective of the earliest reforms in 2016 was
restructuring the PLA’s top components, especially
those directly under the purview of the CMC. This
entailed, among other measures, abolishing the
former General Departments, creating several new
administrative and management organs directly under
the CMC, and reconfiguring the seven former Military
Regions into five Theater Commands (TCs). This new
set-up, described as the CMC chairman responsibility
system (军委主席负责制), is designed to maximize the
direct authority and oversight which paramount leader
Xi Jinping (as CMC chairman) exercises over the PLA,
thereby ensuring “the party’s absolute leadership over
the military is more centralized and unified.”19 The
wholesale transformation of the former GPD into the
current Political Work Department (PWD) of the CMC
as part of the 2016 reforms has profoundly altered
the nature, focus, and responsibilities of the new
organization. The new PWD seems to be considerably
diminished in size in comparison to its predecessor,
with its second-level components downsized from
departments (部) to bureaus (局), likely reflecting
the loss of personnel attendant upon the PLA-wide
300,000-man downsizing that accompanied the 2016
reforms. Of course, a significant proportion of the
personnel taken away from the GPD/PWD was likely
transferred to form the political work organs of the
19. “变与不变的二重奏” [Duet of change and constancy],
解放军报 [PLA daily], September 26, 2016.
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newly established PLA Army service headquarters, so
it does not represent a net loss to the PLA’s political
work system as a whole.
In addition, the PWD has undergone considerable
changes in terms of its functional responsibilities,
including both losses and additions. The PWD has
been stripped of its predecessor’s discipline inspection,
judicial, and counterintelligence functions, while
simultaneously gaining new personnel management
responsibilities and seeing its propaganda elements
reorganized and consolidated (the status of its
inherited intelligence component is less clear, though
intelligence activities remain an integral part of
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political work).20 The overall picture presented is
that of an organization which, in comparison to the
former GPD, has been, if not emasculated, then at
least de-operationalized and reduced to a top-level
propaganda organ and human resources department.
In the propaganda realm, various components
of the former GPD have been consolidated, the
bureaucratic overhead has been reduced, and
propaganda work has been modernized. The PWD’s
Cultural Arts Center (文化艺术中心) was formed by
merging the former GPD’s various artistic and creative
components (these included the former Bayi Film
20. Although unofficial Chinese- and English-language
sources do describe a PWD Liaison Bureau (联络局) as the
successor to the former GPD Liaison Department (联络部), the
authors were able to identify only one official source referring to
such an organization, dating from March 2017: Wang Hongyue
and Zhou Xiangyu, “坚决贯彻习主席重要指示和军委决策部署
高标准高质量落实火箭军改革任务” [Resolutely implement the
important instructions of Chairman Xi and the CMC’s decisions
for high-standards and high-quality implementation of Rocket
Force reforms], 火箭兵报 [Rocket Force news], March 1, 2017,
1. Thus, the fate of the Liaison Department and its attached 311
Base for political warfare is unclear, though Western sources
have speculated that the 311 Base was transferred to the Strategic
Support Force. Notably, an Epoch Times article from December
2016, citing unnamed military sources in Beijing, states that,
except for some personnel specifically engaged in intelligence
work (体情报工作的人员) who were transferred to the Strategic
Support Force, the whole staff of the former GPD Liaison
Department was being converted into civilian, non-active duty
personnel (前总政联络部全部人员转为文职非现役) and merged
with the CPC’s own International Liaison Department. The
authors of this paper could not identify any sources corroborating
this contention, which (combined with the nature of the original
source) means its veracity is at best uncertain; and “传中共总政联
络部与中联部合并” [The GPD Liaison Department merges with
the Central Liaison Department], Epoch Times, December 26, 2016.
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Studio, which was renamed the Film and Television
Production Department (电影电视制作部), as well as the
former GPD Song and Dance Troupe (原总政歌舞团), the
former GPD Opera Troupe (原总政歌剧团), the former
GPD Drama Troupe (原总政话剧团), and the former GPD
Orchestra (原总政军乐团), which were all combined into
the Center’s Literature and Arts Department (文艺部).
The PWD’s various media components were
organized into a News Dissemination Center (新闻传播
中心) in 2018 (these include the original PLA Television
Propaganda Center (电视宣传中心), the PWD’s Cultural
Network Center (政治工作部文网中心), the PLA
Publishing House (中国人民解放军出版社), and the PLA
Daily organization (解放军报社).
The Network Public Opinion Bureau (网络
舆论局) was formed in January 2016, most likely
from components of the former GPD Propaganda
Department (now downsized to the PWD Propaganda
Bureau). The Network Public Opinion Bureau is
responsible for shaping and controlling public
opinion by means of the internet. The bureau’s first
director, Zhang Yutang, became director of the PWD’s
Propaganda Bureau (宣传局) in July 2017, and was
succeeded by Guo Shulin, who previously served
as deputy director of the former GPD Propaganda
Department.21 Little is known, as yet, about the specific
work of the Network Public Opinion Bureau, but its
formation is a function of the premium which the
PLA (and the larger party-state system) places upon
monitoring, shaping, and controlling public opinion
in all forms of media. In particular, the bureau’s
creation likely reflects the desire to adapt the PLA’s
21. Li Yan, “中央军委政法委今年有新任务” [The Central
Military Commission Political and Legal Affairs Commission has
new tasks this year], Sohu News, January 2, 2018.
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propaganda system to current social and technological
conditions, by creating an entity explicitly dedicated
to handling online discourse.
One component of the PLA’s larger military
reporting system, the Network-Related Military
Reporting Platform (网络涉军举报平台), which was
launched on November 19, 2017, is directed (指导)
by the Network Public Opinion Bureau, though
actually operated by the PLA’s official website
(www.81.cn).22 Notably, official sources do refer
generically to “network public opinion departments
at all levels” (各级网络舆论部门), though no reference
can be found to specific bureaus within the service or
theater PWDs, increasing the difficulty of determining
whether the PWD’s bureau is the apex of a full
network public opinion xitong.23 In addition, although
it is more than a decade old, the All-Army Political
Work Network (全军政工网) is another critical tool
enabling the PWD and the political work system to
control and direct military media activities in the era
of big data, informatization, and media proliferation.
The precise delineation of responsibilities between
the all-army network and the service-level political
work networks is unclear, though those networks
are seemingly not being de-emphasized in any way,
as an Army Political Work Network (陆军政工网) was
apparently created as part of the 2016 reforms. The
network is used to coordinate messaging with a wide
22.

Yan, “The Central Military Commission.”

23. See Fei Shiting, “永远不能变永远不能丢—中部战区
陆军某合成旅坚持党指挥枪的根本原则和制度铸牢军魂新闻调
查” [Forever unchanging, forever unlosable—A combined arms
brigade of the Central TC Army adheres to the fundamental
principle and system of the party commanding the gun],
解放军报 [PLA daily], July 26, 2018, for such a generic reference.
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range of both military and nonmilitary websites
and news sources in the creation and distribution
of different kinds of content, so as to “create an
‘omnipresent’ propaganda effect” (形成了“铺天盖地”的宣
传效应).24 A specific example includes the mobilization
of the network after the 2015 Tianjin port explosion to
both quash rumors and push articles depicting search
and rescue operations, to “criticize wrong views,
clarify fuzzy understanding, and effectively guide
online public opinion” (批驳错误观点，澄清模糊认识，有
效引导了网上舆论).25 Political work networks—which
exist at most levels of command—are also used for
political study, ideological indoctrination, and other
political work tasks. A June 2017 People’s Navy article
describes the political work organs of units in the
North Sea Fleet using a particular base’s political work
network (基地政工网) as well as ship-to-ship broadcasts
to organize and carry out a study of a recent Xi Jinping
speech. The article notes that one of the ships involved
was actually at sea conducting operational training,
so personnel used various audiovisual materials and
tools to lead the study of the speech, something they
had never done up to that point.26
The changes described above constitute a simple
reorganization of the management of long-established
components of the political work xitong. More
significant is the PWD’s gained responsibility for the
24. “做好新闻舆论工作必须把握的‘度’” [To do news and
public opinion work well we must grasp “degrees”], 军事记者
[Military reporter] no. 5 (2017).
25.

“To do news and public opinion work well.”

26. Lin Wenjie and Li Ding, “北海制从某基地—坚定强军
意志交上优秀笞卷” [At a North Sea Fleet base—Firm will of a
strong military, and handing over excellent orders], 人民海军
[People’s Navy], June 6, 2017.

17

management of enlisted personnel affairs, in addition
to the former GPD’s existing responsibility for cadre
and civilian personnel management, making the PWD
and subordinate PWDs responsible for the complete
personnel portfolio in the PLA. Following the 2016
reforms, the PWD now has both a Cadre Bureau for
the management of officer personnel and an Enlisted
and Civilian Personnel Bureau (兵员和文职人员局), an
arrangement repeated in the PWDs of each of the
services and the TCs. The political work system’s
newfound responsibility for enlisted personnel is a
product of the ever-increasing emphasis placed on
talent cultivation and the improvement of personnel
quality, for which political work organs and the party
committees have been given primary responsibility.
But even as the political work system’s responsibility
for overseeing and managing personnel education
and development has increased, the political colleges
formerly subordinate to the GPD (in Nanjing and
Xi’an respectively) have been transferred to other
authorities, first to the CMC Training Management
Department in 2016, and then as separate campuses of
the National Defense University Political College (国防
大学政治学院) in 2017 (see figure 1-1).

Figure 1-1. GPD/PWD organizational components
pre-reform and post-reform
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Arguably the most significant aspect of the
transition from GPD to PWD has been the transfer
of the former organization’s discipline inspection,
judicial, and counterintelligence functions to
newly formed (or newly independent) entities
directly under the CMC, including the Discipline
Inspection Commission and Political and Legal
Affairs Commission. These reforms are intended
to “scientifically . . . allocate power according to the
principle of mutual control and coordination of
decision-making, implementation, and supervision”
and enhance the CMC’s supervisory and disciplinary
powers by strengthening the independence of
its discipline inspection, audit, and legal affairs
components from the entities which they are intended
to oversee.27 These efforts are part of “a fundamental
policy to strengthen the restriction and supervision of
power” by ensuring units and organizations are not
solely responsible for disciplining themselves, all in
service of Xi Jinping’s larger call (applicable to every
element of the party-state) for power to be caged
within systems.28 Such changes are a direct response to
the rampant corruption which afflicted the pre-reform
GPD, exemplified most egregiously by former GPD
director Xu Caihou. By removing the PLA’s in-house
investigatory and discipline inspection elements from
one of its most corrupt organizational components
and placing them directly under the CMC chairman’s
27. “变与不变的二重奏” [Duet of change and constancy], 解
放军报 [PLA daily], September 26, 2016.
28. Wu Changde, “积极适应我军领导指挥体制改革新要求”
[Actively adapt to the new requirements of the reform of the
PLA’s leadership system], 求实 [Seeking truth] no. 12 (2016). At
the time of publication, the author was a deputy director of the
CMC PWD.
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supervision, the reforms are intended to reduce the
likelihood that corrupt officers will be able to interfere
with disciplinary matters, thereby increasing the
PLA’s institutional capacity to combat corruption
while also strengthening party control and military
discipline. Notably, a 2017 CMS article on political and
legal affairs work states that the primary problem in
the Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou cases was not their
corruption per se, but rather that “they violated the
political bottom line and caused great harm to the
political ecology of the troops.”29
The Political and Legal Affairs Commission System
The CMC Political and Legal Affairs Commission
(军委政法委员会) (CMC-PLAC) combines various
elements of the PLA’s judicial, counterintelligence,
and security apparatus that were formerly
components of the GPD. These components include
the Military Procuratorate, the Military Court, and
the Military Prison, which together constitute the
PLA’s judicial arm. Beyond these, the CMC-PLAC
also includes (in addition to a General Bureau and
a Political Work Bureau) a Security Bureau (保卫局),
which is the successor to the former GPD Security
Department (总政保卫部). As such, it likely carries
forward that department’s counterespionage and
counterintelligence responsibilities.
Although the CMC-PLAC is a newly established
organization, it oversees a system of PLACs which has
long been in existence. Chinese military publications
date the origins of the system to the early 1980s,
29. Wu Zhifeng, “新时代军队政法工作职能定位研究” [Roles
and responsibilities of military political and legal work in the
new era], 中国军事科学 [China military science] no. 6 (2017): 98.
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when the PLA formed political and legal affairs
work leading organs (政法工作领导机构). In 2003, most
organizations at or above the regiment leader grade
established political and legal affairs work leading
small groups (政法工作领导小组), which became PLACs
in 2007.30 Although these commissions did already
exist at the unit level, the PLA nonetheless depicts
them as undergoing a fundamental shift in nature
simultaneous with the establishment of the CMCPLAC in 2016. Most particularly, the work-unit PLACs
(单位政法委) were adjusted (调整) into a regionally
organized system combining PLACs belonging to
unit party committees, military courts, and military
procuratorates.31 Thus, the formation of the CMCPLAC represents something more fundamental than
the simple sequestration of the PLA’s law-enforcement
components, namely the creation of a new securityfocused xitong permeating all elements of the PLA,
operational, administrative and otherwise.
The breadth of the PLAC system’s responsibilities
is laid out in an article published in China Military
30. Online sources indicate that after the 2016 reforms,
Liu Xunyan (刘训言), former director of the GPD Security
Department, became a vice secretary of the CMC-PLAC, while
Lu Chungeng (陆春耕), a former deputy director the GPD
Security Department, became director of the CMC-PLAC’s
General Bureau (军委政法委综合局). “原总政治部保卫部部长刘训
言少将任军委政法委副书记” [Former GPD Security Department
director Major General Liu Xunyan serves as vice secretary of
the CMC-PLAC], thepaper.cn, August 21, 2018, https://www.
thepaper.cn; and “原总政保卫部副部长陆春耕任军委政法委综合
局局长” [Former GPD Security Department deputy director Lu
Chungeng serves as director of the General Bureau of the CMCPLAC], inews.ifeng, August 31, 2016 https://inews.ifeng.com.
31. “战区和军兵种党委政法委员会有何不同” [What is the
difference between theater command and service political and
legal affairs commissions?], 解放军报 [PLA daily], July 2016.
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Science in late 2017, which describes the system’s role
as defending the principle of the party’s absolute
leadership over the military, upholding and enforcing
the CMC chairman responsibility system, resisting
political infiltration by hostile forces, investigating
political cases and other problems, and generally
ensuring the principle of “the party commanding
the gun” remains firmly rooted.32 Regarding the
preservation of the CMC chairman responsibility
system, political and legal affairs work is described
as “the ‘knife handle’ [刀把子] that the party directly
grasps.” This work ensures the whole of the PLA
consistently obeys the CPC Central Committee, the
CMC, and Chairman Xi personally.33 In this vein,
PLACs are tasked with investigating anything that
undermines operational effectiveness, such as major
training accidents, dereliction of duty, or corruption.
The commissions serve to “purify the combat power
generation environment” (净化战斗力生成环境), thereby
supporting the larger preparation for military
struggle.34 To this end, a Network-Related Military
Crime and Adverse Information Reporting Platform
(网络涉军违法犯罪和不良信息举报平台) was launched on
January 1, 2018, having been “organized and built” by
the CMC-PLAC’s Security Bureau.35 Notably, sources
32.

Zhifeng, “Roles and responsibilities,” 97.

33. At the time of publication, the article’s author was an
associate professor at the National Defense University, where
he was director of the Military Criminal Investigation Teaching
and Research section of the Security Work Department in the
National Defense University’s Political College (国防大学政治学
院军队保卫工作系军队刑事侦查教研室); and Zhifeng, “Roles and
responsibilities,” 97.
34.

Zhifeng, “Roles and responsibilities,” 98.

35.

Zhifeng, “Roles and responsibilities,” 99.
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specifically link the CMC-PLAC’s reporting platform
with that of the PWD’s Network Public Opinion
Bureau (discussed earlier), implying that their
functions either overlap or are at least broadly similar,
though without offering any specific delineation of
responsibilities between them.36
In addition to assuring the efficacy and authority
of the PLA’s command and administrative linkages,
the PLAC system is also responsible for “resolutely
resisting the political penetration of hostile forces”
(坚决抵御敌对势力政治渗透), which means human
espionage capitalizing on potential traitors and
defectors. This counterintelligence work involves
collecting intelligence, tracking enemy movements,
and identifying potential channels of penetration, as
well as assessing and keeping close tabs on units and
individuals, especially those occupying critical roles
and positions.37 This responsibility for assuring the
security of command organs (specifically referred to
as “defending the core and defending the vitals” [保核
心、保要害]) includes overseeing the security education
and management of personnel holding top leadership
positions and the establishment of security technology
defenses (安全技术防线), presumably referring to
counter-cyber and other technical measures.38
Finally, the PLACs are responsible for more
typical legal work in that they provide legal support
(法律保障) for all kinds of major military activities,
including exercises, disaster relief, stability, and
combat operations, as well as the use of military
forces overseas. This work entails providing legal
36.

Yan, “The Central Military Commission.”

37.

Yan, “The Central Military Commission.”

38.

Zhifeng, “Roles and responsibilities,” 98.
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advice and actively participating in the “military
operations decision-making process” (军事行动决策过
程).39 This responsibility applies even in the case of
sudden contingencies and emergency situations, and
is part of the larger effort to foster adherence to the
rule of law, both within the PLA and across the larger
party-state. The coordination functions of PLACs
extend to civilian governments and political organs,
as indicated by theater-wide cooperative meetings
(协作会议) attended by representatives of civilian
provincial governments. These meetings are described
as being focused on fostering the development of
military and civilian cooperation, including new
platforms, new measures, and new mechanisms.40
In the same vein, in late 2016, the Southern TC
Party Committee’s PLAC established a TC militarylocal
cooperation
platform
(战区军地协作平台),
undertook overall planning of the coordination of
“military rights defense work” across the six provinces
within the TC’s area of responsibility, and “formed a
four-level, military-local intercommunication setup”
(形成四级联动、军地互通的格局).
In achieving these objectives, PLACs at all levels
are intended to play complementary roles with one
another, as the main responsibilities of the party
committee PLACs vary by level in accordance with
the larger tripartite CMC–TC–services division of
responsibility enacted by the 2016 reforms. The TC
PLACs are “mainly responsible for political and legal
affairs work in wartime and major military operations,
[and] take the lead in coordinating law enforcement
and regional cooperation,” while the PLACs of other
39.

Zhifeng, “Roles and responsibilities,” 99.

40.

Zhifeng, “Roles and responsibilities,” 100.
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organizations, including the services, are “mainly
responsible for crime prevention and comprehensive
control, [and] maintaining the integrity and stability
of the troops.”41 This arrangement is intended to be
collaborative and allow the TC-PLACs and service
PLACs to guide, direct, and oversee the PLACs of
lower-level units.
The precise nature of the PLACs below the
level of the CMC is less than clear, and they may
not in fact be entirely discrete organizations unto
themselves. As previously noted, the PLACs are
specifically the PLACs of danwei party committees
(whether operational units or other organizations).
Accordingly, their membership necessarily overlaps
with that of the party committees themselves. This
overlap distinguishes them somewhat from the
CMC-PLAC, which is composed of a secretary and
a full-time deputy secretary, as well as the leaders of
the Military Court, Military Procuratorate, and the
principal leaders of the CMC-PLAC’s own bureaus,
but none of whom are in fact members of the CMC
itself. By contrast, in the PLACs of party committees
at all other levels, the position of secretary is held
by a member of the “deputy political leadership of
the unit in question” (本单位政治副职领导)—in other
words, by a deputy political commissar. The deputy
secretaries are the leaders of the staff and political
work departments, and the members are the principal
leaders of the political and legal affairs departments
and related functional departments (政法部门及相关业
41. “杨玉文出任南部战区政法委书记，陈家静出任副书记”
[Yang Yuwen takes up the post of secretary of the Southern TC
Party Committee’s PLAC; and Chen Jiajing takes up the post
of deputy secretary], News.163, December 15, 2016, https://
news.163.com.
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务部门).42

Thus, the degree to which PLACs below the
level of the CMC are actually distinct from the party
committee of which it is a component is less than clear.
This lack of distinction is an important issue in that
the purpose of the PLACs, in managing and overseeing
legal and security work for the party committees, is
seemingly to act as a check on the actions of the party
committees. The commissions are described as critical
elements in the task of breaking up clientelist networks,
described as corruption bio-chains (贪腐生物链) that
lend themselves to corruption, malfeasance, and
place-seeking.43 Yet if the members of the PLACs are
members of the party committees in which potentially
corrupt decisions are going to be made (and, even
more importantly, the subordinates of the senior party
committee members with the greatest capacity for
potential corruption), then how independent can the
PLACs be? Likewise, if unit-level PLACs are tasked
with providing their party committee leadership with
advice that might block an action that leadership
desires to take, how is the impasse to be resolved? Can
a PLAC composed of subordinates effectively serve as
a check on the actions of the senior members of its own
party committee? Perhaps the PLACs are primarily
intended to check the actions of subordinate party
committees, but this would place a serious burden
on coordination between units and party committees

42. “南部战区探索建立涉军维权军地协作平台 [The Southern
TC explores establishing a military rights-protection militarylocal coordination platform], Ministry of National Defense of
the People’s Republic of China, December 9, 2016, http://www.
mod.gov.cn.
43. “战区和军兵种党委政法委员会有何不同” [What is the
difference between theater command and service political and
legal affairs commissions?], 解放军报 [PLA daily], July 25, 2016.
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(especially in a fast-moving operational environment)
and directly contradict the PLAC’s fundamental role
of in-house security and oversight organ, making such
an explanation seem unlikely.
THE PARTY COMMITTEE SYSTEM
The structural changes wrought upon the PLA’s
political work system as part of the 2016 reforms
have been accompanied by changes in the nature
and focus of the system of party committees and
political commissars which provide the core of the
PLA’s command and leadership system. But these
changes are primarily ones of emphasis and focus,
even as the actual structure and responsibilities of
the party committee and political commissar system
have remained broadly consistent over time. The
most significant change has been a consistent effort
on the part of political and military propaganda to
support the party committee’s (and, by extension,
the political commissar’s) role in the exercise
of command and leadership within units and
organizations. The propaganda portrays the party
committees as exercising direct and meaningful
authority over practically all aspects of unit operations
and administration. Although this direct control
has never ceased to be the essential function of the
party committees, propaganda suggests the party’s
confidence in the functionality and efficacy of the
PLA’s party committee system had been shaken,
necessitating both sustained propaganda signaling as
well as practical changes in behavior.
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Role of the Party Committee
In the wake of the Gutian Conference, PLA
propaganda has consistently attacked the idea (which
has apparently become widespread) that commanders
should focus solely on warfighting issues while
political commissars focus on quality-of-life issues.
This idea is described as a fundamental violation
of “the party’s collective leadership organizational
principle” (党的集体领导组织原则). Instead, PLA party
committees must always use “the responsibility system
for the division of labor under the collective leadership
of the party committee” (党委统一的集体领导下的首长分工
负责制), in which “all work is placed under the unified
leadership of the party committee and all important
questions are decided by the party committee” (做到

一切工作都置于党委统一领导之下，一切重要问题都由党委研究
决定).44 Although concern for the health of the party

committee system predates the Gutian Conference,
2014 saw the military propaganda system arguing
forcefully that the command and leadership role of the
party committee itself needed to be strengthened and
respected. Many party committees were focused on
rote or formulaic training without thinking about how
it will be used in actual combat, while others were
stuck in the past, continuing to prepare for mechanized
rather than informatized warfare, and still others
viewed their primary responsibility as overseeing
the management of funds and property, rather than

44.

“What is the difference?”
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exercising operational leadership.45 As one article put
it, the main purpose of the party committee’s work
is effectively planning for and being able to achieve
victory in battle, and that the first priority of party
committees at all levels is leading troops in battle.46
The 2014 Gutian Conference reestablished the
requirement that the party’s leading organs (党的领导
机关) act as “the ‘leadership hubs’ of military work”
(军事工作中的“领导的中枢”).47 In the words of a 2018 PLA
Daily article, “party committee organs are the command
backbone of units and have an important role in
guiding the direction of unit building” (党委机关是部队的
指挥中枢，在部队建设中具有把方向、树导向的重要作用).48 The
committees must serve as guiding lights for all types
of work and reform, combating the various “diseases”
which inhibit effective unit building, including
party committees that are too tentative or scared
45. “What is the difference?” The specific organizations to
which the phrase “political and legal affairs departments and
related functional departments” is referring is unclear, though
it may mean the PLACs of the staff, political work, and other
departments within the command organization.
46.

Zhifeng, “Roles and responsibilities,” 98.

47. Wu Zhengping, “少数人决定岂能代替党委集体决策—
全面加强新时代我军党的领导和党的建设工作系列谈” [A few
people decide that they can replace the collective decisionmaking of the party committee—A comprehensive discussion
on strengthening the PLA’s party leadership and party building
work in the new era], 解放军报 [PLA daily], August 24, 2018.
48. For instance, a February 2004 PLA Daily article argues
that the key elements of PLA political work in the midst of
ongoing military reform are (a) ensuring that the party retains
command of the army; and (b) preserving and strengthening
the party committee system. “强化军魂意识 坚持党对军队绝对
领导不动摇” [Strengthening consciousness of military spirit—
Insisting that the party’s absolute leadership over the army is
unwavering], 解放军报 [PLA daily], February 4, 2004.

29

in organizing training activities, becoming overly
focused on avoiding damage, accidents, or casualties,
which leads to a lack of realism.49 The emphasis on
the party committee’s operational command role is
especially notable. Even as the speed and tempo of
modern combat operations have made the collective
decision-making system of the party committee
increasingly difficult, PLA sources emphasize
adherence to that system “is more important than
anything else.”50 As the speed and tempo of operations
have increased, so have the operations’ degree of
political importance and strategic impact. As combat
operations extend their geographic reach and increase
their potential destructiveness, command organs can
no longer “blindly pursue purely military results”
(盲目追求单纯军事效果) at the expense of larger political
objectives. Commanders must be prepared to strike
and then halt if that is what the broader geopolitical
situation dictates, and party committees must exercise
the higher-level political judgment necessary for
appropriately guiding combat operations under
such circumstances.51 In this way, the party seeks
to assure itself the PLA’s wartime actions will not
exceed its mandate or directives, leading to undesired
geopolitical consequences.

49. “二炮军官：军队党委不善于带兵打仗就没资格领军”
[Second Artillery officer: A military party committee not good at
leading troops in combat is not qualified to lead], 解放军报 [PLA
daily], September 24, 2014.
50.

“Second Artillery officer.”

51. “党委要成为战斗力建设的领导中枢” [Party committees
must become the leading center of combat effectiveness
construction], 解放军报 [PLA daily], December 5, 2014.
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Management of Political Cadres
The PLA has emphasized the importance of
developing political cadres’ military skills, requiring
them to “become both specialized talents in political
work and also experts in military work” by studying
broader military affairs and science technology
(including the equipment used by their units)
while undertaking direct command functions in
training.52 This training is part of the broader push to
involve political cadres and political work organs in
operational training so that their expected political
warfare and other contributions are realistically
performed and adequately practiced they can gain
experience in making command and other operational
decisions under trying conditions.53 Thus, to increase
its realism and give the political cadres involved
operational experience, the PLA Air Force preeminent
Red Sword-2018 (红剑-2018) exercise incorporated 19
types of wartime political work such as battlefield
psychological protection, battlefield public opinion
attack and defense, and prisoner of war management.54
52. “突出关键重点，从军以上党委机关做起严起” [Highlight
critical points, standing up party committee organs at the corps
level and above], 解放军报 [PLA daily], July 5, 2018.
53.

“Highlight critical points.”

54. A 2014 PLA Daily article published immediately
prior to the Gutian Conference states that owing to the advent
of informatized warfare, operational methods and means of
command have undergone profound changes, while war’s
political nature has become even more distinct (政治性更加鲜
明). At the same time, the global and strategic nature of war has
increased, as have its tempo and intensity, all of which combine to
increase the demands placed upon the party committee’s ability
to lead operations. “Second Artillery officer”; and Zhengping, “A
few people decide.”

31

Military sources also describe various other means
to increase political cadres’ operational command
capacity: sending away for study and training
(送学培训), switching of billets (军政换岗), and organgrassroots interchangeable billets (机关基层交叉任职).55
The latter two point toward what seems to be a major
change in the nature of service as a political cadre, in
that the PLA has mandated that they should regularly
switch to non-political staff and command billets,
especially at the grassroots level (meaning battalions
and below). The practice was formally initiated in the
wake of the Gutian Conference and applied to both
company-level political and military cadres who had
held their billets for at least two years and battalion
commanders and commissars who had not previously
held positions in the opposite career track.56 Whether
the program has been expanded to the whole PLA (or
if it even still exists, for that matter), as the most recent
explicit mentions of it in military publications date
from early 2017, when PLA Daily articles described
the post-switching program in the 31st and 27th
Group Armies, respectively, is not clear. Both depict
the practice as beneficial, but still undertaken only in
specified cases, not universally.57 Nonetheless, if it has
been regularized, such a program would constitute
55. GPD Organization Department, “深入探究信息化作
战政治工作作用机理” [Thoroughly explore the mechanisms
of informatized political work], 解放军报 [PLA daily],
November 13, 2015.
56. Zhang Lianguo, “Vigorously improve the level of
construction.”
57. Wang Xingsheng, Han Jinqiang, and Qiao Xiang,
“论重新树立我军政治王作威信问题” [On rebuilding the prestige
of political work in the PLA], 中国军事科学 [China military
science], January 17, 2016, 79–85.
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a significant shift in the nature of political cadres,
ensuring they possess substantive and comparatively
recent operational command or staff experience. This
shift would be in keeping with the 2015 CMC opinion
on building the political work system issued in the
wake of the Gutian Conference, which specifically
mandates that at least 10 percent of the personnel
in political departments in corps-level units and
above consist of military cadres and special technical
officers. Sources also make clear that unit party
committees themselves (typically at the brigade level)
are responsible for overseeing post-switching.58
The PLA is also instituting political cadre personnel
management practices designed to ensure their fitness
for their positions and to combat client networks and
corruption. For instance, a policy directive from the
immediate post-Gutian period sets out a requirement
for political cadres that, to be eligible for a given post as
political commissar, a candidate must have experience
serving as a political commissar at the two grades
immediately below as well as working in the political
organs of a unit or organization of the same grade as
the prospective post.59 This requirement ensures that
a political commissar clearly understands the roles,
functions, and requirements of his subordinates,
both within the unit and within subordinate units.
Likewise, the same document sets out requirements
for transferring political cadres and commissars out
of their present billets when they have been with their
58. Yao Chunming and Li Jianwen, “空军“红剑-2018”演习
探索战时政治工作怎么做” [Air Force “Red Sword-2018” exercise
exploring how to do political work in wartime], 解放军报 [PLA
daily], June 6, 2018.
59. CMC, Opinions on building the ranks of political
organs.
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units too long. For instance, functional department
leaders (业务部门领导) who have served in the same
CMC-level organ for more than 30 years must be
transferred to another unit, while for those at the TC
level, the limit is 20 years, and at the corps level, 10
years. Remarkably, for cadres who are not leaders
of their respective organizations, the limits are even
tighter, working out to 15, 12, and 8 years respectively.
By ensuring political cadres are moved regularly and
cannot spend their entire careers in the same units,
organs, or chains of command, the PLA can both
provide them with a wider range of career experiences
and help guard against entrenched interests at the top
and clientelist networks.
Management of Education, Personnel Development,
and Training
Beyond the issue of managing political cadres
themselves, party committees are also responsible
for overseeing the professional development of
all personnel within the unit, including training,
education, and other programs. Although this
responsibility falls to party committees by virtue of
their status as the core command organ of each unit,
military propaganda has increasingly emphasized
the importance of party committees directly handling
personnel development. A PLA Daily article from
December 2014 states that party committees bear “the
political responsibility for [their units or organizations]
being able to fight and win” (能打仗、打胜仗的政治责任),
and are tasked with overseeing all aspects of
training and ensuring that it is effective at increasing
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operational capability and combat effectiveness.60
These responsibilities include ensuring the right
individuals are placed and retained in the right
posts, as well as creating institutions and conditions
which are conducive to achieving these goals.61 Even
the warfighting-focused TC party committees are
charged with “strictly controlling the education and
management of high- and middle-level cadres of the
theater organs and directly affiliated units” (严抓好战区
机关和直属部队高中级干部教育治理).62
As noted earlier, one of the major changes
instituted as part of the 2016 reforms was transferring
responsibility for enlisted personnel management to
the new CMC PWD and unit-level PWDs. This transfer
of responsibility may prove to be a mixed blessing.
Although such a reform effectively concentrates
responsibility for all aspects of personnel management
(officer, enlisted, and civilian) within the political work
system, it also increases the potential workload being
placed upon political department’s party committees.
This increase in workload is especially true as the PLA
increasingly emphasizes employing civilian personnel
in a wide range of support roles. Although PLA sources
do not specifically describe these new responsibilities
as overwhelming, some point to the considerable extra
burden they place upon party committees, political
departments, and political cadres as they try to handle

60. CMC, Opinions on building the ranks of political
organs.
61. “党委要成为战斗力建设的领导中枢” [Party committees
must become the leading center of combat effectiveness
construction], 解放军报 [PLA daily], December 5, 2014.
62.

“Party committees must become the leading center.”
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enlisted selection and promotion with sensitivity and
in a manner which does not undermine morale.63
IMPLICATIONS
The most prominent implication of the PLA’s
political work system reform is that it has been focused
on strengthening the party’s control of the armed
forces and revitalizing the role of political commissars
and party committees in the command process. Aside
from indicating a seeming lack of confidence in the
PLA’s reliability, these changes will have a serious
impact on how the PLA operates. If the PLA is serious
about reinforcing and revitalizing the role of the party
committee in the operational command process, then
we must consider how its collective decision-making
process is to be reconciled with the need for rapid
decision making in modern, informatized warfare.
The PLA explicitly acknowledges the contradiction,
but believes the nature of modern war is such that the
party committee’s role is only growing in importance.
Ultimately, the most likely solution to the contradiction
is a growing reliance upon computer-aided decisionmaking and command automation tools to speed up
the operational command process as much as possible.
Another question is how precisely PLACs will
interact with one another, with their parent party
committees, and with the PWDs of their respective
units. In relation to the first point, PLACs are intended
63. The Chinese phrase is referring to the organizations
comprising the TC command structure (as opposed to separate
subordinate
units).
“东部战区聚焦主战加快推进联合作战体
系和能力建设纪事” [Chronicle of the Eastern TC focusing
on warfighting and accelerating the construction of the joint
operational system and capacity], Military—People’s Daily
Online, July 6, 2017, http://military.people.com.cn.
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to be guided jointly by the PLACs of both the TCs and
the services. Although those two categories of PLACs
have distinct areas of functional responsibility, the way
in which contradictions in guidance would be resolved
is unclear. Likewise, whether PLACs below the CMC
level can actually function as effective watchdogs
on the actions of the party committees of which they
are a part is unclear. In other words, will unit-level
PLACs be largely toothless and obedient to their
immediate superiors, or will they actively investigate
and discipline them when necessary, thereby
potentially endangering the good order of units? In
addition, the way in which the PLACs’ responsibility
for undertaking political assessments as part of
their security work will be squared with the PWDs’
identical responsibility in relation to promotions,
selection, and party membership is unclear. Will the
number of political assessments simply be doubled,
increasing the bureaucratic burden? Or will efforts and
resources be shared between the two, undermining
the intended division between PLACs and PWDs?
Although the CMC-PLAC and subordinate PLACs
represent a potentially powerful tool for enforcing the
administrative and command system instituted as part
of the 2016 reforms, their ability to do so effectively is
less clear.
Will making the political work system responsible
for all personnel management prove a boon or a
burden? On the one hand, this change could enable
more holistic management of the issue at each level
of command. On the other hand, this change may
overburden the political work system’s management
capacity (especially as higher-level political work
organs have apparently been downsized), thereby
affording even less individual attention and direct
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management, potentially affecting retention of the
high-quality personnel so essential to the PLA’s
development and modernization. Moreover, unless
corruption in the promotion process is dealt with
effectively, it may simply metastasize into the enlisted
and civilian personnel management sectors that have
already had less-prominent corruption problems of
their own.
Finally, the distinction between military and
political cadres may become increasingly blurred.
In the years since the Gutian Conference, the PLA
appears to have pursued a deliberate policy of
requiring political cadres to occupy command and
staff billets for extended periods so that all officers
are well versed in both military and political duties.
Although direct evidence for the practice primarily
discusses the grassroots (that is, battalion and
company) level, sources nonetheless indicate that
the practice is a requirement for higher grades as
well. These requirements may eventually lead to an
officer corps in which the distinction between military
and political cadres is based on current billets, and
not permanent career tracks. Such a change would
represent a return to the PLA’s earliest roots, when
Red Army cadres often served as both political
commissars and commanders during their careers
and there were no set career tracks. Of course, in a
modern, technologically advanced military focused
on conventional (as opposed to guerrilla) warfighting,
such a system could hamper specialization and
decrease the average command experience of each
given officer. Although such an outcome remains
only supposition at the moment, the emphasis on
simultaneously strengthening both political work
and military capacity nonetheless demonstrates a
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determination to ensure the modern PLA will be
just as “red” as it is expert; whether this ultimately
undermines or retards the PLA’s ability to defend the
Chinese communist party-state is a question only the
future can answer.
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THE PLA AND THE PARTY:
STRUCTURAL CHANGES AT THE
BEGINNING OF THE XI ERA
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2. ROCKET FORCE PERSONNEL IN THE AGE
OF XI JINPING
David C. Logan
China’s missile forces have undergone significant
change in recent years. China is the only nuclear
weapons state recognized by the Nonproliferation
Treaty that is increasing the size of its nuclear
arsenal.1 Aside from the moderate quantitative
expansion of its arsenal, China has also focused on
qualitatively improving its missile forces, developing
more advanced solid-fueled, road-mobile missiles
and equipping some with multiple independently
targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs).2 Perhaps one of
the biggest changes, though, has been the introduction
and expansion of conventionally armed missile units
which, at the time of the creation of the Rocket Force,
may have accounted for 80 percent of all Rocket
Force delivery vehicles.3 These changes to force
size and composition have also been accompanied
by organizational changes with the creation of
the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Rocket Force

1. For a comprehensive look at changes to China’s nuclear
forces, see Eric Heginbotham et al., China’s Evolving Nuclear
Deterrent: Major Drivers and Issues for the United States (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017).
2. Tong Zhao and David C. Logan, “What If China Develops
MIRVs,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 24, 2015, https://
thebulletin.org/2015/03/what-if-china-develops-mirvs/.
3. Jeffrey Lewis, “China’s Belated Embrace of MIRVs,” in
The Lure & Pitfalls of MIRVs: From the First to the Second Nuclear
Age, ed. Michael Krepon, Travis Wheeler, and Shane Mason
(Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 2016), 105.
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as the organization responsible for China’s landbased missiles.4
Along with these changes to hardware and
organization, the PLA’s missile forces have also
seen key adjustments to its personnel policies and
practices. This chapter reviews recent policies, trends,
and changes regarding PLA Rocket Force personnel.
The analysis finds evidence that the Rocket Force has
placed greater emphasis on recruiting both people
with college educations and women (two goals which
may be intertwined). Once they enter, these recruits
undergo training which increasingly involves red-blue
confrontations; these trainings, which are improving
in realism, aim to improve the Rocket Force’s ability
to participate in joint operations. In areas of special
importance to the Rocket Force—personnel reliability
and operational security—the PLA has continued its
historic focus on political suitability; but, recently, the
PLA has also emphasized the need to train personnel
in electronic security and to ensure that missile force
troops have sound mental health. The promotion
paths within and beyond the Rocket Force suggest
that it may prioritize conventional over nuclear
constituencies. Finally, beyond its own ranks, Rocket
Force personnel have been promoted to key positions
throughout the PLA and the Chinese defense
bureaucracy, suggesting both that the Rocket Force
may be gaining in prestige and power relative to the
other services and that President Xi Jinping has used
these promotions as a way to advance key allies and
consolidate control over the military.
4. David C. Logan, “PLA Reforms and China’s Nuclear
Forces,” Joint Force Quarterly 83 (4th Quarter, October 2016):
57–62.
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Though the chapter focuses on changes within the
PLA Rocket Force, several of these alterations reflect
broader trends within the PLA, such as efforts to
improve personnel quality and the ability of the force
to conduct joint operations. This chapter includes some
discussion of the history of China’s missile forces,
but it focuses on Rocket Force personnel policies and
practices during the Xi Jinping era—especially on
those changes associated with the recent transition
from the Second Artillery Corps to the Rocket Force.
This chapter begins with a brief overview of the
history of China’s missile forces, tracing it briefly from
the founding of the former Second Artillery Corps,
through the introduction and growth of the country’s
conventional missile units to the recent creation of
the Rocket Force. Next, the chapter examines recent
personnel trends in China’s missile forces, examining
changes across recruitment and selection, training
and education, personnel reliability, promotion, and
career paths. Finally, the chapter closes by discussing
potential implications of these findings for the Rocket
Force, the PLA, and US-Chinese security relations.
CHINA’S EVOLVING MISSILE FORCES
The Second Artillery Corps, the predecessor
to today’s Rocket Force, was founded in 1966 and
was given control of China’s land-based missiles.5
Established just two years after the country’s first
nuclear test, the early Second Artillery Corps
5. For more on the history of China’s missile forces and
the associated nuclear program, see John Wilson Lewis and
Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Redwood City, CA: Stanford
University Press, 1991); and Jeffrey Lewis, Paper Tigers: China’s
Nuclear Posture (New York: Routledge, 2014).
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was equipped solely with nuclear-armed ballistic
missiles, although the force would not deploy its first
intercontinental ballistic missiles until the early 1980s.
For decades, the Second Artillery Corps fielded a
relatively small, unsophisticated force of liquid-fueled,
stationary missiles.
The size and makeup of the Second Artillery
Corps began to change in the early 1990s with the
introduction of the first conventional missile units.6
These changes in force makeup were accompanied
by technological advancements, including the
development and deployment of more sophisticated
solid-fueled and road-mobile missiles which,
due to their enhanced mobility and concealment,
enjoyed greater survivability. The ways in which
the introduction of conventional missiles and the
assignment of a conventional mission set may have
changed the priorities of the Second Artillery Corps
are not yet clear, though patterns of promotion within
the force suggest that the Second Artillery Corps may
have come to prioritize the conventional mission
set over the nuclear one (as discussed later in this
chapter).7
The most recent changes to China’s missile forces
came with the wave of military reforms announced

6. Michael S. Chase and Andrew S. Erickson, “The
Conventional Missile Capabilities of China’s Second Artillery
Force: Cornerstone of Deterrence and Warfighting,” Asian Security
8, no. 2 (2012): 115–37; and Ron Christman, “Conventional
Missions for China’s Second Artillery Corps,” Comparative
Strategy 30, no. 3 (2011): 198–228.
7. David C. Logan, “Career Paths in the PLA Rocket Force:
What They Tell Us,” Asian Security 15, no. 2 (2018).
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at the end of 2015.8 As part of those reforms, the PLA
established the Rocket Force as successor to the Second
Artillery Corps.9 This new military organization is still
charged with commanding China’s conventional and
nuclear-armed land-based missiles, but it features
several differences from its predecessor.
First, the newly established Rocket Force enjoys
the status of a full-fledged service, making it
bureaucratically senior to the former Second Artillery
Corps.10 This elevation in status for China’s missile
forces not only reflects the prestige and importance of
these military units, but could also have implications
for the future trajectory of the missile forces. For
example, this higher status may bring greater
autonomy, perhaps allowing the Rocket Force
more freedom to set China’s strategy governing

8. For more on these reforms, see Joel Wuthnow and Phillip
C. Saunders, Chinese Military Reforms in the Age of Xi Jinping:
Drivers, Challenges, and Implications (Washington, DC: Center for
the Study of Chinese Military Affairs, 2017).
9. Michael S. Chase, “PLA Rocket Force Modernization
and China’s Military Reforms” (testimony before the US-China
Economic and Security Review Commission, Washington, DC,
February 15, 2018).
10. For more on the newly formed Rocket Force and its
implications for China’s missile forces and the PLA at-large, see
David C. Logan, “PLA Reforms and China’s Nuclear Forces,”
Joint Force Quarterly 83 (4th Quarter, October 2016): 57–62; and
David C. Logan, “Making Sense of China’s Missile Forces,” in
Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms,
ed. Phillip C. Saunders and Joel Wuthnow (unpublished book),
Microsoft Word file.

45

its land-based missiles.11 The extent to which the
Rocket Force has a stronger hand in setting nuclear
policies may depend on broader trends in Chinese
civil-military relations. Historically, China’s political
leadership has exercised strong control of its nuclear
strategy and policies and it’s not yet clear that has
changed.12 Greater organizational prestige may aid
the Rocket Force in battles with other military services
over control of key strategic capabilities, such as
the country’s direct ascent anti-satellite weapons
or the nascent nuclear-powered ballistic-missile
submarine force.13
Second, the creation of the Rocket Force has been
followed by an internal reorganization and expansion.
The missile units of the former Second Artillery Corps
were organized under six bases, which were assigned

11. For some recent evidence regarding civil-military
relations and that the degree of military autonomy varies
according to both organization and issue area, see Sofia K.
Ledberg, “Analysing Chinese Civil-Military Relations: A Bottomup Approach,” China Quarterly 234 (2018): 377–98; and Sofia K.
Ledberg, “Political Control and Military Autonomy: Reexamining
the Chinese People’s Liberation Army,” Asian Security 14, no. 2
(2018): 212–28.
12. M. Taylor Fravel, Active Defense: China’s Military Strategy
Since 1949 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2019):
236–69.
13. For an example of how some of these dynamics might
influence the command and control arrangements of China’s
nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine force, see David
C. Logan, China’s Future SSBN Command and Control Structure
(Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies,
November 2016).
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an identification number from 51 to 56.14 Under the
newly formed Rocket Force, those bases have been
renumbered from 61 to 66 and some launch brigades
were reassigned to different missile bases. The Rocket
Force also appears to have established new missile
units. Open-source research published prior to the
recent wave of military reforms identified up to 28 or
32 launch brigades within the former Second Artillery
Corps.15 More recent assessments published since the
reforms have identified as many as 39 brigades.16 The
missile systems that have been assigned to these new
brigades have not yet all been identified.
Third, the conventional units of the Rocket Force
may be more integrated with units of other services
and of the newly created theater commands (TCs). The
recent wave of military reforms aimed at improving
the PLA’s ability to conduct joint operations and recent
reports on Rocket Force training and organization
include language suggesting greater integration

14. For more on the former Second Artillery Corps’ base
organization, see Mark Stokes, China’s Nuclear Warhead Storage
and Handling System (Arlington, VA: Project 2049 Institute,
March 12, 2010).
15. Jeffrey Lewis, Paper Tigers: China’s Nuclear Posture (New
York: Routledge, 2014), 116; and Fiona S. Cunningham and M.
Taylor Fravel, “Assuring Assured Retaliation: China’s Nuclear
Posture and US-China Strategic Stability,” International Security
40, no. 2 (Fall 2015): 43.
16. Mark Stokes, PLA Rocket Force Leadership and Unit
Reference (Arlington, VA: Project 2049 Institute, April 9, 2018);
and Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress:
Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic
of China 2018 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, May 16,
2018), 125.
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with the TCs in pursuit of enhanced “jointness.”17
For example, a recent article in Rocket Force News, in
emphasizing the importance of future joint operations,
also reported that a Rocket Force “base has joined the
joint operations chain of command,” suggesting a
heightened level of integration.18 Public reporting has
highlighted the efforts of a Rocket Force missile base
to better integrate with its relevant TC, with the base
commander saying that “when we cross the threshold
into the theater command, we are like one family.”19
These organizational and armament changes have
several potential implications for the personnel of
China’s missile forces. First, growth in China’s missile
units means that, despite overall personnel cuts
across the PLA, the Rocket Force is likely to require
more personnel. Second, the incorporation of more
sophisticated systems may require better educated and
trained personnel. Third, integration of Rocket Force
units with other PLA forces will require improved
personnel education and training in joint operations.
RECRUITMENT AND SELECTION: FOR THE
ROCKET FORCE, IS THE FUTURE FEMALE?
The size and composition of China’s missile forces
have changed considerably over the last two decades.
17. For more extensive primary-source evidence, see David C.
Logan, “Making Sense.”
18. “某基地首次集群指挥锤炼 “制胜铁拳” [A certain base
for the first time undertakes cluster command “winning iron
fist”], 火箭军报 [Rocket Force news], November 25, 2017, 1.
19. Wang Weidong and Song Haijun, “潜心砺剑, 战略铁
拳越练越硬” [Concentrate on sharpening the sword, the more
the strategic iron fist is used, the harder it becomes], 解放军
报 [PLA daily], February 6, 2018, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap
/content/2018-02/06/content_198862.htm.
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With these changes to force structure have come
changes to personnel. This section reviews recruitment
and selection policies and practices of the Rocket
Force and examines two recent changes. The section
begins by presenting data from academic studies on
Rocket Force personnel which may provide a view
into overall demographics of the force. The section
ends by examining the Rocket Force’s efforts to recruit
more college students and more women into its ranks.
Complete demographics of the Rocket Force are
not publicly available, but they might be inferred from
the many open-source clinical studies conducted using
Rocket Force personnel. In recent years, researchers
at military-affiliated institutions have studied the
ranks of the missile forces across a range of health
indicators, including psychological well-being,
nutritional intake, and post-injury rehabilitation. At
least eight such studies reporting demographics of
Rocket Force subjects have been published since 2014.
In selecting their sample populations, these studies
typically adopt some form of random sampling
technique to maximize the external validity of their
findings (one might assume the demographics of
these samples generally reflect the demographics of
the force at-large, or at least the sampled unit). More
than 9,000 subjects participated in these eight studies.
More than 97 percent of the subjects studied were men
(see figure 2-1), and the average age was 23.7 years.20
But in one recent large-scale study of mental health
in the PLA which included more than 1,300 Rocket
Force troops, 14 percent of Rocket Force respondents
20. Feng Zhengzhi et al., “我国军人症状自评量表2016版
常模的建立” [Establishment of norm of symptom checklist 90
(2016 edition) for Chinese military personnel], 第三军医大学学报
[Journal of Third Military Medical University] 38, no. 20 (2016).
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were female. As shown in figure 2-2, across all studies
examined which reported demographic data, roughly
16 percent had at least a bachelor’s degree, 20 percent
had a degree from a technical college, 51 percent had
a high school diploma, and 13 percent had finished
a lower schooling. Within the samples, as shown in
figure 2-3, roughly 10 percent were officers (cadres)
(干部), 50 percent were noncommissioned officers,
and 40 percent were enlisted.

Figure 2-1. The aggregate gender distribution of
Rocket Force soldiers across eight studies of mental
and physical health within the PLA Rocket Force
Roughly 97 percent of soldiers across the studies were male.
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Figure 2-2. The aggregate distribution of education
levels of Rocket Force soldiers across multiple
studies of mental and physical health within the
PLA Rocket Force
More than half of subjects had a high-school degree or lower. In
recent years, the Rocket Force has emphasized efforts to attract
more highly educated recruits.

Figure 2-3. The aggregate distribution of personnel
classification of Rocket Force soldiers across
multiple studies of mental and physical health
within the PLA Rocket Force
51

The Rocket Force appears to have established two
recruitment goals in recent years: to target higherquality recruits, especially those with university
educations; and to increase the number of women in
the force. These two goals may be intertwined.
Rocket Force recruiting efforts have focused
on attracting college students and graduates to
the ranks.21 The Rocket Force has dispatched
representatives to colleges and universities around the
country, but especially in Beijing, where many of the
country’s most prestigious schools are located.22 At
these recruiting events, the Rocket Force has trotted
out celebrity soldiers, such as Chen Yu, a straight-A
student at selective Tsinghua University who, halfway
through his college career, postponed his studies to
enlist in the Rocket Force for two years.23 As part of
its outreach to university students, the Rocket Force
“has established with local schools a new recruit
training and acquisition cooperative mechanism
and implemented a ‘made-to-order’ way of targeted
recruiting.”24 Prestigious Peking University has
established a special scholarship for students who
work in the military and has enacted policies that
21. For more on the PLA’s educational initiatives, see Brian
Waidelich and Bernard D. Cole, “The People’s Liberation Army
in 2018: Education and People’s War,” in this volume.
22. Zhang Xuanjie and Li Bingfeng, “火箭军征兵宣传走来
首都高校” [Rocket Force recruitment propaganda enters higher
education], 新华 [Xinhua], June 7, 2016, http://www.xinhuanet.
com/mil/2016-06/07/c_1119007311.htm.
23. Zhao Xinying, “‘Student Soldiers’ Swap University for
Uniforms,” China Daily, July 27, 2017, http://www.chinadaily.
com.cn/china/2017-07/27/content_30262932.htm.
24. Zhang Xuanjie and Li Bingfeng, “Rocket Force
recruitment propaganda.”
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would exempt students who served in the PLA from
certain requirements for graduate study.25 College
students also receive preference throughout the PLA
selection process, including on physical examinations
and political investigations.26 In 2015, 15 students from
Peking University enlisted in the Rocket Force.27
Rocket Force efforts to recruit more highly
educated personnel have paralleled similar efforts
across the PLA, though the Rocket Force appears to
be emphasizing education more strongly given the
service’s focus on advanced technology.28 Rocket
Force officials explicitly tie their recruitment goals
to efforts to prepare the force for the more complex
requirements of the kinds of conflicts the PLA expects
to fight in the future. Chen Yu, the Tsinghua graduate
and Rocket Force soldier, told the assembled students
of a university recruiting event that “an informatized
military calls for scientific and technological
talent, and even more requires you to contribute

25. Xu Jingjing and Xu Wen, “大国长剑 欢迎你来” [Great
power’s sword invites you to come along], 解放军报 [PLA daily],
June 8, 2016, http://www.81.cn/gfbmap/content/2016-06/08
/content_146926.htm.
26. Yuan Guorui and Yang Yonggang, “火箭军征兵宣传进
北大” [The Rocket Force’s recruitment propaganda enters Peking
University], 中新网 [China news service], June 12, 2016, http://
www.81.cn/zbrw/2016-06/12/content_7096474_6.htm. For more
on some recent changes aimed at recruiting more college students
generally, see Wang Shumei, The PLA and Student Recruits:
Reforming China’s Conscription System (Stockholm, Sweden:
Institute for Security & Development Policy, January 2015).
27.

Xu Jingjing and Xu Wen, “Great power’s sword.”

28. For more on changes in the PLA’s military education
system and practices, see Ken Allen and Brendan Mulvaney,
“Changes in the PLA’s Military Education,” in this volume.
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to the dream of a strong military.”29 Similarly, the
vice director of the Rocket Force Political Work
Department has directly attributed the need for highquality recruits to the need to fight informatized
conflicts.30 Attracting more highly educated recruits
has been somewhat successful, though detailed data
is hard to obtain. Reports indicate an increase in the
number of college degree holders among recruits and
Rocket Force representatives have claimed that “the
Rocket Force has vigorously implemented its talent
development project and achieved good results.”31
But despite this progress, some Rocket Force officials
still regularly complain of problems in recruiting
qualified individuals (as discussed below). In fact, the
PLA canceled its national defense student program,
reportedly due to failures to attract qualified recruits
and the inability of reserve officers recruited through
the program to integrate into the PLA.32 The ways in
which the program’s cancelation might affect Rocket
Force-specific recruitment efforts are not yet clear.
29. For more on China’s evolving military strategy, see M.
Taylor Fravel, “Shifts in Warfare and Party Unity: Explaining
China’s Changes in Military Strategy,” International Security 42,
no. 3 (Winter 2017/2018): 37–83.
30.

Xu Jingjing and Xu Wen, “Great power’s sword.”

31. Anthony H. Cordesman, The PLA Rocket Force: Evolving
Beyond the Second Artillery Corps (SAC) and Nuclear Dimension
(Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies,
October 13, 2016), 54; and Liu Jianwei, “来自火箭军的人大代表畅
谈履行强军兴军使命担当” [NPC representatives from the Rocket
Force discuss fulfilling the mission of strengthening the military],
解放军报 [PLA daily], March 16, 2018, http://www.mod.gov.cn
/power/2018-03/16/content_4806933.htm.
32. Ying Yu Lin, “One Step Forward, One Step Back for
PLA Military Education,” China Brief 18, no. 7 (April 2018).
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Attempts by the Rocket Force to advance women in
its ranks have been apparent. In recent years, the Rocket
Force has deployed the organization’s first female
soldiers to the country’s university recruiting fairs in
an attempt to encourage more female college graduates
to enlist.33 Recruitment videos of the new Rocket Force
feature images of women soldiers throughout.34 One
video, in trumpeting the past accomplishments of
the missile forces, highlights Wang Xiaoli, one of the
first female missile launch controllers, right alongside
other missile force milestones such as the introduction
of the first intercontinental ballistic-missile unit and
luminaries such as Yang Yegong, a celebrated former
Second Artillery Corps commander who oversaw
the incorporation of some of the force’s earliest
conventional-missile units.35 The PLA has extensively
publicized the Rocket Force’s first all-women missile
launch control team and its members, emphasizing

33.

Xu Jingjing and Xu Wen, “Great power’s sword.”

34. Gai Shuhai and Lei Wu, “火箭军首部征兵宣传片震撼发布”
[The shocking release of the Rocket Force’s first recruitment
video], 81.cn, July 28, 2016, http://www.81.cn/depb/201607/28/content_7179248.htm.
35. For the video, see Gai Shuhai and Lei Wu, “The
shocking release.” For more on Yang Yegong, see Jeffrey Lewis,
“Yang Yegong,” Arms Control Wonk, August 17, 2005, https://
www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/200728/yang-yegong/.
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their ability to perform successfully alongside their
male peers.36
Despite this recruiting emphasis, whether women
are being provided the same professional opportunities
and treatment as their male colleagues and whether
they are being treated as tokens to burnish the PLA’s
image are not yet clear. Nevertheless, female Rocket
Force soldiers have taken on substantive roles.37
China’s missile forces have established at least two allfemale missile launch companies, one each in 2011 and
2012, the first of which was later incorporated as the
Rocket Force’s first female combat unit in 2014.38 These
units have trained extensively on various missile
systems and, in 2015, participated in their first live-fire

36. “第一支女子导弹发射连:
共和国战略导弹部队的新
生力量” [The first female missile launch company: The new
force of the republic’s Strategic Missile unit], 新华 [Xinhua],
August 2, 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2017
-08/02/c_1121419742.htm; Cao Wenxi, “第一代女子导弹发射号手,
6年等待只为将导弹送上蓝天” [The first generation of female
missile launch controllers, 6-year wait just to launch missiles into
the blue sky], 解放军报 [PLA daily], November 24, 2015, http://
www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2015-11/24/content_130176
.htm; and Song Haijun, “导弹女兵焦亚汝” [Missile soldier Jiao
Yazhen], 解放军报 [PLA daily], March 27, 2018, http://www.8
1.cn/jfjbmap/content/2018-03/27/content_202525.htm.
37. Hillary Brenhouse, “China’s Female Astronauts: Must
Be a Married Mom,” Time, March 25, 2010, http://content.time
.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1974793,00.html.
38. Elsa Kania and Kenneth Allen, “Holding up Half the
Sky? (Part 2)—The Evolution of Women’s Roles in the PLA,”
China Brief 16, no. 16 (2016).
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exercises.39 Women’s representation increased at the
highest levels of the missile forces when, in 2015, Li
Xianyu became the force’s first female general.40
Evidence of efforts to increase the number of
women in the Rocket Force may be related to the
efforts to increase the overall quality of military
personnel. In recent years, the PLA has reportedly
faced difficulties with the low quality of people
applying for military service. In 2013, roughly 60
percent of college students applying for military
service failed their physical fitness exam, often due
to poor eyesight or exceeding weight restrictions.41
Rocket Force officials in particular, despite recent
recruiting efforts, continue to complain of a talent
shortage, and Xi Jinping has expressed concerns about

39. “China’s Female Missile Launchers, Winning Battles
and Hearts,” Xinhua, August 26, 2016, http://en.people.
cn/n3/2016/0826/c90786-9106173.html; and CCTV Video
News Agency, PLA Women’s Missile Company Joins LiveFire Drill on China’s NW Plateau (Beijing: CCTV Video News
Agency, 2015), YouTube video, https://www.youtube.com
/watch?v=5TkayfXci0Q.
40. “火箭军首位女将, 当选全国政协委员” [Rocket Force’s
first female general selected as member of the National Political
Consultative Conference], 观察者 [Observer], June 3, 2018,
https://www.guancha.cn/military-affairs/2018_03_06_449161
.shtml.
41. Zheng Xin, “Students Fail Army Fitness Standards,”
China Daily, August 13, 2013, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn
/china/2013-08/13/content_16889014.htm.
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the low quality of PLA troops.42 The PLA has taken
to revising many of its standards for new recruits,
relaxing height and weight restrictions, permitting
tattoos, and allowing recruits with certain mental
illnesses (e.g., schizophrenia, dissociative disorder,
depression, and bipolar disorder).43 The Rocket Force
may have decided that actively recruiting women is
the best way to ensure a high-quality force, especially
given the expected demands of future warfare and
the decline in quality of recruits. Women make up
an increasingly large proportion of college students
in China and typically must score even higher on
entrance exams than their male counterparts.44 In
2016, more than half of the country’s undergraduate
and postgraduate students were women.45 In fact,
PLA representatives have emphasized the high
education levels of its female fighters. In a television
interview, one Rocket Force official advised, “Our
female warriors, don’t think they’re uncivilized girls
42. Lei Xingfeng and Chen Kaijiang, “火箭军某训练区: 不等
不靠解决“人才荒” [Certain Rocket Force training area: Don’t wait
to resolve talent shortage], 解放军报 [PLA daily], May 3, 2018,
http://www.mod.gov.cn/power/2018-05/03/content_4812296
.htm. For some examples, especially in the context of developing
joint operations capabilities, see, in this volume, Kevin McCauley,
“Cultivating Joint Operations Talent.”
43. Zhao Lei and Cang Wei, “PLA Eases Standards
for Recruitment,” China Daily, June 17, 2014, https://www
.chinadailyasia.com/news/2014-06/17/content_15141714.html.
44. Didi Kirsten Tatlow, “Women in China Face Rising
University Entry Barriers,” New York Times, October 7, 2012,
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/08/world/asia/08iht
-educlede08.html.
45. Meng Jie, “Women Dominate Higher Education in
China,” Xinhua, October 27, 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com
/english/2017-10/27/c_136710572.htm.
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who only graduated from middle school. The vast
majority are college students.”46 Similarly, a female
Rocket Force recruiter told journalists that within an
all-female missile launch company, 90 percent of the
soldiers are college students, a common refrain in
discussions of the all-female units.47
Given broader demographic trends, the PLA may
have more difficulty fulfilling its future recruitment
goals of attracting more highly educated people.
Some recent reporting has highlighted soldiers who
have reenlisted or opted for a second commission
(二次入伍 or 二次服役), perhaps in an attempt to
bolster recruitment.48 In addition, the Rocket Force’s
personnel challenges are intensified by the fact that
a large share of its troops are two-year conscripts,
building in regular turnover within the ranks. These
trends could exacerbate the PLA’s talent management
challenges, increasing competition for high-quality
personnel both between the PLA and civilian society
and among the various military services.

46. CCTV Video News Agency, 观众提问王锡民: “东风
第一旅”的战士中有女兵吗? [The audience asks Wang Ximin:
Are there female soldiers among the fighters of the First DF
Brigade?] (Beijing: CCTV Video News Agency, August 19,
2017), Adobe Flash video, http://tv.cctv.com/2017/08/19
/VIDEYePw05i07Z8bvUOaciya170819.shtml.
47.

Xu Jingjing and Xu Wen, “Great power’s sword.”

48. Zhu Wei, “再入军营,
为梦想而战” [Reentering
the barracks, fighting for a dream], 解放军报 [PLA daily],
October 9, 2018, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2018-10/
09/content_217244.htm; and Song Zelong, “The Second Time
He Enlisted, It Was a Military Medal Brought with Him,” China
Military, November 13, 2017, http://www.81.cn/bzzj/2017
-11/13/content_7822758.htm.
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TRAINING AND EDUCATION: ENHANCING
COMPLEXITY, REALISM, AND JOINTNESS
The Rocket Force’s focus on higher education and
personnel training does not end with recruitment;
it appears to also be connected to promotion within
the ranks. In addition to the emphasis on higher
education, the Rocket Force has also made efforts to
strengthen its training programs by promoting the use
of red-blue team confrontation exercises, enhancing
the realism of its training, and emphasizing the ability
to conduct joint operations.
Three educational institutes are subordinate to the
Rocket Force: the Rocket Force Command College in
Wuhan (火箭军指挥学院), the Rocket Force University
of Engineering in Xi’an (火箭军工程大学), and the
Rocket Force Noncommissioned Officer School in
Qingzhou (火箭军士官学校). Limited enrollment data
attests to the growth of the Rocket Force in recent years.
In 2018, the Rocket Force University of Engineering
publicly advertised just under 500 spots for new
students. Though this number is somewhat lower than
the 10-year high of 595 spots in 2015, it still represents
a significant increase from a decade earlier, when the
2008 student enrollment plan called for just 208 spots.
As with both recruitment and promotion, political
traits are a key selection criterion in the admissions
process. The first requirement listed for applicants to
the Rocket Force Command College is a “firm political
position,” preceding references to physical fitness
standards, mental health, and academic credentials.49
49. “火箭军指挥学院 2018年硕士研究生招生简章” [Rocket
Force Command College’s 2018 master’s student admission
guide], 中国军网 [China military online], November 13, 2017,
http://www.81.cn/jwzl/2017-11/13/content_7828394.htm.
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Publicity for the Rocket Force Engineering
University trumpets the many amenities and training
facilities on the campus, including a swimming
pool, dojo, track and field complex, light weapons
shooting range, and missile training grounds. The
campus reportedly houses “54 laboratories, 1 nationallevel experimental teaching demonstration center, 1
national-level virtual simulation experiment teaching
center, 5 key military laboratories, 6 provincial-level
teaching demonstration centers, and 1 provincial-level
virtual simulation experiment teaching center.”50 The
university also reportedly possesses equipment for
each missile system employed by the Rocket Force.
The education centers associated with China’s missile
forces have long been at the forefront of providing
experiential education through these facilities.51
The Second Artillery Command College, which had
been described as a model institution for the use
of technology in professional military education,
incorporated elements of virtual technology into
training programs earlier than other institutions
did.52 These efforts come alongside broader initiatives
50. “火箭军工程大学欢迎你!
报考指南请查收” [Rocket
Force Engineering University welcomes you! Please consult the
application guide], 中国军网 [China military online], June 7, 2017,
http://www.81.cn/depb/2017-06/07/content_7632109_2.htm.
51. For more on the use of simulations and battle labs in
PLA training and education, see McCauley, “Cultivating Joint
Operations Talent,” in this volume.
52. James Mulvenon, “‘True Is False, False Is True, Virtual
Is Reality, Reality Is Virtual’: Technology and Simulation in the
Chinese Military Training Revolution,” ed. Roy Kamphausen,
Andrew Scobell, and Travis Tanner, The “People” in the PLA:
Recruitment, Training, and Education in China’s Military (Carlisle,
PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press,
2008), 68–69.
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within the PLA to strengthen and reform its military
education, including the establishment of eight new
military-affiliated academies for high school graduates
and an effort within the curriculum to reduce the
focus on traditional combat forces and establish a new
“focus on early-warning, command and control and
combat data.”53
Within the realm of education, the Rocket Force
appears to be emphasizing missile technology and
creating slightly more space for female soldiers. Each
year, China’s military academies prepare detailed
student enrollment plans establishing the number of
applicants who will be accepted that year within each
field of study. In the 2011 plan for the former Second
Artillery Corps, the three largest allocations were
given to Weapon Systems and Launch Engineering
(20 percent), Measurement and Control Engineering
(17 percent), and Command Automation Engineering
(10 percent). In 2018, the three largest allocations
went to Weapons Launch Engineering (30 percent),
Measurement and Control Engineering (22 percent),
and Communication Engineering (9 percent). Some
fields of study, such as those relating to automation,
appear to have been eliminated or scaled back.
Over the same time period, a slight increase has
occurred in the number of spots reserved for female
students, jumping from just over 1 percent of all spots
in the 2011 plan to more than 4 percent in the 2018
plan, the highest proportion ever. In addition, these
reserved spots have changed from non-command to
command spots. In 2011, none of the spots reserved
for female students were command spots; all were
53. Yao Jianing, “PLA Schools to Expand Recruitment, Help
China Win Information War,” Global Times, June 12, 2017.
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non-command, technical ones. In 2018, all the spots
reserved for female students were designated as
command positions. Despite reforms to promote
women within the missile forces, restrictions still
impede the advancement of female soldiers. For
example, the 2018 recruitment notice of the Rocket
Force Command College notes “campaign studies
[战役学], arms tactics [兵种战术学], combat command
studies [作战指挥学], and military management
studies [军队管理学] only enroll male students.”54
The Rocket Force’s emphasis on higher education
extends beyond recruitment and selection, as studying
at one of the force’s higher education institutions
appears to be nearly a requirement for promotion
within the force. Within the PLA Rocket Force,
93 percent of brigade commanders, 75 percent of
chiefs of staff, and 90 percent of chief engineers have
been educated at the PLA Rocket Force University
of Engineering.55
With regard to training, the Rocket Force has
focused on three aims: increasing and improving redblue exercises (where, in this chapter’s reference, the
red team is the home team), improving the realism
of training, and enhancing the force’s ability to
conduct joint operations. First, the Rocket Force has
expanded the use of red team exercises in its training

54.

“2018 master’s student admission guide.”

55. Second Artillery Engineering University, Chinese
Second Artillery University Promos (Xi’an, China: Second Artillery
Engineering University, n.d.), YouTube video, https://www
.youtube.com/watch?v=tOppK05J1Xk.
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activities.56 News accounts of Rocket Force red-blue
exercises have become somewhat regular, suggesting
they are becoming an increasing component of the
force’s training regimen.57 One indication of this trend
comes from PLA Daily reporting on red-blue efforts
with China’s missile forces, which has significantly
increased in the Rocket Force era. In the 24 months
before the establishment of the Rocket Force, the
PLA Daily included seven articles describing Second
Artillery red-blue exercises. In the 24 months since the
Rocket Force’s establishment, the PLA Daily has run 58
such articles (see figure 2-4).

56. Wei Zhigang, “火箭军着眼未来战争组织红蓝对抗训练
理论集训” [Rocket Force turns eye toward future war, organizes
red-blue opposition training], 火箭兵报 [Rocket Force news],
April 29, 2016.
57. “火箭军某导弹旅红蓝双方角色互换练攻防” [A Rocket
Force brigade’s red-blue dual role exercises, switching between
offense and defense], 新华网 [Xinhua], June 4, 2018, http://
www.xinhuanet.com/mil/2018-06/04/c_129886372.htm;
“火
箭军“天剑”系列演训 提升战略打击能力” [Rocket Force’s “Sky
Sword” series of exercises increases strategic strike ability], 中
国新闻网 [China news], June 23, 2018, http://www.chinanews.
com/mil/2018/06-23/8545007.shtml; and Liu Zunqi and
Yang
Yonggang,
“战略导弹部队信息化蓝军显威红蓝对抗
演兵场” [Strategic Missile Force’s informatized blue army],
Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China,
January 12, 2017, http://www.mod.gov.cn/power/2017-01/12
/content_4769782.htm.
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Figure 2-4. Number of PLA Daily articles each month
mentioning red-blue exercises involving China’s
missile forces in the 24 months preceding (gray bars)
and following (black bars) the establishment of the
Rocket Force
Reporting on red-blue exercises under the Rocket Force increased
noticeably in comparison to that under the Second Artillery Corps.

In addition to increasing the frequency of red-blue
exercises, the Rocket Force has attempted to increase
their rigor and realism. In the past, the exercises
suffered from several shortcomings. Rocket Force redblue exercises were occasionally rigged so that the
red team would always win, sometimes with exercise
supervisors even providing valuable intelligence about
the opposition blue force.58 In the past, participants in
red-blue exercises were reportedly overly fixated on
the exercise’s outcome or on the pursuit of individual

58. David C. Logan, “The Evolution of the PLA’s Red-Blue
Exercises,” China Brief 17, no. 4 (2017).
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success, rather than viewing the exercise as an
opportunity to learn and improve across the force.59
The Rocket Force has reportedly tried to move away
from overly scripted exercises to more realistic ones in
which commanders are allowed to fail. As one report
just before the 2015–16 wave of military reforms noted,
troops were being encouraged to “emphasize testing,
not comparison; emphasize substantive effect, not
form; and emphasize review, not winning or losing.”60
The outcomes of some recent exercises suggest the
Rocket Force has taken these orders to heart. For
example, a series of articles from 2017 in Rocket
Force News covering recent training improvements
noted in a string of red-blue exercises conducted
that year, the red force had a record of five losses
and two wins.61 The number of losses alone suggests
that, though the Rocket Force may be struggling to
perform in these exercises, it has taken seriously the
goal of improving their realism. The Rocket Force has
also undertaken efforts to standardize assessment
criteria for the exercises so that all units train under
similar conditions.62
59. Liang Pengfei and Zou Fei, “砥砺胜战之刀开拓胜战之
路” [The blade tempered by victory opens up the path to victory],
解放军报 [PLA daily], March 13, 2016, http://www.81.cn
/jfjbmap/content/2016-03/13/content_137561.htm.
60. “连续十场军演释放出什么信号” [What signals are
released by the ten consecutive field exercises], 中国青年报
[China Youth daily], July 25, 2014.
61. David C. Logan, “The Evolution of the PLA’s Red-Blue
Exercises,” China Brief 17, no. 4 (March 2017).
62. Cai Ruijin, Tian Liang, and Zhang Hongliang, “火箭军
某旅开展冬季红蓝对抗演练闻思录” [Certain Rocket Force brigade
launches winter red-blue confrontation exercises], China Military
Online, January 28, 2016, http://jz.chinamil.com.cn/n2014/tp
/content_6872128.htm (site discontinued).
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These efforts to increase the frequency and quality
of red-blue exercises are being led by Diao Guangming,
a professor at the Rocket Force Command College with
extensive experience implementing and studying redblue exercises. Diao has emphasized the importance
of realism in Rocket Force exercises, saying, “Those
whose peacetime training is overly nice will suffer
greatly when they take the battlefield.”63 Diao was
recently recognized as one of the Rocket Force’s “ten
great Pathbreakers” for his efforts.64
Second, along with the increased use of red team
exercises, the Rocket Force has taken other steps to
improve the realism of its training. Xi has emphasized
the need for realistic training since early in his tenure,
and the Rocket Force has responded accordingly,
with Rocket Force officials reporting that “realistic
combat training . . . has already become normal.”65
A major Rocket Force News article, published within
a year after Xi’s ascension to chairman of the Central
Military Commission, exhorted the PLA to look to
the United States and Russia as examples of how to
63. Han Lei, Cao Fan, and Xiao Pan, “刁光明: 变脸”只为
打胜仗” [Diao Guangming: Changing face is the only way to
win], 解放军报 [PLA daily], April 17, 2016, http://www.81.cn
/jfjbmap/content/2016-04/17/content_141844.htm.
64. “军 中 排 头 兵 ！ 火 箭 军 “砺 剑 尖 兵 ”又 迎 1 0 位 新 成 员 ”
[The military’s vanguard! The Rocket Force “sword-sharpening
vanguard” welcomes 10 new members], 新闻中心 [Sina],
December 29, 2017, http://news.sina.com.cn/o/2017-12-29
/doc-ifyqchnr7069068.shtml.
65. Lu Xiaolin, Cai Ruijin, and Li Yongfei, “火箭军按
照随时能战准时发射有效毁伤标准练兵备战”
[Rocket
Force
preparing and training according to the standard of being able
to launch effective damage on time any time], 中视网 [CCTV],
December 17, 2017, http://military.cctv.com/2017/12/17
/ARTI5aGsliegUI8kSbBz5crH171217.shtml.
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conduct realistic training. The article noted that “in
conducting actual combat conditioning training . . . it is
necessary to focus on the future battlefield . . . conduct
confrontation with a powerful enemy, and stick
close to actual combat in inspecting and examining
training concepts, training methods and actual combat
capabilities.”66 Units under the newly formed PLA
Rocket Force have participated in a number of training
drills with emphasis on operating in adverse weather
and geographic conditions and combating enemy
countermeasures. Since the creation of the PLA Rocket
Force, a number of news reports have highlighted
night drills for the units, while others have focused
on adverse weather conditions, especially on extreme
temperatures as low as negative 16 degrees Celsius.67
One account described a drill requiring units to
navigate difficult terrain and protect themselves
against the enemy’s harassing strikes, electromagnetic
interference, and high-altitude reconnaissance, among

66. Andrew S. Erickson and Michael S. Chase, “China’s
Strategic Rocket Force: Upgrading Hardware and Software (Part
2 of 2),” China Brief 14, no. 14 (2014).
67. Wen Zhihui, “速来围观! 火箭军导弹夜间集群发射”
[Onlookers come forth! Rocket Force conducts nighttime
group launch], 中国军网 [China military online], June 3, 2016,
http://www.81.cn/depb/2016-06/03/content_7085448.htm;
“火箭军常规导弹部队实现夜暗连射与调旅火力突击”
[Rocket
Force conventional missile unit undertakes nighttime burst
launch and adjusts brigade’s strikes], 解放军报 [PLA daily], May
13, 2016, http://www.chinanews.com/mil/2016/05-13/7868972.
shtml; and “火箭军极寒气候对抗演练”蓝军”超狠令官兵意外”
[Rocket Force extreme cold weather exercise, blue army’s extreme
hardiness surprises officers], Military—People’s daily online,
January 28, 2016, http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0128
/c1011-28091140.html.
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other challenges.68 A launch brigade has reportedly
even constructed a new training facility to simulate
challenging weather conditions, including “rain, snow,
gale-force winds, fog and lighting, as well as electronic
warfare situations.”69 Units training at the facility
reportedly have also donned protective suits meant
for operating in conditions of biological warfare.
Third, the Rocket Force has increased joint
exercises to improve coordination with the units of
both the other services and of the newly established
TCs. Improving jointness has been a key goal of the
recent wave of military reforms. As part of those
reforms, the PLA replaced the old military regions
with new TCs. Each of these TCs, established with an
eye to what the PLA considers the most likely future
conflicts, feature a joint operations command center.70
These efforts comport with efforts to emphasize joint
operations within PLA-wide training.71 The Rocket
Force had in the past at least paid lip service to the
68. Li Yongfei and Tian Liang, “出门即出征火箭军某旅专挑
险难环境”出招” [Going out means going out to battle: A certain
PLA Rocket Force brigade moves in a rare difficult environment],
解放军报 [PLA daily], May 26, 2016, http://www.81.cn
/depb/2016-05/26/content_7073091.htm.
69. Zhao Lei, “New Rocket Force Gets Facility to Acclimate
Its Soldiers,” China Daily, February 1, 2016, http://www
.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-02/01/content_23333248.htm.
70. For more on the recent reforms and their implications
for joint operations, see Wuthnow and Saunders, Chinese Military
Reforms; and Joel Wuthnow, “A Brave New World for Chinese
Joint Operations,” Journal of Strategic Studies 40, no. 1 (2017):
169–95.
71. Mark R. Cozad, “PLA Joint Training and Implications
for Future Expeditionary Capabilities” (testimony before
the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission,
Washington, DC, January 21, 2016).
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need to conduct joint operations, but as recently as
2014, “few instances of actual joint training were
reported” for the Rocket Force.72 By contrast, as of mid2017, the Rocket Force reportedly had fired “hundreds
of missiles in live-fire exercises over the past few years
to improve its combat readiness. The missiles were
fired during about 40 exercises within the force itself,
as well as during more than 30 joint drills between the
force and other military branches and regional theater
commands, according to the release.”73
If public reporting is any indication, the new
Rocket Force appears to have significantly increased
its focus on jointness. Under the Rocket Force, the PLA
Daily features significantly more articles that address
both the missile forces and the concept of jointness
than it did under the Second Artillery Corps. In the
24 months before the establishment of the Rocket
Force, the PLA Daily included 20 articles addressing
both jointness and the Second Artillery Corps. In the
23 months since the Rocket Force’s establishment, the
PLA Daily has run 271 such articles (see figure 2-5). The
dramatic increase in reports at the beginning of 2016,
while providing evidence of increased tempo, also
suggests that the level of reporting may exaggerate the
actual tempo. If number of monthly reports were an
accurate measure of actual joint exercise tempo, one
might expect to see a more gradual buildup over time
as these exercises are developed. Instead, one sees a
sharp dichotomy around the creation of the Rocket
72. Kenneth W. Allen and Jana Allen, Building a Strong
Informatized Missile Force (Washington, DC: Jamestown
Foundation, 2015), 3.
73. Zhao Lei, “Rocket Force More Versatile,” China Daily,
June 21, 2017, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2017-06
/21/content_29830330.htm.
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Force. In addition to the increase in joint exercises,
recent reporting suggests that the Rocket Force may
also have reformed some of its command and control
structures to better integrate Rocket Force units with
the forces of other military services and with those
of TCs.74 For example, reports increasingly mention
attempts by the Rocket Force to integrate or build
into TC joint operations command centers and some
accounts reference the presence of Rocket Force officers
within those joint operations command centers.75 The
Rocket Force has been working to better coordinate
future joint operations with other forces, including the
newly established Strategic Support Force.76

74. For some evidence, see David C. Logan, “Making
Sense.”
75. “某基地联战联训淬炼制胜‘铁拳’” [A certain base’s
joint training wins “Iron Fist”], 火箭军报 [Rocket Force news],
November 11, 2017, 1; and Guo Yuandan, “中国战区如何打仗:
中国战区如何打仗:体系深 度联合, 指挥一体融合, 指挥一体融
合” [How China’s Theater Commands conduct operations: By
truly joining systems and fusing command and control entities],
环球网 [Global times], October 9, 2017, https://mil.huanqiu
.com/article/9CaKrnK5t3j.
76. “火箭军同战略支援部队讨论联合作战现场热烈” [Rocket
Force and Strategic Support Force discuss joint warfighting], 解
放军报 [PLA daily], February 3, 2016, https://mil.huanqiu.com
/article/9CaKrnJTEmD.
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Figure 2-5. Number of PLA Daily articles each
mentioning jointness and China’s missile forces in
the 24 months preceding (gray bars) and following
(black bars) the establishment of the Rocket Force
Reporting on jointness under the Rocket Force increased noticeably
in comparison to that under the Second Artillery Corps.

Despite these reforms and improvements, the
Rocket Force may still face significant obstacles to
performing effective joint operations. For example,
although the recent military reforms were intended
to reduce the army’s traditional dominance of the
military, 9 of the 10 highest ranking officials in the
newly established TCs were drawn from ground
forces.77 And despite the structural changes to the
force, the Rocket Force still faces the challenges of
producing soldiers who can effectively function in
77. Phillip C. Saunders and John Chen, “Is the Chinese
Army the Real Winner in PLA Reforms?” Joint Force Quarterly 83
(Fourth Quarter, 2016): 44–48.

72

a joint environment.78 As one Rocket Force brigade
commander has lamented, “Under the new system,
individual cadres have not changed their thinking in
a timely manner. The problem of ‘old wine in new
bottles’ still exists.”79 These problems appear to be
present across the PLA, as, according to one US expert,
“press reporting highlighted cases in which PLA
commanders were not well-versed in the wide range
of capabilities at their disposal, failed to coordinate
and share information among the units under their
command, and demonstrated weak command and
organization skills.”80
In its attempts to improve and increase both redblue and joint exercises, the Rocket Force appears to
be lagging behind the other services. For example,
reporting on both red-blue and joint exercises
involving the other services has regularly surpassed
analogous reporting on the Rocket Force. In addition,
the Rocket Force has been relatively slow to integrate

78. For more on the PLA’s efforts to develop personnel
capable of effectively conducting joint operations, see Joel
Wuthnow and Phillip C. Saunders, “A Modern Major General:
Building Joint Commanders in the PLA,” in Chairman Xi Remakes
the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms, ed. Phillip C. Saunders
and Joel Wuthnow (unpublished book), Microsoft Word file; and
in this volume, McCauley, “Cultivating Joint Operations Talent.”
79. Feng Jinyuan and Yang Yonggang, “火箭军某导弹旅组
织‘蓝军’督导专门‘找茬’” [Certain Rocket Force missile brigade
organizes “blue army” supervision to specially “nitpick”], 解放
军报 [PLA daily], June 13, 2016, http://www.81.cn/depb/2016
-06/13/content_7097562.htm.
80.

Mark R. Cozad, “PLA Joint Training.”
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its command and control structures with those
of the TCs.81
PERSONNEL RELIABILITY AND OPERATIONAL
SECURITY: EMPHASIZING ELECTRONIC
SECURITY AND PSYCHOLOGICAL STABILITY
Efforts have been made to enhance the reliability
and operational security of Rocket Force personnel
in recent years. Personnel reliability programs are
a crucial component of militaries, especially of the
units in control of a state’s nuclear forces.82 This
section reviews issues relating to China’s personnel
reliability programs, including political vetting of new
recruits, psychological evaluations of personnel, and
heightened concerns with electronic security.
Information on China’s earliest personnel
reliability efforts is scant, though early reliability
measures appear to have focused on ensuring the
political suitability of troops and safeguarding
operational secrets by strictly isolating troops. Early
on, technicians and officials associated with China’s
nuclear program were sequestered from the rest of
society, sometimes including even members of their

81. For evidence these command and control arrangements
had changed little after the reforms, see David C. Logan, “PLA
Reforms and China’s Nuclear Forces,” Joint Force Quarterly 83
(4th Quarter, October 2016): 57–62. For a more recent assessment
including evidence of some integration and remaining challenges,
see David C. Logan, “Making Sense.”
82. For a (somewhat dated) review, see Herbert L. Abrams,
“Human Reliability and Safety in the Handling of Nuclear
Weapons,” Science & Global Security 2, no. 4 (1991): 325–49.
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immediate family.83 According to one unofficial
account reportedly authored by a former member of
the early Second Artillery Corps, the unit specifically
targeted the Chinese countryside for recruitment,
and new recruits reportedly faced two requirements:
Their previous three family generations must all
have been “red” (祖宗三代都要红) and they had to
come from families designated as poor or lowermiddle peasants (贫下中农).84 As recently as the 1990s,
China’s personnel reliability program was reported
to still consist of an investigation into the individual’s
political background, but seemingly without similar
investigations into the potential for financial coercion,
psychological instability, or substance abuse.85
Today, the focus on political vetting of Rocket Force
personnel continues. Recruits must undergo a political
investigation before entry to the military. These
political investigations are carried out at the county
level, with the local public security bureau in charge
and other relevant bureaus providing assistance.
The investigations typically involve interviews with
people in the applicant’s family, workplace, and
school. In the Xi era, several high-level statements
have reaffirmed the importance of the PLA following
the Communist Party of China’s (CPC) lead, while
83. John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb
(Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991), 95, 162;
and Chinese expert, interview by the author, August 2018.
84. “青春红似火(6)二炮组建政审严 转场河南夜难眠” [A
youth red as fire part 6: The Second Artillery establishes strict
political review, transfer to Henan, and sleepless nights], 人过五十
网 [China 50 plus], April 24, 2009, http://www.china50plus.com.
85. Herbert L. Abrams, “Human Reliability and Safety in
the Handling of Nuclear Weapons,” Science & Global Security 2,
no. 4 (1991): 339.
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some observers have worried the military has begun
to chafe under Xi’s rule.86 In addition to the general
political investigations required of PLA soldiers, the
Rocket Force reportedly has higher standards for
political suitability given its sensitive missions and
symbolic importance.87 For example, applicants to the
master’s program at the Rocket Force University of
Engineering (火箭军工程大学) must submit a political
investigation form (政治审查表) (see figure 2-6), which
solicits information about an applicant’s political
outlook (政治面貌), family background (家庭出身),
and examples of how they have demonstrated their
political ideology (政治思想工作表现). As mentioned
earlier in the chapter, the first requirement listed for
applicants to the Rocket Force Command College
is a “firm political position,” which comes before
requirements related to physical fitness standards,
mental health, and academic credentials.88

86. Liu Hang, “深入抓好思想政治建设” [Thoroughly
grasp ideological and political construction], 解放军报 [PLA
daily], February 5, 2017, http://www.81.cn/jmywyl/2017
-02/05/content_7476452.htm; and Lily Kuo, “Xi Jinping Calls
for ‘Absolute Loyalty’ from Chinese Army,” Guardian, August
20, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/20
/xi-jinping-calls-for-absolute-loyalty-from-chinese-army.
87. Liu Hongwei, Cai Ruijin, and Yang Yonggang, “习近平
为火箭军授旗之后发生了什么?” [What happened after President
Xi awarded the rockets?], 解放军报 [PLA daily], January 16, 2016,
http://www.81.cn/jmywyl/2016-01/16/content_6859456.htm.
88.

“2018 master’s student admission guide.”
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报考硕士研究生对象政治考核登记表
姓名

性别

人员
类别

填写国防
生或地方
生

现学习工

政治

家庭

面貌

出身

报考学科

作单位

政治思想
工作表现

何时、何地
受过何种奖
励或处分

家庭主要
成员情况

直系亲属受刑事
处罚，党纪、政
纪处分情况

主要社会关系、
境外关系情况

Figure 2-6. Excerpt of the Political Investigation
Form required for applicants to master’s programs at
the Rocket Force University of Engineering
In addition to the continued focus on political
reliability, the Rocket Force has, in recent years,
focused on increasing personnel reliability in two
other areas: psychological well-being and electronic
security. This focus parallels increased concerns over
mental health across the PLA, though the Rocket Force
appears to be moving earlier and faster because it faces
more serious mental health challenges.89 According to
one large-scale analysis of more than 50,000 soldiers
89. For a strong overview of these efforts, see Zi Yang,
“China’s Military Mental Health System in Transit” (PowerPoint
presentation, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies,
Singapore, n.d.).
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from across the PLA, Rocket Force troops received the
lowest mental health scores, below their counterparts
in the army, navy, air force, and Strategic Support
Force.90 In response to these challenges, China’s missile
forces are dedicating greater resources to studying
and addressing psychological problems within the
ranks. In the last few years, at least seven academic
studies have been published investigating the factors
affecting the psychological and emotional well-being
of Rocket Force personnel. The earliest of these recent
studies, published in the PLA Journal of Preventive
Medicine in 2014, examined the psychological wellbeing, sleep patterns, and fatigue levels of soldiers
in a then-Second Artillery unit.91 The study found,
on most psychological measures, respondents fared
better than the average population. But on measures
of physical fatigue, mental fatigue, and overall fatigue,
the scores were worse than average, and researchers
recommended that the force work to promote better
sleeping conditions and psychological support.
Subsequent research focused on Rocket Force troops
has examined the connections between the personality
characteristics of new recruits and their mental
health status, connections between soldiers’ levels of
psychological stress and the development of various
psychological biases, the connection between stress
and self-evaluation, and the methods by which missile

90. Feng Zhengzhi et al., “Establishment of norm of
symptom checklist 90,” 2211.
91. Luo Xianrong et al., “第二炮兵某部官兵心理, 睡眠, 疲
劳状况调查” [An investigation into the psychological, sleep, and
fatigue conditions of the soldiers in a Second Artillery unit], 解放
军预防医学杂志 [PLA journal of preventive medicine] 32, no. 1
(February 2014): 49–50.
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force troops regulate their emotions.92 These studies
have noted areas for concern and have advocated for a
greater focus on mental health within the ranks. Most
recently, an assessment of the mental health status of
Rocket Force troops concluded that “the mental health
level of Rocket Force troops awaits improvement.”93
The study notes other research, concluding that “in
comparison with the mental health level of various
other branches and services, the mental health level
of the Rocket Force is comparatively low. For the
majority of Rocket Force troops, the work environment
92. Cai Yun et al., “二炮某部新兵人格特征与心理健康水
平相性研究” [Research on the correlation between personality
characteristics and mental health level on new recruits in a Second
Artillery unit], 人民军医 [People’s military surgeon] 57, no. 5
(May 2014): 467–8; Xu Yuanyuan et al., “二炮某部队军人心理应
激水平与心理弹性, 认知偏向核积极情绪的关系” [Relationships
of psychological stress with resilience, cognitive bias and positive
affect in a troop of Second Artillery Force], 第三军医大学学
报 [Journal of the Third Military Medical University] 37, no. 7
(April 2015): 698–702; Tian Yiqin et al., “二炮某部军人高原驻训
期间作业疲劳状态与心理应激,
压力感知核自我效能感的关系”
[Relationship of military fatigue with psychological stress, stress
perception and self-efficacy in soldiers from Second Artillery
Corps during plateau encamping], 第三军医大学学报 [Journal of
the Third Medical University] 37, no. 21 (2015): 2156–9; Wu Tong
et al., “火箭军某部军人运用积极情绪上调方式的调查” [Survey
on positive emotion-promoting strategies in military personnel
from a troop of Rocket Force], 第三军医大学学报 [Journal of the
Third Military Medical University] 39, no. 7 (2017): 597–602; and
Huang Weirong et al., “二炮某部军人情绪调节方式的特点研究”
[Investigation into the emotional regulation methods of Second
Artillery troops], 第三军医大学学报 [Journal of the Third Military
Medical University] 38, no. 38 (2016): 1581–84.
93. Hua Yan et al., “火箭军某部官兵心理健康现状及其
影响因素分析” [An analysis of the mental health of soldiers
in a Rocket Force unit and their influencing factors], 人民军医
[People’s military surgeon] 61, no. 6 (June 2018): 480.
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is abominable, with an isolating work environment,
arduous lifestyle requirements, strict group discipline,
and high-intensity military training.”
This extensive research on the troops’ psychological
well-being has been accompanied by efforts to
strengthen mental health in the barracks and in the
field. Recent public accounts note that training for new
recruits emphasizes the importance of mental health,
educating troops in how to regulate their emotions
in the face of adversity, implementing regular
psychological examinations, and distributing military
mental health pamphlets.94 Rocket Force psychological
consultants have written that the normal psychological
challenges of military work can be further exacerbated
by the intense secrecy and isolation of China’s missile
forces.95 Thus, the Rocket Force provides counseling
services to its troops.96 Despite these efforts, officials
note challenges, including concerns that the stigma
attached to mental health challenges would prevent
some soldiers from seeking treatment.97
Since the creation of the Rocket Force, reporting
on electronic security within the missile forces has
94. Wu Yongfang and Chen Chaoming, “二炮某部给新战
士脆弱心理‘补钙’” [A Second Artillery unit gives a supplement
to new troops with weak psychology], 人人健康 [Health for
everybody] 2 (2014): 51.
95. Mo Peng and Chen Xiuli, “火箭军总医院史杰: 官兵的心
灵‘守护神’” [Rocket Force General Hospital’s Shi Jie: The guardian
spirit of soldiers’ minds], 解放军报 [PLA daily], March 24, 2016,
http://www.81.cn/zghjy/2016-03/24/content_6975090.htm;
and Kang Changyi, “密闭环境, 如何保持心理健康” [How to
maintain psychological health in an airtight environment], 解放
军报 [PLA daily], December 22, 2016, http://jz.chinamil.com.cn
/n2014/tp/content_7418510.htm (site discontinued).
96.
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97.
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increased markedly. The growing digitalization
of Chinese society and the entrance of a younger
generation into the military ranks has introduced
new potential vulnerabilities to the PLA. The broader
PLA and the Rocket Force have tried to mitigate
these risks with new guidelines and training focused
on electronic security. In July 2015, the four General
Departments issued new guidelines related to
management within the PLA, including provisions for
the use of smartphones and other network devices.98
The regulations reportedly relaxed restrictions on
cell phone networks, permitting soldiers to use
them during extracurricular periods and rest or
holiday times, provided they maintained appropriate
security.99 Specific rules governing phone usage were
to be set at the division level, though some Rocket
Force units have reportedly struggled to cope with
the new digital world. One recent report on electronic
security within a Rocket Force base included a litany
of violations and missteps.100 An officer uploaded
photos of his uniform to social media, potentially
revealing secret information. Soldiers listed the exact
name and location of the base when shopping online.
98. “四总部颁发关于进一步规范基层工作指导和管理秩序
若干规定” [Guidelines on further improving and standardizing
grassroots work and order management], Military—People’s
Daily Online, July 3, 2015, http://military.people.com
.cn/n/2015/0703/c1011-27246704.html.
99. For a summary of the new guidelines, see “图解基层工
作指导和管理新规定” [Graphic: New rules for grassroots work
guidance and management], 中国军网 [China military online],
2015, http://www.81.cn/2015jcglgd/node_78327.htm.
100. Wang Weidong, Wu Tianxi, and Cheng Pengyu, “智能
手机撞开了军营“哪扇门?” [Have smartphones broken down the
barracks door?], 解放军报 [PLA daily], December 9, 2016, http://
www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2016-12/09/content_163770.htm.
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One new recruit, whose phone was confiscated by the
security office upon entering the base, began illicitly
purchasing replacements until he had acquired
four new cell phones. A company commander had
not realized that his smart-device bracelet could
connect to his smartphone and that the Bluetooth
and GPS functions could leak sensitive information.
Some soldiers, in attempts to circumvent restrictions
about social media posting, have resorted to puns or
wordplay to communicate publicly about sensitive
work topics.101 But, the report admonishes, “if the
enemy truly understands detection, they will not fear
our ‘code words.’”102
To enhance these apparent weaknesses in electronic
security, the Rocket Force has resorted to training,
education, and new policies. Some of these efforts can
be seen in articles published in the monthly Secrets
Protection (保密工作), a publication of the General
Office of the Secrets Protection Committee of the
Communist Party of China’s Central Committee that
reports on efforts by the PLA and government bodies
to maintain secrecy, as well as counterespionage
efforts. A 2016 report in the periodical highlighted
efforts to train new recruits in operational security.103
The report noted the new recruits were mostly born
after 1996, and “cell phones and computer games
101. Du Lilong, “安全保密不可‘掩耳盗铃’” [One cannot
bury one’s head in the sand when it comes to security and
secrecy], 解放军报 [PLA daily], August 25, 2017, http://www.81
.cn/jfjbmap/content/2017-08/25/content_186417.htm.
102.

Du Lilong, “One cannot bury one’s head in the sand.”

103. Chen Shifeng and Li Qun, “火箭军某基地:新兵未
入营,保密已先行” [At a certain Rocket Force base, new recruits
have not yet entered the base and the work of secrets protection
already begins], 保密工作 [Confidential Work] 10 (2016): 42.
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had developed right alongside them. Thus, the unit’s
management of this factor was very strict.”104 The unit
attempted to enhance soldiers’ awareness of electronic
security by registering and centrally storing electronic
devices which could release sensitive information
and by keeping detailed records of recruits’ social
media activities. A Rocket Force brigade tried to
inculcate better electronic security practices through
educational demonstrations, advisory films, and
regular trainings.105 Barracks have begun to require
that soldiers receive certification before purchasing an
Internet card, and bases are coordinating with mobile
phone providers to ensure that troops do not receive
potentially dangerous equipment.106 Enhancing
digital security has sometimes meant resorting to
older technologies and practices. Calls between
senior officers are not made directly; instead, they
are connected by a central communications regiment.
As an account of the regiment noted, “The military’s
demand for confidentiality forbids an online directory
of internal phone numbers, let alone those for highranking officers. Having an operator pass through calls

104. Chen Shifeng and Li Qun, “New recruits have not yet
entered the base,” 42.
105. Pei Xian and Hao Jiangzhen, “网络共享进军营, 信
息安全咋把握?” [Network sharing enters the barracks: How
does one grasp information security?], 解放军报 [PLA daily],
June 14, 2017, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2017-06/14
/content_179963.htm.
106. Pei Xian and Hao Jiangzhen, “Network sharing enters
the barracks.”
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still remains the most secure way, and paradoxically,
the quickest way for getting through.”107
Despite the increased academic and operational
focus on psychological health and electronic security,
gaps still exist in Rocket Force vetting. For one, no
public reports of efforts to ensure that a Rocket Force
member is not vulnerable to financial coercion or
substance abuse have surfaced. In addition, despite
the recent focus on mental well-being and electronic
security, a recent review of media reporting, official
documents, and academic literature did not uncover
any evidence that the Rocket Force proactively screens
potential recruits for either psychological health or
good digital hygiene. The force may be using education
and other indicators as proxies for reliability, but
these may represent weaknesses in the Rocket Force’s
screening and personnel reliability efforts. This
observation is particularly troublesome given the
difficulties of working in China’s missile forces and
the recent decision by the PLA to admit recruits with
potentially serious mental health challenges.
PROMOTION AND CAREER PATHS:
ADVANCING THE CONVENTIONALLY ARMED
AND THE LOYAL
Assessing the personal and institutional ties of
officers who are promoted can provide evidence about
the current and future priorities of China’s missile
forces. Recent promotion patterns suggest the Rocket
Force may be prioritizing the conventional mission
set, followed by the strategic nuclear deterrent, and
107. Chen Boyuan, “Female PLA Operators Link Rocket
Force,” China Internet Information Center, March 16, 2017, http://
www.china.org.cn/china/2017-03/16/content_40463599.htm.
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then regional nuclear deterrent missions. Evidence has
surfaced that senior Rocket Force officials may have
been promoted due to their personal loyalties to Xi
Jinping. Finally, the selection of Rocket Force officers
for key PLA-wide positions suggests the service is
gaining in power and prestige relative to the army,
navy, and air force.
Previous work analyzing the career paths and
promotion patterns of officers within China’s missile
forces suggested the force may be prioritizing the
conventional mission set and units over the nuclear
one.108 Senior commanders within the Rocket Force
were more likely to have early career experience
working in Base 61 (the former Base 52), the force’s
premier conventionally armed base opposite
Taiwan (see figure 2-7 below). The Rocket Force’s
intercontinental ballistic-missile bases, responsible
for strategic nuclear deterrence, were the next most
likely to be represented among the experience of
senior leaders. Bases assigned regional nuclear
deterrent missions and equipped with nuclear-armed
medium and intermediate-range missiles were the
least likely to be represented. In addition, when base
commanders were transferred laterally, they were
likely to be transferred away from bases assigned
a regional nuclear deterrent role and toward those
assigned a strategic nuclear deterrent mission and
those assigned a conventional mission set. Since that
analysis, at least four individuals have entered the
ranks of the Rocket Force’s senior leadership: Base 62
Commander Xia Xiaoping, Base 65 Commander Zhao
Xiuling, Base 66 Commander Xue Jinfeng, and Rocket

108.

Logan, “Career Paths.”

85

Force Deputy Commander Zhang Zhenzhong.109
The career histories of these officers correspond
with earlier findings suggesting the prioritization of
the conventional and then strategic nuclear mission
set; prior to their ascension to the ranks of senior
leadership, each of the officers served in either the
conventionally focused Base 61 (former Base 52) or
the intercontinental ballistic missile-equipped Base 66
(former Base 54). The ways in which the introduction
of dual-capable systems such as the DF-21 and DF-26
might change the structure, identity, and priorities of
the Rocket Force are not yet clear.

Figure 2-7. Number of Rocket Force (and Second
Artillery Corps) senior leaders who served in each
missile base prior to their promotion to the level
of senior leadership
Missile bases are listed with current Rocket Force designation
(61–66) and former Second Artillery designation (51–56).
The overrepresentation of Base 61 suggests an institutional
prioritization of the conventional mission set.

109. For more on definitions and the research methodology,
see Logan, “Career Paths,” 6–7.
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Data on promotions from the Xi era continue to
suggest the Rocket Force may prioritize experience
with conventional units. In 2017, Zhou Yaning was
appointed the new commander of the Rocket Force,
replacing Wei Fenghe (who would go on to become
defense minister).110 Zhou had previously served as a
deputy commander within China’s missile forces and,
previously, as commander of Base 61. But Zhou has
important ties to the conventional side of the missile
forces, beyond just his experience commanding the
former Base 52. Early in his career, Zhou served as
commander of a Base 52 brigade equipped with the
short-range conventionally armed DF-11. As head of
former Base 52, Zhou is also believed to have overseen
the introduction of the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic
missile into the force.111 In 2014, Zhou was one of the
featured speakers at an event to commemorate the
10-year anniversary of the death of Yang Yegong, a
vaunted one-time commander of the former Second

110. Mimi Lau, “China’s Missile Forces Get a
New Tech-Focused Commander,” South China Morning
Post,
September
16,
2017,
https://www.scmp.com
/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2111497
/chinas-missile-forces-get-new-tech-focused-commander.
111. Mark Stokes and Russell Hsiao, “Leadership
Transitions in the Second Artillery Force at the 18th Party
Congress: Implications for Roles and Missions,” Project 2049,
May 7, 2012, https://project2049.net/2012/05/07/leadership
-transitions-in-the-second-artillery-force-at-the-18th-party
-congress-implications-for-roles-and-missions/amp/.
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Artillery Corps who has been called the pioneer and
founder of the conventional missile arm.112
In addition to his history with the conventional
units, Zhou has emphasized the importance of
advanced technology for fighting future wars. In a
2011 article, Zhou argued, “Warfare in the future will
be largely dependent on weapons. Strategy will only
help to refine and supplement the technology.”113
A report from just around the time he was assigned
to command Base 52 described Zhou as believing
that “technology and tactics are fused. Technology
determines tactics. This is a vivid feature of
the way in which the generation of combat power
is transforming.”114
Promotions of Rocket Force officials may be guided
by personal loyalty to Xi Jinping, who is reportedly
112. For a report on the commemoration event, see “黄
山: 杨业功逝世十周年纪念仪式举行” [Huangshan: An event
to commemorate the ten-year anniversary of the passing of
Yang Yegong is held], 中国文明网 [China civilization network],
July
3,
2014,
http://wenming.cn/syjj/dfcz/ah/201407
/t20140703_2040586.shtml. For more on Yang Yegong and his
importance to the conventional missile forces, see Jeffrey Lewis,
“Yang Yegong”; “时代先锋: 导弹司令员杨业功” [Pioneer of
the times: Missile Commander Yang Yegong], CCTV, July
2004,
http://www.cctv.com/news/special/C14394/index.
shtml; and “追忆火箭军常规导弹部队开拓者
如今已‘百箭齐
射’” [Recalling the pioneers of the Rocket Force’s conventional
missile units: Today already a hundred-arrow valley],
China.com, September 7, 2017, https://military.china.com
/history4/62/20170907/31311228_all.html.
113. Mimi Lau, “China’s Missile Forces Get a New TechFocused Commander.”
114. “二炮多种型号导弹联动攻防‘中军帐’增设专家席” [Two
types of Second Artillery missile systems link offense defense],
解放军报 [PLA daily], July 17, 2011, http://www.chinanews.com
/gn/2011/07-17/3187617.shtml.
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directly involved in promotions at the group army
level and higher. Several of those promoted to senior
positions in the Rocket Force have served in the
former Nanjing Military Region, where Xi rose to
prominence.115 Zhou Yaning served in the Nanjing
Military Region during his time as commander of Base
61 (former Base 52). Gao Jin, another Rocket Force
veteran of the Nanjing Military Region, was assigned
command of the newly established Strategic Support
Force.116 Former Rocket Force Commander and
current Defense Minister Wei Fenghe was reportedly
one of the first senior officers to pledge loyalty to
Xi.117 According to one anonymous official, “Xi
Jinping does not believe that ability is a key criterion
for appointment—the only one is loyalty.”118 These
moves to place political allies and subordinates in key
positions comes against the backdrop of increasing

115. Oki
Nagai,
“Xi
Packs
Top
Chinese
Military
Posts
with
Allies,”
Nikkei
Asian
Review,
September
20,
2017,
https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics
/Xi-packs-top-Chinese-military-posts-with-allies.
116. Willy Lam, “Xi Jinping Consolidates Power by
Promoting Alumni of the Nanjing Military Region,” China Brief
15, no. 1 (2015): 3–5.
117. Minnie Chan, “‘Reticent’ General Wei Fenghe
Could Be China’s New Defense Minister, Sources Say,”
South China Morning Post, February 24, 2018, https://www
.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2134555
/reticent-general-rockets-ranks-central-military.
118. Jérôme Doyon, Personnel Reshuffle in the PLA: The Two
Promotions That Did Not Happen (London: European Council on
Foreign Relations, March 2016), 1.
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public calls affirming the Communist Party of China’s
control of the military.119
Finally, promotion patterns among the highest
levels of the PLA also suggest the Rocket Force may
be gaining in organizational power relative to the
other services. Two of the six military positions on the
Central Military Commission are occupied by Rocket
Force personnel and Rocket Force commanders
have taken the helm of other key military, state, and
Communist Party of China positions. Wei Fenghe,
a former Rocket Force commander, was promoted
in 2018 to minister of national defense and state
councilor.120 Gao Jin, a former top commander in
the Second Artillery Corps, was assigned command
of the newly established Strategic Support Force,
which is believed to be focused on “combat in space,
cyberspace, and the electromagnetic domain.”121
Zhang Shengmin, who spent most of his career
as a political commissar in China’s missile forces,
now serves as both secretary of the Central Military
Commission’s Commission for Discipline Inspection
and as deputy secretary of the Central Commission
for Discipline Inspection, the country’s highest-level

119. Josephine Ma, “Chinese President Xi Jinping
Returns to Public Stage with Renewed Call for Military
Loyalty to the Communist Party,” South China Morning
Post,
August
19,
2018,
https://www.scmp.com
/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2160400
/chinese-president-xi-jinping-returns-public-stage.
120. “Defense Minister,” Ministry of National Defense
of the People’s Republic of China, n.d., http://eng.mod.gov.cn
/Ministry/index.htm.
121. John Costello, “The Strategic Support Force: Update
and Overview,” China Brief 16, no. 19 (2016).
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anti-corruption body.122 Until recently, Rocket Force
officer Chen Guangjun commanded the newly
consolidated intelligence apparatus, and the Rocket
Force was the second most represented service among
Joint Staff Department heads.123
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ROCKET FORCE:
MORE ADVANCED, MORE BELLIGERENT,
BUT LESS CAPABLE?
These personnel policies and trends motivate
important implications for the Rocket Force, for the
broader PLA, and for US-Chinese security relations.
For the Rocket Force, the evidence presented here
suggests an organization still aligned toward the
conventional mission set, increasingly focused on
advanced technology, and perhaps better positioned
to execute joint operations. For the PLA, evidence
of a greater emphasis on loyalty over effectiveness
suggests a both less capable and more aggressive
military. Finally, for US-Chinese security relations, Xi’s
emphasis on personal loyalty and his concentration of
political power could suggest a more aggressive China,
while more robust operational security and personnel
reliability programs could improve strategic stability.
Evidence from personnel policies and trends
suggests the Rocket Force may continue to prioritize
the conventional component of its identity over the
nuclear one. The placement of Rocket Force personnel
122. Zhao Lei, “Nation’s Top Military Body Appoints New
General,” China Daily, November 3, 2011.
123. Zi
Yang,
“Rocket
Force
Gaining
Power
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Army-Dominated
PLA,”
Asia
Times,
September
23,
2017,
https://asiatimes.com/2017/09
/rocket-force-gaining-power-chinas-army-dominated-pla/.
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in key military posts throughout the PLA, along with
the recent elevation of the Rocket Force, suggests
China’s missile forces will enjoy more power relative
to the other military services. This status could mean
a more independent Rocket Force that is able to make
a play for important strategic military capabilities,
or one that is better positioned to set its own policies
and doctrine. Historically, China has been relatively
restrained in the development and deployment of its
(nuclear) missile forces,124 affirming that it “has never
participated in any form of nuclear arms race, nor will
it ever do so.”125 But the Rocket Force’s focus on highly
educated recruits and Commander Zhou Yaning’s
focus on advanced technology suggest the force may
continue to develop and deploy new capabilities. In
2018, some media reports quoted Chinese observers
arguing that Beijing should consider developing new
smaller-yield warheads, and information released by
the Chinese Academy of Engineering Physics suggests

124. For recent evidence on Chinese thinking toward
nuclear weapons, see Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor
Fravel, “Assuring Assured Retaliation: China’s Nuclear Posture
and US-China Strategic Stability,” International Security 40,
no. 2 (Fall 2015): 7–50. For a review of some of the technical
and organizational challenges China could face in adopting a
more aggressive nuclear posture, see David C. Logan, “Hard
Constraints on a Chinese Nuclear Breakout,” Nonproliferation
Review 24, no. 1-2 (2017): 13–30.
125. Chinese Ministry of National Defense, “China’s
National Defense in 2010” (white paper, Chinese Ministry of
National Defense, March 2011).
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China may be increasing the frequency with which it
conducts simulated nuclear tests.126
At the operational level, the Rocket Force’s focus
on increasing the frequency and complexity of joint
exercises, as well as attempts to further integrate
command and control structures between China’s
missile forces and those of the TCs, could enhance the
ability of the missile forces to coordinate with other
units in joint campaigns. But significant challenges
remain. Whether the Rocket Force and the PLA
at-large will be able to overcome these challenges,
especially in the near term, remains to be seen.
At the strategic level, however, to the extent that
the PLA under Xi Jinping prioritizes political loyalty
over military effectiveness as a criterion for promotion,
the ability of the Chinese military to fight and win
future wars may be jeopardized. Indeed, findings
from political science suggest that the militaries of
authoritarian states are, on average, less effective,
126. “美国大玩核火早晚烧到自己眉毛” [If the US plays
with nuclear fire, it will eventually burn its own eyebrows], 环
球时报 [Global times], February 5, 2018, http://news.sina.com.
cn/o/2018-02-05/doc-ifyremfz4996202.shtml;
“美国要降低核
武器使用门槛 中国应做这四件事回应” [The US wants to lower
the nuclear threshold—China should do these four things to
respond], 环球时报 [Global times], February 5, 2018, https://
mil.sina.cn/2018-02-05/detail-ifyremfz5016306.d.html?cre=tian
yi&mod=wpage&loc=4&r=0&doct=0&rfunc=0&tj=none&tr=12;
Raymond Wang, “Making Sense of Chinese Reactions to the
US 2018 Nuclear Posture Review,” Diplomat, February 24, 2018,
https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/making-sense-of-chinesereactions-to-the-us-2018-nuclear-posture-review/; and Stephen
Chen, “China Steps up Pace in New Nuclear Arms Race with
US and Russia as Experts Warn of Rising Risk of Conflict,” South
China Morning Post, May 28, 2018, https://www.scmp.com/
news/china/society/article/2147304/china-steps-pace-newnuclear-arms-race-us-and-russia-experts-warn.
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in part because of the privileging of loyalty over
merit and of coup-proofing policies which at times
deliberately neuter the military’s capabilities to reduce
its potential threat to the regime.127
The focus on political loyalty also suggests that
perhaps China under Xi would be more likely to
fight interstate conflicts. Some of the political science
literature examining how patterns of interstate conflict
vary with regime type may be instructive in plotting
the future of Chinese security relations. Jessica Weeks,
for instance, identifies four ideal types of authoritarian
states: machine (civilian, non-personalist), boss
(civilian, personalist), junta (military, non-personalist),
and strongman (military, personalist).128 Weeks finds
evidence that authoritarian, personalist states are
more likely to initiate interstate conflicts, as personalist
leaders are less constrained by a domestic audience.
Until recently, China’s various features of consultative
governance meant it could best be described as a
machine.129 But Xi Jinping’s efforts to consolidate
power and cultivate a personalistic rule may mean
China is increasingly adopting characteristics of a

127. Caitlin Talmadge, The Dictator’s Army: Battlefield
Effectiveness in Authoritarian Regimes (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2015).
128. Jessica L. P. Weeks, Dictators at War and Peace (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 2014), chapter 1.
129. Rory Truex, “Consultative Authoritarianism and Its
Limits,” Comparative Political Studies 50, no. 3 (2017): 329–61;
and Rory Truex, Making Autocracy Work: Representation and
Responsiveness in Modern China (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
University Press, 2016).
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boss regime, one with fewer constraints at home and,
therefore, more likely to initiate conflict abroad.130
Finally, though China appears to be emphasizing
important aspects of its operational security and
personnel reliability programs, important weaknesses
may still exist if the force does not adequately address
the mental health of its troops or if it fails to screen
for important security risks such as vulnerability to
financial coercion or substance abuse. US officials
may wish to engage their Chinese counterparts on
issues of personnel reliability within the Rocket
Force. Enhancing personnel reliability within nuclear
programs may simultaneously enhance both positive
and negative control of weapons, reducing risks of an
accidental or unauthorized launch and strengthening
strategic stability.131 Of course, the specifics of a state’s
nuclear security and personnel reliability programs
are sensitive and closely held.
These personnel trends portend a complex
future for China’s missile forces. The PLA Rocket
Force confronts a series of challenges in personnel
management: competing with other elements of
society and the PLA to attract high-quality recruits,
balancing the Rocket Force’s conventional and nuclear
130. Susan Shirk, “The Return to Personalistic Rule,”
Journal of Democracy 29, no. 2 (April 2018): 22–36; Minxin Pei,
“China’s Return to Strongman Rule,” Foreign Affairs, November
1, 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2017
-11-01/chinas-return-strongman-rule; and Ryan Haas and Tarun
Chhabra, “How Much Does Xi Matter? New Voices on China’s
Foreign Policy,” Brookings, January 22, 2019, https://www
.brookings.edu/articles/how-much-does-xi-matter-new
-voices-on-chinas-foreign-policy/ (site discontinued).
131. Peter D. Feaver, “Command and Control in Emerging
Nuclear Nations,” International Security 17, no. 3 (Winter 1992
–1993): 160–87.
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constituencies, guaranteeing the security of its nuclear
weapons and the people who manage them, and
managing the tensions between being red and being
an expert. At the same time, however, China’s missile
forces have gained organizationally, thanks to the
growth of its personnel and weapons systems and to
the key promotions of some of its alumni. Although
the future of the people of the Rocket Force remains
to be seen, it is a future that will have important
implications for the Rocket Force, the PLA, and
Chinese security relations abroad.
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3. THE THREE ENABLERS: MANAGING AND
ASSURING ACCESS FOR PEOPLE’S LIBERATION
ARMY BASES AND OVERSEAS OPERATIONS
Eric Kiss
This chapter discusses China’s ability to manage its
current and potential overseas bases. China will most
likely continue to expand its global presence to ensure
its economic ambitions. To be successful, the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) will require three key enablers
if it is to obtain and maintain the access and privileges
to leverage its overseas bases. These enablers include
foreign-area expertise, legal support, and contracting
for base support. If the PLA fails to develop these
capabilities, it could fail to successfully manage the
political and social dynamics of host nations necessary
to leverage an overseas base.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
• To support its global ambitions, China will likely
continue to expand its overseas bases, which
will engender a narrative of resistance among
the population of the nation hosting a PLA base.
• The PLA’s apparent lack of expertise to
manage the local host political, social, and
economic dynamics could undermine China’s
overseas presence.
• If the PLA can incorporate the capabilities and
expertise required to manage base access and
privileges, it will require China to be more open
and transparent concerning its strategic and
global intentions.
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Imagine the PLA has established a new base in a
foreign country. The 1,000 soldiers, sailors, and airmen
assigned to the base are tasked to support contingency
missions important to China’s interests in the region and
to provide services to the base and force protection. The
base relies on a consistent delivery of supplies from China
to sustain the unit. The base relies very little, if at all, on
the local economy, and the personnel living on the base
are effectively isolated from local population.
After a year on the base, the periodic resupply is
delayed due to storms, causing a shortage of food. The
commander of the PLA force decides to use a contingency
fund to buy food from a local market. A few select logistics
soldiers from the base, with some ability in the local
language, go to a small community market and buy up
most of the food to feed personnel for about the next three
days. The vendors in the market are happy, but the food
prices go up as the supply in the market is diminished.
Angry at the impact on the price of food and possessing
a general resentment at the presence of foreign forces in
their country, a small contingent of local men, women,
and children gather outside to protest.
The protest is peaceful at first, and a small group of
journalists are recording the event. Watching the protest
is an armed PLA force protection contingent standing
behind the large security gate. Among the protestors, a
small group of younger individuals—who are known
affiliates of a local group generally opposed to foreign
occupiers—begin to agitate the crowd. Taking advantage
of the lack of local authorities, they throw rocks at the
gate in effort to provoke the Chinese guards. One rock
strikes a PLA soldier, slightly injuring him. A second
protestor then begins to throw a rock at the gate just
as a PLA soldier turns his attention back to the crowd.
Determining the rock-throwing protester presents a
danger to the safety of other PLA soldiers, he turns his
weapon and fires, striking the rock-thrower in the chest.
The other PLA soldiers, confused, also open fire on the
crowd—hitting three other local protesters. The crowd
begins to run away from the gate and disperse back into
the local community. The media, now present, begins
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to take pictures and videotape three individuals lying
motionless on the ground.
The host-nation population and the opposition are
swift to respond: They begin to criticize the government
in power for the corruption that allowed the PLA to build
the base in the first place. To assuage the local constituency
and to avoid appearing weak, the president of the host
nation demands the PLA soldiers, who fired the shots, be
handed over to the local authorities for prosecution. The
PLA, fearing for the safety of its troops and not wanting
to subject them to local jurisdiction which will not be
impartial, quietly returns them to China. Local anger
escalates, resulting in the government of the host nation
demanding the Chinese to leave.

The above scenario has not occurred, but it is
plausible. Nations that manage an overseas presence
have had to deal with a host of variables to ensure they
can maintain the base access and privileges necessary
to support effective overseas operations. This study
asks whether China has the capabilities to maintain
effectively the privileges and rights to sustain a base in
a sovereign country.
This first part of this chapter confirms that China
likely intends to expand its overseas basing posture to
protect its interest and to realize its global economic
ambitions. The second part of chapter identifies and
discusses three important capabilities, or enablers,
critical to establishing and maintaining bases and
analyzes the PLA’s capabilities in the areas of foreignarea expertise, legal support, and expeditionary
contracting support. Every country hosting a military
base from another country’s military is different and
presents unique challenges; as a result, these three
enablers become very critical to an overseas mission.
If the PLA is unable to successfully manage the unique
set of dynamics in each country hosting a permanent
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presence, its desire to protect its interest will end
before it can even start.
The final part of this chapter speculates on the
impact these enablers will have on the PLA and its
policies. This analysis is a thought experiment, but some
imagination is necessary in the attempt to extrapolate
and raise questions for further inquiry concerning the
future trends for the PLA transformation and to gain a
better understanding of the ambitions of the People’s
Republic of China (PRC). Predicting exactly how the
PLA will evolve as it takes on greater responsibilities
for China’s interests is impossible, but how the PLA
responds to the pressures and pluralities of the
international environment will have a tremendous
impact on current rules-based order.
This chapter does not consider PLA deployments
to participate in UN peacekeeping operations.
Growing PRC confidence to stage the PLA in other
countries outside of multilateral endorsements is
creating new dilemmas for the international rulesbased order in Djibouti and other PRC facilities that
may have military utility.
ENSURING ACCESS FOR A NEW GLOBAL
CHINA
Former US Secretary of Defense James Mattis
stated, “We are aware China will face an array of
challenges and opportunities in coming years.”1 With
its new base in the country of Djibouti, China has
taken a significant step toward securing its interests
beyond its immediate periphery, and it will likely
1. James Mattis, “Remarks by Secretary Mattis at Plenary
Session of the 2018 Shangri-La Dialogue” (speech, Singapore,
June 2, 2018).
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not be its last. Securing its economic interests is a
natural outcome of China’s current ambitions and
a path which other countries with global economic
interests have followed. But as these countries have
learned, establishing and sustaining bases does not
only involve securing real estate and putting up
military facilities. Basing in foreign countries will
present new challenges to the PLA when obtaining
and maintaining the necessary access and privileges
that are the prerogative of a host nation to grant.
Command and control and logistics are obvious
challenges, but less obvious is the ability to manage
the local political, legal, and economic dynamics
that have a profound impact on the legitimacy of a
foreign presence or posture. PLA leadership will have
to consider these factors and build the capabilities
required to successfully manage these dynamics. These
capabilities, which will be imperative to ensure the
PRC is able to protect its interests through persistent
global presence, will impact the internal culture and
the international perceptions of the PLA.
MORE BASES IN PLACES?
China’s Belt and Road Initiative, whether it is
defined as a strategy, a policy, or strictly an economic
initiative, will result in the entangling security
issues and political blowback that have historically
accompanied a country’s global ambitions.2 As
the PRC proffers huge infrastructure projects and
business investments to countries—especially those
2. Eric Kiss and Kate Zhou, “China’s New Burden in
Africa,” in Dancing with the Dragon: China’s Emergence in the
Developing World, ed. Dennis Hickey and Baogang Guo (Lanham,
MD: Lexington Books, 2010), 145–64.
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with emerging economies and fragile political and/
or social systems—it will be vulnerable to threats to
the supposedly altruistic Belt and Road Initiative.
The PRC will, undoubtedly, take steps to ensure the
security of its interests, investments, supply chains,
and the Chinese diaspora that emigrates to support
these projects. As Tim Heath states in his study on
PRC overseas security, “if China lacks a reliable way
to protect its interests in unstable countries, ambitious
infrastructure and investment projects could suffer
heavy losses or remain unrealized.”3
Devin Thorne and Ben Spevack point out that
security is inseparable from its economic ambitions.
In their report, Harbored Ambitions: How China’s Port
Investments Are Strategically Reshaping the Indo-Pacific,
Thorne and Spevack assert that while the impetus for
the Belt and Road Initiative is economic gain, “Chinese
analysts . . . routinely prioritize China’s national
security interests over the objective of mutually
beneficial economic development, contradicting the
position of official policy documents.”4 President Xi
Jinping would much rather highlight the altruistic
intentions and the mutual benefits of his hallmark
initiative; however, the PRC understands it must
protect its ambitious economic interests.5
In the PRC’s 2015 white paper on military strategy,
the PLA is directed to shoulder a list of tasks, “to
3. Tim Heath, China’s Pursuit of Overseas Security (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018), ix.
4. Devin Thorne and Ben Spevack, Harbored Ambitions: How
China’s Port Investments are Strategically Reshaping the Indo-Pacific
(Washington, DC: C4ADS, 2018), 4.
5. Tanner Greer, “One Belt, One Road, One Big Mistake,”
Foreign Policy, December 6, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.
com/2018/12/06/bri-china-belt-road-initiative-blunder/.
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safeguard the security of China’s overseas interests.”6
Among a host of other threats to China’s rise, violent
extremist groups top the list. China is currently more
focused on its own domestic terrorist threat, which the
government attributes to Uighur Muslims, but China
recognizes the need to address the threat outside
of PRC borders as well. Zhang Xiaoqi, intelligence
chief at China’s paramilitary People’s Armed Police,
said, “anti-terror fight preparations” must be ready
to safeguard national strategic interests anywhere,
and “the mission scope of the special forces stretches
from land to sea, from home to abroad.”7 The new
PRC anti-terrorism law endorses Zhang’s ambition by
mandating that the PLA and the People’s Armed Police
leave the country for counterterrorism purposes at the
approval of the Central Military Commission (CMC).8
The new PLA Navy base in Djibouti was a
watershed moment for the PLA and China, lending
evidence the PLA intends to extend its reach outside
of a multilateral consensus; however, this is not a new
idea. In a 2015 report published in the PLA Daily, basing
was viewed as a way to extend a nation’s influence
and act as “bridgehead” (桥头堡) to participate in

6. Information Office of the State Council, “China’s Military
Strategy” (white paper, Information Office of the State Council of
the PRC, May 26, 2015).
7. Ben Blanchard, “China Eyes Anti-Terror Force to Protect
Overseas Interests,” Reuters, September 29, 2018, https://www
.reuters.com/article/us-china-defence-security/china-eyes-anti
-terror-force-to-protect-overseas-interests-idUSKCN1M909U.
8. National People’s Congress of the PRC, Xinjiang Uighur
Autonomous Region Regulation on De-Extremification (Standing
Committee of the 13th People’s Congress of the Xinjiang Uighur
Autonomous Region, October 9, 2018).
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global affairs.9 Now with the rumors of additional
bases from Tajikistan to Iceland and the extrapolation
of China’s intentions when it invests in distant places
like Sri Lanka, China will likely continue to build
bases in areas where it has strategic interests and can
extend its influence.10 But the ways in which the PRC
will handle the practical and diplomatic challenges to
executing such contingencies are unclear.11
For the first time, China unilaterally established a
permanent military presence in a foreign country. In
the past, China has preferred to manage its overseas
deployment through multilaterally sanctioned UN
peacekeeping operations, while under the auspices
of the UN.12 But the Chinese base in Africa is a clear
departure from this preference. A UN staff that
handles many legal aspects, coordinates local support,
and organizes logistical support under UN operating
procedures and agreements eradicates many of the
9. “外军海外基地扫描” [A scan of foreign military overseas
bases], Chinamil.com, 2016, http://txjs.chinamil.com.cn/.
10. Gerry Shih, “In Central Asia’s Forbidding Highlands,
a Quiet Newcomer: Chinese Troops,” Washington Post,
February 18, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world
/asia_pacific/in-central-asias-forbidding-highlands-a-quiet
-newcomer-chinese-troops/2019/02/18/78d4a8d0-1e62-11e9
-a759-2b8541bbbe20_story.html; Trym Aleksander Eiterjord,
“China’s Busy Year in the Arctic,” Diplomat, January 30, 2019,
https://thediplomat.com/2019/01/chinas-busy-year-in-the
-arctic/; Maria Abi-Habib, “How China Got Sri Lanka to Cough
up a Port,” New York Times, June 25, 2018, https://www.nytimes
.com/2018/06/25/world/asia/china-sri-lanka-port.html;
and
“More Chinese Military Bases abroad Possible, PLA Strategist
Says,” EFE, January 10, 2019, https://www.efe.com/efe
/english/world/more-chinese-military-bases-abroad-possible
-pla-strategist-says/.
11.

Ben Blanchard, “China Eyes Anti-Terror Force.”

12.

Heath, China’s Pursuit, ix.
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challenges that emerge in a base similar to the one
in Djibouti. Now, the PLA must set the necessary
conditions on the ground conditions before China can
successfully exploit its forward stationed capacity to
augment its expeditions overseas.
NOW COMES THE HARD PART
Establishing a base, building the military facilities,
and deploying the personnel is the easy part. The
PRC’s Ministry of National Defense indicated that “Xi
encouraged them to establish a good image for China’s
military, and promote international and regional peace
and stability.”13 But the difficult part of managing
any overseas presence is obtaining and maintaining
the access and privileges required to facilitate the
mission of a forward deployed military unit or any
a contingency operation. In Kurt Campbell’s book,
Pivot: The Future of American Statecraft, he asserts
unequivocally, “there is perhaps nothing so difficult
as stationing one’s military forces on the sovereign,
democratic soil of another country.”14 Many studies
allege that China’s port investments are intended to
capture and control facilities and real estate that will

13. Ben Blanchard, “Promote Peace, Xi Tells Soldiers at
First Overseas Base,” Reuters, November 3, 2017, https://www
.reuters.com/article/us-china-defence/promote-peace-chinas-xi
-tells-soldiers-at-first-overseas-base-idUSKBN1D401U.
14. Kurt Campbell, The Pivot: The Future of American
Statecraft (New York: Grand Central Publishing, 2016), 280.
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provide exclusive access for the PLA, or at least be
used for dual use purposes.15
Prescient examples include the Hambantota Port
in Sri Lanka and concerns of China coercing with
the Djiboutian government to gain control of port
operations.16 But nations have sovereign rights to
negotiate—and sometimes renegotiate—terms of an
agreement, to include a basing agreement. Historically,
the biggest threat to basing rights is the internal
political and security dynamics of a host nation.
In their RAND report, Access Granted: Political
Challenges to the Overseas Military Presence, 1945–2014,
Stacie L. Pettyjohn and Jennifer Kavanagh point out,
“local opposition often emerges organically within
nations that permit U.S. forces on their soil, and at
times, these internal access threats can force the host
nation to restrict or rescind U.S. access.” They identify
two types of threats: internal threats—a local population
challenging a US military presence or US forces’ right
to operate from its nation’s territory—and external
threats—a third party pressuring a host nation to deny,
restrict, or rescind US basing rights. Both rely on either
organically or externally influenced local indigenous
attitudes toward a foreign force presence.17 Although
15. Christopher D. Yung and Ross Rustici with Scott
Devary and Jenny Lin, “Not an Idea We Have to Shun”: Chinese
Overseas Basing Requirements in the 21st Century, China Strategic
Perspectives 7 (Washington, DC: National Defense University
Press, 2014), 1.
16. Mark Green, “China’s Debt Diplomacy: How Belt
and Road Threatens Countries’ Ability to Achieve SelfReliance,” Foreign Policy, April 25, 2019, https://foreignpolicy
.com/2019/04/25/chinas-debt-diplomacy/.
17. Stacie L. Pettyjohn and Jennifer Kavanagh, Access
Granted: Political Challenges to the U.S. Overseas Military Presence,
1945–2014 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2016).
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their study focused on the impact these dynamics play
on US overseas bases, the same challenges are likely to
apply to other countries seeking to build a long-term
overseas basing posture.
The PLA is new to establishing bases in another
country’s sovereign territory under peacetime
conditions, and it has not previously secured access
to operate from a base in a contingency operation.
Extensive security-study literature on the complexity
of obtaining access and managing the relationship
with a host country is lacking, and the sources that are
available did not entail robust research. In contrast,
managing relations with a host government and
the local community, addressing legal issues, and
contracting services from the local economy are likely
to consume as much of the time of policy makers and
decision makers as making decisions on strategy,
posture, training, manning, and equipping.
Accurately ascertaining how China will ensure the
security of its interests overseas has been difficult. The
PRC’s combination of opacity and limited experience
makes sufficiently anticipating China’s strategic
intentions difficult. Thus, the ways in which China
will command and control its overseas operations
are not apparent. The only glimpse the public has
received is the very public demonstration of Xi
Jinping’s visit (wearing a PLA camouflage uniform)
to the PLA Joint Battle Command Center, where he
participated in a teleconference with the personnel
stationed on the PLA base in Djibouti.18 This visit
demonstrated the Joint Battle Command Center’s
18. Tyler Rogoway, “Take a Rare Peek inside China’s
Expansive Joint Battle Command Center,” Drive, November 7,
2017, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/15866/take-a
-rare-peek-inside-chinas-expansive-joint-battle-command-center.
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ability to communicate across great distances in real
time to its people stationed in foreign countries, but
did not clarify how the Chinese leaders would control
or manage the nuance of fluid dynamics if the Chinese
presence were to expand in scale.
THE THREE ENABLERS
Three capabilities critical for assuring base access
include foreign-area expertise, legal support, and
contracting for local base support. No evidence or
significant study is available indicating the way in
which the PLA is developing these enabling functions
to support overseas basing. Furthermore, illustrating
the impact competency has in these areas on managing
base access and privileges is difficult because the
variables are diverse and belie statistical analysis.
Nonetheless, these capabilities are critical enablers
that assure mission access and maintain the legitimacy
of a forward deployed force occupying a permanent
basing facility.
Foreign-Area Expertise
Having individuals on hand—whether they be
members of the staff or the actual commander—who
have extensive experience in a region or expertise in
the language, culture, and local politics of a specific
country is an unspoken rule for successfully executing
expeditionary operations and managing foreign
basing. The language ability and the accompanying
cultural aptitude that follows extensive language
study, whether acquired through travel or more
formal training, are critical when enlisting support
from the host government and the local population.
More specifically, foreign-area experts can find and
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develop the locals—through contacts developed
over time via travel or research—who will be able to
accentuate the positive impacts brought by the foreign
force on the host nation and to diffuse those benefits to
the local population. These experts can also assist the
commander of forces deployed in the foreign country
to mitigate disputes and to deescalate local conflicts
through a developed understanding of the local social
dynamics and power centers.
The US experience in Iraq and Afghanistan
illustrates the importance of this foreign-area
knowledge. After the initial invasions and subsequent
occupations of both countries, the US military took
great pains to train and develop local area expertise.
The US Army had already established the Foreign
Area Officer Program, which cultivates foreign-area
expertise through language training, academic study,
and in-country experience. But US commanders in
Iraq and Afghanistan quickly recognized the impact
local-area expertise had on mission success and how
deployed units were critically short. In an effort to
foster more expertise quickly in Afghanistan, the
US military established the Afghanistan-Pakistan
Hands program to build a bench of experts quickly
who would rotate in and out of Afghanistan and
Pakistan.19 Additionally, to fill that critical capability
gap, all pre-deployment training began to include
language and culture training along with the training
on the firing range that prepares a unit for its
tactical combat mission. This trend continues in other
regions where US forces deploy to support exercises
and other operations.
19. Mark Lee, “The Afghanistan-Pakistan Hands Program,”
US Army (website), February 12, 2014, https://www.army.mil
/article/115523/the_afghanistan_pakistan_hands_program.
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To meet the PLA’s needs for foreign expertise, the
PLA University of Foreign Languages in Luoyang,
Henan Province, is one of the top nine foreign
language schools in China.20 The PLA Institute of
International Relations in Nanjing also trains officers
in foreign languages for the military intelligence
sections of various military regions and attaches
assigned to its embassies in foreign countries.21 China
also has many government-affiliated think tanks and
universities that study global security, regional affairs,
and international relations. China is likely gaining
more regional expertise through the diaspora of
Chinese citizens who have emigrated from China to
support its economic initiatives and to start businesses.
But this expertise from academics in China—or the
diaspora of Chinese citizens—does not appear to
diffuse into the military ranks of the PLA. Members
of the PLA have confirmed the army is unprepared
for foreign deployments because the members lack the
foreign language capability and the cultural aptitude
to understand foreign nations, despite the availability
of language schools and an expanding contact with
foreign people and cultures. This lack of capability and
aptitude was anecdotally evident at a People’s Armed
Police base in Tajikistan when Chinese policemen’s
tasks between local security forces relied heavily on
a Tajik interpreter for some simple tasks at a market

20. Xu Lin, “Top 9 Foreign Language Universities in
China,” China Internet Information Center, June 13, 2011, http://
www.china.org.cn/top10/2011-06/13/content_22772925_3.htm.
21. John Pike, “Second [Intelligence] Program,” Federation
of American Scientists, April 15, 2000, https://fas.org/irp
/world/china/pla/dept_2.htm.
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in Murghab, despite occupying the base for “three,
four years.”22
One problem is the PLA appears to largely
insulate its operational units and leaders from contact
with foreigners. The Office of International Military
Cooperation is tasked with managing all international
military interaction.23 If an event does not include a
representative from this office, the US military has
difficulty attending the event. Even in its leadership
structure under the current reforms, the Chinese
seemingly seek to insulate their force from foreign
interaction. The minister of the PRC’s Ministry of
National Defense and a deputy director of the Joint
Staff Department of the CMC have a portfolio that
includes engagement with foreign military leaders,
yet has little influence over operational or strategic
decision making. In contrast, their counterparts with
operational responsibilities have little contact with
foreign leaders. PLA regulations limiting most officers
to one international trip per year and restrictions on
interactions with foreigners make building relations
with foreign officers difficult for PLA officers.24 Some
PLA officers can briefly travel overseas as part of their
studies at the PLA National Defense University, but
they are carefully scheduled and closely monitored on
their travel.
22.

Gerry Shih, “Central Asia’s Forbidding Highlands.”

23. Yao Jianing, “MND Holds Press Conference on CMC
Organ Reshuffle,” Ministry of National Defense of the People’s
Republic of China, January 12, 2016, http://eng.mod.gov.cn
/TopNews/2016-01/12/content_4636291.htm.
24. Kenneth Allen, Phillip C. Saunders, and John Chen,
Chinese Military Diplomacy, 2003–2016: Trends and Implications
(Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2017), 16.
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This isolation could be attributed to the Chinese
suspicion that outside influences intend to undermine
socialist values. Huang Kunming, the head of the
Publicity Department of the Communist Party of
China, claims “some western countries . . . are trying
to seduce people into ‘beautifying the West’ and
‘being compliant with the West,’ weakening or even
abandoning their identification with their own spiritual
culture,” and that Chinese socialist values must be
protected.25 In fact, a key purpose of the new Politics
and Law Commission under the PLA is to “keep
the troops pure and consolidated.”26 The PLA has
expressed concern that contacts with foreign militaries
could expose PLA officers to political threats, including
Western efforts to promote the idea the PLA should be
a national army, rather than loyal to the Communist
Party of China. If China is to promote its core socialist
values and foster loyalty to the communist party and
nationalist pride, it will continue insulating its most
vulnerable and impressionable junior soldiers from
contact with foreigners, preventing them from gaining
a better understanding of world affairs and—most
importantly—from acquiring the local expertise for
places where the Chinese might build bases.
The point at which the Chinese begin a concerted
effort to grow and foster the experts they will need
to support a more expeditionary global presence will
be apparent. More PLA soldiers will be traveling,
studying, and learning foreign languages. In fact, such
25. Ben Blanchard, “China Minister Warns against
Seduction of Values by Western Nations,” Reuters, November
16, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-politics
-culture/china-minister-warns-against-seduction-of-values-by
-western-nations-idUSKBN1DH0AU.
26.

Yao Jianing, “MND Holds Press Conference.”
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an event will clearly mark China’s intent to expand
basing and, depending on where those PLA personnel
travel to experience foreign culture, where personnel
will build the new bases.
Legal Support
An expeditionary legal capability is also critical
to support forward deployed forces. Legal experts
ensure that local units operate within the limits set
by international law, PRC national law, or the laws
of the host nation. Interpreting law and rectifying
disparities between international law and the basis
for use of force in an international crisis requires
knowledgeable and informed legal expertise in
many areas of law. The spectrum of legal issues is
extensive and complex. Areas that require a nuanced
interpretation and application of law can include
intelligence law and interrogation operations, rules
of engagement, international agreements, status of
force agreements, detainee operations, contingency
and deployment contracting, foreign and deployment
claim environmental law in operations, administrative
law, and military justice in operations.
The PLA has a rich and developed legal culture.
Significant studies and commentary abound regarding
the Chinese approach to “lawfare,” which is a third
of the so-called “three warfares.”27 But the Chinese
have a narrow scope of law and its application in the
military and for national security.

27. Peter Mattis, “China’s ‘Three Warfares’ in Perspective,”
War on the Rocks, January 30, 2018, https://warontherocks
.com/2018/01/chinas-three-warfares-perspective/.
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The Chinese use domestic law to establish a legal
precedent as a casus belli for military action.28 In
effect, the PRC establishes a domestic law to justify
the use of force or to claim the legal right to use force
under certain circumstances. Two ready examples are
the 1992 Law of the People’s Republic of China on
the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, which
sets out some of China’s maritime territorial claims
(and justifies PRC efforts to protect those claims in
disputes), and the 2005 Anti-Secession Law, which
includes justification for the use of force to reunify
Taiwan with the mainland. PRC lawmakers lay out
a plan to achieve a peaceful reunification, but also
the conditions that will require the PRC to compel
reunification through force.29 In the territorial sea law,
Chinese lawmakers describe the baseline for Chinese
land and ambiguous measurements for determining
China’s sovereign territory and seas.30 Neither law
provides for limitations, oversight, or authority
signaling intent to exercise restraint or to comply with
international norms and standards.
If one is to apply this logic to other areas of Chinese
military law, the Law of the People’s Republic of China
on the Protection of Military Installations, adopted by
the Twelfth Session of the Standing Committee of the
28. Larry Wortzel, The Chinese Liberation Army and
Information Warfare (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US
Army War College Press, 2014).
29. National People’s Congress of the PRC, Anti-Secession
Law (3rd Session of the 10th National People’s Congress of the
PRC, March 14, 2005).
30. National People’s Congress of the PRC, Law of the
People’s Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone (24th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the
7th National People’s Congress of the PRC, February 25, 1992).
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Seventh National People’s Congress on February 23,
1990, highlights this troubling trend.31 Article 3
states, “People’s governments and military organs at
all levels shall, in the interests of national security,
jointly protect military installations and safeguard the
interests of national defense.” Later, in chapter 5 of the
law Protection of Military Installations Not Included
in the Military Restricted Zones and the Military
Administrative Zones,” article 21 directs that the
units in charge of military installations “shall adopt
measures for the protections of the military installations
not included in the military restricted zones and the
military administrative zones.” Without a specific
law for overseas bases or any other clarification, one
can assume this policy includes military installations
outside of China’s sovereign territory. These policies
are essentially broad directives justifying the use of
force; however, the law does not impose a limitation
on the measures that a unit may adopt or the caveat
that units must defer to international laws of armed
conflict or, more importantly, the domestic laws of a
host nation. In addition, the laws do not call for the
development of status of force agreements.
Reinforcing the directions in the law described
above, the counterterrorism law promulgated by the
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress
in December of 2015 directs that “organizations
based abroad shall establish and complete security
protection systems and advance response planning,
31. National People’s Congress of the PRC, Law of
the People’s Republic of China on the Protection of Military
Installations (2014 Amendment) (12th Session of the Standing
Committee of the 7th National People’s Congress, February 23,
1990).
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and strengthen security protections for relevant
personnel and property.”32 The law also dictates,
Personnel that are lawfully equipped with and carry
weapons, may use their weapons against persons at the
scene in possession of weapons such as guns and knives,
or who are using other dangerous methods, who are
committing violent acts or are preparing to commit violent
acts, where warnings prove ineffective. In emergency
situations or where giving a warning might cause a more
serious harm, weapons may be used directly.33

This, in essence, is a broad set of rules for
engagement which, if not further refined at the local
level, potentially risks the use of excessive force in
an effort to provide security to a forward deployed
PLA unit. No specific law or direction for developing
regulations or guidelines for managing foreign bases
is apparent.
The PLA is organized enough to manage military
legal affairs to a degree. The PLA court is a parallel
structure to the Supreme People’s Court of the PRC
under the Politics and Legal Affairs Commission. The
PLA organized the military courts under the CMC’s
Politics and Law Commission to “help intensify
the CMC’s leadership of the military’s political and
legal work, deepen the rigorous military governance
in accordance with the law, give larger play to the
politics and law department, prevent, investigate
and deal with criminal activities, and keep the troops
pure and consolidated.” Subordinate military courts
32. National People’s Congress of the PRC, CounterTerrorism Law of the People’s Republic of China (18th Session of
the Standing Committee of the 12th National People’s Congress,
December 27, 2015).
33. National People’s Congress of the PRC, CounterTerrorism Law.
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are arranged under the theater commands to exercise
jurisdiction over military personnel and their families
in the areas of criminal, administrative, and civil law.
In an article for The Diplomat, Susan Finder points out
“there is much less transparency in the military legal
system than in the civilian legal system.”34 But the
Chinese recognize the need to improve the military
legal system. Unfortunately, these calls for reform
are only focused on the need to train more judges to
prosecute crimes and to protect the rights of soldiers.35
Although efforts at prosecutorial reform are admirable
to maintain discipline, they will not meet the needs for
forces deployed overseas in peacetime or in support of
a contingency.
Contracting Support and Procurement
Sun Tzu stated, “The line between disorder and
order lies in logistics.” Operational contracting
support provides significant benefits and efficiencies
to forward deployed forces. Contractors—whether
from China, other foreign countries, or the local
host population—can provide for a range services,
to include local area transportation, construction,
janitorial, groundskeeping, food preparation, and any
other services that contribute to the comfort of the
deployed force and mission success. Contractors can
be hired, as the need arises, to free uniformed military
from base support tasks in order to conduct operational
34. Susan Finder, “Shoring up the ‘Rule of Law’ in China’s
Military,” Diplomat, February 4, 2015, https://thediplomat
.com/2015/02/ruling-the-pla-according-to-the-law/.
35. “比较我国军事法院法官与地方法院法” [On the status of
the judicial committee in criminal proceedings], Docin, January
24, 2014, http://www.docin.com/p-758693962.html.
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tasks.36 Many of these contractors can be filled by local
workers, both building efficiency for logistical support
and contributing to the legitimacy and bolstering of
local support for the occupying forces.
To realize these efficiencies and the inherent
benefits, the military must have experts or trained
personnel who are able to procure the goods and
services necessary for base support. This requirement
calls for personnel who can provide the service,
manage and service the contract, handle labor disputes,
and ensure those who provide necessary services
are paid fairly. If the services are to be procured
locally, then ensuring a certain level of quality and
safety is important.
A key component of the PLA reform included
improving joint logistics capability. On September 13,
2016, China established the Joint Logistics Support
Force under the CMC. During the ceremony
establishing this new command, President Xi Jinping
stated “the Joint Logistics Support Force is the main
force to conduct joint logistics support and strategic
and operational logistics support.”37 Kevin McCauley,
in his testimony before the US-China Economic and
Security Review Commission’s hearing China’s
Military Reforms and Modernization: Implications for
the United States, provided a comprehensive review
of the PLA’s joint logistics modernization. Along with
developing the ability to provide a strategic delivery
36. Moshe Schwartz and Jennifer Church, Department
of Defense’s Use of Contractors to Support Military Operations:
Background, Analysis, and Issues, CRS Report for Congress 7-5700
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, May 17, 2013).
37. Zhang Tao, ed., “China Establishes Joint Logistic Support
Force,” China Military (website), September 13, 2016, http://eng
.chinamil.com.cn/view/2016-09/13/content_7256651.htm.
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capability that can support combat units and overseas
bases, civil-military integration is a key component of
the modernization of logistics capability.
The PLA recognizes that outsourcing certain
logistics requirements to the private sector creates,
“great efficiency, flexibility, and timeliness,” for
logistics. But this integration is limited to developing
better inventory control and leveraging private sector
research for military use. The integration of systems
and schemes that would support local contracting
for Chinese bases is not apparent in the joint logistics
force modernization. McCauley states the Chinese can
leverage private Chinese business under the reforms.
IMPACT ON THE PLA
As Mattis indicated, “China should and does have
a voice in shaping the international system and all of
China’s neighbors have a voice in shaping China’s
role.” If China is to continue its global ambitions,
foreign bases will most likely be necessary. Obtaining
and maintaining base access and operational privileges
will require some of the capabilities described above,
otherwise, such access can easily be threatened by a
miscalculation.38 Without the right systems, legal
agreements, and political relationships in place,
the very legitimacy of a PLA base could come into
question. Basing rights and privileges can be rescinded
even if extensive rents, contracts, and operational
integration are in place; this is often forgotten, though
Pettyjohn and Kavanagh point it out in their study of
China’s political challenges to overseas basing.39
38.

Pettyjohn and Kavanagh, Access Granted.

39.

Pettyjohn and Kavanagh, Access Granted.
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Thus far, no systematic PLA research, as part
of PLA modernization efforts on how to answer the
challenges that a more persistent global presence
will bring, is apparent. Once PLA leaders realize the
Chinese military must develop the ability to manage
the political dynamics of a host-nation relationship
wherever it constructs a base or seeks contingency
access, the culture and the perspectives of the PLA will
be impacted. China will inevitably need to consider
how it will compromise and integrate its forces into
the international community. The PLA will have to
consider its openness and transparency, as well as the
risk of outside influences that could raise questions
of loyalty. The potential for an impact on the cultural
attitude of the PLA will transform as the force becomes
more global.
Empathy
The broad expertise required to manage basing
successfully also requires a certain amount of empathy
to local conditions and interests. This empathy leads
to an understanding that then leads to the ability to
better negotiate mutually beneficial outcomes. As
these experts seek to align the interests and demands
of leaders far removed from the local conditions, their
frustration and doubt of PRC principles, policies,
and law could engender perspectives that could run
counter to PRC’s myopically derived narratives for
global good.
Political Loyalty
The buffer with which the Chinese attempt to
prevent its forces from “being compliant with the
West” will cause a schism between the devout patriots
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insulated from the daily realities on the ground and
those who must accomplish the mission. This dilemma
is already captured in popular culture. In the movie
Wolf Warrior 2, the PLA is stuck in the dilemma to
protect the Chinese people or to adhere to the PRC
and UN authorization for intervention.40 Throughout
the movie, the commander of the PLA Navy and the
sailors in the combat control center on a ship offshore
hover over the trigger to launch a missile, despite
disregarding the carnage they are witnessing through
constant feed from an unmanned aerial vehicle.
Luckily, a former PLA soldier, Leng Feng, who has
been living in China and Africa as a trader and not
constrained by PRC authority, is willing to go find a
Chinese doctor with a cure to a local pandemic and to
then secure a Chinese-owned factory. Although this
character, played by Chinese actor Wu Jing, is able
to operate outside of the PRC principles and rules, he
conveniently demonstrates his patriotism in the end
by waving Chinese flags and declaring the greatness of
China. This friction between dealing with the realties
on the ground and remaining loyal to patriotic dogma
is one that is inherent in a military that operates
globally but is not always so easily rectified.
Conformity to International Rules and Norms
The PLA will be required to compromise and to
achieve success in better line with rules and norms.
The Chinese will not be able to supplant the local
rules or norms every other country observes so easily.
Even the PLA will be required to conform in a foreign
country, especially if the base is in a more developed
40. Wolf Warrior 2, directed by Jing Wu (2017; Plano, TX:
Well Go USA, 2017), DVD.
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country with a functional government and robust laws
and standards.
Increased Transparency of Strategic Intent
If Chinese bases and the PLA presence continue
to expand, the actions required for securing access
provide a clarity of the PLA’s intentions and
aspirations. When a PRC state-owned company
begins construction on a port or attains a lease to run
a port, anxieties and doubts concerning the PRC’s
intentions emerge. An effort to learn a new language,
the negotiation of a status of force agreement, or
the signing of new contracts for base support in a
foreign country offer clear signals of a nation intent
on increasing its profile. These activities may not
necessarily be public knowledge, but they are next to
impossible to keep secret, especially if the host country
insists these items and processes be transparent in an
effort to inform its people and prevent corruption. The
inevitable result will be a publicly available range of
signals and indicators of China’s intentions.
CONCLUSION
This study uses the practical questions about
obtaining and maintaining base access as a lens
through which to raise new questions about China’s
global ambitions and the PLA’s role in securing
them. Two things are clear: The PLA is going to
continue playing a greater role in ensuring China’s
interests abroad, and it is not currently prepared to
manage the political and security dynamics a greater
forward presence and overseas bases will entail. The
United States, which has managed a significant global
presence since the end of World War II, still struggles
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to ensure access to bases in peacetime and during
contingencies. Foreign-area specialists, lawyers, and
contracting experts mitigate the potential for friction,
but when an incident occurs, the guest military
needs to have built the political foundations and
relationships with the host government and the local
community that allow the host and guest to work out
meaningful and mutually beneficial solutions. If the
PLA does not begin considering how it will manage
these dynamics and train officers to help carry out
these tasks, it will have difficulty obtaining and
maintaining the access necessary to pursue its goals.
Though economic leverage is a useful tool, it will not
necessarily be sufficient to coerce a host nation and
bend local leaders to China’s will.
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4. THE PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY IN 2018:
EDUCATION AND PEOPLE’S WAR
Brian Waidelich and Bernard D. Cole
INTRODUCTION: YEARS OF CHANGE, 2008–18
China’s military modernization increased its pace
with the growth of the economy that began with Deng
Xiaoping. The modernization has been marked by
recognition of China’s increasing power following
the 2008 global economic crisis. The 10 years since
have been notable for China’s continued economic
prosperity and concomitant growth in its military
capability. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
modernization has been marked by more state-of-theart equipment and efforts to ensure its personnel are
capable of operating the equipment effectively.
This chapter addresses an important aspect
of that emphasis—namely, China’s campaign to
increase reliance on civilian educational institutions
for sourcing PLA personnel. Relying on a civilian
educational background for new officers and other
personnel does not mean disregarding traditional
military sources for PLA personnel, but it recognizes
the advantages of a modern personnel system of
multiple origins. Both the motivation for this effort
and the various associated programs of civilian origin
will be discussed.
Thomas Bickford previously argued that the PLA
made a “turn to civilian education” around 1999,
prior to which the education of Chinese officers
and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) had been an
“entirely military affair.” This “turn” included an
effort to recruit more college graduates as officers,
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the establishment of a reserve officers’ training
corps similar to that in the United States, and the
development of agreements with civilian universities
to have their professors teach at military academies.1
This chapter provides an updated view of this shift
and concludes with a look at how these changes might
affect the US and Chinese militaries, now and in
the future.
PLA MODERNIZATION AND THE NEED FOR
HIGHER-QUALITY PERSONNEL
PLA modernization in the mid-1990s focused
primarily on improving materiel and addressing
readiness concerns spurred by the US military
performance during Operation Desert Shield and
Operation Desert Storm in 1990–91, and by the 1996
Taiwan Strait Crisis.
As noted above, however, modernization has
increasingly focused on improving personnel
performance, including education and training.
Programs have been developed, instituted, and
changed when deemed appropriate for commissioned
officers and NCOs as well as other enlisted personnel.
Historically, the PLA usually commissioned
officers directly from its enlisted ranks. But China
recognizes that a twenty-first-century military requires
officers with stronger educational backgrounds
and intellectual potential. Personnel accession now
1. Thomas J. Bickford, “Trends in Education and Training,
1924–2007: From Whampoa to Nanjing Polytechnic,” in The
“People” in the PLA: Recruitment, Training, and Education in China’s
Military, ed. Roy Kamphausen, Andrew Scobell, and Travis
Tanner (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War
College Press, 2008), 36–37.
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includes an emphasis on candidates with at least high
school and, if possible, further education.2 This has
contributed to recruiting civilian university graduates
into officer candidate programs.
The military has been making major efforts
to leverage civilian educational resources to
produce officers able to deal effectively with force
modernization. These efforts also reflect an apparent
conclusion that the PLA is by itself unable to develop
the high-quality officers needed. As one manual
on the PLA’s reserve officers’ training corps-like
program put it, China’s civilian universities have
“clear advantages” in their inventories of advanced
technologies, and, by relying on civilian resources, the
military can “patch up” its shortcomings in high-tech
talent development.3
Recruiting and educating higher-quality officer
and enlisted personnel is highlighted as an important
factor in modernizing the PLA. Improving human
capital is emphasized as being of equal importance to,
if not greater importance to than, fielding new, stateof-the-art equipment. Former Chinese President Jiang
Zemin stated, “Though we’re unable to develop all
high-technology weapons and equipment within a
short period of time, we must train qualified personnel
first, for we would rather let our qualified personnel

2. “国务院、中央军委《关于建立依托普通高等教育培养
军队干部制度的决定》” [State Council and CMC “decision to
establish a military cadre cultivation system based on normal
higher education institutions”], China National Radio Online,
May 30, 2000.
3. Cadre Department of the General Political Department of
the PLA, 中国国防生 [China’s national defense students] (Beijing:
PLA Press, 2007), 7.
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wait for the equipment than the other way round.”4
Jiang’s successor, Hu Jintao, announced the Two
Transformations in 2005, seeking to transform the PLA
from “an army preparing to fight local wars under
ordinary conditions” to one preparing for “modern
high-tech conditions,” as well as from “an army based
on quantity to an army based on quality.”5
Hu’s Two Transformations emphasized the need
for more highly educated and capable officers and
enlisted personnel. Mao Zedong’s classic citizen
soldier, who could put down his hoe and pick up a
rifle, was no longer adequate material from which
a proficient modern service man or woman could
be molded. Whether draftee or volunteer, the new
PLA servicemember must possess both the native
intelligence and formal education necessary for
maintaining and operating complex systems. More
recently, PLA personnel quality has been emphasized
in the revival of the bizarre Lei Feng cult.6
These requirements for higher-quality personnel
came at the same time the PLA was undergoing major
personnel cuts and military academic institutions
were being reorganized. These changes made
it more difficult for the PLA by itself to improve
the educational background of officers and
enlisted personnel.
4. Dennis J. Blasko, “Technology Determines Tactics: The
Relationship between Technology and Doctrine in Chinese
Military Thinking,” in China’s Emergence as a Defense Technological
Power, ed. Tai Ming Cheung (New York: Routledge, 2013), 65.
5.

Bickford, “Trends in Education and Training,” 34.

6. See, for example, “Chinese Observe Lei Feng Day by
Doing Good Deeds for Others,” Xinhua, March 5, 2018, http://
www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-03/05/c_137018287.htm.
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Against this backdrop, the Chinese State Council
and Central Military Commission (CMC) jointly
released a document in 2000 strongly signaling the
PLA’s “turn to civilian education.” The “Decision to
establish a military cadre cultivation system based
on normal higher education institutions” offered
a detailed justification and implementation plan
for increasing the use of civilian universities and
vocational schools for preparing military officer
candidates. The opening paragraph first emphasizes
that the PLA is “facing a new situation in which
science and technology [are] rapidly developing,”
which means the PLA must “grasp the initiative”
and cultivate “new-type military talent” able to
take advantage of this new scientific and
technological knowledge.7
Ensuring these new officers are “politically
excellent” is even more important. Hence, the directive
requires reliance on nontraditional commissioning
sources to “satisfy the force’s requirements for highquality talent,” including “progress in employing . . .
normal higher education institutions in national
defense and military modernization.” This in turn
caused the State Council and CMC “to establish a
Military Cadre Cultivation System” based on the
civilian education system. The inclusion of “political
excellence” underlines the leadership’s continued
concern about the political reliability of the PLA.8
The 2000 “Decision” proposed the following four
main channels through which the military could
garner officer candidates from civilian education
institutions.
7.

“State Council and CMC ‘decision to establish.’”

8.

“State Council and CMC ‘decision to establish.’”
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1. Reserve Officer Program. The military
establishes cultivation targets among loweryear students in normal higher education
institutions, ensuring that as they complete
their college studies, they also receive necessary
military-political training, and that after they
graduate, they are selected to be military cadres.
2. Direct Recruitment of Graduates. Among
the soon-to-graduate students (including
graduate students) of normal higher education
institutions and research organizations, highquality students are selected and received into
the force to be military cadres.
3. Post-Oriented Cultivation. Normal higher
education institutions, according to the targeted
student recruitment plans of relevant state
and military departments, recruit outstanding
graduates from secondary and high schools,
ensuring that as they complete their college
studies, they carry out necessary militarypolitical training, and that after they graduate,
they are assigned to posts that match their skills.
4. Hybrid Cultivation Programs. Military and
civilian schools jointly cultivate talent and send
active-duty cadres to normal higher education
institutions for advanced studies.9
The PLA has used all four of these officer candidate
channels during the past decade. Some have been very
small in scale, such as a five-year hybrid cultivation
program between Tsinghua University and the PLA
Air Force Aviation University to grant concurrent
bachelor’s degrees and pilot licenses upon graduation.
9.

“State Council and CMC ‘decision to establish.’”
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Though this program began in 2011, it only graduated
just over 20 students in 2016. In general, there is a lack
of data available about these programs.10
The National Defense Student (国防生) Program
(NDSP), also known as the Reserve Officer (后备军官)
Program, has been much more prominent. This
program was implemented at civilian universities in
the late 1990s and expanded rapidly during the early
2000s, but was canceled in 2017 due to a number of
problems that will be addressed below.
New civilian recruitment programs are linked
with other plans to improve the quality of the force’s
officers, notably the Strategic Project for Talented
People, which the CMC ordered the PLA to implement
in August 2003. This program directed the military to
develop by 2023 a cohort of commanding officers who
were “capable of directing informationalized wars and
of building informationalized armed forces.” These
commanders were to be supported by staff officers
“proficient in planning armed forces building and
military operation,” supported in turn by scientists
“capable of planning and organizing the innovative
development of weaponry and equipment and the
exploration of key technologies.” The immediate
goal was to make “a remarkable improvement in
the [presumably educational] quality of military
personnel” by 2010.11

10. “PLA, Tsinghua Student Pilots Assigned to Air Forces,”
Xinhua, June 19, 2016, http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2016
-06/19/content_7220877.htm.
11. State Council of the People’s Republic of China,
“Revolution in Military Affairs with Chinese Characteristics,” in
China’s National Defense in 2004 (Beijing: Information Office of the
State Council of the People’s Republic of China, December 2004).
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The PLA also increased measures to use civilian
educational institutions to produce NCO candidates.
The two main methods for this since the early 2000s
have been the direct recruitment of NCOs upon
graduation from a civilian college-level institution,
or when they take a college entrance examination,
after which they must take courses addressing
military requirements at partner vocational schools.
The Chinese military also adjusted its recruitment
policies to raise the maximum age of recruits to
increase the pool of soldiers with a civilian postsecondary education.
CIVILIAN SOURCES OF BETTER-EDUCATED
CONSCRIPTS
Although China has long recognized the
importance of improving the education levels of
military personnel, certain systemic issues hampered
previous efforts to conscript or recruit collegeeducated students as entry-level soldiers. For instance,
conscription requirements for college students were
relaxed under the 1955 Military Service Law of the
People’s Republic of China (兵役法); the Military
Service Law amendment in 1998 expanded this to
outright deferment.12
Another problem arose from the enlistment
ages, 18 to 22, which overlapped with most full-time
college-student enrollments, meaning most graduates
were too old to enlist. The PLA partially addressed
this problem with the release of the 2001 amended
12. Chen Yongfu, Chen Wei, and Yang Zhonghua, “对新
形势下大学生征兵工作的几点思考” [Several thoughts on college
student conscription work under the new situation], 国防
[National defense] 7 (2017): 70.
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Regulations on Conscription Work (2001年《征兵工作
条例), which allowed full-time college students under
22 to leave school for a two-year enlistment, followed
by a guaranteed return to their schools.
These problems were further addressed in
2011 amendments to the Military Service Law,
which removed the deferment clause and raised
the maximum enlisting age to 24.13 These changes
provided a legal basis for the military to more
aggressively recruit soon-to-graduate or recently
graduated college students.
Conscription had been an annual winter event,
which also created problems, since the PLA was
missing the window to conscript most college
graduates, who typically signed employment
contracts in early autumn following graduation.
Hence, peak recruitment was changed in 2013 to late
summer–autumn, which better positioned the PLA to
recruit recent college graduates and eased difficulties
associated with the annual training cycle.14
The effort to increase personnel accession from
civilian sources has made significant progress since
2001. Data from 2001 shows 2,000 college students as
the conscription goal; that number reportedly rose
to 130,000 in 2009 and 150,000 in 2014. The numbers
are not consistent over time, however, as indicated in
table 4-1.15

13. Wang Shumei, The PLA and Student Recruits: Reforming
China’s Conscription System (Stockholm: Institute for Security and
Development Policy, January 2015), 6–7.
14.

Wang, PLA and Student Recruits, 12.

15.

Wang, PLA and Student Recruits, 5–6.
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Table 4-1. Conscription of college-educated students
into the PLA, 2001–14
Year

Goal for Recruiting College
Students

2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014

>2,000
3,000
~2,000
~2,000
~2,000
Not released
Not released
38,000
130,000
>100,000
>100,000
>100,000
~140,000
~150,000

Despite the rising numbers of enlisted college
students, there are signs that these students’ education
may not be meeting the requirements of a modernizing
PLA. One sample of newly admitted college
student recruits in 2017 contained “basically
no graduates of Program 211 and Program 985
universities,” generally considered China’s top civilian
educational institutions.16

16. Cao Zhigang, “对提升大学生征集比例的‘冷思考’” [A
“dispassionate look” at increasing the proportion of college
student recruitment], 国防 [National defense] 10 (2017): 73.
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Furthermore, the Chinese media has recently
reported about volunteer enlistees in the PLA who quit
prior to their required two years in service, although
numbers are not readily available. In a recent case,
four male enlisted personnel in Fujian province who
were “unhappy with the military’s strict discipline”
were each fined 50,000 RMB (approximately $7,900)
after leaving the military early. For three years, these
men would also be blacklisted from employment in
government or state-owned enterprise jobs, banned
from traveling abroad, and prohibited from enrolling
in school.17
One new soldier opined that today’s young people
have more choices than just joining the army: “They
can enroll in universities, go abroad, or join the
workforce.” “The strict regulations in the army” and
“the increasing difficulty of securing promotions” are
also disincentives, he said. This opinion was published
almost simultaneously with a government document
calling for an increase in the quality and numbers of
university graduates entering the PLA.18 Recruiting
difficulties certainly are not unique to China, but the
PLA’s flexibility in responding to them is uncertain.
CIVILIAN SOURCES OF PLA OFFICERS
The PLA is seeking military officer candidates
who are studying in or who graduated from
17. Zhao Lei, “Military Quitters Face Heavy Penalties,”
China Daily, April 9, 2018, http://www.chinadaily.com
.cn/a/201804/09/WS5acac0f9a3105cdcf6516da7.html.
18. Wang Lianzhang, “People’s Liberation Army
Warns of Rise in Dropouts,” Sixth Tone, January 26, 2017,
http://www.sixthtone.com/news/1876/peoples-liberation
-army-warns-of-rise-in-dropouts.
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university-level institutions and who possess the
physical fitness necessary to participate in active
military operations. The first requirement emphasizes
university students majoring in science, technology,
engineering, and mathematics (STEM) subjects, which
reflects the oft-repeated emphasis in PLA writings
about the future of warfare being characterized by
“informatized conditions.” These students in turn are
subject to written examinations and oral interviews to
assess both their knowledge and political suitability.
In addition, these students are subject to written
and oral examinations to assess their political
knowledge and reliability. These programs have
technical requirements similar to US reserve officers’
training corps programs, but the latter are generally
unconcerned with candidates’ politics.19
By 1999, the PLA Navy had established a 2010 goal
of accessing at least 40 percent of new officers from
civilian universities.20 This was updated and expanded
in 2007, when the General Political Department’s
Cadre Department established a 2010 goal for the
entire PLA that 60 percent or more of its annual officer
accessions come from civilian sources.
The PLA’s primary civilian education source
program, the NDSP, focused mainly on first- and
second-year university students. The program was
launched in several Chinese universities in 1999
19. See Justin B. Liang and Sarah K. Snyder, comps.,
“Colloquium Brief: Exploring the ‘Right Size’ for China’s
Military: PLA Missions, Functions, and Organizations,” Strategic
Studies Institute, US Army War College Press, February 1, 2007,
https://press.armywarcollege.edu/articles_editorials/117/.
20. Xinhua, August 17, 1999; and Bernard D. Cole, The Great
Wall at Sea: China’s Navy Enters the 21st Century (Annapolis, MD:
US Naval Institute Press, 2001), 70.
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and began expanding rapidly to other schools.21
Twenty-six civilian schools were participating in the
program by 2001, a number that grew to 118 in 2006,
but dropped to 86 in 2012.22 Students in the program
received military-political training in addition to their
undergraduate coursework. An annual scholarship
of 5,000 yuan was offered until 2007, when it was
increased to 10,000 yuan.23 Upon graduation, and
pending successful evaluation of their physical and
mental fitness, NDSP students either entered the
military as cadres or pursued graduate degrees.
For example, a 2007 publication listed 45 military
educational institutions that accepted NDSP students
as master’s degree candidates.24
The NDSP apparently was supposed to provide
most of the increased input given for 2007. This goal
was apparently not met; a 2009 PLA Daily article
estimated that only approximately 30 percent of the
roughly 100,000 graduates joining the officer corps
each year came from the NDSP, with the remaining
70 percent coming from military academies or direct

21. Kenneth Allen and Morgan Clemens, The Recruitment,
Education, and Training of PLA Navy Personnel (Newport, RI: China
Maritime Studies Institute, 2014), 7.
22. Zhou Lichun and Wang Ping, “利用MOOC平台推动军官
在职培训实现军民融合深度发展的思考” [Thoughts on the use of
MOOC platforms to advance deepened civil-military integration
development in military officer in-service training], 中国军转民
[Defense industry conversion in China] 2 (2015): 76.
23. Allen
Training, 9.

and

Clemens,

Recruitment,

Education,

and

24. Cadre Department of the General Political Department
of the PLA, China’s national defense students, 53.
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commissioning.25 Table 4-2 provides the most accurate,
available data.26
Table 4-2. Sources of PLA officers
Year

High School
Students for
PLA and
People’s
Armed
Police (PAP)
Academies

High
School
Students
for
National
Defense
Students
(PLA +
PAP)

PAP
Academies
and
National
Defense
Students

NCOs/
Conscripts
into PLA
and PAP
Academies

Total

2018

12,000

5,500

17,500

2017

12,000

4,800

16,800

2016

14,500

4,700

5,900

25,100

2015

15,700

6,000

5,300

27,000

2014

15,000

5,000

2013

No data
available

2012

15,000

8,000

6,000

31,000

2011

20,000

8,000

Included in
20,000

28,000

2010

15,000+2,200
=17,200

6,000+850
=6,850

4,100

28,150

2009

15,000

7,500

7,190

29,690

2008

10,000

10,000

2007

10,000

11,000

2006

10,000

10,000

5,000

25,000

2005

20,000

12,000

5,000

37,000

2004

20,000

8,000

25. Allen
Training, 8.
26.

and

3,800

23,800

20,000
21,000

28,000
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Dennis J. Blasko, interview by author, October 1, 2018.
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The CMC Training and Administration Department
announced the termination of the NDSP in May 2017
and began filling its quota by directly recruiting college
graduates.27 Currently enrolled NDSP students were
not affected by the change; however, undergraduate
students who enrolled in 2016, the last year of NDSP
recruitment, could graduate and join the military as
cadres as late as 2020.28 Furthermore, starting in 2018,
NDSP students in the command track would no longer
be able to enroll directly in graduate school; only select
technical-track graduates specializing in areas such
as joint operations command and network security
would be able to begin graduate school immediately,
and they would be required to study in military, not
civilian, academic institutions.29
One PLA academic, conducting a postmortem
analysis of the program in late 2017, identified the
following problems:
• poor planning about what kind of reserve
officers the military required;

27. Ni Guanghui and Wu Xu, “不再从普通高中毕业生中定
向招收国防生” [No longer designating and recruiting national
defense students among normal higher education graduates],
人民日报 [People’s daily], May, 30 2017, http://military.people.
com.cn/GB/n1/2017/0530/c1011-29307051.html.
28. “权 威 解 读 ｜ 2 0 1 7 年 军 队 院 校 招 生 政 策 （ 附 报 考 指
南” [Authoritative interpretation: 2017 military academic
institution recruitment policy], 中国军网 [China military
online], May 27, 2016, http://www.81.cn/zggfs/2017-05/27
/content_7620087.htm.
29. “权 威 发 布 | 终 于 来 啦 ！ 2 0 1 8 年 军 队 研 究 生 招 生 政 策
解读” [Authoritative release: It’s finally here! Explanation of
2018 military graduate student recruitment policy], 中国军网
[China military online], October 24, 2017, http://www.81.cn
/zggfs/2017-10/24/content_7798539.htm.
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• lack of standardization across the cultivation
and evaluation process;
• poor feedback mechanisms linking recruiters to
the units receiving reserve officers;
• policies that were still at a basic stage after
nearly 20 years;
• poor communication between the military and
civilian sides at civilian universities;
• lack of sufficient teaching materials, training
equipment, and instructors; and
• an emphasis on lectures rather than drills.30
Official Chinese sources have not identified a
replacement for the NDSP, but new programs have
been discussed in open literature. For example, Jin
Nongbin, a staff officer at the central PLA recruitment
department, argued in 2016 that China should flip
the basic model of the NDSP on its head. Rather than
having officer candidates engage in four years of
university study followed by a one-year probationary
period at military organizations (the “4+1” model), Jin
suggested the military could more effectively weed out
low performers by having candidates spend their first
year at military organizations, after which candidates
exhibiting strong capabilities would be sent to study
at civilian universities (a “1+4” model). Although this
approach might help the PLA make better investments
in human capital, China would have to undertake

30. Zhang Xu, “国防生制度调整对后备军官任职教育的
启示” [Lessons from the National Defense Student System
adjustment for reserve officer in-service education], 继续教育
[Continuing education] 12 (2017): 76–78.
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a number of other reforms to build a more effective
reserve officer program.31
Aside from the NDSP, there has been evidence
that a small number of civilian university graduates
have been directly commissioned as officers upon
graduation, though there is little available information
on this approach. Also, civilian university graduates
who choose to enlist are later given preferential
consideration for promotion to NCO or commissioned
officer status.32
CIVILIAN SOURCES OF NCOS
PLA delegations to the United States in the late
1990s and early 2000s routinely inquired about
creating and managing an NCO corps. China took one
step toward this goal in 2005, when the CMC issued
Opinions on Strengthening the Noncommissioned Officer
Corps, requiring at least a high school education for
NCO candidates. Progress has undoubtedly been
made establishing an effective, career-oriented NCO
corps, but the degree of success remains largely
unknown. The US model requires NCOs to guide and
train junior officers, manage enlisted personnel, and
serve as the source of practical, professional “knowhow” for their respective military units.
31. Jin Nongbin, “大学生士兵培养使用的矛盾问题和对策
措施” [Contradictions and countermeasures for college student
soldier cultivation and utilization], 国防 [National defense] 5
(2016): 52–54.
32. “全 国 鼓 励 大 学 生 应 征 入 伍 服 义 务 兵 役 有 关 政 策 ”
[Relevant policies of the state to encourage college students to
enter the military in volunteer service], 全国征兵网 [National
recruitment network], March 14, 2014, https://www.gfbzb.gov
.cn/zbbm/zcfg/dxsrw/201403/20140314/819867878.html.
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Three data points raise questions about the PLA’s
success in building such an NCO corps. The first is
anecdotal, from a former US defense attaché who
served multiple tours in Beijing. At a PLA conference
in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, he noted possible cultural
constraints that would prevent commissioned PLA
officers, who were more highly educated and came
from a higher socioeconomic background than their
NCOs, from respecting the NCOs greater practical
knowledge and accepting their advice.33
A senior US NCO delegation that spent several
days visiting PLA counterparts in 2008 provided the
second point. The senior enlisted personnel from US
Pacific Command components concluded that PLA
senior NCOs serve more as technicians than leaders.34
Additionally, the Congressional Research Service’s
2016 report on the PLA observed, “Compared to
other militaries, the PLA has underutilized its noncommissioned officers.”35 PLA senior NCOs in
2018 may be expected to serve more as leaders than
just technicians, but progress in that direction has
been slow.
This goes to the point of NCO candidate
qualifications, both practical and educational. NCOs
33. Former US defense attaché to China, interview by the
author, October 2007.
34. Senior enlisted US Pacific Command personnel,
interview by the author, October 2007.
35. Jim Garamone, “Enlisted Delegation Visits Chinese
Counterparts,” US Department of Defense, July 11, 2008, http://
archive.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=50476; and Ian
E. Rinehart, The Chinese Military: Overview and Issues for Congress,
CRS Report No. R44196 (Washington, DC: Congressional
Research Service, 2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44
196.pdf.
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historically have been promoted from the enlisted
ranks. Now, the PLA wants to improve its NCOs by
raising their educational backgrounds, but rapidly
promoting new recruits to the NCO rank sacrifices
the benefits that accrue from many years of service
in the ranks. As noted in a 2008 article, directly
recruited NCOs “basically meet the requirements of a
specialized technical officer,” but this is different from
the experienced NCO’s leadership ability.36
Improving the quality of its NCOs remains a
priority for the PLA, which began pilot work on
directly recruiting civilian university graduates as
NCOs in 2003.37 The PLA General Staff Department
began offering “preferential treatment in the selection
of non-commissioned officers” in October 2011, with
efforts focused on university students in their final
year of study, vocational technical school graduates,
and students possessing “advanced technical
‘vocational qualifications certificates.’”
In 2012, the PLA made agreements with several
vocational schools for the “directed education of
directly recruited NCOs.”38 Under this so-called
“2.5+0.5” cultivation model, high school graduates
under the age of 20 spend two-and-a-half years
completing technical studies at civilian vocational
schools, where they also take preapproved courses
36. Li Dezhong, Hao Weijie, and Yan Xuehua, “From
‘Skilled Citizens’ to Tactical Soldiers’—The Reform of Recruiting
NCOs from Nonmilitary Departments Has Been Underway
for Six Years, So How Are These Directly Recruited NCOs
Performing? And Which Problems Need to Be Resolved?” [in
Chinese] PLA Daily, September 3, 2008, 3.
37.

Wang, PLA and Student Recruits, 17.

38. Allen
Training, 20.
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to meet the requirements of specific military units.
The final half-year is spent at a military academy or
training organization, after which favorably evaluated
candidates are assigned to NCO billets.
This 2.5+0.5 NCO cultivation model was reportedly
still in an “exploratory phase” in 2018.39 The PLA had
signed on slightly less than 50 partner vocational
schools as of 2017, but approximately 10,000 NCO
candidates were reported to be enrolled at these
schools annually.40 The number of civilian college
graduates recruited as NCOs apparently remains low;
for example, only 260 university graduates entered
the PLA Navy as NCOs in 2012.41 Furthermore,
the PLA appears to be having trouble integrating
directly recruited university students into their new
roles as NCOs. Zhao Hengzhi, deputy director of
the mobilization department in the former Shenyang
Military Region, complained in 2016 that directly
recruited NCOs were receiving inadequate training
prior to entering the force—as little as two to three
months of military training and political education.
According to Zhao, too many new NCOs exhibited a
poor sense of duty, a lack of military skills, and poor
work ethic.42
39. Chen Hailong, Deng Zhiming, and Tong Dapeng,
“军民融合式士官人才选拔策略研究” [Research on civil-military
integration-style NCO talent selection strategy], 中国军转民
[Defense industry conversion in China] 2 (2018): 71.
40. Chen,
strategy,” 70.
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42. Zhao Hengzhi, “新形势下直招士官工作研究” [Research
on the work of directly recruiting NCOs under the new situation],
国防 [National defense] 6 (2016): 70–71.
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The drive to create a more capable, professional
NCO corps is part of the PLA’s campaign to increase
the civilian educational level of incoming personnel,
formalized in the 2011 amendment to the Military
Service Law, which also offered new incentives for
college students and graduates to serve as officers in
the PLA. These included student loan write-offs, future
tuition aid, and officer commissions. See table 4-3 for
the basic requirements for PLA enlisted personnel.43
Table 4-3. Basic requirements for PLA
enlisted personnel
Recruitment
Method
Conscription
registration
(required)
(兵役登记)
Service
application
(voluntary)
(应征报名)

Annual
Timing

Gender

Age

Male

17–18

January
10 to June 30

Male

17–24
(high school
graduates 17–22;
postsecondary
graduates 17–24;
middle school
graduates 18-20)

January
10 - August 5

17–22

January
10 to August 5

Under 24

June 5
to July 10

Under 20

JuneJuly (appears
to vary by
province)

Female
Direct NCO
recruitment
application
(voluntary)
(直接招收士官)

Male
(unmarried)

Post-Oriented
NCO Recruitment
Application
(voluntary)
(定向培养士官)

Male
(unmarried)

43. “Basic Requirements for PLA Enlisted,” National
Recruitment Network, n.d., https://www.gfbzb.gov.cn/bydj/.
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CIVILIANS SERVING IN THE PLA
A strong relationship between the PLA and the
civilian population lay at the core of Mao Zedong’s
vision of military effectiveness, characterized by his
argument that “the army must become one with the
people so that they see it as their own army.”44 Civilmilitary interdependence remains a priority in PLA
personnel accession programs. President Jiang Zemin
listed “ten categories of [PLA] technical, managerial,
and support positions” in 2003 that would be filled
with civilians. There also has been linkage between
the PLA’s modernization drive and its need for
highly educated civilian personnel. The 2003 Strategic
Project for Talented People permitted hiring “nonactive duty” contract workers, who were civilians
“hired for specific periods of time to perform service
and support tasks in higher headquarters noncombat
units, hospitals, schools, etc.” The 2003 accessions
began working into PLA units in 2006, filling “over
20,000 NCO posts” by the end of the year.45
Full authority “to institute a professional corps”
of civilians was instituted in 2005.46 Civilian numbers
further increased in 2005 when a second category of
44. Mao Zedong, “On Protracted War,” in Selected Works of
Mao Zedong (Beijing: People’s Publishing House, April 10, 1952),
2:186.
45. See Dennis J. Blasko, “PLA Ground Force Modernization
and Mission Diversification: Underway in All Military Regions,”
in Right-Sizing the People’s Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours
of China’s Military, ed. Roy Kamphausen and Andrew Scobell
(Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College
Press, 2007), 281–374, particularly 298.
46. Kevin Pollpeter and Kenneth W. Allen, eds., The PLA
as Organization v2.0 (Washington, DC: Defense Group, Inc.,
2015), 156.
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contractors was created “to perform many functions
of uniformed PLA active duty personnel;” however,
these contractors are “not counted as active duty
personnel.”47
A 2008 directive followed, calling for
“strengthening security of strategic importance,”
which included the intention to “deepen reforms
in . . . the officers’ professionalization system and
civilian personnel system . . . for in-depth civil-military
integration [italics added].”48
The search continues for more highly educated
civilian personnel to serve the military. The PLA’s
General Political Department launched its “first
public recruitment of civilian employees” in 2014. Of
7,000 “shortlisted candidates . . . 42 percent . . . hold a
master’s degree or above and 33 percent are graduates
from key [Chinese] colleges and universities,” creating
favorable conditions for the PLA to recruit high-quality
talent.49 The PLA hired 1,148 of these applicants,
all of whom a year later received an “instrument

47. The best—perhaps only—comprehensive explanation
of civilians “in” the PLA is Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army
Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century, 2nd ed.
(New York: Routledge, 2012), 73.
48. He Lei, “Strengthening Security of Strategic
Importance,” China Daily, June 4, 2018, http://www.chinadaily.
com.cn/a/201806/04/WS5b147d30a31001b82571de48.html.
49. Yao Jianing, ed., “PLA Deploys Recruitment Interview
Work for Civilian Employees,” China Military Online, March 18,
2014,
http://eng.mod.gov.cn/DefenseEducation/2014-03/18
/content_4550195.htm.
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of ratification [which] is an essential credential for
civilian employees.”50
A 2017 source cited that over 20,000 contract
civilians are employed throughout the PLA.51 Of
note, civilians being recruited for positions at military
academies were being hired only as teaching assistants
(助教) or lecturers (讲师), which are low-ranking
positions in the teaching hierarchy.52 Higher-ranked,
higher-paid teaching positions apparently continue
to be held by active-duty military personnel. Indeed,
another author writing in 2017 noted that many civilian
personnel work in entry- to mid-level billets, but very
few work in senior-level positions.53 Possible reasons
include the novelty of hiring civilian personnel, a
budgetary preference for hiring at the entry level,
and the increased credibility in the classroom of more
experienced military instructors.
50. Guo Renjie, ed., “PLA Issues Instruments of
Ratification of Civilian Employees First Time,” China
Military Online, February 6, 2015, http://english.chinamil.
com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2015-02/06/
content_6344281.htm.
51. Mao Saiqun, “军队院校非现役文职人员的作用及管理”
[The use and management of non-active-duty civilian personnel
in military educational institutions], 海军工程大学学报（综合
版） [Journal of Naval University of Engineering (comprehensive
edition)] 14, no. 4 (December 2017): 79.
52. “全 军 首 次 面 向 社 会 公 开 招 考 文 职 人 员 岗 位 计 划 ”
[Billet plan for the first time whole military opens to society for
recruiting of civilian personnel], 军队人才网 [Military talent
net], July 10, 2018, http://www.81rc.mil.cn/news/2018-07/10
/content_8085464.htm.
53. Ma Jianchang, “增强军队文职人员职业吸引力的对策
思考” [Thoughts on strategies for increasing the attractiveness
of civilian personnel careers in the military], 西安政治学院学报
[Journal of Xi’an Politics Institute] 30, no. 1 (February 2017): 65.
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The CMC’s Political Work Department issued
a circular in July 2018 to promote military-civilian
relations across the country, urging “local governments
and PLA units to organize educational activities” to
remind both civilian and military personnel of the
importance to the PLA of maintaining close ties with
the civilian population. Local authorities were also
directed to accelerate the establishment of militarycivilian coordination mechanisms.54
PLA authors have highlighted problems the PLA
has experienced retaining qualified civilian personnel
for more than a few years, especially in military
academies. As one author notes, recent civilian hires,
particularly those with doctoral degrees, are “much
more likely” to drop out of jobs at military academies
than those who are employed at civilian universities.55
As one author argues, poor retention may be due
particularly to the salaries of civilian employees being
significantly lower than those of their active-duty
counterparts, few civilians being hired for senior-level
positions, and poor access to continuing education
and promotions.56
In 2017 the CMC and State Council revised the
Regulation on the Civilian Staff of the Chinese People’s
54. Li Jiayao, “China Strengthens Military-Civilian
Relations Ahead of Army Day,” Xinhuanet, July 21, 2018, http://
eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-07/21/content_8095419.htm.
55. Bickford, “Trends in Education and Training,” 37;
and Wang Yang, “军队院校文职人员离职现象的回顾与反
思” [Reflections and thoughts on the phenomenon of civilian
personnel leaving posts at military academies], 经济研究导刊
[Economic research guide] 10 (2018): 146–47.
56. For example, see Ma Jianchang, “Thoughts on
strategies,” 64–66; and Mao Saiqun, “Use and management,”
78–81.
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Liberation Army, addressing many of the problems
mentioned by military authors.57 The new regulations
include more detailed language on the grade and
promotion structure for management-oriented and
technically oriented civilian personnel, likely as part
of a move to increase confidence in long-term career
prospects.
The 2017 revision also notes that follow-on
regulations would address active-duty personnel
who are demobilized and then assume employment
as PLA civilian employees. For instance, 112 former
active-duty officers took civilian posts in the Zhejiang
Military District alone in August 2018.58 How many
active-duty personnel may be demobilized in this
fashion is unknown, and it begs the question of how
many civilian personnel hired by the PLA previously
served as officers. An increasing reliance on civilian
members of China’s military effort clearly is implied
in the current goal of reducing PLA officers by
30 percent.59
PLA employment of civilian members is part of
a reinvigorated campaign for the military to take
advantage of civilian technology and research through
“civil-military fusion.” Xi Jinping emphasized his aim
57. “中国人民解放军文职人员条例”
[PLA
civilian
personnel regulations], 中国政府网 [China government online],
November
10,
2017,
http://www.81rc.mil.cn/
Civilianpost/2015-10/08/content_6712456.htm.
58. “现役军官转改文职人员陆续换装” [One after another,
active-duty officers change uniforms to that of civilian personnel],
军事报道 [Military report], August 4, 2018, 19:04–19:36.
59. “China Focus: Marking 91st birthday, PLA Marches
into New Era of Reform, Capacity Building,” Xinhua,
August 1, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018
-08/01/c_137361915.htm.
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to “bake” civilian technological progress into PLA
advances, including developing close military ties with
private research institutes, when he chaired the third
meeting of the Central Commission for Integrated
Military and Civilian Development on March 2, 2018.60
Even more recently, in summer 2018, the PLA
announced a new recruiting program to hire 9,297
civilian personnel who possessed the “professional
knowledge to serve in key positions.” The program
sought personnel who “work in management or
professional technical posts but are not in active
service . . . but work in active service if necessary.”61
Of these personnel, 3,728 (40.1 percent) were slated for
PLA academic institutions and 2,328 (25 percent) were
slated to serve as instructors.
At the Ministry of National Defense of the People’s
Republic of China’s regular press conference on July 26,
2018, a spokesman cited “the reform of civilian staff”
as a “major achievement” dedicated to “remolding
Chinese military strength” as well as “freeing our

60. Lorand Laskai, “Civil-Military Fusion and the PLA’s
Pursuit of Dominance in Emerging Technologies,” China Brief
18, no. 6 (April 9, 2018), https://jamestown.org/program/civil
-military-fusion-and-the-plas-pursuit-of-dominance-in
-emerging-technologies/, credits Deng Xiaoping with originating
the idea of merging the civilian and military research sectors.
61. Huang Panyu, “Chinese Military Begins Recruiting
‘Civilian Personnel,’” Xinhuanet, July 12, 2018, http://eng
.chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-07/12/content_8087282.htm; and
“China: Recruiting Poster for Civilian Personnel of the People’s
Liberation Army,” China Military Online, July 11, 2018 (poster
removed from website).
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officers and men from non-combat positions.”62 In
March 2019, PLA media stated the first round of this
new recruiting effort had been completed successfully.
But only “around 5,700 civilian personnel” had
been recruited, suggesting the PLA fell short of its
original target of filling over 9,000 civilian personnel
billets.63 Going forward, it will be worth watching to
see whether PLA writings discuss lessons learned
and propose adjustments for improving the future
recruitment of civilian personnel.
HOW DO THE CHANGES AFFECT THE PLA,
NOW AND IN THE FUTURE?
“Will a candidate who graduates from a military
academy be a better officer than one who receives
a commission after graduating from a civilian
institution” is a question that cannot be answered
with any degree of fidelity.64 The degree of influence
of a civilian versus a military education background
for a PLA officer is no less difficult to evaluate than
62. Ren Guoiang, SRCOL (PLA), “Defense Ministry’s
Regular Press Conference” (press conference, Beijing,
July 26, 2018), http://eng.mod.gov.cn/news/2018-07/26
/content_4820784.htm.
63. “Chinese Military Completes First Public Civilian
Personnel Recruitment,” China Military Online, March 7,
2019,
http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2019-03/07/content
_9443845.htm.
64. The opinion of one of the authors, who served 30 years
in the US Navy with officers from various commissioning sources
(academy, reserve officers’ training corps, officer candidate
school, limited duty officers, direct commissioning from enlisted
ranks, warrant officers, and interservice transfers), is that the
source makes no difference. But the issue of political reliability
may lead to a different view in the PLA.
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it would be for an officer in the US military. But for
the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the PLA, a
particular concern is whether an academic or civilian
education instills more or less political reliability.
The CPC still values commissioning officers
from military and academy sources. Concern about
political reliability in the officer corps plays a role in
widening the source and educational background of
new officers. Political indoctrination is easier to instill
at a military academy than at civilian universities,
which are geographically separated and offer widely
varying academic programs and environments. But
military cliquism may more easily begin among cadets
and midshipmen while they are academy students;
officer candidates from civilian educational
institutions are much more likely to come from a
heterogeneous background.
The PLA also is making greater efforts to use
civilian vocational institutions as a source of incoming
NCOs who lack previous military experience. This
program has been expanding since 2012, when the
NDSP already was in decline, so it will be worth
watching to see whether the 2.5+0.5 program at
civilian vocational schools encounters problems
similar to those that plagued the NDSP. There are
already signs in PLA writings of this possibility, such
as a 2018 article stating the PLA has not yet drafted
detailed guidelines for military supervision of the
2.5+0.5 program at civilian vocational schools.65
Another change has been the degree to which
personnel enlisted from civilian educational
institutions are being assigned to NCO and officer
65. Chen,
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billets. The PLA has introduced new policies
to encourage enlisted personnel with some
postsecondary civilian education to become NCOs or
commissioned officers, but these appear to have not
been very successful; less than 20 percent of enlisted
personnel with college degrees were selected as NCOs
in 2015.66 Soldiers with a college education who do not
receive commissions apparently do not want to serve
as career NCOs in the PLA.
Another element in the CPC’s view of PLA officer
quality may result from military leaders not having
an unblemished reputation for political reliability. For
instance, the Chinese Civil War period, particularly
the 1930s and 1940s, saw more than one instance
of power struggles among CPC and PLA leaders.
Second, in early 1950, Mao apparently overruled his
PLA commanders when he postponed—effectively
canceling—the planned assault on Taiwan to move
troops north to the North Korean border. Third, that
conflict was followed by Mao deposing and punishing
his erstwhile military commander, Peng Dehuai,
apparently for “speaking truth to power.” A fourth
example is the problematic PLA performance in 1979
against the Vietnamese military, followed by Deng
Xiaoping’s admonishing the military and instituting
reforms. Fifth, the 2001 Hainan Island incident
involving Chinese and US aircraft demonstrated a
degree of PLA incompetence, and may have featured
military leaders lying to their political masters.
Most recently, Xi Jinping’s anti-corruption drive
has included notable attacks on senior PLA officers.
Concerns about PLA reliability and loyalty are also
reflected in the force’s self-evaluations of warfighting
66.

Jin, “Contradictions and countermeasures,” 53.
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capability. For example, the “Three Whethers”
(三个能不能), a recently employed self-critical slogan,
questions whether the PLA can maintain party
leadership, whether it can fight victoriously when
needed, and whether commanders can effectively lead
forces and command during wartime.67
China’s leaders apparently think the PLA will be
strengthened by increased numbers of new officers
commissioned from civilian academic institutions
who have the STEM knowledge necessary to perform
effectively on today’s increasingly technologyintensive battlefield. Grunts and deck seamen will
always be essential to military operations, but more
and more important are the officers and enlisted
personnel who can effectively operate complex
equipment and systems.
Termination of the four-year NDSP signals a lack
of satisfaction with one attempt to increase the STEM
education of newly minted military officers. That goal
remains important, however, there is little doubt China
will be able to increase the presence of such educated
officers and enlisted personnel, which should enhance
PLA capabilities.
The PLA is also concerned with ensuring such
personnel receive the degree of political education
required by the CPC to ensure “political reliability.”
As the late Ellis Joffe once stated, there is no reason
why a PLA officer cannot be both professionally
competent and politically reliable. At some point,
however, a threshold may arise where a decision has
67. For more on the Three Whethers and other PLA
self-evaluations, see Dennis J. Blasko, “PLA Weaknesses and
Xi’s Concerns About PLA Capabilities” (testimony before
the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission,
Washington, DC, February 7, 2019).
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to be made between increased political education and
increased technical learning and training.
The increased emphasis on acquiring officers with
an enhanced STEM background to use new military
systems more effectively should contribute to the
PLA’s operational effectiveness. The point is not
simply to increase the number of officers with STEM
degrees from either civilian or military educational
institutions, but to commission STEM-educated
officers, as well as lower-ranking personnel, able to use
their knowledge on the battlefield, not in a classroom
or laboratory.
But not all senior PLA officers may support further
integration of civilian resources into the military.
Some military leaders may prefer the status quo or
less integration with civilian institutions. Sources
cite a number of concerns, including civilians’ lack
of knowledge of military affairs, the amount of time
needed to get civilians oriented with military ways of
thinking and discipline, and concerns about secrecy
and “subversive thinking.”68
The decision to integrate the military and civilian
sectors rests with Xi Jinping, who declared in 2015
that civil-military integration, which formerly had
only been an area of interest at the national level, was
now a national strategy.69 This undoubtedly induced
the military to find ways to implement the strategy.
Several papers since authored by PLA academics have
pointed toward programs like the direct recruitment
68.

Mao, “Use and management,” 79–81.

69. Cao Zhi et al., “习近平的两会时间（十）：系统阐述
军民融合发展的三个看点” [Xi Jinping’s time at the two sessions
(ten): Systematically setting forth three views on civil-military
integration development], Xinhua, March 12, 2015, http://www
.xinhuanet.com/politics/2015lh/2015-03/12/c_1114623628.htm.
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of NCOs from civilian schools as being the result of
Xi’s strategy, although the program existed before
he took office in 2012. NDU professor Gong Fangbin
reported that “120,000 graduates have directly joined
the PLA as [NCOs]—the first direct recruitment of
this kind from college graduates.”70 As long as civilmilitary integration is a priority item at the national
level, the PLA will be expected to make it happen,
including the civilian education of a number of officer
and NCO candidates.
Some PLA analysts expect economic advantages
to arise from the shift to civilian-sector education, a
thought expressed in China’s 2004 defense white paper,
in which the Strategic Project for Talented People
goals were described as including “[devoting the
PLA] to improving the level of scientific management
and achieving a higher overall cost-effectiveness in
military expenditure so as to modernize the armed
forces with less input and better results [italics added].”71
A 2015 PLA publication estimated the average
cost of educating a four-year undergraduate at a
military academy at 100,400 RMB, compared to the
cost at a civilian university of only 40,000 to 60,000
RMB.72 Other sources indicate a preference for the
70. We are grateful to Dennis Blasko for referring us to
several references concerning the direct recruitment of college
graduates as NCOs as early as 2002; see in particular Ma Haiyan’s
August 31, 2009, China News Agency report.
71. State Council of the People’s Republic of China, China’s
National Defense in 2004 (Beijing: Information Office of the State
Council of the People’s Republic of China, December 2004).
72. Su Yuyao, “军民融合人才培养战略”为啥成为代表委员“
必谈话题?” [Why has “civil-military talent cultivation strategy”
become a “must-discuss topic” among representatives?], 中国军
网 [China military online], March 14, 2017, http://www.81.cn
/byyd/2017-03/14/content_7526113.htm.
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wide variety of technical majors offered by civilian
institutions. One metaphor used in this regard is the
need to go from the military’s “small circle” to the
“big market” of the civilian sector.73 “People’s War”
has not been consigned to history’s dust heap, but it
has been modernized to emphasize a specific part of
the population who contributes directly to the twentyfirst-century PLA.
HOW DO THE CHANGES AFFECT THE UNITED
STATES, NOW AND IN THE FUTURE?
The degree to which the PLA officer corps and
NCO corps are manned by graduates of civilian rather
than military educational institutions may be of little
direct concern to the United States in 2020, but how
that sourcing affects the efficiency of the PLA is of
direct concern, now and in the future. The central
point is the effect of recent and ongoing changes in
personnel accession on the PLA’s capabilities across
the spectrum of military operations, from peacetime
humanitarian assistance to combat operations against
the United States and its allies. That in turn is a major
element in defining China’s power on the world stage.
This capability is indeed vital to crises and
potential conflicts over the East and South China Seas
and Taiwan. None of these three geographic issues are
as important to the United States as they are to China,
but they concern important US treaties, allies, friends,
and, perhaps more importantly though more difficult
to delineate, the US role and capability as a leading
global power.
73. Wang Liancheng, “军民融合
人才为先” [In civilmilitary integration, talent is first], PLA daily, July 3, 2017, http://
www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2017-07/03/content_181423.htm.

158

The US military has been at war since fall 1990.
More than a quarter-century of near-constant, hightempo operations has taken an unplanned toll on
equipment and personnel. This means that despite a
defense budget that dwarfs China’s, the US military’s
ability to confront the PLA in East Asia scenarios
successfully is problematic. Hence, any steps China
takes to improve its military capabilities in twentyfirst-century warfare should be an issue of concern to
the United States.
China’s military capability against that of the
United States is not a zero-sum calculation, but
perceptions of that balance perforce exist, especially
as East Asian nations witness the growth of China.
US officials currently emphasize the need for the US
military to field the capability to fight a conventional
near-peer competitor, particularly China, which
could in time lead to a second Cold War against a
twenty-first-century PLA manned by increasingly
competent personnel.
CONCLUSION
China’s multi-decade military modernization
program reached a significant milestone in 2015.
Changes included a thorough reorganization,
technological advances, and equipment modernization,
as well as the doctrinal revision to more accurately reflect
the kinds of wars the PLA expects to fight in the future.
Beijing has indicated 2020 as the completion
date for the current round of PLA modernization, a
probably unattainable date for the full reorganization
and modernization of China’s armed forces. But the
administrative changes, including new and modified
organizations, should be completed by that year, when
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Beijing no doubt will announce the PLA has “finished
mechanization of all forces and made important
progress in incorporating information and computer
technology” and established “a solid foundation for
the PLA to become a world-class military force.”74
But if this announcement is made in late 2020 or early
2021, it will be problematic.
PLA modernization includes both equipment,
from small arms to intercontinental ballistic missiles,
and the improvement of PLA personnel quality and
capabilities. The latter, though not as newsworthy as
new hardware, is arguably the most important aspect
of military modernization. Operating new equipment
requires new education and training paradigms;
employing the new equipment requires new doctrine
and tactics. These requirements fit within China’s
long-standing recognition of its military personnel’s
vital role in defending the nation and securing the
CPC’s position in power—hence, the recognition
that modernizing the system of military academies is
important but not adequate to provide the personnel
resources necessary for the new, twenty-first-century
PLA. China’s civilian education system offers a way to
improve and expand those resources.
Efforts to increase the role of civilian education
for PLA candidates have apparently not all been
successful, as evidenced by the cancelation of the fouryear NDSP, but in toto they are raising the educational
level of incoming servicemembers. Following the
combined efforts of military and civilian educational
institutions since the PLA’s “turn to civilian education”
in the late 1990s, 80 percent of the PLA’s officers had
74. “China Aims to Complete Military Reform by 2020,”
China Daily, May 13, 2016, https://www.chinadaily.com.cn
/china/2016-05/13/content_25245704.htm.
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four years of higher education by 2010, compared to
just 25.8 percent in 1998.75 The authors acknowledge
the possibility that the NDSP’s cancelation could
have been the result of factors other than program
mismanagement and the poor quality of program
graduates. For example, the PLA may have judged
the program was successful in creating specialists
who would be better suited to the NCO corps than to
the officer corps, but the authors did not observe this
reasoning in related Chinese writings.
Though some statistics point toward success,
Chinese writings have enumerated a number of
challenges the PLA continues to face in the course of
integrating civilian resources into officer and enlisted
education. Recent adjustments to several programs
appear aimed at overcoming these challenges, but
they also raise a number of unanswered questions. For
instance, as a result of the PLA canceling the NDSP and
announcing it would shift to the direct recruitment of
college graduates, what sort of onboarding program
will be put in place to prepare civilian college
graduates for their initial officer billets? How long
will such a program last, where will it be held, and
how will the PLA assess when civilian graduates are
ready? Will the process of direct recruitment be able
to overcome past complaints that civilian graduates
lack proper fighting spirit, have poor leadership skills,
do not integrate well with soldiers from different

75. “Defense Minister Says China Has 510,000 in Military
Reserves,” People’s Daily Online, December 29, 2010, http://
en.people.cn/90001/90776/90786/7245072.html.
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backgrounds, and are unwilling to “eat bitterness”
that is part of military life?76
For enlisted personnel, the degree to which the
technical skills of NCOs directly recruited from
civilian educational institutions match up with the
skills required in PLA units appears to be an area of
concern.77 Furthermore, the degree to which civilian
college-educated conscripts can be incentivized to
stay in the military after their required two years of
service is another sticking point.78 The PLA may have
to increase incentives to keep these highly desirable
conscripts on as NCOs or officers.
Finally, past Chinese writings have highlighted
issues with the retention of civilian instructors at
military academies due to a number of factors,
including comparatively low salaries, lack of ability
to socialize with military colleagues, and an unclear
path to promotion. Recently reformed regulations for
civilian personnel employed in the PLA appear aimed
at remedying a number of these issues, and whether
these reforms are effective will be something to watch
for in future Chinese reporting.79
Even if the PLA is able to overcome the
abovementioned difficulties, the success of efforts to
improve the education of military personnel may well
76. He Zongfa, Dong Jinhai, and Wang Zhanhe, “对进一步
提高国防生选拔培养质量的几点思考” [Some thoughts on further
improving the quality of national defense student selection and
training], 教学研究 [Research in teaching] 31, no. 3 (2008): 211–12.
77.

Zhao, “Directly recruiting NCOs,” 70–71.

78.

Jin, “Contradictions and countermeasures,” 52–53.

79. “中国人民解放军文职人员条例” [PLA civilian personnel
regulations (2017 revision)], 中国政府网 [China government
online], November 10, 2017, http://www.gov.cn/zhengce
/content/2017-11/10/content_5238592.htm.
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founder on the rocks of a future economic downturn
or Beijing’s failure to change the direction of the
country’s demographic decline. Another indirect and
even indistinct problem may well continue to be the
cultural aversion in China to military service, captured
in the classic Chinese saying, “As one does not use
good iron to make nails, one does not use good men
as soldiers.”80
Xi Jinping offered the bottom line in the PLA’s
search for more highly educated, STEM-competent
personnel in his July 2, 2017, comment that “[i]t takes
first-class military talent, theory, and science and
technology to build the PLA into a world-leading
military . . . Science and technology is [sic] the core
fighting capacity in modern warfare.”81 More recently,
in May 2018, Xi highlighted the need “to build China
into a world leader in science and technology,” which
echoes his call to make the PLA “a world-class military
by mid-century.”82

80. June Teufel Dreyer, Middle Kingdom and Empire of the
Rising Sun: Sino-Japanese Relations, Past and Present (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2016).
81. Zhang Hui, “Reshuffle of Chinese Military Academies
Aims to Bring Institutions Closer to Real Combat: Experts,”
Global Times, July 20, 2017, http://www.globaltimes.cn
/content/1057335.shtml.
82. Zhang Tao, ed., “China Aims to Complete Military
Reform by 2020,” Xinhua, May 13, 2016, http://english.chinamil
.com.cn/news-channels/2016-05/13/content_7052671.htm.
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5. CHANGES IN THE PLA’S MILITARY
EDUCATION
Kenneth Allen and Brendan Mulvaney
In his report to the 19th CPC National Congress,
Xi Jinping, general secretary of the CPC Central
Committee and the nation’s president, pledged to
make sure that by 2020, the PLA will basically achieve
its mechanization, make big strides in informatization,
and gain substantial improvement in strategic
capabilities. He also set a midterm goal for the Chinese
military—to turn itself into a modernized power by
2035—as well as a long-term one—to become a toptier military by 2050.1
In March 2016, Xi Jinping stressed that “to achieve
the goal of strengthening the military and building a
world-class army, the construction of China’s military
academic institutions must have a major strengthening
. . . which includes actively promoting reform and
innovation in academic institutions, and constantly
improving the level of education for the realization of
the Chinese dream.”2
As seen by these two declarations, Xi Jinping
makes a direct connection between improving the
quality of education and training in the Communist
Party of China’s armed wing, the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA), and his signature goal of “realizing the
1. Zhao Lei, “PLA to Be World-Class Force by 2050,” China
Daily, updated October 27, 2017, https://www.chinadaily.com
.cn/china/2017-10/27/content_33756453.htm.
2. “习 近 平 ： 为 实 现 中 国 梦 强 军 梦 提 供 人 才 和 智 力 支
持” [Xi Jinping: Providing talent and intellectual support for
realizing China’s dream of strong military dreams], Xinhuanet,
March 23, 2016, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2016-03
/23/c_1118422270.htm.
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China Dream,” of which a world-class military is an
integral part. Although the PLA’s military education
system has undergone major changes over the past
two decades, the pace of this change has quickened
since Xi Jinping took office in 2012. These changes
have occurred in parallel with the dramatic change in
the overall education situation throughout China.
Although there are likely several reasons for the
emphasis on redesigning the PLA educational system,
one primary driver appears to be linked back to the
time when China began receiving high-technology,
sophisticated weapon systems in the 1990s, such as
Su-27 fighters, Sovremenny-class submarines, and
surface-to-air missiles from Russia, and started to
produce next-generation weapon systems within
China. President Jiang Zemin concluded the PLA was
not recruiting, educating, and training officers who
were qualified to operate or support the new weapon
systems, nor was the PLA enlisted force, the core of
which revolved around ninth-grade graduates who
could only serve for a maximum of 16 years, qualified
to support the new systems. As such, in 1999, Jiang
completely reformed the officer academic institution
structure, reduced the number of institutions, and
created a 30-year enlisted force.
At the same time the PLA created the National
Defense Student Program. Xi Jinping also created a
30-year noncommissioned officer (NCO) program;
however, it was still based on conscripting ninthgrade students and high school graduates. In 2009,
the PLA completely revised its conscription and
recruitment process for enlisted personnel and focused
on recruiting civilian college and graduate students;
however, even this program was revised again in 2013.
In 2017, Xi made yet another major change to the entire
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officer academic institution structure by reducing
the number of academic institutions and abolishing
the National Defense Student Program. The obvious
reason is the exiting program was not producing the
desired results of recruiting, educating, and training
qualified officers to operate and support even highertechnology weapon systems and equipment.
This aspect only continues to grow in importance,
as the PLA shifts from being a ground forcedominated, territorial defense-focused military to
a joint and outward-facing force. No longer can you
rely on 16-year-old boys from the rural areas with a
ninth-grade education to form the bulk of your force.
Modern platforms, weapons, communications, and
ways of war demand a greater degree of training and
education. This is particularly true of the new domains
of war, specifically space and cyber, on which the
People’s Republic of China has placed an even greater
emphasis, as evidenced by the creation of the Strategic
Support Force (PLASSF).
This chapter discusses how the Communist Party
of China thinks about education for the PLA, the
categories of education, and the organization and
institutions providing that training and education.
It will only address the education within the PLA
academic institution system, and not PLA programs
involving civilian academic institutions, including the
National Defense Student Program, and study abroad.
Next, it details the PLA education system, which
traditionally has focused on officers; however, with
the PLA’s growing realization that NCOs play an
increasingly important role in a modern military, the
PLA is paying increased attention to the inclusion of
NCOs in this system, though it still pays much more
attention to the inclusion of the officer corps. Of note,
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in the PLA, “officer” (军官) and “cadre” (干部) are
synonymous. This chapter only uses “officer,” unless
“cadre” is contained in the official name of a book.
Finally, we offer an explanatory example: PLA Air
Force (PLAAF) commanding officers.
Although there has been considerable work by the
Communist Party of China to strengthen its control
over and indoctrination of the PLA, particularly since
Xi Jinping came into power, the political education
aspects of the PLA education system are outside the
bounds of this chapter, and merit discussion in their
own right.
DISTINCTION OF CHINESE TERMS
For comparison purposes, in the US military the
term “professional military education” encompasses
a range of courses designed for officers and enlisted
personnel throughout their careers.3 But it is important
to consider the issue of PLA military education from
the Chinese perspective, rather than through the
lens of the US system. Specifically, US professional
military education includes pre-commissioning
education for officers, but does not include
education at civilian academic institutions in
residence or by correspondence.
The PLA does not use the term “professional
military education.” The closest term used
for this foreign concept is peiyang xunlian (
培养训练) or just peixun (培训), which the
PLA translates as “cultivation and training,”
3. Joint Staff, Enlisted Professional Military Education Policy,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 1805.01B
(Washington, DC: Joint Staff, May 2015).
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“development and training,” or just “training.”4
At times they also use junshi jiaoyu (军事教育),
which is translated as “military education,” or
junshi zhiye jiaoyu (军事职业教育), which translates
as “military professional education” or “education
of military profession.”5 These terms refer to the
education and training required for NCOs and officers
to move up their career ladders. This includes billet
training as well as an understanding of theory and
technical issues. For the purposes of this chapter,
the term “military education” or just “education”
will be used.
The PLA defines “military professional education”
as “education outside of military academic

4. “Cultivation and training,” in 军事训练 中国军事百科
全书 [Military training volume of China military encyclopedia,
2nd edition] (Beijing: Encyclopedia of China Publishing House,
June 2006), 563–64; “培训” [Development and training], in 中国
人民解放军军语 [PLA military terminology] (Beijing: Academy
of Military Science Press, December 2011), 323; and “培训”
[Training], in Dictionary of Modern Military Education [in Chinese],
ed. Dong Huiyu and Mou Xianming (Beijing: NDU Press, August
2011), 223.
5. Chinese Ministry of National Defense, 中国的军事战
略 [China’s military strategy] (white paper, Chinese Ministry of
National Defense, May 26, 2015); and “军事职业教育” [Education
of military profession], in Dictionary of Modern Military
Eduction [sic] [in Chinese], ed. Dong Huiyu and Mou Xianming
(Beijing: NDU Press, August 2011), 89–90.
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institutions.”6 Under this concept, the PLA system
offers continuous education, including mostly
Internet-based, long-distance learning, to all PLA
personnel. It also includes the National Defense
Student undergraduate and graduate program, as
well as some graduate programs at civilian academic
institutions for certain officers. In other words, it
does not involve education within the PLA academic
institutions discussed in this chapter.
The PLA also uses the terms xueli jiaoyu (学历教育)
and renzhi jiaoyu (任职教育), which it translates as
follows (though it is not consistent in how it translates
each term).
• Xueli jiaoyu is translated as “academic
credential education,” “academic education,”
or “education of officer candidates for academic
credentials, which offers undergraduate
education for pre-commissioned officers and
graduate education for officers” in military

6. “划重点！军事职业教育与你我息息相关” [Focus on the
key! Military professional education is closely related to you
and me], Xinhua, March 1, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com
/mil/2018-03/01/c_129819877.htm; and Ni Hai, Xu You, and
Li Xiaoliang, “军事职业教育：与你我息息相关—军委机关有关部
门专家解读我军军事职业教育” [Military vocational education:
Closely related to you and me—Interpretation of the military
professional education of our army by experts from relevant
departments of the Military Commission], Jiefangjun Bao, March 1,
2018, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2018-03/01/content_
200638.htm.
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academic institutions.7 In other words, this is
the basic education component for theory, such
as that which is received for four years at the
Aviation University of the Air Force.
• Renzhi Jiaoyu is translated as “professional
education in military academic institutions”
and “preassignment education,” which consists
of basic-, intermediate-, and advanced-level
officer institutions and NCO schools and
offers preassignment training and rotational
training for active-duty officers and NCOs at
each level (basic, intermediate, and advanced)
of their career before they assume their
billets. It is also translated as “vocational
education.”8 For the purposes of this chapter,
it is identified as “preassignment education.”
Some preassignment educational institutions
also offer graduate courses in military science

7. “军队院校学历教育” [Academic credential education],
军事训练 [Military training] (Beijing: Encyclopedia of China
Publishing House, 2008), 539–540; Higher Education Law of
the People’s Republic of China, August 29, 1998; “学历教育”
[Academic education], in Dictionary of Modern Military Education
[in Chinese], ed. Dong Huiyu and Mou Xianming (Beijing: NDU
Press, August 2011), 111; and Information Office of the State
Council, “2006年中国的国防” [China’s national defense in 2006]
(white paper, Information Office of the State Council of the
People’s Republic of China, December 2006).
8. “军队院校任职教育” [Military vocational education],
军事训练 [Military training] (Beijing: Encyclopedia of China
Publishing House, 2008), 322.
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as officers move up their career ladders.9 In
other words, this component provides the
technical and command component of officers’
preassignment education and training.
Furthermore, the PLA has three terms for different
types of academic institutions: daxue (大学), xueyuan
(学院), and xuexiao (学校). Whereas daxue is always
translated as “university” and xuexiao as “school,”
xueyuan can be translated as “college” or “academy.”
This may result in differing opinions as to the nature
or importance of an institution. PLA academic
institutions are organized into officer universities
and xueyuan and NCO schools. Unfortunately,
the PLA is not consistent when it uses an official
English translation; for example, different official
PLA publications translate the three Air Force Flight
Xueyuan as “Flight Colleges” or “Flight Academies.”10
Complicating matters, very few academic institutions
have a website, and even those that do are not
consistent with the English translation for their names.
9. “军队院校任职教育” [Professional education in military
colleges and schools], 军事训练 [Military training] (Beijing:
Encyclopedia of China Publishing House, 2008), 538–39; “人
制教育院校” [Professional education college], in Dictionary of
Modern Military Education [in Chinese], ed. Dong Huiyu and
Mou Xianming (Beijing: NDU Press, August 2011), 144–5; and
Information Office of the State Council, “China’s national defense
in 2006.”
10. “哈尔滨飞行学院” [Harbin Flight College], in Dictionary
of Modern Military Education [in Chinese], ed. Dong Huiyu and
Mou Xianming (Beijing: NDU Press, August 2011), 481; and
“Free Air Combat Training Course Included in Air Force Flight
Academy Syllabus,” China Military Online, February 6, 2018,
http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-02/06/content
_7934591.htm.
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Each academic institution generally focuses on a
particular range of specialties, such as engineering;
aviator education and training; infantry, medical, or
logistics (i.e., services); and commanding officers.
Of note, in Chinese terms, a commanding officer is
any officer who holds a leadership billet, such as the
commander or deputy commander, all the way down
to a deputy director of a third-level office.11
Although most universities, such as engineering
universities, have multiple subordinate officer
xueyuan as well as a subordinate NCO school, some
universities, such as the Aviation University of the
Air Force, do not have any subordinate xueyuan, and
are very narrow in scope. For example, the PLAAF
Engineering University (空军工程大学 / 空工大) has
the following eight subordinate academic institutions:
Air and Missile Defense College (防空反导学院), Air
Traffic Control and Navigation College (空管领航学院),
Aviation Engineering College (航空工程学院),
Aviation Maintenance NCO School (航空机务士
官学校), College of Science (理学院), Engineering
College (工程学院), Graduate School (研究生院), and
Information and Navigation College (信息与导航学院).
Although xueyuan do not have any subordinate
xueyuan, some of them do have a subordinate NCO
school. All academic institutions have subordinate
administrative organizations, academic departments,
and research offices.

11. “指挥军官” [Commanding officer], 中国军事百科全
书(第二版 [Volume 39, Military cadre work, of China military
encyclopedia, 2nd edition] (Beijing: Encyclopedia of China
Publishing House, December 2006), 85–86.
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EDUCATION LEVELS
The PLA has three levels (等级) of education: basic
(初级), intermediate (中级), and advanced (高级).
Each level is based on the PLA’s officer and NCO
grade system. As of 1988, the PLA has had 15 grades
and 10 ranks. In the PLA system, the grade is far more
important than the rank. It is the grade that determines
one’s position and level of responsibility. Besides
each person having a grade, every organization is
assigned a grade.
In addition to dividing PLA academic institutions
into academic and preassignment education
institutions, historically, the PLA has divided officer
cadet and post-cadet education into two basic
categories: command academic institutions (指挥院校)
and
special
technical
academic
institutions
(专业技术院校).12 Furthermore, the PLA divides its
academic institutions into three types: command
(指挥), special technical (专业技术), and NCO
(士官). Although officer command and special
technical academic institutions include graduate
school programs, no NCO schools include bachelor’s
degree or graduate school programs as of 2018.13
Personnel can receive the following types of
degrees, diplomas, and certificates through the
military education system.
12. “军队院校培训体制” [Training system in military
xueyuan and schools], 中国军事百科全书(第二版 [Volume 39,
Military cadre work, of China military encyclopedia, 2nd edition]
(Beijing: Encyclopedia of China Publishing House, December
2006), 562–63.
13. Yuan Wei and Zhang Zhuo, ed., 中国院校展史 [China
academic institution development history] (Beijing: National
Defense Press, August 2001), 915.
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• Certificate (学历证书 / 学位证书): NCOs and
officers who do not receive a degree, including
for one-year programs such as the command
xueyuan commanding officer programs, receive
a certificate.
• Special (technical) secondary diploma (中专): A
one-year online program equivalent to a general
equivalency diploma or high school diploma
for two-year enlisted personnel, this diploma
is required for one to be selected as an NCO.
Of note, until 1994, this program was available
in PLA officer academic institutions for officers
who joined the PLA as enlisted personnel
during the Cultural Revolution and received a
direct promotion as an officer around the age
of 15 to 17.
• Senior technical (associate’s) degree (大专):
A two- to three-year program for NCOs
and officers.
• Bachelor’s degree (本科): A four-year degree
for cadets.
• Master’s degree (硕士).
• Doctoral degree (博士).
According to the Dictionary of Modern Military
Education, officer academic education institutions are
responsible for the provision of bachelor’s degrees
to pre-commissioned officers, as well as graduate
education (研究生教育).14 Preassignment education
institutions are responsible for providing cultivation
14. “学历教育院校” [Academic education college], in
Dictionary of Modern Military Education [in Chinese], ed. Dong
Huiyu and Mou Xianming (Beijing: NDU Press, August
2011), 144.
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and training for all categories of officers and NCOs
(各级各类军官和士官岗位任职培训).
INSTITUTIONS
From the early 1980s until 1999, the PLA (including
the People’s Armed Police, in this instance) had 117
officer and NCO academic institutions.15 Since 1950,
the PLA has held 16 All-Army Academic Institution
Conferences (全军院校会议), which implemented
major reforms to the entire PLA academic structure.
During the 14th All-Army Academic Institution
Conference in June 1999, decisions were made to
reduce the number of institutions to 67, create the
National Defense Student (国防生) reserve officer
program at 118 civilian engineering and science and
technology universities, separate academic credential
education (学历教育) and preassignment education
(任职教育), switch from academic credential
education to preassignment education as the primary
educational method, and designate 5 PLA universities
as comprehensive universities (综合大学).16
As such, the focus of education in PLA academic
institutions shifted from engineering and technology
to military theory education for command and staff
15. 中国军事百科全书
中国人民解放军军史 [Volume 3,
PLA military history, of China military encyclopedia] (Beijing:
Encyclopedia of China Publishing House, December 2007).
16. Supersic, “军之骄子！解放军全军五所综合大学” [The
proud army: Five comprehensive universities of the PLA],
September 8, 2010, http://club.xilu.com/emas/msgview-821955
-4656460.html; “综合院校” [University], in Dictionary of Modern
Military Education [in Chinese], ed. Dong Huiyu and Mou
Xianming (Beijing: NDU Press, August 2011), 143; and “中国人
民解放军信息工程大学” [Information Engineering University],
Baidu Baike, n.d., https://baike.baidu.com/item/中国人民解放
军战略支援部队信息工程大学/21507141?fromtitle=解放军信息工
程大学&fromid=682913.
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officers. The five comprehensive universities, each of
which has several subordinate officer xueyuan and, in
some cases, an NCO school, are shown below. Only
the first three of the universities remain after the
2017 reorganization; the other two were merged with
other institutions.
• National University of Defense Technology
(NUDT) (国防科学技术大学)
• Naval Engineering University
(NAE) (海军工程大学)
• Air Force Engineering University
(AFEU) (空军工程大学)
• PLA Information Engineering University
(PLAIEU) (解放军信息工程大学)
• PLA Science and Engineering University
(PLAUST) (解放军理工学院)
As of 2006, the PLA had 41 educational institutions
authorized to award doctoral degrees and 60
authorized to award master’s degrees.17 According to
the 2006 defense white paper:
Under the unified leadership of the CMC, the PLA’s
academic institutions are managed at two levels:
1) by the Four General Departments and 2) by the
military regions, PLAN, PLAAF, and PLASAF. The
Four General Departments provide overall guidance
for all PLA educational institutions, and the General
Staff Department administers military education. The
development goal of military educational institutions is to
establish and improve a new school system with distinct
military features to shift priority from education of officer
candidates for academic credentials to preassignment
education. The new system takes preassignment
educational institutions as the main form, and makes a
17. Information Office of the State Council, “China’s
national defense in 2006.”
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distinction between these two types of education. The
PLA has 67 military educational institutions, which are
divided into two types: those for academic credentials
and those for preassignment education. The former offers
undergraduate education for pre-commissioned officers
and graduate education for officers. The latter consists of
basic-, intermediate-, and senior- level institutions and
NCO schools, and offers preassignment training and
rotational training for active-duty officers and NCOs.
Some preassignment educational institutions also offer
graduate courses in military science.18

During the 16th All-Army Academic Institution
Conference in July 2011, the decision was made to
change from identifying the institutions as academic
institutions and preassignment education institutions
to dividing them into the following eight categories:
joint command (联合指挥), comprehensive (综合),
service command (军种指挥), branch (兵种), academic
(学历教育), specialty (专业), NCO (士官), and basic
professional (初级任职教育) (see table 5-1).19 Also, the
number of institutions was reduced to 64. Of note, the
academic institutions category is still broken down into
the academic and professional institutions, but only
consists of 12 out of the 64 institutions. In addition,
there were four People’s Armed Police institutions.
In
continuing
to
reform
its
academic
structure, the PLA has focused on two areas:
unit
personnel
requirements
and
academic
institution structure. In November 2013, the Third
18. Information Office of the State Council, “China’s
national defense in 2006.”
19. “全军院校会议” [All-Army Academic Institution
Conference]; and “中国人民解放军院校” [Military academic
institutions] in Dictionary of Modern Military Education [in
Chinese], ed. Dong Huiyu and Mou Xianming (Beijing: NDU
Press, August 2011), 445–59, 460–85.
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Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee
of the Communist Party of China adopted
中共中央关于全面深化改革若干重大问题的决定
(The decision on several major issues concerning
comprehensively deepening reform), which stated,
“We must deepen the reform of military academic
institutions and improve the triad of military
education, military training, and military professional
education.”20 According to a General Political
Department (GPD) report in June 2014 concerning the
military professional education component, officers at
all levels should generally accumulate no less than 240
study hours per year, and enlisted personnel should
have no less than 180 study hours.21
Building on reforms that began in late 2016, in June
2017 the PLA further reduced the total number of PLA
officer and NCO academic institutions from 64 to 37;
this included the abolishment of several institutions,
the creation of new ones, and the merging of others
(see table 5-2 for a full list). For example, the PLAAF
went from a total of 15 academic institutions in 2006 to
a total of 10 in 2017. The 43 institutions include 37 PLA
and six People’s Armed Police institutions, the latter of

20. Liu Longlong, “军队院校调整改革：师职以上领导岗位
大幅压减” [Military academic institutions adjustment and reform:
The leadership positions above the division are greatly reduced],
Sina, August 7, 2017, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/nd/2017-08
-07/doc-ifyitayr9652243.shtml.
21. Pang Kun and Lu Rongjun, “发展军事职业教育是实现强
军目标的战略路径” [Developing military professional education
is strategic path for achieving strong military objective],
Jiefangjun Bao, June 4, 2014, 3.
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which are not discussed in this chapter.22 In addition,
“several of their grades were reduced, the number
of service support personnel was reduced, and the
proportion of civilian staff to make the frontline
teaching and research forces was increased.” 23
Within the PLA, each organization is assigned
a bureaucratic grade commensurate with the grade
of the commander and the political commissar. The
grade determines the organization’s level of relative
importance. A reduction in grade results in a loss of
bureaucratic importance for the organization, as well
as all of its leaders, and all subordinate organizations
and personnel. Also of note, the former Naval Marine
Academy and Air Force Airborne Troop College
were converted into training bases, which means
that the students apparently no longer receive four
years of academic and technical training before they
begin their specialty training. It is not clear why these
schools were downgraded to bases.

22. “共43所！国防部公布调整改革后军队院校名称”
[A
total of 43! MND announces the name of military colleges after
adjustment and reform], 81.cn, June 29, 2017, http://www.81.
cn/jmywyl/2017-06/29/content_7657370.htm;
“军改后43所军
队院校名单及分布区公布” [List of 43 military academies and
distribution areas announced after the military reform], Sohu,
January 5, 2018, http://www.sohu.com/a/214861084_184797
(site discontinued); and PLA Air Force, 中国人民解放军空军军
官手册 [PLA Air Force officer handbook] (Beijing: Lantian Press,
November 2006), 38–39.
23. Liu, “Military academic institutions adjustment and
reform.”
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Table 5-1. The PLA’s 64 academic institutions
in 2011
Joint
Service
Comp
Branch
Cmd
Cmd
CMC (2)

1

GSD (19)

Academic

Speciality

2

2

Basic
Professional

1
2

2

11

GPD (3)

3

GLD (10)
GAD (5)
PLAN (8)

1

1

3

PLAAF (11)

1

1

5

PLASAF (2)

4

4

2

2

2

1

2
1

1

MR (4)
TOTAL

NCO

1
2

1

13

5

1
3

1

5

5

1

22

12

1

Table 5-2 below lists the current 37 PLA officer and
NCO academic institutions that were reorganized in
June 2017; they are listed in protocol order.24 As of
2017, the PLA subordinated its academic institutions
to the following organizations: the Central Military
Commission, Army (PLAA), Navy (PLAN), PLAAF,
Rocket Force (PLARF), and PLASSF. The table includes
the Headquarters (HQ) the institution is subordinate
to, the English and Chinese name, and the locations
of the main campuses (校本部) and branch campuses
(分校区). Overall, the institutions are organized into
two categories: 1) directly subordinate to the Central
Military Commission (军委直属院校) and 2) service
and branch academic institutions (军兵种院校). Note:
Each officer university and xueyuan has several
subordinate xueyuan, and some have an NCO school.
24. Defense Intelligence Agency, Directory of PRC Military
Personalities 2018 (Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence Agency,
March 2018); and “List of 43 military academies.”
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#

Institution

Main
Campus

Branch Campuses

National Defense University (国防大学)

Beijing

Xi’an, Shanghai, Shijiazhuang

2

National University of Defense Technology
(国防科技大学)

Changsha

Nanjing, Wuhan, Hefei

3

Army Command Academy (陆军指挥学院)

Nanjing

4

Army Engineering University (陆军工程大学)

Nanjing

Shijiazhuang, Chongqing,
Wuhan, Xuzhou

5

Army Infantry Academy (陆军步兵学院)

Nanchang

Shijiazhuang

6

Army Armored Force Academy (陆军装甲兵学院) Beijing

Bengbu, Changchun

7

Army Artillery and Air Defense Academy
(陆军炮兵防空兵学院)

Hefei

Nanjing, Zhengzhou, Shenyang

Army Aviation College (陆军航空兵学院)

Beijing

Army Special Operations Academy
(陆军特种作战学院)

Guilin

Guangzhou

10

Army Border and Coastal Defense Academy
(陆军边海防学院)

Xi’an

Urumqi, Kunming

11

Army Chemical Defense Academy (陆军防化学院) Beijing

12

Army (Third) Medical University
(陆军军医大学（第三军医大学))

Chongqing

8
9

PLAA

1

CMC

Table 5-2. The PLA’s 37 academic institutions
in 2018

Army Service Academy (陆军勤务学院)

Chongqing

Wuhan

Army Military Transportation Academy
(陆军军事交通学院)

Tianjin

Zhenjiang, Bengbu

15

Naval Command College (海军指挥学院)

Nanjing

16

Naval Engineering University (海军工程大学)

Wuhan

17

Naval Dalian Ship Academy (海军大连舰艇学院)

Dalian

18

Naval Submarine Academy (海军潜艇学院)

Qingdao

Naval Aviation University (海军航空大学)

Yantai

20

Naval (Second) Medical University
(海军军医大学 (第二军医大学))

Shanghai

21

Naval Service Academy (海军勤务学院)

Tianjin

22

Naval NCO School (海军士官学校)

Bengbu

19

PLAN

13
14
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Tianjin

Qingdao

Table 5-2. The PLA’s 37 academic institutions in 2018
(continued)
#

Main
Campus

23

Air Force Command College (空军指挥学院)

Beijing

24

Air Force Engineering University (空军工程大学)

Xi’an

25

Aviation University of the Air Force
(空军航空大学)

Changchun

26

Air Force Early Warning College (空军预警学院)

Wuhan

27

Air Force Harbin Flight Academy
(空军哈尔滨飞行学院)

Harbin

Air Force Shijiazhuang Flight Academy
(空军石家庄飞行学院)

Shijiazhuang

29

Air Force Xi’an Flight Academy
(空军西安飞行学院)

Xi’an

30

Air Force (Fourth) Medical University
(空军军医大学 (第四军医大学))

Xi’an

31

Air Force Service College (空军勤务学院)

Xuzhou

32

Air Force Communications NCO School
(空军通信士官学校)

Dalian

PLAAF

28

CMC

Institution

33
PLARF

Xi’an

35

Rocket Force NCO School (火箭军士官学校)

Qingzhou

36

Strategic Support Force Aerospace Engineering
University (战略支援部队航天工程大学)

Beijing

Strategic Support Force Information Engineering
University (战略支援部队信息工程大学)

Zhengzhou

37

Qingdao

Rocket Force Command College (火箭军指挥学院) Wuhan
Rocket Force Engineering University
(火箭军工程大学)

PLASSF

34

Branch Campuses

Luoyang

In June 2017, Xi implemented major changes to
the PLA National Defense University (NDU) and the
NUDT. According to a deputy director of the Ministry
of National Defense Information Bureau and the
Ministry of National Defense spokesperson, Senior
Colonel Wu Qian, “This adjustment and reform of
the military academic institutions basically formed a
layout with the joint operations academic institutions
as the core (基本形成以联合作战院校为核心), the
branches/arms specialized academic institutions
as the foundation (以兵种专业院校为基础), and the
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military-civil fusion cultivation as the supplement
(以军民融合培养为补充的院校布局).”25
At the ceremony in June 2017, Xi emphasized that
the “NDU is an important base for cultivating joint
operations personnel and senior- and intermediatelevel leading officers. It is necessary to grasp the
characteristics and laws of the construction of highlevel professional education institutions, promote
the innovation of teaching and scientific research
management, highlight high-quality joint operations
command and staff training, strengthen military
theoretical research, and strive to build a worldclass comprehensive joint command university.”26
Furthermore, he emphasized that:
NUDT is a high-quality, new-type, military personnel
training and national defense technology independent
innovation institution. It is necessary to keep up with the
development trend of the world’s military science and
technology, adapt to the requirements of winning localized
wars of informationization, do a good job in cultivating
general professional talents and joint operations to ensure
talents, strengthen key core technology research, and
strive to build world-class higher education institutions.27
25. “国防部公布调整改革后43所军队院校名单” [The MND
announced the list of 43 military academies after adjustment
and reform], China (website), June 29, 2017, https://news.china
.com/domestic/945/20170629/30866113.html.
26. “新调整组建的军事科学院国防大学国防科技大学成
立大会暨军队院校科研机构训练机构主要领导座谈会在京举行”
[Leaders from the PLA’s academic and research institutions and
training organizations hold meeting in Beijing to implement
reforms for the Academy of Military Science, NDU, and NUDT],
Xinhua, July 20, 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/mrdx/2017
-07/20/c_136457579.htm.
27. “Leaders from the PLA’s academic and research
institutions.”
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In February 2018, Xi recommended improving
the Triad New-Type Military Personnel Cultivation
System, which resulted in the PLA’s academic
institutions reorganizing their administrative and
functional staff departments.28 Yet another change
occurred in March 2018, when the PLA downgraded
the NDU from a Theater Command (TC) leadergrade organization to a TC deputy leader-grade
organization, which is the same grade as the NUDT.
The Academy of Military Science, which is not a PLA
academic institution, was also downgraded to TC
deputy leader.29
Of note, despite the fact that major changes have
continued apace during the Xi Jinping era, the PLA has
not held an All-Army Academic Institution Conference
since Xi took office. Although no information has
yet to be announced about the 17th conference, it
will most likely be held in mid-to-late 2020 and will
likely focus on reforms under Xi. The key themes will
include the reduction of PLA academic institutions to
37 that occurred in June 2017 and the abolition of the
National Defense Student Program.
OFFICER EDUCATION
The PLA officer corps has five career tracks:
military, political, logistics, equipment, and special
technical officers. The PLA also makes a distinction
28. “着力健全三位一体新型军事人才培养体系”
[Focus
on improving the triad new military personnel training
system], February 28, 2018, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/
content/2018-02/28/content_200544.htm.
29. Cui Shifang, “PLA NDU is Downgraded,” Epoch Times,
March 12, 2018, https://www.epochtimes.com/gb/18/3/12
/n10211708.htm.
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between what it calls “commanding officers”
(指挥军官) and staff officers, who are also identified
as “noncommanding officers” (非指挥军官). As
previously discussed, by definition, a commanding
officer is an officer who holds any type of leadership
billet. The PLA combines the first four career tracks
together and identifies them as nonspecial technical
officers (非专业技术军官).
For simplicity purposes and to make the distinction
between the first four tracks as a group and the special
technical officer track, this chapter identifies the first
four tracks as “regular officers,” even though the
PLA does not use this term.30 It is not clear exactly
when it is determined whether a cadet will become
a commanding officer, but it is most likely within
the first two years of cadet training (i.e., during the
academic education phase). Once officers complete
their cadet education, their future education is based
on whether they are a commanding officer or a
noncommanding officer. Specifically, commanding
officers, regardless of their career track, return to the
command xueyuan for their military education and
to receive a certificate, while noncommanding officers
can return to their original cadet academic institution,
where they may receive a graduate degree.
New officer cadets attend one of the PLA’s academic
institutions to receive their pre-commissioning
academic credential education (生长军官学历教育)
and preassignment education (生长军官任职教育). In
some cases, the two types of education are divided
between different institutions. For example, PLAAF
30. “指挥军官” [Commanding officer], 中国军事百科全
书(第二版 [Volume 39, Military cadre work, of China military
encyclopedia, 2nd edition] (Beijing: Encyclopedia of China
Publishing House, December 2006), 85–86.
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aviators receive their academic credential education
as a cadet at the Aviation University of the Air Force
for four years, for which they earn a bachelor’s degree.
Next, they receive their preassignment education as a
student at a flight academy for two years, for which
they earn a second bachelor’s degree. For the academic
credentials, the length of training can vary.
A command xueyuan is an educational
organization that provides basic training and
education for cadets (生长军官) who will serve in
commanding officer billets in the military, political,
logistics, and equipment specialties and staff officer
billets in the HQ/Staff Department. In addition, a
command xueyuan provides military education to
post-cadet commanding officers and staff officers in
all four specialties.31
Command xueyuan do not necessarily have to have
the word “command” in their name, but do have to
provide cadet-level education for commanding officers
and staff officers. Command institutions are organized
into three levels: basic, intermediate, and advanced.32
Although commanding officers in the logistics
and equipment tracks receive their undergraduate
education at a logistics or equipment-related academic
institution, they receive their intermediate education
at their service’s command academic institution.
Basic-level academic education includes a
bachelor’s degree. The focus is on military and political
foundation education for pre-commissioned officers
(生长军官) in officer cadet academic institutions who
31. “指挥学院” [Commanding college], in Dictionary of
Modern Military Education [in Chinese], ed. Dong Huiyu and Mou
Xianming (Beijing: NDU Press, August 2011), 140–41.
32. Yuan and Zhang,
development history, 914.
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academic

institution

are preparing to become platoon-level commanding
officers, as well as for staff officers in the military
track.33 The cadets include high school graduates
and outstanding enlisted personnel. Some of these
institutions also include a two- or three-year senior
technical degree for NCOs who will assume squad
deputy leader or leader billets. Upon graduation, new
officers serve as platoon and company commanders,
vessel branch chiefs (部门长), and aviation pilots and
navigators. All commanding officers who serve in
billets at the battalion level and below must complete
their basic-level education.34
Intermediate-level education includes both
commanding officers and staff officers, as well as
special technical officers, at the battalion level who
are preparing to assume regiment-level commanding
officer or staff officer billets.35 Most, but not all, of these
xueyuan have the word zhihui (command) in their
name, such as the PLA Air Force Command College.
“Air Force Command College” and “AFCC” are the
official English name and acronym. The lead author of
this chapter has escorted student delegations from the
AFCC within the United States each year since 2014.
Although various logistics xueyuan provide this
level of command military education, they do not have
33. Yuan and Zhang, China academic institution
development history, 914; and “干部逐级培训制度” [System of
cadre training at different levels], 军队干部工作 中国军事百科
全书(第二版 [Volume 39, Military cadre work, of China military
encyclopedia, 2nd edition] (Beijing: Encyclopedia of China
Publishing House, December 2006), 119; “Commanding college,”
140–41.
34.

“System of cadre training,” 119.

35. Yuan and Zhang, China academic institution
development history, 914; and “Commanding college,” 140–41.
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“zhihui” in their names. These xueyuan are responsible
for providing combined-arms education as well as
individual service and branch education for regimentlevel military, political, logistics, and equipment track
officers so they can become advanced-level officers.
They also provide education for staff officers serving
in the four specialties at the group army, division,
brigade, and regiment levels. Finally, they provide
education for combined-arms combat, political, and
logistics instructors.
Most commanding xueyuan also have a fouryear program for cadets who are going to progress
as staff officers. All commanding officers who serve
in regiment-, brigade-, and division-level billets must
complete their intermediate-level education.36
Advanced-level education includes officers who
are preparing to assume commanding billets at the
corps level and who have completed intermediatelevel education and already have a bachelor’s degree.37
This is a one-year program that results in a certificate.
The NDU (国防大学), which is the only institution
responsible for joint education, is the only institution
that fits in this level. Whereas most commanding
officers attend the NDU for one year and receive a
certificate, other noncommanding officers can attend
the NDU’s graduate school and receive a master’s
or doctoral degree. Students who attend the NDU
are selected from officers holding corps leader-grade
and deputy-leader-grade billets. All commanding
officers who serve in corps-level billets and above

36.

“System of cadre training,” 119.

37. Yuan and Zhang, China academic institution
development history, 914; and “Commanding college,” 140–41.
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must complete their advanced-level education to be
promoted in grade.38
Historically, no formal joint training occurred
until officers reached the corps level and attended
the NDU; however, this is beginning to change. In
2017, the NDU initiated a 10-month course, running
from October to July, for 200 commanding and staff
officers.39 The commanding officers were selected
from officers at battalion or deputy regiment level,
and all of the staff officers had working experience in
departments in the five TC HQs, including the Joint
Operations Command Centers, as well as the different
service HQs. The staff officers also came from HQ
departments in various service and branch HQs at
the division, corps, and above levels. Each student
receives a certificate. The NDU plans to hold two of
these courses per year.
With the increased emphasis on joint training,
in early 2017, the Eastern TC Joint Operations
Command Center began requiring all personnel to
attain a duty qualification certificate (值班资格证书)
for joint command training (联合指挥训练) whereby
each person must pass over a dozen tests in four
categories, including basic skills, professional skills,

38.

“System of cadre training,” 119.

39. Huang Panyue, ed., “PLA aims to cultivate commanding
talents for joint operations,” China Military Online, September 7,
2017, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/2017-09/07/content
_7747234.htm; and Chen Yanwei and Cai Pengcheng, “Our
military joint operations command talent selection and training
has taken a new step; This year, we will start a joint job
qualification training course,” 81.cn, September 6, 2017, http://
www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2017-09/07/content_187441.htm.
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skill applications, and physical fitness.40 It is not clear
how the program is implemented, the length of time it
is implemented, or where it is implemented. Although
the article is about the Eastern TC, each TC has most
likely implemented the same program.
Although PLAAF officers now participate in joint
exercises throughout their careers, as a general rule,
they do not participate in any joint education until
they are deputy corps-level flag officers. By that time,
however, they have typically reached their mandatory
grounding (停飞) age and can no longer fly aircraft;
the mandatory grounding ages are 45 for fighter and
ground attack aircraft, 50 for bombers and helicopters,
55 for male transport pilots, and 48 for female
transport pilots.41
As for graduate degrees, whereas the command
academic institutions primarily provide a one-year
program that results in a certificate, intermediate
and advanced institutions also provide master’s and
doctoral degrees that focus on command issues.42
For example, in 2016, the AFCC recruited 60 officers

40. Cheng Yongliang, “东部战区组织联指中心人员值班
资格首批认证” [Eastern theater command organizes the first
certification for Joint Operations Command Center personnel
duty qualification], Chinanews, February 14, 2017, http://www
.chinanews.com/mil/2017/02-14/8149557.shtml.
41. Zhu Rongchang, 空军大辞典 [Air Force dictionary]
(Shanghai: Shanghai Dictionary Press, September 1996), 175; 当代
中国空军 [China today: Air Force] (Beijing: China Social Sciences
Press, 1989), 507; and PLA Air Force, PLA Air Force officer
handbook, 230.
42. Yuan and Zhang,
development history, 914.
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academic

institution

to receive a master’s degree in a two-and-a-halfyear program.43
Graduates from special technical academic
institutions, most of whom serve as special technical
officers and are not commanding officers, can return
to their original basic academic institutions (i.e., where
they received their bachelor’s degrees) to receive
a master’s or doctoral degree that focuses on their
technical specialties. For example, in 2017, the Air
Force Engineering University had 1,600 students in
master’s and doctoral programs, including 38 master’s
specialties and 25 doctoral specialties.44
According to China’s 2015 white paper, 中国的军
事战略 (China’s military strategy) (see figure 5-1):
Concerning cultivating (培养) new-type military
personnel, China’s armed forces will continue with
the strategic project for personnel training and perfect
the system for military human resources. They will
deepen the reform of military educational institutions
and improve the triad training system for new-type
military personnel (军事职业教育三位一体的新型军事
人才培养体系), which consists of the three components
of institutional education (军队院校教育); unit training
(部队训练); and military professional education (军事
职业教育), in order to provide more opportunities to
cultivate more personnel who can meet the demands of
informationized warfare.45

43. “PLA Air Force Command College,” China Education
Online, n.d., http://souky.eol.cn/HomePage/takeinfo/880
/13689.html.
44. “About University,” [Chinese] Air Force Engineering
University (website), n.d., http://www.afeu.cn/web/afeu/dxgk
/gk/.
45. Chinese Ministry of National Defense, China’s military
strategy.
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“Double Learning” Activities (双学活动)

Academic Education (学历教育)
Professional Education (任职教育)
NCO Education (士官教育)

Military Academic
Institution
Education
(军队院校教育)

Unit Training
(部队训练实践)

Military Professional
Education (军事职业教育)

Online Courses (在线课程)
Cloud Platform (云平台) (will be rolled out by the end of 2018)
Cadet Professional Education (生长军官任职教育)
Promotional Training (晋升培训）
Specialized Training (专项培训)

Figure 5-1. “Triad” new-type military talent
cultivation
Unlike command education institutions, special
technical institutions are organized into the following
three categories, vice levels:46
• The first category includes outstanding enlisted
personnel and civilians who have received a
ninth-grade education, and who then receive
two or three years of education and a general
equivalency diploma.
• The second category includes outstanding
enlisted personnel and civilians who have a
earned a high school degree, and then receive a
three-year senior technical degree.
• The third category includes outstanding enlisted
personnel and civilians who have earned a high
school degree, and then receive a four-year
bachelor’s degree.

46. Yuan and Zhang,
development history, 914–15.
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academic

institution

NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS (NCOS)
Based on regulations implemented in the early
2000s, NCOs must now have a general equivalency
diploma to become a junior-grade NCO, a senior
technical degree to become an intermediate-grade
NCO, and a bachelor’s degree to become a seniorgrade NCO.47 But most NCO schools currently only
provide two-year secondary technical or two- or threeyear senior technical degree education for NCOs,
making them inadequate as institutions to educate
enlisted personnel who already have an associate’s or
bachelor’s degree.
Noncommissioned officer (NCO) schools, which
are division leader-grade organizations, also provide
three-month preassignment programs for personnel
to become nontechnical specialty junior-grade NCOs
and a three- to six-month preassignment program for
personnel to become special technical junior-grade
NCOs.48 Depending on the NCO’s specialty, NCO
schools also offer a two- to three-year preassignment
senior technical degree program for intermediateand senior-grade NCOs. It is not clear where an NCO
can receive a bachelor’s degree; however, the PLA
has increased the number of online correspondence
courses it offers.
One of the key issues today is that, each year, the
PLA averages about 150,000 new enlisted recruits—
roughly 35 percent of the total number of new enlisted
members—who already have some college education.
47. Kenneth Allen and Morgan Clemens, The Recruitment,
Education, and Training for PLA Navy Personnel (Newport, RI:
China Maritime Studies Institute, 2014).
48. PLA Air Force, 中国人民解放军空军士兵手册 [PLA Air
Force enlisted force handbook] (Beijing: Lantian Press, 2006), 259.
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But the PLA NCO schools are not geared toward
providing education for them; therefore, it is not clear
whether they receive any type of education at an NCO
school after they become an NCO.
Although the PLA previously had five stand-alone
NCO schools (Army vehicle, Army medical, Army
ordnance, Navy surface vessel support, and Air Force
communications), as of 2018, there are only three:
Navy vessel, Air Force communications, and PLARF.
Besides stand-alone NCO schools, each service also
has NCO schools that are subordinate to officer
universities and xueyuan. Each school focuses on one
specialty. For example, the PLAAF has one standalone school and at least two subordinate schools,
which are listed below:
• Air Force Communications NCO School (空军
通信士官学校), which has about 1,500 students49
• Air Force Engineering University’s Aviation
Maintenance NCO School (空军工程大学
航空机务士官学校)50

49. “PLA Air Force NCO Communications School,” Air
Force News, n.d., http://www.baike.com/wiki/中国人民解放军
空军通信士官学校 (site discontinued).
50. Zhou Honghui, “空军工程大学航空机务士官学校加强
党组织建设实际” [Air Force Engineering University Aviation
Maintenance NCO School strengthens party organization
development documentary], Air Force News, December 12,
2017, 3; and “空军工程大学航空机务士官学校简介” [Air
Force Engineering University Aviation Maintenance NCO
School introduction], 360doc.cn, November 8, 2017, http://
www.360doc.com/content/17/f1108/09/7872436_701875130
.shtml (page deleted from site).
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• Air Force Early Warning College’s Radar NCO
School (空军预警学院雷达士官学校)51
EXAMPLE CASE: PLAAF COMMANDING
OFFICER TRAINING
From 1949 to 2011, China’s cultivation and training
system for commanding officers (指挥军官培养模式)
went through five major stages.52 These changes led to
widespread confusion about how careers are supposed
to progress, and have led to many commanding
officers holding positions without the required
education credentials. For example, a survey of over
2,100 Air Force personnel who became commanding
officers in 2012 or afterward revealed that 63.7 percent
were unclear about how their careers were supposed
to proceed, and 64.2 percent reported that they had
not received the required cultivation and training for
their positions.
Most discussions divide the training model
for Air Force commanding officers into either
Air Force ground command officers and flight
command officers or officers serving in commanding
billets or staff officer billets, and the programs
are designed correspondingly. Figure 5-2 below
provides an overview of the five stages, which were
51. Wang Xiaonan, “预警学院雷达士官学校教学科研以十九
大精神提升办学理念” [Early Warning College Radar NCO School
Teaching and Research Division uses the 19th Party Congress
spirit to promote the concept of running a school], Air Force News,
December 25, 2017, 2.
52. Liu Baoying and Cheng Ling, 中外空军指挥军官培
养模式比较研究 [A comparative study on the training models
of commanding officers in China and foreign countries]
(Beijing: Lantian Press, 2016).
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adopted during the All-Army Academic Institution
Conferences (全军院校会议).

Figure 5-2. Five stages of PLAAF command
education and training
Pilots are the main component of PLAAF combat
strength and the main source of command officers at
all levels in the PLAAF.53The quality and speed of pilot
training directly determines the quality of the PLAAF
officer corps, unit combat strength, and emergency
operations capabilities. The PLAAF, therefore,
emphasizes the role of pilot cultivation and training
(飞行员培训) and regards it as the key link in officers’

53. He Weirong, ed., Science of Air Force Training (Beijing:
Academy of Military Science Press, 2006), 257; and Kenneth W.
Allen, PLA Air Force, Naval Aviation, and Army Aviation Aviator
Recruitment, Education, and Training (Washington, DC: Jamestown
Foundation, February 2016).
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military training. Pilot education progresses from
rudimentary to advanced in the following four phases.
• Basic-level education and training at the
Aviation University of the Air Force (基础教育)
• Basic flight training at one of the three flight
academies (中级和高级教练机训练)
• Transition training at the pilot’s operational
unit (改装训练)
• Training in the pilot’s operational aircraft at the
pilot’s operational unit (作战部队)
All pilots are considered military-track officers and
move up their promotion ladders in this career field,
but only PLAAF pilots who become commanding
officers in their units have the opportunity to attend
academic courses at the AFCC. As such, most pilots
do not receive any military education once they are
assigned to their operational unit, or cease becoming a
commanding officer. For example, a pilot can become
one of the deputy commanders at the flight squadron
(company level), flight group (battalion level), or air
regiment/brigade level, but not the commander.
As such, he becomes a regular aviator (普通飞行员)
and continues to move up his career path only as
a pilot or is grounded (停飞) and assigned to a staff
position at an HQ.
Therefore, it appears only a few pilots who
continue to move up their career paths as
commanding officers receive any military education
at the AFCC. The PLAAF has apparently created
three successive courses for flight squadron and flight
group commanding officers.54 These include a flight
54. Fu Guoqiang, Comparison of Chinese and Foreign Military
Flight Education (Beijing: Military Science Press, January 2013), 64.
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squadron course (飞行中队长班), a mid-level course
(中培班), and a small campaign course (小战役班). The
duration of these courses is unknown, but they most
likely last only a few weeks at the most. According to
one source, the primary reason the PLAAF does not
have longer courses or courses that all pilots attend is
the concern that a lengthy absence from a pilot’s unit
would adversely impact the pilot’s flying capabilities.55
It appears the next time pilots who serve as
commanding officers in a regiment, brigade, or
division HQ receive any military education is when
they attend their intermediate (battalion/major and
regiment/colonel) and advanced (division/senior
colonel) education at the AFCC in Beijing.56 Although
all commanding officers return to the AFCC for their
intermediate education, they only receive a certificate
for that training.57
As a result, very few commanding officers in any
field, including aviators, receive a graduate degree.
As of June 2016, the AFCC had 21 specialties for
commanding officers. These include military thought
(军事思想), military history (军事历史), strategy
(战略), campaigns (战役), tactics (战术), operations/
combat command (作战指挥), logistics (后勤), military
operations (军事运筹), military management/

55.

Fu, Chinese and Foreign Military Flight Education, 61.

56. PLA Air Force, PLA Air Force officer handbook,
331–32; and Fu, Chinese and Foreign Military Flight Education;
Bai Chongming and Ji Changguo, ed., Air Force Strategy
Transformation and Flight Personnel Education Innovation (Beijing:
Lantian Press, May 2010).
57. “中国人民解放军空军指挥学院” [China PLA Air Force
Command College], Baidu Baike, n.d., https://baike.baidu.com
/item/中国人民解放军空军指挥学院.
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administration (军事管理), and military political
work (军队整治工作).
The AFCC also has six-month and one-year
specialty programs for staff officers, who receive
a secondary or special technical degree. Special
technical officers and some staff officers (参谋军官)
do receive graduate degrees during their intermediate
education. The PLA has three terms for staff officers:
canmou (参谋) for the military track, ganshi (干事) for
the political track, and zhuli (助理) for the logistics
and equipment tracks. Canmou junguan (参谋军官)
is the generic term for all of them.58 The AFCC, as of
2016, had 14 graduate programs, including 3 doctoral
programs and 2 postdoctoral programs. The number
of students ranges from about 30 to 60, some of whom
get to travel abroad toward the end of the course.
For example, the lead author of this chapter escorted
the annual AFCC delegations to Washington, DC, or
Maxwell Air Force Base from 2014 to 2018. The number
of students averaged 15, of whom 10 to 12 were senior
colonels with the grade of division deputy leader or
division leader.
As with everything in the PLA, however, there
are always exceptions to the rule. Although most
aviators do not receive a graduate degree, some
aviators have been involved in special programs.
Specifically, during the early 1990s, the PLAAF began
providing the opportunity for certain pilots to receive
a master’s degree. For example, in 1994, Northwestern
Polytechnical University (西北工业大学) in Xi’an
began providing master’s degree programs in
engineering for PLAAF test pilots assigned to the
58. “参谋军官” [Staff officers contingent], in 军队干部工作
[Military cadre work], ed. Xu Yaoyuan (Beijing: Encyclopedia of
China Publishing House, November 2006), 72–73.
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Ministry of Aviation Industry’s China Flight Test
Establishment at Xi’an Yanliang.59 In addition, in
January 2003, Le Wenya (勒文雅), who was a member
of the sixth female aviator class (1989–93), became the
first female aviator in the PLAAF to receive a master’s
degree, which she began at the AFCC in 2000.60
SUMMARY
The entire training system for PLA personnel, both
officer and enlisted, has, for a long time, focused on just
that—training. The only education that has happened
has been very basic (i.e., officers’ undergraduate
education) or consisted of the communist political
education that permeates all levels of the system. It
was not until the dawn of the twenty-first century
that the PLA even considered that officers, much less
enlisted members or NCOs, might benefit from a more
generalized education.
One thing that has been mentioned throughout,
but needs to be explicitly emphasized, is throughout
the system, almost all personnel training, both officer
and enlisted, takes place solely within the confines
of an individual’s specialty. Pilots attend training
with other pilots, submarine engineers with other
submarine engineers, and truck mechanics with other
truck mechanics. There is almost no interaction, even
within a single service, with members of a different
discipline, much less from another service. This has
major implications for improving the force as a whole.
59. “首批硕士试飞员毕业20周年” [20th anniversary for first
master’s test pilot graduates], Snowflake News, June 21, 2018,
https://www.xuehua.us/a/5eb5c33c86ec4d2aadd665e3.
60.

Air Force News, January 28, 2003, 1.
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Indeed, it is not until the very senior levels of
training at the NDU that joint topics are even discussed.
There are a handful of reports indicating that the PLA’s
latest round of reorganization, specifically focused on
establishing and improving jointness, is leading to
changes in the military education system, including
joint training at lower levels. Although there have
been no definitive public policies as of mid-2018, it is
logical to conclude this would be one of the changes
that Xi Jinping has ordered as he tries to remake the
PLA for the twenty-first century.
A joint force is not one in which all of the services
are “modernized” (现代化), “informatized” (信息化),
and “intelligentized” (智能化); it is one in which they
can operate together. This will not happen unless the
PLA begins to break down the institutional barriers
preventing specialties, career tracks, and services
from interacting and learning together and from one
another. A well-trained force is critical and necessary
to a military, but it is ultimately insufficient to fight
and win wars. A modern, high-tech military must be
well-equipped, well-educated, and well-integrated if
it wants to prevail. As described above, the current
training and cultivation system does not lend itself to
creating a joint force, but we are beginning to see some
shifts which may slowly start to reform the system
and better enable military education in the future.
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6. LEARNING FROM RECENT PROTESTS
AMONG PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY
VETERANS
Neil J. Diamant
Widespread and persistent veteran protests
challenge the security forces but do not threaten the
communist party in any significant way, primarily
because the veterans who protest tend to be older and
in ill health and do not articulate an alternative political
vision. Instead, protests focus on improving material
benefits, commemorating past wars, or fighting
corruption. At the same time, the scale of veteran
protests do threaten Communist Party of China (CPC)
Secretary Xi Jinping’s plans for rapid transformation
of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) because largescale reductions in the land forces would swell the
ranks of protesters. To better manage veterans, in
March 2018, the Xi Jinping administration established
the Ministry of Veteran Affairs (MVA). This chapter
argues that this ministry is unlikely to quell veteran
protests. Veterans also are quite skeptical.
Policy implications of this chapter include:
• The establishment of the MVA presents a new
opportunity for American engagement with
China. The United States has accumulated
significant policy expertise managing veteran
benefits which could prove helpful to China as
it navigates the challenging logistics running a
separate ministry for veterans.
• The Chinese government has an interest in
portraying its public as standing unified
beyond state policy objectives and ambitions.
But, looking at how China treats its veterans

205

suggests that its population is not as nationalistic
or militaristic as media reports often suggest.
Amid so much bellicose rhetoric about looming
wars with China—over trade and unpopulated
islands—why should anyone care about actual wars
of the distant past, the postwar activities of millions
of their combatants, or the recent establishment of
the MVA?1 In particular, why should policy makers,
scholars, and analysts who are well-versed in the
harder currency of evaluating the PLA in terms
of its armament, organization, command structure,
and doctrine, devote that scarce resource—
time—toward understanding this softer side of civilmilitary relations?
I would like to make the case for the payoff of
this investment on several grounds. First, veterans
are long-time “disaffected insiders” who are wellorganized, trained in weaponry, and thus potentially
a source of danger for Communist rule.2 Second,
Xi Jinping’s plans to transform the PLA into a more
technologically advanced force less beholden to large
ground forces could be threatened by ongoing unrest
among discharged soldiers. Third, veteran discontent
can affect recruitment into the PLA as the public
becomes increasingly aware of what awaits soldiers

1. “Zhongguo tuiyi junren yiyou 5700 duowan,”
Chinanews, March 18, 2017, http://www.chinanews.com
/mil/2017/03-18/8177011.shtml.
2. For a recent study of insider protests, see Kevin J.
O’Brien, “China’s Disaffected Insiders,” Journal of Democracy 28,
no. 3 (July 2017): 5–13.
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upon their demobilization.3 Fourth, to counter veteran
protests, China recently established a ministry to deal
with veterans’ problems, which is the most significant
innovation in veteran management since 1949. What
are the ministry’s chances for success given China’s
history of dealing with veteran discontent?
This essay tackles these issues. I argue that the
new ministry is unlikely to succeed in the absence
of other reforms, and that veterans will continue to
be a chronic thorn in the side of the regime. Veteran
protests could delay the planned transformation of
the PLA through large-scale land force reductions
(which hits relatively unskilled soldiers the hardest)
and increase the difficulty of recruiting high-quality
people into the PLA. At the same time, veteran
discontent does not constitute a danger to the CPC.
The implication of this for the United States is policy
makers should not deduce promilitary sentiment on
the part of the Chinese public based on media reports
of rising nationalism. Instead, this essay suggests
that the treatment of veterans can be an alternative,
and potentially more accurate, way of gauging
contemporary Chinese feelings toward the PLA.4
In this chapter, I review the character and
dynamics of recent veteran protests and examine the

3. “关于漯河市涉军事件的深思” [Thinking about the Luohe
veteran incident], n.d., http://sdds-gov-cn.sdds-gov-cn.bbs.
mc81.net/thread-1764-1-1.html (site discontinued).
4. For an example of widespread skepticism during the
Korean War, see Neil J. Diamant, Embattled Glory: Veteran,
Military Families and the Politics of Patriotism in China, 1949–2007
(Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009), 126–30.
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government’s response.5 I then look at the implications
for understanding civil-military relations, military
reform, Chinese nationalism, and opportunities for
US-Chinese cooperation, given the establishment
of the MVA.
VETERAN ACTIVISM 2010–18
Veteran protests receive significantly less
attention in Western media and scholarship than
those involving other sectors of society or causes.6 In
many cases, protests do not attract the attention of
the international media unless they are sudden and
very large. But to the few of us who track veterans
over the long term, pay attention to smaller cities and
towns, and examine their online presence, the lack of
media coverage of veteran protests is hardly news; the
protests began soon after the CPC took over power
in 1949, and persisted with particular ferocity during
the Hundred Flowers Campaign, Cultural Revolution,
and early-mid 1980s. Whereas earlier demonstrations
came to light thanks to the partial declassification
of archives, these days, owing to harsh censorship,
one can learn about protests thanks to veterans
themselves, citizen-journalists, rights protection (维权)
5. Owing to the lack of longitudinal quantitative data about
veteran protests, identifying medium- to long-term trends in
veteran activism is impossible. One cannot know, for example,
whether more protests occurred in 2017 than in 2014.
6. Kevin J. O’Brien, “The Politics of Lodging Complaints in
Rural China,” China Quarterly 143 (1995): 756–83; and Feng Chen,
“Industrial Restructuring and Workers Resistance in China,”
Modern China 29, no. 2 (April 2003): 237–62. For an early article on
PLA demobilization, see Yitzhak Shichor, “Demobilization: The
Dialectics of PLA Troop Reduction,” China Quarterly 146 (June
1996): 336–59.
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activists, and non-Western reporters. Surfacing online
more frequently than in print, the coverage of veteran
protests provides a closer-to-the-round illustration of
the landscape of veterans’ engagement with state than
the top-heavy, post-event studies offered up by state
agencies during the pre-internet era. The archives
of the PRC era reflect this observation; they almost
exclusively store records of government agencies only
reporting what they consider to be important.
Scope
Given the geographical distribution of provinces
from which the PLA has recruited its soldiers, veterans’
political activism (including large and small protests,
individual and collective petitioning, blogging, and
filing lawsuits) has been a widespread phenomenon.7
According to long-standing state policy, veterans,
with some exceptions, are expected to return to their
place of origin (原籍), which ensures that local identity
remains important to veterans’ conception of their role
in the polity; in many protests they hold aloft signs
that read “Sichuan Veterans” or “Hubei Veterans.”
This policy also suggests that activism has a strongly
regional flavor, taking place in provincial capitals
or lower down the administrative ladder in towns
(镇) and counties (县). Protests in Beijing are often
escalations of protests initiated elsewhere in which
people from the same county or province evaded
7. A methodological qualification is in order here. Internetbased materials often suffer from sample bias: People with
problems are those who are mostly likely to take to the Internet
to complain. But because of the extreme censorship of veteran
protests, these accounts are often the best source one has available
to discover individual veterans’ experiences.
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the security forces. But regional identification, which
might provide the basis for mobilization, is hardly
exclusive. Historically and today, many veterans
move across provincial boundaries to support
their comrades.
At the same time, the geography of contemporary
veteran protests reflects China’s military conflicts,
most importantly the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War. As a
border war that developed rather quickly and did not
last long, the PLA drew heavily among farmers from
the south, southwest, and central military regions,
recruiting many of them through promises of urban
jobs in state-owned industries or elsewhere in the
state sector. Upon discharge, these veterans faced
significant challenges making ends meet. Close to 60
percent of a sample of 185 blog posts examined on
the Voice of the Veteran website (退伍军人之声) were
penned by former soldiers from these regions.
Forms
Variation in the form of protest roughly parallels
diversity in location. Like many other groups that
mobilize to gain something from the state or protect
themselves from it, veterans deploy mixed tactics,
change their methods in response to mixed signals
they receive from local officials during a protest,
retreat, and then strategically advance when they feel
that they have an opening.8 Although media reports
focus on public protests simply because they are
highly visible, submitting petitions (as individuals
8. On state signaling in the context of protests, see
Rachel E. Stern and Kevin J. O’Brien, “Politics at the Boundary:
Mixed Signals and the Chinese State,” Modern China 38, no. 2
(2012): 174–98.
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or collectively) is probably more common because
it is less risky. But protesting and petitioning are
not mutually exclusive; failing to get responses to
a petition can lead a veteran to join a protest. In a
similar fashion, veterans sometimes file administrative
lawsuits knowing they will be summarily rejected, but
then use the case when they post their situation to a
website. Veterans also write strongly worded missives
to journalists, letters to the editors, university faculty,
People’s Congresses, and PLA generals they hope
might intervene on their behalf (see table 6-1).9

9. Neil J. Diamant and Kevin J. O’Brien, “Veterans’ Political
Activism in China,” Modern China 41, no. 3 (2015), 285.
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Table 6-1. Forms of protest
Forms of Protest

Cases

Public demonstration

11

Public demonstration + petitioning

2

Petitioning

36

Petitioning + web post

8

Petition + lawsuit + web post

15

Petition + “report” （反映）

1

Petition + letter

1

Lawsuit (including mock indictments)

10

Lawsuit + newspaper + petition

3

Lawsuit + open letter

1

Petition + newspaper + people’s congress appeal

2

Publishing an open letter (to public, officials)

23

Filing a report

18

Blog post/submitting case to a website

32

Web post + contacting a newspaper

3

Contact journalist/newspaper

9

Letter to PLA/senior officials

7

Writing on the street

1

Publishing a suicide letter

1*

Letter to law professor

1
185**

*There was a protest of hundreds of veterans nationwide as a
result of this post.
** Ten cases did not indicate a course of action. This variation
in protest form, however, coexists alongside a commonality noted
in most all.

This variation in protest form, however, coexists
alongside a commonality noted in most all reporting on
veterans’ contentious actions: they are well-organized.
Veterans’ high capacity for organization is evident
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in their ability to slide across provincial borders and
coordinate logistics across long distances. Having
arrived at a protest site, veterans remain regimented.
In addition to regional identification, veterans might
situate themselves according to military branch,
unit, or conflict in which they participated (Vietnam
veterans, Laoshan veterans, etc.). Veterans also
preselect negotiators. Whether this high level of
organization is a tactical decision, an indication of the
endurance of military identity, or simply an engrained
militarized script for collective action (what the late
sociologist Charles Tilly called a “repertoire”) is
difficult to determine. From a risk calculus, orderly
marches signal that protesters are peaceful. At the
same time, by dressing and acting the part of the old
soldier (老兵), protesters also remind officials of their
past service, the promises the government made to
them, and the duty to honor the elderly.
Such promises—offered as verbal commitments,
in State Council documents and implicitly in the
nationalistic propaganda of the Xi Jinping era—help
explain the chronic nature of veteran activism. Since
China lacks a veterans law that clearly stipulates what
they are entitled to, veterans sometimes claim rights
based on conversations with local cadres that occurred
decades earlier. More so than verbal commitments,
People’s Republic of China State Council policies from
the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s would seem to be a better
foundation for asserting claims, but rapid economic
change has rendered many policies unenforceable
(for example, allocating jobs in industries that have
been downsized). Perhaps the most important state
commitment occurred not in a long-ago conversation
or in a decades old policy document, but in
omnipresent propaganda about China’s “national
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rejuvenation,” “dream,” Made in China 2025, aircraft
carriers, and Road and Belt Initiative, all suggesting
that China is, or will soon be, a very wealthy and
powerful state equal to the United States. Veterans
reason, “Why is the government not using this wealth
to help us?”10 Throwing salt on this wound, veterans
read and listen to speeches given by Xi and other
top leaders expressing gratitude to veterans for their
service and glorifying the role of the PLA in China’s
liberation. Like many workers who make moralistic
and debt-owed sorts of claims protesting their
dismissal from factories, veterans also assert that the
state made, and continues to make, implicit promises
that they should be treated as valued citizens. That is,
like many others in society, veterans are as likely to
draw upon political, ethical, and moralistic language
as often as legal and administrative.11
Timing
Veteran political activism, then, has been a
constant feature of the entire reform era owing to
the ubiquity of promises of many sorts. That said,
protests are not temporally random. Veterans select
10. “当年超期服役221名湖南贵阳农村籍老兵维权之路”
[Rights campaign by 221 veterans from the Hunan and Guiyang
countryside who served extended service time], September 10,
2012, http://blog.boxun.com/hero/2011/voiceofveteran/31_1
/shtml (page deleted from site).
11. Feng Chen and Mengxiao Tang, “Labor Conflicts in
China: Typologies and Their Implications,” Asian Survey 53, no. 3
(May–June 2013): 559–83. For examples of how plaintiffs use this
language in the context of lawsuits and discussions with lawyers,
see Ethan Michelson, “The Practice of Law as an Obstacle to
Justice: Chinese Lawyers at Work,” Law and Society Review 40,
no. 1 (2006): 1–38.

214

dates based on when the discrepancy between their
daily lives and the state’s overblown rhetoric about
them can be publicly displayed, such as anniversaries
(founding of the CPC on July 1), the convening of the
National People’s Congress, and PLA Day (August
1), not specific battles.12 The security apparatus is well
aware of this practice and tries, often successfully, to
prevent activism, particularly in places that would
attract international media attention. But the state
has been less successful preventing more localized
protests unconnected to the political calendar and
that result from poor or failed implementation of
specific policies.13
Such protests have gotten the state’s attention.
Learning from prior mistakes, during the last decade,
the government has adopted a different approach
toward its younger veterans: It promises very little—
no secure employment or government job, land,
education, rental assistance, or the like. Instead, most
veterans are granted small stipends and access to job
placement services, but otherwise are told they should
be self-reliant. But given the highly competitive job
market and the continued disdain for (mostly rural)
veterans among many employers, protests among
younger, unemployed, or underemployed veterans
12. Ng Yik-tung and Pan Jiaqing, “Thousands of Chinese
Army Veterans Protest in Beijing,” Radio Free Asia (RFA),
October 11, 2016, https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china
/veterans-protest-10112016160706.html.
13. Christopher Bodeen, “Over 2,000 Ex-Soldiers Riot in
North China over Railway Training—HK Paper,” Associated
Press Archive, September 11, 2007, http://www.aparchive.
com/; and Ming Pao, “HK Paper: Demobilized Soldiers-TurnedStudents in Heilongjiang Clash with Police,” World News
Connection Databases, September 15, 2007, https://library.udel
.edu/databases/wnc/.
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are unlikely to stop. On the positive side, the widening
opportunities for employment in construction
projects abroad—jobs that would seem to fit many
lower skilled veterans—could substantially decrease
employment-related grievances.
WHO PROTESTS?
We can get a better understanding of the sources
of veterans’ discontent by paying close attention to
the primary political protagonists in the online and
street dramas taking place in China these days. Both
visual evidence (videos uploaded to YouTube and
photographs in newspapers and chat rooms) and
on-the-scene reporting reveals the reverse of the
stereotypical notions of political activism. Around
the world, protests are often seen as the province
of the young, whether as a result of idealism or
a greater abundance of that scarce resource: time
(sometimes referred to as biographical availability).
In China, however, college students and people in
their twenties and early thirties are not very visible in
protest movements, nor are younger veterans. Instead,
China’s veteran activism—virtual and otherwise—
stands out in the large number of fatigue-wearing,
balding, graying, and getting-soft-around-the-belly,
middle-aged men and those we genially refer to as
senior citizens. In the first decade of the twenty-first
century, some of these veterans (without their old
uniforms) also participated in widespread protests as
regular laid-off (下岗) pensioners.14
14. On these protests, see William Hurst and Kevin O’Brien,
“China’s Contentious Pensioners,” China Quarterly 170 (June
2002): 345–60.
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Research I have conducted with Kevin O’Brien has
found three distinctive veteran subpopulations within
this protest demographic. Veterans of the Vietnam
War have been first and perhaps most visible since
the onset of the economic reforms in the late 1970s (in
rural areas) and late 1990s (in urban areas). Drafted
in 1979, many are now in their early- to mid- sixties.
Many of these men have been engaged in political
activism (sometimes violently) for decades, first in
the early 1980s when they suffered from high levels
of unemployment, followed by protests over job losses
as state-owned enterprises went bankrupt in the 1990s
and 2000s, and currently because of the onset of more
serious medical problems and the higher expenditures
associated with them.15 Unsurprisingly, many of these
veterans complain about insufficient pensions (in
cases of disability) or financial aid (if they are below
the poverty line), and demand that the state live up
to its commitment to prevent veterans from falling
below that line.16 Vietnam War veterans also protest
for more emotional and symbolic reasons. Unlike its
over-the-top commemorations of the CPC’s so-called
victory over Japan in World War II, the Chinese
government has been quiet about its claimed victory
over Vietnam in 1979, for fear of riling up tensions
with its testy neighbor. The absence of widespread,
celebratory official commemorations has prompted
some veterans to organize their own, which swiftly

15. These reports first appeared in Ming Bao on September 12,
1981, but were later republished under the title “Zheng Wu,” no.
50, Baijia Publishing. See also FBIS-CHI, December 14, 1981, W/1.
16.

Ng and Pan, “Thousands of Chinese Army Veterans.”
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meet state repression.17 This repression has been a sore
point for several decades and is unlikely to change,
even if the government substantially increases its
medical funding or pension payouts.
The second group of graying veterans making
their voices heard quite loudly these days are men
who would not officially be considered veterans in the
Western understanding of the term, which is almost
always applied to those who served in a strictly
military capacity. In the People’s Republic of China,
however, owing to the notion of people’s war that
involved militias and other ordinary people taking up
arms, as well as quasi-military/political and economic
campaigns (such as building nuclear weapons, the
Third Front, and Xinjiang oil fields), many have
claimed this designation when seeking benefits that
would help pay for medical expenses and caring
for elderly parents, blurring the boundary between
military and civilian spheres.
Among the blog posts we have analyzed, some 10
percent were composed by individuals somewhere
on this civil-military border, including militiamen,
border guards, PLA volunteers, soldiers of the
People’s Armed Police, railroad workers, engineers
and antiaircraft personnel (who in the 1960s and 1970s
worked secretly in Vietnam in PLA logistics units),
policemen, firefighters, and even forces that helped
suppress the 2008 Tibetan unrest. These self-identified
17. Jiang Pei, “Protests Marking War Anniversary in China,
Vietnam Disrupted,” RFA, February 17, 2014, https://www.
rfa.org/english/news/china/anniversary-02172014181310.
html; and “年全体青岛籍对越战老兵要求尊严与待遇” [Vietnam
War veterans from Qingdao demand respect and benefits],
February 13, 2013, https://blog.boxun.com/hero/201107
/voiceofveteran/50_1.shtml.
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veterans, scattered all around the country, spend
much of their time simply fighting for the right to gain
benefits, a problem most Vietnam veterans do not
have. But similar to Vietnam veterans, their grievances
tend to focus on health problems and poverty (often
caused by health problems) and a strong sense that
they are unappreciated and have been forgotten
during China’s pell-mell rush into worshiping gross
domestic product growth.
Joint collective action (in protests and lawsuits)
between individuals on the civil–military border and
Vietnam veterans has taken place, but the unclear
status of some as veterans and the perception that the
state’s veteran allocations are limited diminish the
potential for a longer-term alliance. In effect, these two
groups compete for recognition and benefits. Since this
could be prevented, or at least limited by a clarifying
statute, keeping veteran benefits in the realm of policy,
and thus leaving the criteria vague, is most likely an
intentional divide-and-rule tactic, with the added
benefit of saving money. Veterans are not asking for
much in the larger scheme of things, and China has
the means to satisfy most of their material demands
if the leadership so chooses; therefore, money is most
likely not driving the issue.
The third large group of gray-green veterans are
online and on the streets more because of poor luck
than poor health.18 Before their discharge, these men
had a higher rank in the PLA than most Vietnam War
veterans (ranging from staff sergeant to mid-level
officers) and are, by far, the most vocal, organized,
and policy-literate veterans involved in contentious
18. For a larger study of this group, see Kevin J. O’Brien and
Neil J. Diamant, “Contentious Veterans: Chinese Retired Officers
Speak Out,” Armed Forces and Society 41, no. 3 (July 2015): 563–81.
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action today. These veterans are also on the younger
side of middle age—mainly in their forties and fifties.
These veterans’ poor luck struck twice. First, rather
than getting sent to relatively stable positions in the
state sector like some of their comrades, these veterans
were transferred to large industries as militarytransfer cadres (军转干部), sometimes referred to as
state enterprise cadres (国家企业干部).
These veterans’ second misfortune happened when
their factories failed to survive in the market economy
(or their managers were corrupt), while others who
also had military-transfer cadre status enjoyed greater
success (for example, those demobilized to strategic
industries such as oil and telecommunications).
When factories went under, these veterans lost their
former rank and the benefits attached to it. These
former officers engage the state mainly to reclaim their
standing as retired military cadres, which would, in
turn, restore both their status and material benefits.
The nature of these veterans’ claims and the
resources they bring to their activism differs from
other veterans. These veterans are less interested in
symbolic issues such as war commemorations. On
the younger side, these veterans are also less afflicted
by health concerns. More so than the other veterans,
they are former insiders in the party-state-military
apparatus, and thus have insider knowledge about
how the government operates. These veterans are not
likely to be fooled by delaying tactics or propaganda.
Because of this and their good health, these veterans
are seen as a greater threat to stability. At the same
time, the veterans’ insider status militates against
highly confrontational tactics, such as violence. On the
contrary, these veterans fervently profess their loyalty
to the CPC, but much like many other veterans, do not

220

think that this profession will protect them from the
wrath of local officials at home.19
STATE RESPONSES TO VETERAN PROTESTS
How does the Chinese government respond to
veteran protests? Veterans, having served in the
military, take propaganda about their contributions
seriously (or pretend to in a serious way), and
expect to be accorded respect and a certain degree
of deference. But this expectation is unrealistic; local
officials have long been rewarded, disciplined, or
even fired based on their ability to prevent petitioners
of any sort from reaching the capital.20 Faced with
this incentive structure, local officials pressure the
security forces under their authority, who sometimes
use excessive force or hire local thugs to do the same;
whether one is a PLA veteran or an ordinary victim of
house demolition matters very little.21
Mistreatment by the authorities appears to have
been the cause of several recent protests. In the June
2018 protests in Zhenjiang (镇江), Jiangsu Province,
over 1,000 veterans gathered from as many as four
provinces (Hebei, Henan, Shandong, and Sichuan) to
protest the beating of a fellow veteran at the hands
of a security guard outside the municipal building
19. For a good example, see “山东潍坊约百退伍军人到天安门”
[Around a hundred veterans from Weifang, Shandong arrived at
Tiananmen Square], RFA, July 21, 2009 (site discontinued).
20. Yang Fan and the RFA Cantonese Service, “China’s Army
Veterans Face Backlash following Mass Beijing Protests,” trans.
Luisetta Mudie, RFA, October 18, 2018, https://www.rfa.org
/english/news/china/veterans-protest-10182016134348.html.
21. For an excellent illustration of these practices, see
Petition, directed by Liang Zhao (Bry-sur-Marne, France: National
Audiovisual Institute, 2009), DVD.
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when he tried to file a petition.22 In late May 2018 in
Luohe, Henan, veterans took to the streets when a
“former soldier’s wife had been detained by the police
after she joined veterans who had gone to Beijing to
demand better treatment.” Further south, veterans
protested after hearing via the Protecting Rights blog
site that a disabled veteran was beaten by the police.23
Since such protests are motivated by what veterans
consider violations of procedural justice—how they
are treated rather than how much they get (i.e.,
distributive justice)—the protests are unlikely to be
resolved solely through improved pensions or better
jobs. Instead, the government would have to improve
policing tactics vis-à-vis petitioners or change the
current incentive structure, both tall orders unlikely to
happen anytime soon.
Although such protests and their inevitable
repression garner much attention in the media and
the scholarly community, presuming that most
veteran grievances are resolved in this way would be
a mistake. If we look at the sample of blog posts that
describe state responses (see table 6-2, which roughly
covers the years 2011–13), we find that the Chinese
government has been more likely to simply ignore
the complaints of individual and small groups of
veterans than to actively repress them, surely hoping
22. On thugs and local government, see Lynette Ong,
“Thugs and Outsourcing of State Repression in China,” China
Journal 80 (July 2018): 94–110.
23. Wong Siu-san and Lam Kwok-lap, “Chinese Military
Veterans Converge on Zhenjiang as Protests Swell,” RFA, June
22, 2018, https://msguancha.com/a/lanmu1/2018/0622/17632.
html; and Minnie Chan, “Chinese Military Veterans’ Rally for
Better Welfare Ends as Armed Police Move in,” South China
Morning Post, June 24, 2018.
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that not responding will be enough to prevent further
action; litigation, filing appeals, writing letters, and
the like consume energy, which not everyone has in
sufficient quantities. Furthermore, the government,
which is willing to pay cash for peace (花钱买平安)
by offering small concessions, meets with veterans
during their protests without resorting to violence.24
In most of these cases, local authorities deal with these
issues, either because the veterans directly appeal to
them, or because Beijing dispatched them back home
after appearing in the capital. Most action in veteran
activism, therefore, occurs at the local rather than
national level.
Table 6-2. State responses to veteran activism

Modified from Neil J. Diamant and Kevin J. O’Brien, “Veterans’
Political Activism in China,” Modern China 41, no. 3 (2015), 299.

Method
Avoidance

Cases

%

94

54

Repression*

30

17

Denial**

27

15

Mixed Positive***

10

6

Accede to Request

9

5

170

98#

* This includes threats, detentions, beatings, intercepting petitioners,
kidnappings, hunting down protesters, and denying rights (such as
voting).
** This refers to refusing requests for payment, compensation,
investigation, or transparency. Administrative agencies include public
security bureaus, courts, state-owned enterprises, and labor arbitration
committees. Also includes registering a case but then refusing to hear it.
*** In this scenario, higher-level personnel approve the request, but
local authorities refuse to enforce it.
# Other methods include the central government sending cases back to
local authorities (2); negotiation (1); and a court accepting a case but no
reference to the outcome (2).

24. Chris Buckley, “Marching across China, Army Veterans
Join Ranks of Protestors,” New York Times, June 25, 2018.
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These measures (e.g., applying coercion, ignoring
complaints, and relying on localities to handle
problems) are not veteran-specific or new; they have
been honed during the last several decades as the
state confronted irate farmers, students, workers, and
victims of environmental pollution and corruption.
The same applies to other tactics, including automated,
keyword-based surveillance of social media accounts,
websites, and chat rooms, and state-funded trolling
to deter and dissuade malcontents from gathering.25
Recently, officials have been conducting thought work
(思想工作) on petitioners’ (veterans and nonveterans)
relatives, friends, and employers (threatening them
with sanctions should their relative/friend/employee
happen to show up in Beijing or elsewhere); contracting
petition social workers (信访社工) from various social
work institutes to do “emotion work” among the
most persistent of petitioners; and, should these fail
to dissuade, selectively arresting protest leaders.26 In
the Xi Jinping era, these tactics have become more
repressive as the state has invested in facial recognition
25. For an overview of China’s censorship, see Rebecca
MacKinnon, “China’s ‘Networked Authoritarianism,’” Journal of
Democracy 22, no. 2 (April 2011): 33–47; and Jason Q. Ng, Blocked
on Weibo: What Gets Suppressed on China’s Version of Twitter and
Why (New York: New Press, 2013). On the broader relationship
between authoritarianism and media in China, see Daniela
Stockmann and Mary Gallagher, “Remote Control: How the
Media Sustain Authoritarian Rule in China,” Comparative Political
Studies 44, no. 4 (2011): 436–67.
26. Yanhua Deng and Kevin J. O’Brien, “Relational
Repression in China: Using Social Ties to Demobilize Protestors,”
China Quarterly 215 (September 2013): 533–52; and Jieren Hu,
Tong Wu, and Jingyan Fei, “Flexible Governance in China:
Affective Care, Petition Social Workers, and Multi-Pronged
Means of Dispute Resolution,” Asian Survey 58, no. 4, (July/
August 2018): 679–703.
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technology, social credit monitoring, and other ways
of using big data for social control purposes, albeit
with uneven results across the country.
In March 2018, however, the Chinese government
introduced something both entirely new and
veteran-specific. In a break from nearly 70 years
of administrative practice, but moving toward the
international norm in veteran administration, the
Chinese government announced the creation of a
new ministry, the MVA (中国退役军人事务部), which
opened for business in April 2018. Until then, veterans’
affairs had been nested jointly in the sprawling
Ministry of Civil Affairs and Ministry of Human
Resources and Social Security—never as a stand-alone
entity.27 Xinhua News Agency noted that the new
ministry would be led by Sun Chaoyang (a Ministry
of Civil Affairs senior official without any experience
in the PLA or quasi-military enterprises) and would
aim to “protect the legitimate rights and interests of
military personnel and their families, improve the
service and management system of demobilized
military personnel, and make military service an
occupation that enjoys public respect,” a back-handed
admission that veterans’ rights under the previous
system were not well-protected and people failed to
afford them proper respect.28 Without pointing out
specific reform measures, state commentators took to
the airwaves to point out that, in addition to helping
the 57 million veterans currently in the system, the
27. For further elaboration on this structure, see Diamant,
Embattled Glory, chapter 5.
28. “Sun Shaocheng,” n.d., http://www.chinavitae.com
/biography/Sun_Shaocheng/full; and “China to Form Ministry
of Veterans Affairs,” March 13, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet
.com/english/2018-03/13/c_137035510.htm.
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new ministry would improve the morale of currently
serving troops who might be called upon to fight
against India or the United States in the South China
Sea. As noted by Song Zhongping in the Global Times,
“if veterans aren’t respected or properly resettled,
how do we talk about the dignity of our military? The
establishment of a new ministry will tackle this issue
and make it easier to manage veterans.”29
Though the impetus for it is not entirely clear,
this administrative restructuring seems to confirm
an argument advanced by Christopher Heurlin that
large-scale, sustained protests can lead to policy
change.30 Many reports surrounding the MVA focused
on the frequency of veterans’ protests over low
retirement benefits and unemployment resulting from
bankruptcies and mergers and the threat these posed
to social stability, but this is still deductive reasoning
in the absence of an insider account.31 With close to
300,000 soldiers expected to enter the ranks of veterans
thanks to the downsizing of the PLA, the government
is perhaps trying to stave off more protest wavelets
around the country, acknowledging implicitly that
29. Zhang Yu, “China to Improve Welfare for Veterans to
Enhance Troop Morale,” Global Times, March 14, 2018.
30. Christopher Heurlin, Responsive Authoritarianism
in China: Land, Protests, and Policy Making (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2017).
31. Zhang Yu, “China to Improve Welfare”; Frank
Chen, “Veterans Affairs Ministry Set Up to Calm Disgruntled
Laid-Off Soldiers,” Asia Times, March 23, 2018, http://www.
asiatimes.com/article/veterans-affairs-ministry-set-calmdisgruntled-laid-off-soldiers/; and Catherine Wong, “China’s
Military Veterans Ministry Opens after Pension Protests,”
South China Morning Post, April 16, 2018, https://www.scmp
.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2141894
/chinas-military-veterans-ministry-opens-after-pension.
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recent policy moves designed to pacify veterans were
not working well. These failed policies included a 2014
regulation asking state-owned enterprises to reserve
at least 5 percent of positions for veterans and a 2017
People’s Republic of China State Council regulation
stipulating that 80 percent of veterans should (rather
than must) be placed in state institutions and stateowned enterprises.
At this early date, the jury is still out on whether
the MVA will satisfy veteran demands and be able
to provide solutions to problems that have vexed
veterans for decades, or if it is largely a symbolic
effort designed, like so many other projects focused
on enhancing state legitimacy, to project an image
of modernizing but caring leaders—while not doing
much to resolve fundamental problems. Some online
evidence suggests that veterans are pleased they
finally have a place to call their own (comparing the
MVA, which they claim to have created through their
protests, to their so-called parental home). But many
remain skeptical, noting (among other things) that the
MVA is based in Beijing and does not have regional
locations, the ways in which it will implement policy
in a system where localities have so much power are
unclear, its creation is a superficial solution and just
postpones the resolution of the problem, and its leader
is a long-serving Ministry of Civil Affairs official
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responsible for many of the problems veterans are
currently experiencing.32
In my view, this skepticism is warranted. First,
from a financial perspective, whether the Chinese
government has shifted the burden of caring for
veterans away from overburdened, often debt-ridden
localities where most veterans are located (unlike, say,
Shanghai, which is wealthier but has few veterans)
and toward the central government and whether
the practice of unfunded mandates, which has long
characterized the pension system, has ended are
unclear. Second, bureaucracies require power to
be effective, and whether the greenhorn MVA will
possess this vis-à-vis other bureaucracies (such as the
State Reform Commission) and, more importantly,
employers in the state and private sectors is unclear.
As noted, the MVA’s current minister, Sun Shaocheng,
has been promoted from within the Ministry of Civil
Affairs, which has never been powerful.33 Third, no
evidence exists that bureaucracy alone can solve
employment, medical, and status-related problems
among veterans (particularly in a quasi-market
economy that values skills many veterans do not
32. “关于漯河市涉军事件的深思” [Pondering the Luohe
veteran incident], n.d., http://sdds-gov-cn.sdds-gov-cn.bbs.
mc81.net/thread-1764-1-1.html (site discontinued); “退役军人
事务部的六个意想不到” [Six difficult-to-imagine things about
the Ministry of Veterans Affairs], n.d., http://sdds-gov-cn.sdds
-gov-cn.bbs.mc81.net/thread-1878-1-2.html (site discontinued);
and “不能乱给老兵扣”涉黑”的帽子” [The government should not
falsely claim that veterans “participate in gang activities”], n.d.,
http://sdds-gov-cn.sdds-gov-cn.bbs.mc81.net/thread-1844-1-3.
html (site discontinued).
33. Sarah Zheng, “Chinese Leaders Gather for Back-to-Back
Meetings after Military Veterans Protest,” South China Morning
Post, July 2, 2018.
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possess and that has historically discriminated against
rural people).
History suggests that the generosity of veterans’
programs hinges on the support they receive from
feisty veterans’ organizations, legal institutions,
and civil society.34 From my vantage point, China is
deficient in all of these: veterans cannot legally form
interest groups; the hastily authored MVA draft of a
statute has a whopping 83 articles and appears to have
had very little input from veterans; and, critically,
veterans are isolated from other sectors of society,
and little hard evidence exists of widespread social
support for their cause.35 Considering these issues, one
can reasonably expect more of the same—surveillance,
repression, co-optation—for another decade or so, by
which time most Vietnam War veterans will be too
elderly to engage in forceful protests.
Perhaps the best interpretation for the MVA,
therefore, is the Chinese government’s effort to:
(1) placate at least some veterans (thereby draining the
protest pool and pitting veterans against each other);
(2) project a benevolent and modern image; and
(3) channel discontent so that it is more easily
“managed” (the term used by a military expert in the
34. This argument is developed in Martin Crotty, Neil J.
Diamant, and Mark Edele, The Politics of Veteran Benefits in the
Twentieth Century: A Comparative History (Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press, 2020). For the US case, see Glenn C. Altschuler
and Stuart M. Blumin, The GI Bill: A New Deal for Veterans
(Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2009). On Australia, see
G. L. Kristianson, The Politics of Patriotism: The Pressure Group
Activities of the Returned Serviceman’s League (Canberra, Australia:
Australia National University Press, 1966).
35. Minnie Chan, “China Drafts New Law to Protect
Veterans’ Welfare, but Will It Pass Muster?” South China Morning
Post, July 20, 2018.
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Global Times). For instance, now veterans in Beijing
write to and congregate around the MVA, which
could relieve pressure on other institutions, such
as the PLA’s General Political Department and the
State Council Petition Office. For Xi Jinping, I think
this alleviation of pressure would be enough in the
near- to mid-term, even if it does little to alleviate
the concerns about veteran treatment negatively
impacting recruitment. But if China fights a war that
produces massive numbers of veterans—particularly
disabled ones—then leadership will surely have to go
back to the drawing board.
Zooming Out
Having
looked
at
veterans’
protests
microscopically, and noted their propensity to express
devout loyalty to the CPC while complaining bitterly
about its policies toward them, can we offer any
insights about civil-military relations more generally,
or even a concept as abstruse and difficult to pin down
as nationalism or patriotism?
First, the Chinese government’s failure to stem
the protests involving an admittedly small number of
veterans (given the total size) has seeped into popular
consciousness and made recruiting individuals
who have other career possibilities more difficult.36
Veterans usually protest in public places, ensuring
multiple witnesses and even more conversations
around dinner tables; social media also helps spread
the news (until censors catch up). Given that Xi Jinping
aims to build a more technologically oriented military
36. Liu Wei, Can Mou, and Ma Zengfei, “征兵工作面临的
矛盾问题及对策思考” [The thoughts on dilemmas and problems
faced by drafting work], 国防 [National defense] 5 (2011): 22–23.
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based on higher-quality recruits, knowledge about
the poor treatment of veterans could be an obstacle to
this plan. The Chinese government will have to work
hard to attract these soldiers through more generous
benefit packages, and even harder to make sure they
are implemented at the local level. China has the
resources to accomplish the former, but, to date, has
not been willing to break with highly decentralized
policy implementation, which is the cause for much
discontent among veterans who reside in poorer areas.
Likewise, officials in these areas face greater difficulty
in buying off veterans by devising local compensation
schemes. I anticipate future veterans will be as
disappointed as many of their contemporaries unless
these conditions change.
Second, the Chinese government’s belated
recognition that veterans merit a separate ministry,
and its failure to address a core problem in veteran
care, speaks to the political impotence of veterans as
a political force. The CPC, led by radicalized leftist
students and intellectuals for much of its history,
has been wary and weary of veterans’ activism since
the early years of the state and has done its best to
limit their power to shape political events, all while
praising them profusely. This attitude toward veterans
speaks to the weakness of the PLA as a lobbying
force, which is the result of military, political, and
economic problems, such as its violent interventions
during the Cultural Revolution, the Lin Biao affair,
its underwhelming performance in Vietnam, lack of
representation in the Politburo’s Standing Committee
since 1997 (after the retirement of General Liu
Huaqing), and Xi Jinping’s sustained attack on many
of its top officers for corruption.
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In this fraught political atmosphere, the PLA
will likely not make waves by insisting on a major
restructuring of how its soldiers are treated after
their discharge. Instead, their approach seems to be
that once soldiers are discharged, they are no longer
the PLA’s concern. When veterans target the Bayi
Building in Beijing, they seem to be imploring the PLA
to intervene on their behalf. But the ease with which
they are dispersed suggests civilian and domestic
security personnel have the upper hand. As suggested
by a high-level meeting about best practices dealing
with veterans that was cochaired by two top security
officials—Guo Shengkun, who serves as the director
of the National Anti-Terror Work Group and is the
deputy director of the National Politics and Law
Commission, and Zhao Kezhi, who serves as minister
of public security—stability maintenance remains
the CPC’s most important domestic priority.37 This
prioritization is reflected, in part, by a steady increase
in spending in domestic security and the central
state’s willingness to tolerate local government’s
regular use of thugs to enforce unpopular and illegal
policies or prevent petitioners from leaving to Beijing.
From a governance perspective, veterans are just one
of many troublesome (麻烦) groups that require a firm
state hand.

37. Sarah Zheng, “Chinese leaders gather.” On domestic
security spending, see Sheena Greitens, “Rethinking China’s
Coercive Capacity: An Examination of PRC Domestic Security
Spending, 1992–2012,” China Quarterly 232 (July 2017):
1002–25. On thugs, see Ong, “Thugs and Outsourcing.” For
stability maintenance officials’ perspectives on their work,
see Ching Kwan Lee and Yong Hong Zhang, “Seeing like a
Grassroots State.”
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Finally, I would argue the treatment of veterans
speaks to concerns in the United States about rising
nationalism in China. In this view, the Chinese
government could feel pressured to do something
militarily by citizens enraged (mostly online) about an
affront to China’s dignity, or its claim to sovereignty
over disputed islands and atolls in the South China
Sea. As I expressed in a Strategic Studies Institute
op-ed, such worries are unwarranted.38 Studies
by scholars such as James Reilly and Jessica Chen
Weiss have demonstrated that the CPC responds
quite effectively to nationalist protests (which are
sometimes a disguise for Mao-inspired grievances
about inequality, downsizing, and corruption) using a
flexible array of tactics, such as persuasion, negotiation,
concessions, and repression, without giving too much
ground, and that many such protests are organized
by the government itself, either directly or with its
tacit approval.39 In other words, the government can
manage such so-called patriots with the same aplomb
as they can protesting veterans. But there is also room
to question the patriotic bone fides of these seemingly
aggressive nationalists. Few appear concerned with
veterans of past wars, nor are they inclined to join
the PLA. If veterans demonstrated their patriotism
through action and sacrifice, at least according to
the CPC’s understanding of the concept, whether
38. Neil J. Diamant, “Op-Ed: Reflections on the ‘China
Threat’” Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press,
August 1, 2013.
39. James Reilly, Strong Society, Smart State: The Rise of Public
Opinion in China’s Japan Policy (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2012); and Jessica Chen Weiss, Powerful Patriots: Nationalist
Protest in China’s Foreign Relations (Oxford, UK: Oxford University
Press, 2014).
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online bloggers writing from their bedrooms in their
pajamas or Internet cafés about the nefarious deeds of
foreign countries count as patriots is unclear.40 Under
Xi Jinping, some of these patriotic bloggers (many
of whom are compensated) are appointed to official
posts while others are made into celebrities. WeChat
(which has over 40,000 official accounts) and Weibo
have expanded under Xi Jinping’s administration; the
top three outlets on these platforms are official media.
Even if these bloggers are patriots, I am not
convinced they are the sort of people about which the
United States needs to be worried. The Chinese public
today seems to be more confident about China’s status
as a world power that will perhaps eventually replace
the United States, but rising militarism does not
seem to factor into this perception. These conditions
could change; for example, China could experience
an economic downturn that causes widespread
unemployment that proves beyond the central
government’s capacity to relieve through large-scale
spending, and this downturn could be pinned on an
aggressive and erratic foreign power. Throughout
history, plenty of states have distracted their people
from domestic crises through foreign adventurism.
Rather than focusing on areas of conflict, the
United States would do well to support innovative
programs that boost cooperation in areas of shared
concern, or mutual indifference if one takes the more
cynical but perhaps more realistic perspective. Like
China, the United States has certainly had its share of
difficulties running a large veterans administration.
40. For a scholarly debate about these issues, see Neil J.
Diamant, “On Caffè Lattes, Nationalism and Legitimate Critique:
A Reply to Gries, Zhang, Crowson and Cai,” China Quarterly 210
(July 2012): 494–99.
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But more positively, the US Department of Veterans
Affairs has cultivated generations of knowledgeable
and skilled administrators, some of whom might
enjoy the opportunity to share their experiences
with their Chinese counterparts now that they have
accepted the premise that veterans should have
their own bureaucracy. Such a policy could lead to
improvements in US-Chinese relations at very little
cost and risk.
On the other hand, if we are indeed entering a
new Cold War, this policy will not work. For example,
Taiwan’s poorly run veterans’ administration was
thoroughly reorganized in the mid-1950s by several
senior retired Department of Veterans Affairs
administrators working for George Fry Consultants,
based in Chicago, on a US government contract.
Taiwan’s veterans came to enjoy a far higher quality
of life than their counterparts on the mainland,
even though they lost the Chinese Civil War and
the CPC won.41 I hope these potential areas of
fruitful cooperation do not get lost in the fog of the
forthcoming trade war.

41. Fred Riggs, The Consulting Firm, the US Aid Agency and
the Chinese Veterans Program (Syracuse, NY: Inter-University Case
Study Program, 1970); and Neil H. Jacoby, US Aid to Taiwan:
A Study of Foreign Aid, Self-Help, and Development (New York:
Praeger, 1966).
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7. CULTIVATING JOINT OPERATIONS TALENT
Kevin McCauley
This chapter examines the People’s Liberation
Army’s (PLA’s) cultivation of joint talents, focusing
on military educational reforms that target the
development of joint commanders and staff, as well
as efforts to improve joint training. Qualified joint
officers and a well-trained joint force are fundamental
requirements to transform the PLA into an advanced
military force. The PLA’s reform efforts in military
education are intended to improve the quality of
personnel in general, but an important emphasis of
the current military educational reforms is specifically
focused on joint commanders and staff. The PLA
intends to instill a general level of joint knowledge
throughout the entire military as joint operations
capabilities are pushed down to the tactical level.
Although the detailed outline of these reforms is
known, the full extent and quality of implemented
reforms is difficult to gauge. Continuing PLA press
articles detailing problems in military education and
training indicate slow progress in implementing
quality reforms.
MAIN ARGUMENT
Operationalizing an integrated joint operations
capability is placing new and complex requirements
on joint commanders and staff and unit training.
The PLA is implementing a Triad military education
program that will reform military educational
institutions and the joint curriculum to develop highquality joint operations talent. The Triad system—
named based on the English translation in the defense
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white paper “China’s Military Strategy,” released
in 2015—incorporates three components: military
academy education, military professional education,
and unit training practice. These three components are
not new, but the current reform attempts to update
and integrate them into a holistic system of systems
that would create a synergistic effect between the
components to cultivate the joint talents required
for the PLA’s transformation. Importantly, the
PLA intends to integrate closely military academic
institutions with unit training, believing that the
interaction will benefit both areas.
The PLA intends to improve joint training through
realistic, actual-combat conditions to compensate for
a lack of combat experience. An important element
to improve joint training reforms is improving and
standardizing unit training assessment and evaluation.
Reportedly, the PLA is expanding simulation at wargaming centers and battle labs. These facilities can
provide economical training for joint commanders
and staff, as well as experimentation and innovation
in operational methods.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The PLA’s successful implementation of joint
education and training reforms has significant
implications as it achieves its goal of becoming one
of the world’s advanced militaries. The PLA believes
developing a large contingent of joint commanders
and staff will take time. But the incremental
improvement and expansion of joint talents should
enable the gradual implementation of an integrated
joint operations capability, leading to increased
combat effectiveness. Even though the transformation
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process will likely be long, the PLA can still be a lethal
opponent—its long-range precision strike capability
would be effective in this situation, for example. The
PLA would especially be lethal against countries with
armed forces at roughly the same development stage
or that are less advanced than the PLA. But the PLA
would still have to mostly rely on conducting joint
coordinated operations, rather than a fully developed
advanced form of joint combat. This approach could
work well in smaller, shorter conflicts, but the PLA
could face increasing difficulties in joint command and
coordination during a longer dynamic conflict against
an advanced military.
INTEGRATED JOINT OPERATION
REQUIREMENTS
President Xi Jinping’s current reform effort
has, in part, prioritized implementing the key twin
capabilities of integrated joint and system-of-systems
operations. These theoretical concepts impose
new joint requirements on commanders and staff,
necessitating the PLA’s emphasis on cultivating
joint talent and improving joint training. These
joint command requirements include decentralized
command, complex coordination, the employment
of joint modular task forces, employment of modern
informationized weapons systems and equipment, the
execution of joint tactical actions, and the creation of
new innovative operational concepts.
The successful implementation of integrated joint
and system-of-systems operations will require a
high level of joint command and staff skills, as well
as realistic joint training to operationalize new joint
concepts. The future operations the PLA envision
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will place great stress on joint commanders and their
staffs at all echelons to control and coordinate forces
dispersed across a vast battlespace while conducting
complex operations. These operations require a high
level of integration of forces, reconnaissance and
intelligence, and weapons systems. The requirement
for a rapid sensor-to-shooter time line places a burden
on the observe, orient, decide and act loop for rapid
information transmission, analysis, and decision
making on a fast-paced battlefield. The restructuring
of task force groupings during an operation will
require extensive practice during exercises. New,
integrated, joint command systems require more
highly developed technology skills, computer literacy,
and training on the new systems than in the past. The
development of joint tactics and joint tactical force
groupings will also require joint skills and training
down to the tactical level.
PLA-IDENTIFIED PROBLEMS RELATED TO
JOINT TALENT DEVELOPMENT
The PLA has identified numerous significant
problem areas in the cultivation of joint talents that
need to be addressed. President Xi has stated the
development of joint command personnel is an urgent
priority to address the shortage of qualified personnel.
In 2018, the PLA continued to view the general quality
of officers and men at all echelons as inadequate,
especially joint commanders and staff. Additional
resources are needed to develop the specialized
skills in core competencies to conduct modern joint
operations and support the broad modernization
effort. The personnel evaluation and selection process
requires improvements to correct significant problems,
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as evidenced by press reporting on PLA corruption
cases related to promotions and recruitment.1
The PLA has identified numerous problems in
military academic institutions, including:
• outdated courses and instructors who are out of
touch with modern operational concepts;
• poor discipline and management;
• lack of innovation;
• fraud and corruption polluting the academic
environment and diverting funds and resources;
• the need for improved regulations on joint
military education and training;
• poor coordination between military academic
institutions and units;
• lack of adequate funding for military education;
• difficulty arranging research exercises; and
• a requirement for top-level design for the highlevel, holistic planning and management of
military education reforms.2

1. Yao Jianing, “Senior Official Urges Deeper Military
Graft Inspections,” Xinhua, July 16, 2014, http://eng.chinamil.
com.cn/news-channels/china-military-news/2014-07/16
/content_6049536.htm; General Political Department Editor, 习
近平关于国防和军队建设重要论述选编 [Selection of important
expositions of Xi Jinping on national defense and army building]
(Beijing: PLA Press, 2014), 120, 188; and Ma Qingtao and Liu Huating,
“以 习 近 平 强 军 思 想 为 引 领 大 力 培 育 高 层 次 复 合 型 军 事 人 才 ”
[Vigorously cultivate high-level interdisciplinary military talent
under the guidance of Xi Jinping’s thought on strengthening the
military], 中国军事科学 [Chinese military science] 1 (2018): 36.
2. General Political Department Editor, Selection of
important expositions, 119–23, 182–94, 224; and Hu Limin et al.,
军事人才联合教育论 [On the joint education of military
personnel] (Beijing: National Defense Industry Press, 2017),
139–40, 169.
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In June 2018, the Central Military Commission’s
(CMC) Training and Administration Department
(TAD) continued to report violations in the
military educational system involving teaching and
management problems.3 President Xi has accused the
military academic institutions of the four winds (四
风), namely formalism, bureaucracy, hedonism, and
waste. He believes reforms will be a difficult struggle
that must be won.4
The PLA uses the slogan translated as the
“five incapables” (五个不会) to describe command
deficiencies in some officers. The five problem
areas do not accurately assess the situation,
understand the superior’s intent, make accurate
combat determinations, properly deploy troops,
and adequately deal with emergencies.� Improved
command and staff education, training, and
job certification are required to overcome these
deficiencies.
Military reform efforts emphasize improvements in
training, especially joint training, to approach actualcombat conditions. The requirement for actual-combat
training is to overcome the lack of recent PLA combat
experience and a peacetime mentality permeating the
force. To improve training, the PLA believes it needs to

3. Li Yun and Gai Yulin, “中央军委训练管理部通报２２起
违反院校教育制度规定问题” [The Central Military Commission
Training and Management Department reported 22 violations
of the educational system of the universities and colleges],
Xinhua, June 24, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/201806/24/c_1123028143.htm.
4. General Political Department Editor, Selection of
important expositions, 159–61.
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• continue to upgrade large training bases,
simulation centers, and battle labs to support
joint training and experimentation;
• focus on rigorous and complex joint training;
• improve opposing force training;
• focus training on wartime missions;
• eliminate its indifference to realistic training
and its fear of accidents, which limits training
intensity; and
• standardize evaluation methods to eliminate the
falsification of training results and accurately
gauge unit combat capabilities.5
JOINT EXERCISE EXPERIENCE
The PLA has conducted increasingly complex
joint exercises for the last two decades, including
the incorporation of campaign and tactical joint
formations. The disbanded Jinan Military Region was
tasked with conducting experimental joint training
during the first decade of the twenty-first century.
This joint training has likely built up a group of
commanders and staff with some understanding
of the problems and requirements of complex joint
operations. This understanding does not equal combat
experience, but at least some officers in the PLA likely

5. Yu
Qifeng,
“破解‘五个不会’难题要从源头入手”
[Crack the “five incapables” starting at the source], PLA daily,
October 13, 2015, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/201510/13/content_125880.htm.
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understand the complexities and requirements of joint
operations based on their experience in joint exercises.6
REFORMS TO CULTIVATE JOINT TALENT
The PLA has researched the education and training
of joint operations officers, beginning as early as the
mid-1980s, and with increased focus since the 1990s.
The PLA’s analysis concludes that new, high-quality
military talents will play an increasingly important
and decisive role on the informationized battlefield.
The PLA also assesses that there is currently a deficit
in military personnel that are skilled in integrated
joint operations and informationized warfare. The
current military educational reforms emphasize
joint operations and information technology.
Importantly, the PLA continues to believe that man
is the decisive factor for victory on the battlefield,
reinforcing the importance of developing high-quality
joint personnel.7
Background
• The PLA has focused on improvements to
military education for more than three decades,
with increased emphasis over the last two
6. Zhang Tao, “Chinese Army to Raise Military Training
Standards,” Xinhua, November 15, 2013, http://eng.mod.gov.cn
/DefenseNews/2014-03/20/content_4498796.htm; Li Xingzhu et
al., 基于信息系统的体系作战能力建设100问 [Information systembased system-of-systems operational capability building in 100
questions] (Beijing: NDU Press, June 2011), 218, 230; and General
Political Department Editor, Selection of important expositions,
21–22, 32, 60–62, 158, 217–18.
7. Kevin McCauley, PLA System of Systems Operations:
Enabling Joint Operations (Washington, DC: Jamestown
Foundation, February 28, 2017), 50–75.
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decades. The PLA views improving military
education as providing a foundation for military
modernization, forming a pool of high-quality
military talent, and preparing for combat.
Highlights of the current reform efforts include
the following occurrences.
• The PLA issued two documents covering the
period from 2000 to 2020 to cultivate military
talent and realize an informationized and
innovative education system: the 2000 Central
Military Commission “Outline on the Reform
and Development of Military Academy
Education (2000–2010)” and the 2012 CMCissued “Outline on Military Academy Education
Reform and Development Plan before 2020.”8
• In August 2003, the CMC issued the 20-year
Strategic Project for Talented People (军队人才
战略工程) to build up a contingent of command
officers capable of planning and directing
informationized wars.9
• In October 2008, four documents were released
to improve the education and training of joint
operations command talent. This effort aimed
at increasing joint training, developing joint
8. Wu
Qingli,
基于信息系统的体系作战能力理论探索
[Exploration of information systems-based operational capability
theory] (Beijing: Military Science Press, 2011), 6–7; and “30年
军队干部队伍和人才建设创新发展” [30 years of military cadre
ranks and talent building innovative development], PLA daily,
December 30, 2008, http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2008-12
-30/0720536852.html.
9. Liu Fengan and Yang Xuguang, “2020年前军队院校
教育改革和发展规划纲要” [Outline of education reforms and
development plan for military academies by 2020], Xinhua,
June 4, 2012, http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2012-06/04/content_
2152816.htm; and Limin et al., On the joint education, 37–38.
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operations course materials and teaching staff,
integrating military educational institutions
and unit training, encouraging innovation
in teaching and training, and improving the
assessment and evaluation system.10
• The former General Staff Department in 2012
issued two additional documents to clarify
and standardized the content and methods for
training joint operations command talent in the
informationized era.11
Current Military Educational Reforms
In early 2016, the CMC issued the “Opinion on
Deepening National Defense and Military Reform,”
with the current reforms scheduled to be completed
between 2017 and the end of 2020. The opinion
proposed deepening the existing Triad New Military
Talent Education System of Systems (三位一体新
型军事人才培养体系), which is composed of three
programs that develop military academy education,
unit training practice, and military professional
education. None of the three components of the Triad
system are new, but the ongoing reforms update and
fuse the three systems to create a synergistic effect. The
new education system of systems further integrates
military educational institutions with unit training to
provide cross fertilization. The opinion also adjusts
10. Information Office of the State Council, “China’s
National Defense in 2004” (white paper, Information Office of the
State Council of the People’s Republic of China, December 2004).
11. “解 放 军 总 部 下 发 文 件 加 强 联 合 作 战 指 挥 人 才 培 养 ”
[Document issued by the People’s Liberation Army headquarters
to strengthen the training of joint operations command
personnel], Global Times, October 15, 2008, http://mil.huanqiu
.com/china/2008-10/252499.html.
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and optimizes the scale and structure of the military
academic institutions and continues “civilian military
integration” to support the improvement of military
education.12 The PLA believes it is important to focus
on joint commanders and staffs and popularize and
improve joint operations knowledge and education
throughout the force.13
The PLA considers the National Defense
University (NDU) as the one joint military educational
institution, although the National University of
Defense Technology (NUDT) and service colleges
provide some joint courses. The theater commands
have initiated on-the-job training programs and
certification for joint personnel. The PLA intends to
create a virtual joint command college with online
courses and learning resources.
National Defense University
The China’s National Defense in 2004 white paper
describes basic command colleges providing joint
operations basic training, intermediate command
colleges providing combined arms training, and
advanced command colleges providing strategic
research and joint campaign training. The NDU was
established in 1985 as an advanced command college
providing strategic research and joint campaign
training. The NDU lay the organizational foundation
12.

Limin et al., On the joint education, 18.

13. Wang Dongming, Wang Jingguo, and Mei Changwei,
“中央军委《关于深化国防和军队改革的意见” [Central Military
Commission’s “Opinion on deepening national defense and
military reform”], Xinhua, January 2, 2016, http://www.gov.cn
/zhengce/2016-01/02/content_5030168.htm; and Limin et al.,
On the joint education, 7.

247

for cultivating joint operation command talent. The
university also has a war-gaming center for strategic
and campaign confrontation exercises.14
The NDU includes the Joint Operations College,
which sends experts to field training to provide
guidance to units. Also, the NDU established an
All-Army (Joint) Operations Knowledge Learning
Network Training Platform and a Joint Operations
Command Talent Network Education Platform
to promote online training by the entire military.
The two platforms offer an open and collaborative
environment with a variety of educational programs
to meet miscellaneous educational requirements. The
PLA Daily has reported on units using the All-Army
(全军) platform.15
The NDU has initiated a series of measures to
improve joint talent, including the following.16
14. Limin et al., On the joint education, 40–43; and AllMilitary Military Terminology Management Committee, 中国人
民解放军军语 (People’s Liberation Army military terminology)
(Beijing: Academy of Military Science Press, 2011), 323–24.
15. Information Office of the State Council, “China’s
National Defense in 2004”; and Yu Dongbing, 联合训练学教
程 [Lectures on the science of joint training] (Beijing: Military
Science Press, 2013), 36.
16. Limin et al., On the joint education, 49–51, 59;
Lai Wenyong, “第31集团军团以上党员干部手机里装上了客户端”
[Party members of the 31st Group Army and above have
installed clients in their mobile phones], PLA daily, November
2, 2015, http://www.81.cn/jwgz/2015-11/02/content_6748927.
htm; Zhang Shuo, “@指挥员 远离套路！大漠演兵需要多种战法
预案” [@Commander stay away from routines! Desert exercise
needs multiple tactical plans], China Military Online, September
12, 2017, http://www.81.cn/jwgz/2017-09/12/content_7752193
.htm; Information Office of the State Council, “China’s National
Defense in 2004”; and “30 years of military cadre ranks.”
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• In 2009, the NDU provided one- to two-year
training classes for joint operations commanders
and reportedly launched a new generation of
joint courses.
• In September 2014, the 44th joint command class
added six new joint disciplines.
• In spring 2016, the 46th command class
began a one-year program divided into
two majors: joint operations command and
leadership management.
• The NDU has constructed 14 new training
facilities, including a joint battle lab (联合
作战实验室) with a war-gaming system for
confrontation exercises.
• The NDU organizes training at command
colleges and training bases and conducts a
master teacher (名师工程) project to bring in
instructors with unit experience and dispatch
professors to units, as well as offer study abroad
and conduct research projects to improve
teaching staff.
In August 2017, the PLA announced the NDU had
trained more than 1,000 joint operations commanders
in the past five years. The PLA announced the
graduation of the first phase of the joint post
qualification training course in August 2018. The joint
operations command track is designed to address
problems in joint operations command development.
The course includes all-domain, multidimensional,
joint operations; informationized local war; national
defense economy; and preparation for military
struggle. Nearly 200 students passed the graduation
assessment with qualification certificates. The training
began in October 2017 and lasted nine months. A
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second class began in April 2018, and the course will
be assessed to identify problem areas requiring further
refinement. The new joint course will be held once or
twice a year.17
National University of Defense Technology
The NUDT provides joint support courses,
including six specialty tracks and 14 joint operations
support courses. The NUDT provides technical
support for the military professional education
platform.18 President Xi identified senior officers
as having limited knowledge of high-tech systems,
even though they command units equipped with
modern equipment. This remark resulted in the
NUDT assuming a role in officer training to address
17. Wang Yitao, “国防大学：新型联合作战指挥人才方阵在
这里崛起” [National Defense University: New joint operations
command talent phalanx rises sharply], Xinhua, July 10, 2017,
http://www.81.cn/jwgz/2017-07/10/content_7671060.htm;
and Zhou Chao and Luo Jinmu, “国防大学集中精力履行核心
职能” [National Defense University concentrates on fulfilling
core functions], PLA daily, August 30, 2017, http://www.81.cn
/jfjbmap/content/2017-08/30/content_186762.htm.
18. Shen Peng and Wu Xu, “我军联合作战人才选训考用蹚
出新路” [Our army’s new way for joint operations talent selective
training and evaluation], PLA daily, August 7, 2018, http://
www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2018-08/07/content_212718
.htm; Huang Panyue, “PLA Aims to Cultivate Commanding
Talents for Joint Operations,” China Military Online,
September 7, 2017, http://english.chinamil.com.cn/view/201709/07/content_7747234.htm; and Liu Junmu, “国防大学
聚焦备战打仗培养联合作战指挥人才纪实”
[The
National
Defense University focuses on preparing for war and training
joint operations command talent], China Military Online,
May 22, 2018, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2018-05/22/
content_206747.htm.
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the lack of scientific and technical knowledge.19 The
NUDT is seemingly important in supporting reforms
to develop joint talents. A faculty trained in science
and technology likely positions the NUDT to play an
important role in educational reforms.
Theater Commands
The theater commands created in 2016 represent
new joint command organizations, force structure,
missions, and functions. The joint operations command
center in each theater is the primary organization
for conducting operations in their theater’s strategic
direction. The theater joint commands conduct
joint training during peacetime and command joint
operations in wartime or during nonwar operations.
Theaters play a role in developing and administering
joint command personnel qualification assessments.20
The service personnel assigned to theater
commands have demonstrated unfamiliarity with
joint operations and joint command. During a visit
to the Southern Theater Command in October 2018,
President Xi noted that the command capability
was not strong in citing problems with command
19. Chen Zhen and Guo Zhenyu, “国防科技大学国际
关系学院联合作战保障课程再增14门” [NUDT’s International
Relations Institute joint operational support increases 14 more
courses], PLA daily, April 3, 2018, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap
/content/2018-04/03/content_203092.htm; and Ni Haixu, “军委
机关有关部门专家解读我军军事职业教育” [Interpretation of our
army’s military professional education by experts from relevant
departments of the Central Military Commission], PLA daily,
March 1, 2018, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2018-03/01
/content_200638.htm.
20. General Political Department Editor, Selection of
important expositions, 188–89.
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personnel, the command information system, and joint
training. Theater commands have exhibited growing
pains since their establishment primarily the result
of officers with limited joint experience. Although
selection for theater commands requires a minimum of
two years’ headquarters experience at the group army
level or above and participation in large-scale, joint
exercises, officers are not prepared for joint staff duty.
The theater commands will likely take several years
to overcome the joint staff shortcomings and become
fully functional joint operations commands. This lag
does not mean the theater commands cannot conduct
joint operations; instead, it means it will take time to
reach an optimal joint operational effectiveness. At
their establishment, the theaters formulated a threeyear program to train a contingent of competent joint
operations command personnel. Joint operations
command center exercises have also provided in joint
command and coordination of forces.21
The theater command party committees appear
to be developing joint operating regulations and
procedures based on CMC guidance. The theaters are
developing joint command procedures that govern
various command levels, area-specific requirements,

21. Liu Jianwei, Liu Lei, and Zhao Lei, “透过战区改革
发展新成就领悟习主席“7·26”重要讲话精神” [Develop new
achievements through theater reform comprehending the spirit
of Chairman Xi’s “7·26” important speech], China Military
Online, September 3, 2017, http://www.81.cn/jwgz/2017
-09/03/content_7741437.htm.
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level-by-level and skip echelon command, and theater
and service command functions.22
Triad System Military Educational Reform
President Xi recently stressed the need to accelerate
the construction of the Triad military education and
training system aimed at cultivating joint operations
command talent identified as a strategic resource.23
The Triad system provides a building-block approach
to training joint officers at increasingly complex
levels. The system represents an attempt by the PLA
to update and modernize education and training
programs to meet the requirements of integrated joint
operations and system-of-systems operations. Also,
the Triad system reform represents the PLA’s desire
to better integrate education and training programs
to create new synergies, share resources, and

22. Wang
Ting,
“中部战区起步开局大力提升联合作战
指挥能力” [The central theater begins to vigorously promote
joint operations command capability], Xinhua, April 1, 2016,
http://www.xinhuanet.com/mil/2016-04/01/c_128857500.
htm; Du Shanguo and Wang Qinghou, “让备战打仗成为唯一
状态” [Let war preparations be the only state], China National
Defense Network, June 16, 2016, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap
/content/2016-06/16/content_147808.htm; Liu Jianwei, “联战
联训, 千军万马看指挥” [Joint training and teaching, thousands
of troops command”], PLA daily, May 5, 2016, http://www.81
.cn/jfjbmap/content/2016-05/05/content_143593.htm; and “加
快把指挥能力搞过硬” [Accelerate good command capability],
PLA daily, October 27, 2018, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap
/content/2018-10/27/content_219136.htm.
23. Shanguo and Qinghou, “Let war preparations be.”
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cross-fertilize innovation and knowledge.24 The Triad
system’s components—military academy education,
unit training practice, and military professional
education—represent an attempt to improve and
integrate the education and training system to better
support the cultivation of military talent in general,
with a specific focus on joint talent. Figure 7-1 shows a
graphic representation of this model.25

Figure 7-1. Basic system-of-systems model of
military talent joint education
In 2018, the PLA continued to assess many
continuing problems with the development of joint
military talent that the reforms must surmount.
Military educational institutions problems continue
with outdated policies remaining, a weak linkage
between military colleges and unit training,
24. Wang Shibin, “习近平出席中央军委党的建设会议并发表
重要讲话” [Xi Jinping attended the Central Military Commission
party-building conference and delivered an important speech],
Xinhua, ed. Li Pengfang, August 20, 2018, http://www.81.cn
/syjdt/2018-08/19/content_9256949.htm.
25. Teach
Beecham,
“新时代军事职业教育大有可为”
[Military professional education in the new era is promising],
PLA daily, November 6, 2018, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap
/content/2018-11/06/content_219948.htm.
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inadequate unit training, waste and lack of resources,
and an underdeveloped joint education system.
The construction of military professional education
platforms continues to have insufficient online
resources and poor incentives to promote continuing
education. The traditional mindset must be broken
to achieve successful implementation of a long-term
plan for developing joint talent throughout an entire
military career. The PLA needs to build up a unified
leadership, resolve interdepartmental problems, and
integrate education and training across the military
to fully implement the Triad system.26 The PLA’s
assessments of the status of joint education and
training appear to make the projections for reform
completion by the end of 2020 unrealistic, unless
the 2020 goal addresses only the downsizing and
reorganization of the military educational institutions.
Military Academy Education
Military academy education (军队院校教育)
is the main channel for improving the quality of
military personnel and teaching basic knowledge
and skills. Military academic institutions need to
promote innovative minds and thinking abilities to
lay the foundation for long-term talent development.
The PLA intends to make military academic
education consistent through a three-tier, four-level
(三层四级) standard for command officers, which
includes uniformity of the teaching outline and talent

26. Cai Linlin, “探索‘三位一体’育才的核心要冲” [Exploring
the core importance of the “Triad” talents education], PLA
daily, April 10, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/mil/2018
-04/10/c_129847159.htm.
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training program, class standards, and other education
system specifications.27
The PLA wants instructors to have a strong
understanding of military theory and practical
military experience. Publications by the PLA
discuss a regular rotation system based on their
examination of the US Military Academy at West
Point, where instructors rotate from units to teach
at the academy. The intention is to create a “teacherexpert-commander” type of faculty to enable students
to access high-end knowledge. This system would
allow military educational institutions to better
incorporate unit training requirements into courses.28
But bringing officers from units to serve as instructors
for the program has seemingly been abandoned
because officers participating in the rotations failed to
be promoted.
Unit Training Practice
Unit training practice (部队训练实践) is critical to
enhance the capability to fight and win, as well as an
important basic program to develop command officers.
Please note, the PLA states “unit training practice” has
acquired a specialized meaning, although a consistent
definition is not available. The term “practice” signifies
the consciously transformative nature of the training.
Comprehensive exercises integrate personnel and
equipment, transform theory into practice, and place
the classroom in the battlefield. The PLA believes that
in order to improve joint education, military education
needs to move closer to unit training, focus on
27. Cai, “Exploring the core importance”; and Limin et al.,
On the joint education, 55, 65.
28.

Limin et al., On the joint education, 166, 172.
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actual-combat training, and form a seamless linkage
between military educational institutions and units.29
Joint Teaching and Training
Joint teaching and training leverage the military
education institutions and provides joint coordination
between military academic institutions and units.
Joint teaching and training use military educational
institutions teaching and research to support
unit training.30
Joint teaching focuses on the joint development
talent program and joint training focuses on
unit actual-combat training. The PLA intends to
emphasize standardization of joint teaching and
training including participation of military academic
institutions and units in joint exercises. An example is
deploying instructors and students to conduct on-site
teaching and participation in the military unit training.
At the same time, troops go to the military educational
institutions to teach and participate in seminars. The
PLA believes this system will optimally use military
resources and provide cooperation between military
education and training to improve unit actual-combat
training and enable students to absorb the latest
military training methods.31
The Joint Teaching-2012 Queshan (联教-2012 确山)
exercise was directed by the former General Staff
Department and lead by the Shijiazhuang Army
Command College at the Queshan Combined Arms
Training Base. The exercise included a joint tactical
29. Cai, “Exploring the core importance”; and Limin et al.,
On the joint education, 55, 65.
30.

Limin et al., On the joint education, 48.

31.

Limin et al., On the joint education, 49–50.
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formation and 19 military educational institutions
showcasing the integration of education and training.
The PLA considered this the first multidimensional
joint teaching and training exercise.32
Military Professional Education
The TAD’s Professional Education Bureau provides
top-level design (顶层设计) for military professional
education (军事职业教育). In August 2017, the CMC
issued the Military Professional Education Reform
Implementation Plan, launching the reform of this
component of the Triad system. The plan includes
the Network Plus Education program for the sharing
of resources and provision of online learning. A
pilot project within the military was implemented
within 24 units to be completed by the end of 2018.
The PLA plans to promote military professional
education during 2019, with a planned realization of
this component of military educational reforms by the
end of 2020. The overall program includes leveraging
civilian educational resources as well as continuing
assessment and revision of the program as needed.
The PLA believes military professional education
boosts military talent, improving performance and
professionalism. Individual learning activities and
high-quality network education resources that rely
on technological innovation can reshape military
professional education to better support joint
education as the age of intelligent technologies impacts

32.

McCauley, PLA System of Systems Operations, 47.
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military affairs. The aim is to create a joint command
college without walls.33
Ubiquitous Learning: Online, Open, and
Continuing Military Education
Previously, most PLA military education was
limited to the classroom. Courses were criticized as
not being innovative or directly relevant, with military
personnel described as having passive learning
habits. The PLA intends to apply innovative methods
to improve military education, including lessons
from civilian and Western education. The PLA is
addressing the issues of innovation and interactive
and continuing education with a massive open online
course program. The online platforms support sharing
of resources and expertise between the military
educational institutions. The continuing military
education is to adapt to and support a military career
development ladder.34 The Dream Course Learning
Platform (梦课学习平台) is a large-scale, open, online
course platform that is open to all officers and men in
the PLA supporting the Triad system.35

33. Liu Jinghang, “全军军事职业教育工作” [All-army
military professional education work], Xinhua, November 25, 2017,
http://www.xinhuanet.com/mil/2017-11/25/c_129749290.htm;
and Shi Ge, “军事职业教育互联网服务平台测试运行” [Test and
operation of internet service platform for military professional
education], Xinhua, November 16, 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.
com/2017-11/16/c_1121967603.htm.
34. Cai, “Exploring the core importance”; and Limin et al.,
On the joint education, 55.
35.

Limin et al., On the joint education, 51–52.
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Cross-Training
Beginning in 2003, the PLA began placing personnel
across services and branches to gain experience. The
section in “China’s National Defense in 2004” on the
strategic project for talent discusses cross-training as
a method for cultivating high-caliber, joint talent.36
Cross-service training continues, with recent reports
of officers being assigned to other services to gain
joint experience.37
Construction of a High-Quality Military Faculty
Team
President Xi has identified the problem of military
faculty lacking knowledge of joint operations and
other advanced skills to meet the needs of cultivating
joint talents. Although the PLA believes the military
faculty has shown improvements, problems remain.38
Developing a skilled and innovative faculty and
providing relevant joint courses and teaching materials
at military educational institutions are fundamental
requirements in the PLA’s quest to build a group of
joint commanders and staff. The PLA believes the
36. NUDT,
“梦课”学习平台，万人超级课堂等你加入!”
[“Dream Course” learning platform, thousands in super classroom
waiting for you to join!], China Military Online, ed. Li Xian,
October 25, 2016, http://www.81.cn/2016rmxzjxs/2016-10/25
/content_7323791.htm; and Limin et al., On the joint education, 51.
37. Information Office of the State Council, “China’s
National Defense in 2004”; and “30 years of military cadre ranks.”
38. Li Wenji, “百日内5名将军密集跨军种 ‘转战,’ 均在
近两年调整过岗位” [Five generals in the 100-day intensive
cross-service “battle,” they have adjusted positions in the past
two years], paper, July 30, 2018, https://www.thepaper.cn
/newsDetail_forward_2304212.
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military faculty are critical for imparting knowledge
and mentoring and fully mobilizing the enthusiasm,
initiative, and creativity of students. Other important
missions of the military teaching staff are to conduct
research in military science and to be innovators in
the development of military theory, technology, and
teaching methods.39
Proposals to improve military faculty have
been made, but whether the proposals have been
implemented is unknown. General proposals include
strengthening teachers’ dedication, virtue, sense of
responsibility, and understanding of new educational
theories through improved courses and independent
learning for instructors. One proposal is to increase
the opportunity for instructors to study abroad,
particularly in foreign military academies. The
PLA also recognizes the need to adjust the faculty
structure with a more even distribution of young,
middle-aged, and older-aged teachers to create a
stable faculty system in addition to adding teachers
with both military experience and advanced
academic credentials.40
Ultimately, one of the proposals that might achieve
the greatest success is the implementation of a strong
reward-and-punishment mechanism based on an
accurate evaluation system. The PLA contends this
would create a “survival of the fittest” system. A
punishment system would provide a tool for culling
inferior teachers, but apparently this has not occurred.
A strong reward system would both recognize gifted
39. Li Cheng An, 新形势下军队院校教育改革 [Reform of
military university and college education in the new situation]
(Beijing: NDU Press, October 2015), 142.
40.

Li, Reform of military university, 136–37.
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teachers and instill greater enthusiasm and incentive
to excel and innovate.41
Military Educational Institution Evaluation
The PLA believes an effective evaluation system
can promote high-quality military educational
institutions. The process of collecting data on military
educational institutions also supports reform efforts
by identifying problem areas and possible solutions.
As of 2015, no comprehensive evaluation system
was in place. Evaluations of military educational
institutions began in the early 1980s, with an
experimental exploratory stage from 1986 to 1995,
followed by continuing refinement to the present.
The Regulations on PLA Academy Education in 2000
stipulated the establishment of an evaluation system to
support improving the quality of personnel education.
Since 2005, 22 military educational institutions have
received evaluations in a pilot program.42
Joint Military Talent Requirements and Evaluation
The PLA is developing standards to ensure
quality control in joint command education. The
PLA is proposing the three-tier, four-level structure
for command officer cultivation. The transformation
process for joint command officers is from theory
to practice, from basic knowledge to specialized
knowledge, and from branch and arms to joint
command and operations. The establishment of joint
command quality standards affects both the quality
of joint officers and staff and the quality of military
41.

Li, Reform of military university, 147–58.

42.

Li, Reform of military university, 158–59.
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educational institution course content. The PLA
has developed the “four haves” (四有) for the new
generation of revolutionary soldiers: have spirit,
have capability, have courage, and have integrity.
The PLA believes the traditional concept of quality
and capability evaluation standards must be replaced
by qualities highlighting informationized warfare
system integration, information fusion, and other
requirements to master modern combat theory and
operational methods.43 The structure of the threetier, four-level system is depicted in graphic form in
figure 7-2.44

Figure 7-2. Three-tier, four-level structure for
command officers
Military Education Management
The TAD provides top-level design plans and
implements the Triad system strategic plan for
standardization of joint education and training by
establishing the basic framework and contents. The
CMC and the services provide a two-level management
43.

Li, Reform of military university, 233–47.

44.

Limin et al., On the joint education, 58–64.
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system for the military education institutions. This
high-level direction incudes establishing norms for
military educational curriculums. Each syllabus
contains training objectives and requirements, main
course subjects and content, and assessment criteria.
The current focus is accelerating the construction
of teaching for joint operations and deepening
comprehensive training reform. Military educational
institutions will actively participate in teaching and
training joint forces and conducting joint exercise
simulations. Objectives include accelerating the
expansion of simulation centers, establishing
specialized laboratories for research, upgrading
training bases, conducting research on new methods
of joint training and exercise design, and eliminating
academic misconduct.45
The TAD’s Professional Education Bureau
is responsible for centralized management and
supervision of the Triad system military professional
education program. The bureau supervises joint
professional development in the theaters and
services.46 Centralized support for the Triad system
program is provided by the following documents:
Outline for College Education Teaching provides an
overall plan and requirements for military education,
Outline for Unit Training Practice provides integrated
requirements and evaluation for military unit
45.

Limin et al., On the joint education, 60.

46. Limin et al., On the joint education, 12–13, 23, 140–41;
Management Committee, People’s Liberation Army military
terminology, 300; and Zhang Zhibin and Wu Xu, “适应全民终
身学习时代要求助力官兵成才” [Adapt to lifelong learning for
all the times require helping officers and soldiers to become
talented], PLA daily, October 31, 2018, http://www.81.cn
/jfjbmap/content/2018-10/31/content_219474.htm.
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training, and Outline for Military Professional Study
provides planning and requirements for professional
education programs.47
Joint Training Reform
The PLA is reforming joint unit training to build
toward an integrated joint operations capability.
The reform of military education connects with joint
training enhancements as the PLA attempts to build
a synergy by integrating military education and
training. Integrated joint operations are conducted
at three levels: strategic, campaign, and tactical. The
PLA is focusing on improving joint tactical training
(primarily at the division or brigade level) because
the organization intends to push joint combat down
to the tactical level and employ integrated, joint
tactical formations. Improved and accurate training
evaluations are intended to enhance the quality of
joint operations capabilities through training that
approaches the conditions of real combat. Most
importantly, the PLA’s training is based on wartime
missions in each theater; thus, the organization believes
improved and realistic joint training can support
modifications and help to perfect operational plans.48
Joint campaign training’s primary purpose is to
develop commander and staff knowledge of theory,
organization, and command capabilities during joint
campaign formation exercises. The significance of
the joint training focus on commanders and staff is
reinforced by the military educational reforms to
develop joint command talent. The PLA believes
command and organization of joint forces represent
47.

Limin et al., On the joint education, 152–53.

48.

Limin et al., On the joint education, 153.
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the greatest training difficulty. Strategic training is
focused on high-level mastery of warfare principles
and methods for strategic commanders and staff
and national security related institutions. Exercises,
seminars, and lectures focus on strategic planning,
national security policy, and military strategic
decision-making problems. Specialized joint training
emphasizes that basic capabilities should include
operational elements, such as reconnaissance and
intelligence, command and control, and information
coordination and confrontation. In addition, joint
training can involve nonwar joint operations,
the testing of new weapons and equipment, and
experimental exercises that test new concepts.49
Joint training should also focus on joint campaign
and tactical formations’ command, coordination,
composition, and restructuring during changes in
operational phases. The employment of a modular
approach in forming a campaign and tactical
operational system of systems should be an important
component of joint training.
High-Level Training Direction
High-level organizations are beginning to provide
unified leadership and management over joint training.
The TAD establishes requirements for actual-combat
(实战化) training. Actual combat is warfightingoriented training that approaches the environment
and conditions of real combat to overcome the lack
49. Dongbing, Lectures on the science, 56, 96–97; Zhu
Aihua, 联合战术训练 [Joint tactical training] (Beijing: Tide
Publishing House, 2008), 50–51; and Zhang Hui, 信息时代军事训
练论 [On military training in the information age] (Beijing: NDU
Press, 2016), 234.
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of combat experience and peacetime mentality. The
TAD provides guidance to the theaters on planning
joint exercises to ensure standardization. The theaters
plan joint training based on wartime missions. The
PLA intends for the regularization of joint training
to develop more effective and sophisticated training
methods throughout the entire force. Simulation
centers and battle labs provide significant support to
joint training of commanders and staff.50
In April 2018, the TAD held a special meeting of
the theaters, services, and branches, People’s Armed
Police, and other CMC organizations to examine
military training in the last two years and adherence
to the Interim Regulations for Strengthening Actual
Combat Training of 2016 to rectify problems. The
leadership of the Training Supervision Bureau
discussed accountability and linked the evaluation
and punishment of units to create a deterrent effect.
Previously, more than 630 problems had been
identified, with 90 percent of the issues rectified.
The relevant departments of the CMC plan to create
a special network for the supervision of military
training, with the responsibility of reporting to the
CMC’s Commission for Discipline Inspection. The
meeting also explored the establishment of a doubleaccountability mechanism focused on eliminating the
peacetime mentality and requiring responsibility and
rule of law for training.51

50.

Dongbing, Lectures on the science, 33–34, 50–54, 167–77.

51. Dongbing, Lectures on the science, 93–94; Limin et
al., On the joint education, 12–13, 23, 140–41; and Management
Committee, People’s Liberation Army military terminology, 300.
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Joint Training Guidance
The PLA believes the development of regulations
on joint operations, joint command and coordination,
and joint training is required to train adequately
toward and implement an integrated joint operations
capability. The PLA notes the US military has issued
more than 110 joint publications. The PLA has
seemingly made some decisions on joint operations
issues that have been areas of disagreement between
PLA theorists. In 2013, the PLA was in the process of
updating joint operations basic guidance documents.
This guidance provides the conceptual foundation
needed to reform the joint training program structure.52
But an NDU book on theater joint command from
2016 states that regulations on command relationships
remained vague and lacking in detail and did not
support organized and purposeful joint command.53
In January 2018, the CMC issued a new military
training outline (军事训练大纲) to build a new military
training system of systems. The new training outline
provides new regulations and rules for military
training in the new era. The training outline supports
the development of actual-combat training, joint
training, and jointness of the force.54 Importantly, the

52. Liang Pengfei and Liu Yiwei, “抓实问题整改 立起监
察权威” [Correcting problems, establish supervision authority],
PLA daily, April 26, 2018, http://jz.chinamil.com.cn/n2014/tp
/content_8015788.htm.
53.

Dongbing, Lectures on the science, 93.

54. Liu Wei, ed., 战区联合作战指挥 [Theater joint operations
command] (Beijing: NDU Press, 2016), 107, 341–42.
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new training outline is intended to align unit training
with the new Triad system.55
In February 2019, the TAD announced a regulation
on military training supervision, described as the first
of its kind. The new training regulation is intended to
improve combat readiness, rectify corruption related
to military training, and eliminate problems hindering
actual-combat training. The regulation prioritizes
supervision of military training, standardizes
methods for organizing training, and refines criteria
for determining training violations.56
System-of-Systems and Integrated, Joint Operations
Training
PLA training will increasingly focus on developing
a system-of-systems and integrated, joint operations
capability. The complexities of integrated joint
operations will place greater requirements on
commanders and staff. Training will integrate forces,
systems, and platforms from the tactical to the strategic
levels; this will include training of joint strategic
groups, joint campaign formations, and joint tactical
formations that conduct operations as an operational
system of systems. A high level of command and
coordination will be required to control dispersed

55. Liang Pengfei and Wu Xu, “我军首批新军事训练大纲正
式颁发” [Our army’s first batch of new military training syllabus
was officially issued], PLA daily, January 26, 2018, http://
www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2018-01/26/content_197929.htm.
56. Liang Pengfei, Liu Yiwei, and Wu Xu, “努力开创新时
代军事训练新局面” [Strive to create a new situation in military
training in the new era], PLA daily, February 1, 2018, http://
www.81.cn/jfjbmap/content/2018-02/01/content_198469.htm.
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forces across a broad, dynamic battlespace.57 Figure
7-3 demonstrates the flow of this integration into a
joint operations capability.58

Figure 7-3. Joint training building to an integrated
joint operations capability
The PLA has proposed a series of training
building blocks required to develop an integrated
joint operations capability; these include unitintegrated training leading to basic joint operations
skills, operational element integrated training (basic
warfighting capabilities such as command and control,
reconnaissance, and firepower support) leading to
subsystem joint action capabilities, and operational
system-of-systems (integrated force grouping) training
leading to joint-force synchronized actions. Within
the context of these joint training building blocks,
the PLA considers the following areas important in
57. Liu Jianwei and Wu Xu, “中央军委主席习近平签署
命令” [Chairman of the CMC Xi Jinping signed the order],
PLA daily, February 12, 2019, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap
/content/2019-02/12/content_227084.htm.
58. Dongbing, Lectures on the science, 97; and Hui, On
military training, 234–35, 248, 287.
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developing joint capabilities: integration of serviceweapon platforms and information networks, realtime coordination, the intelligence process, long-range
digital communication, and complex combined
arms training.59 A requirement not mentioned is the
capability to reorganize a modular joint task force as
operational requirements change during the course
of a joint campaign or action. The extent to which the
PLA has progressed in implementing this proposed
training plan is unclear, though the organization has
embarked on system-of-systems-based training for
the force.
Joint Training Areas and Bases
The PLA identifies military training cooperation
zones and large training bases as important for joint
training and continues to upgrade these training
areas. Military training cooperation zones (军事训练协
作区) (different PLA publications translate “协作” as
“cooperation” or “coordination”) have been important
joint training locations for more than a decade, with
at least one of these large joint training areas in
each theater.60
Combined arms tactical training bases are in each
theater. Originally established primarily for ground
force combined arms training, these training bases
evolved into sophisticated exercise venues featuring
facilities for the integration of war-gaming and
simulation training, exercise monitoring equipment
to support unit evaluations, umpires, and multiple
integrated laser engagement systems to provide
greater realism and specialized training facilities and
59.

Dongbing, Lectures on the science, 29–32, 35.

60.

Aihua, Joint tactical training, 1.
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increasingly support joint training between the army
and the air force.61
Simulation Centers and Battle Labs
The PLA describes warfighting experimentation
(作战实验) as using combat simulations to study
operational problems in a controllable, measurable,
and
near-realistic,
simulated
confrontation
environment. The simulations provide analysis
and evaluation of combat experiments. Joint
simulation training can support the validation of joint
operational methods, the provision of confrontation
training, and research on employment of new or
future weapons and equipment. Joint simulation
exercises train joint commanders and staffs and link
dispersed field training together in a joint exercise
scenario. The dispersed training supports long-range
synchronization of operations by the dispersed staffs
and units, which approximate the PLA’s vision of
the future battlefield. Simulation and war gaming
provide an efficient and cost-effective means for
experimentation and testing of new operational
61. Management
Committee,
People’s
Liberation
Army military terminology, 319; Zhang Kunping, “Zhurihe
Combined Tactics Training Base—PLA’s Modern-War-Oriented
Drill Ground,” China Military Online, January 23, 2013,
http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/china-military
-news/2013-01/23/content_5192997.htm; “From Red and Blue
Real Confrontation Historical Changes in Experiencing Combat
Effectiveness Standards,” China Military Online, February 28,
2014; “Naval Air Force ‘Wetstone,’” PLA daily, June 25, 2014,
5; and Guo Renjie, ed., “PLA Navy, PLA Air Force to Conduct
Free Air-Combat Confrontation Drill,” China Military Online,
August 19, 2014, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/TopNews/2014-08/19
/content_4530414.htm.
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concepts.62 Simulations and dispersed joint training
also conceal the exercise scenario and full scope of the
training, creating difficulties in assessing joint training
quality and new operational developments.
The 2004 China defense white paper reviewed the
use of simulation and network training to improve
joint capabilities. Progress had already occurred at
that time to improve simulation and network training,
with all services and branches having established
tactical simulation training systems for command
training. An All-Army Academy Operational (Joint)
Laboratory Training Simulation System (全军院校作
战（联合）实验室训练模拟系统) supports integrated
training among military command educational
institutions, services, and branches.63 The Academy
of Military Science contains a Joint Operations
Experiment Center under the War Research Institute.
The center researches joint campaign confrontation
experimentation and innovation.64
The PLA defines “battle labs” (作战实验室)
as specialized facilities for conducting combat
experimentation and research. Battle labs are an
important Information Age simulation means to test
new or future operational theories and verify concepts
before moving to expensive field testing. But the PLA
considers its battle lab system to be incomplete. Some
battle labs have been established, but whether they are
62. Aihua, Joint tactical training, 66–67; and Management
Committee, People’s Liberation Army military terminology, 669.
63. Information Office of the State Council, “China’s
National Defense in 2004.”
64. Shao Longfei, “叶雄兵：我在作战实验中心模拟战争”
[Ye Xiongbing: I simulated war in the operational experimentation
center], China Military Online, December 7, 2017, http://
www.81.cn/jmywyl/2017-12/07/content_7858153.htm.
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coordinating work with other research laboratories
is unclear.65 In 2010 the PLA called for strengthening
the construction of battle labs at academic institutions
with modern equipment, including virtual reality and
artificial intelligence; promoting sharing of resources;
and linking with regional joint training bases.66
Joint Tactical Training
Joint tactical training has become increasingly
important as the PLA intends to push joint operations
down to the tactical level. This shift will require the
education and training of joint commanders and staff
at the tactical level to provide experience with joint
combat principles and methods.67 The disbanded
Jinan Military Region began conducting research
field exercises on the organization of joint tactical
formations in 2002, and joint training has continued to
include these tactical modular task forces. At the same
time, the former Nanjing Army Command College
65. Dong Zifeng, 战斗力生成模式转变 [Transformation of
generating mode of war fighting capability] (Beijing: Military
Science Publishing House, 2012), 37; Management Committee,
People’s Liberation Army military terminology, 669; “PrePractice: Dispersing Informationized Warfare Fog?,” PLA daily,
December 9, 2010; Yan Meng and Ma Qian, ed., “‘Battle Lab’
Aids Transformation of Combat Power Generation Mode,”
PLA daily, June 29, 2012, http://en.people.cn/90786/7860104
.html; “Naval Battle Starts on Land,” PLA daily, February 4, 2010;
and “Informationized Warfighting Capability of the PLA Has
Multiplied,” Zhongguo tongxin she, July 22, 2007.
66. Yang Ge, “以体系作战引领人才培训机制创新” [Systemof-systems operations leading the innovation of talent training
mechanism], PLA daily, February 25, 2010, http://www.mod
.gov.cn/gflt/2010-02/25/content_4126353_3.htm.
67.

Dongbing, Lectures on the science, 49–51.
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began the study of joint tactical formations and related
tactical issues.68
The PLA assesses that most units could not conduct
tactical level joint operations due to technological,
capability, and training limitations. Integrated joint
communications and military education issues
continue to hinder joint training efforts.69 Although
these assessments are likely generally true for the
PLA, some units conduct advanced experimentation
in tactical joint operations—for example, the 82nd
Group Army (formerly the 38th Group Army) and a
digitized division in the Central Theater Command.
In addition to communications and joint tactical
literacy, the PLA has identified additional issues
inhibiting joint tactical training. These issues include
the partitions that have existed between the services,
leading to a lack of knowledge of other services’
procedures, capabilities, and tactics; the required high
level of specialized branch training within the services,
which limits the amount and quality of joint training;
and coordination within and between services, which
has proved difficult for commanders and staffs at the
tactical level.70
Training Evaluation
As with military academic education, improved
and accurate assessment and evaluation systems are
important to the development of joint capabilities.
The PLA intends to continue improving training
assessments and eliminate fraud. The PLA assesses
68.

Aihua, Joint tactical training, 11.

69. Yang Gong Kun, Joint Operations Research, ed. Ma Ping
(Beijing: NDU Press, 2013), 113–14.
70.

Aihua, Joint tactical training, 23–26.

275

the quality of training based on various indicators,
including the overall amount of training time for
units, confrontation and simulation training, and
training content. Live-fire, confrontation, and
simulation training quality are given more weight in
evaluating training.71
In 2014, the former General Staff Department’s
Military Training Department revised unit training
evaluations. Changes were made to evaluate unit
training throughout the year instead of conducting
only an end-of-year evaluation. Another change was to
emphasize assessment of command organizations and
unit capabilities in the evaluation. The PLA reportedly
inspects unit evaluations to ensure the evaluations are
fair and accurate.72
The Training Supervision Bureau began
monitoring military training beginning in the first half
of 2016 to provide high-level management. The bureau
monitors important service exercises, theater joint
exercises, as well as military educational institutions.
A military training inspector team was established
in 2017 to support supervision and monitoring of
major exercises.73
71.

Dongbing, Lectures on the science, 26–28.

72. Liang Pengfei, “总参部署年度军事训练等级评定工作”
[General Staff Deployment annual military training level
assessment work], PLA daily, September 11, 2014, http://
jz.chinamil.com.cn/n2014/tp/content_6133670.htm; and Limin
et al., On the joint education, 161–63.
73. Limin et al., On the joint education, 152–53; and Liu
Qiang,
“我军新体制下首届军委军事训练监察员队伍即将上岗”
[The first military training supervisor team of the Central Military
Commission under the new system of our army is about to take
up their post], Xinhua, June 24, 2017, http://www.xinhuanet
.com/2017-06/24/c_1121202400.htm.
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Collection and analysis of training data are
important for unit evaluations and the provision of
valuable research data to support future training and
doctrinal development. The PLA considers conducting
exercises approximating actual-combat conditions as
vital for supporting research for future training and
operational methods, as well as a means to overcome
lack of combat experience and peacetime mentality.74
GOAL FOR ACHIEVING REFORMS
The PLA has established 2035 for achieving its
current military reform strategic goals, including
military education and training. Some PLA
publications cite a 2020 date for military educational
reforms; however, continued problems make it
unattainable. The PLA appears to believe it is making
progress in education and joint training, although
much work remains. The goal of 2035 is reasonable
for achieving reforms in joint education and training
if key objectives are met. These objectives include
controlling corruption that adversely affects military
education and training; constructing a high-quality
joint faculty and curriculum; improving pay, benefits,
and rewards to attract and retain high-quality faculty;
establishing effective evaluation methods for students,
instructors, and joint training; and integrating the new
military revolution based on intelligent technologies
into military educational institutions’ courses. The
lack of progress in military education reform over
the past 20 years leaves success in doubt. The CMC
needs to overcome the cause of this lack of progress,
whether it be a lack of capability or an institutional
74. Dongbing, Lectures on the science, 239; and Aihua, Joint
tactical training, 120–21.
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impediment. The modernization goals in the reform
areas of joint education and training need to be clear,
with implementation of a systematic scientific plan to
improve the quality in these key areas guided by highlevel direction and management.75
CONCLUSION
President Xi’s current reform effort is focused,
in part, on developing integrated, joint, and
system-of-systems operational capability to boost
the PLA’s warfighting capability significantly.
Improvements in military education to develop
joint talent and joint training are critical for the
successful implementation of these twin capabilities.
Joint and system-of-systems operations establish
complex requirements for joint commanders and
staff, including command, coordination, information
technology skills, innovation, and joint tactical
combat. These requirements are being addressed in
the military reforms, although the extent and quality
of implementation is unclear.
The PLA has identified a number of problem
areas related to joint talent development that could
cripple President Xi’s reform plans if not adequately
resolved. These problems include corruption, lack
of qualified joint personnel at all echelons, lack of
innovation, outdated courses, poor instructors,
insufficient funds and resources, waste of resources,
poor discipline and management, bureaucratic inertia,
poor command capabilities, a peacetime mentality,
75. Lu Junjie, “推进新时代军事训练创新发展” [Promoting
the innovative development of military training in the new
era], PLA daily, October 30, 2018, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap
/content/2018-10/30/content_219407.htm.
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lack of combat experience, and inadequate assessment
and evaluation systems for individuals and units. The
PLA Daily articles state that these problems continue
to afflict the PLA.
The PLA’s Triad military education reform plan
and improvements in joint training attempt to redress
many of the problems. The Triad system reform plan
modernizes and integrates the three elements that
have existed in the past: military academy education,
unit training practice, and military professional
education. Importantly, the PLA intends to integrate
military academic institutions and unit training closely
to enrich both areas with the exchange of knowledge
and experience. Ubiquitous learning with online
courses, teaching materials, and resources promotes
continuing education throughout the force. Crosstraining is a potentially effective means of providing
joint experience and knowledge. The PLA intends to
push joint learning to joint commanders and staff and
the entire PLA.
The NDU and NUDT are playing important roles
in developing joint talent and educational reform.
Although military educational reforms are planned
to be implemented by the end of 2020, both military
education and training modernization efforts will
be constantly assessed and refined as needed. The
2020 goal appears difficult for the PLA to attain, as
systemic problems continue in military education
and training. In particular, the development of highquality joint faculty and courses appears to be the
critical component to developing a cohort of joint
commanders and staff. Readjusting the current mix
and improving the quality of military faculties appear
to constitute a long-term project the PLA has not
achieved so far.
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The two-tier military and training management
system consists of the CMC and the services. This
system is intended to provide top-level guidance
and management of military education and training
reforms. Although high-level management is
provided, lower echelons appear to have initiative
in implementation. For example, the theaters are
implementing joint training and evaluation for
commanders and staff that leads to a qualification
certificate, but the theaters appear to be implementing
the program according to different requirements in
each theater. This lack of coordination points to a lack
of standardization and uniformity, which is a goal
of top-level design and could lead to varying levels
of joint personnel quality and competence among
the theaters.
Improvements in joint training include upgrades to
joint training bases and zones, expansion of simulation
centers and battle labs, and establishment of joint
training evaluations over the course of the training
year. The PLA is implementing a three-pronged,
building-block training method to implement systemof-systems and integrated, joint operations. The PLA
is focusing on joint tactical training because it intends
to broaden joint operations to include joint tactical
combat by joint tactical task forces. Actual-combat
training is intended to address the PLA’s lack of
combat experience and its peacetime mentality. The
PLA believes enhanced joint training will lead to new
operational methods, implementation of integrated
joint operations, generation of greater warfighting
capabilities, development of joint command and
coordination procedures, and establishment of
modular, joint, task-organized force groupings at the
campaign and tactical levels.
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President Xi’s speech at the National Education
Conference in September 2018 addressed the
need to build a military educational system that
would cultivate joint talents and support military
transformation. Although he noted the military
educational and training system has improved, he
acknowledged that work remains. He recognized the
overall training system does not match the mission
requirements of the new era or the new organizational
form of the military. The traditional mindset remains,
and military professional education is still in the initial
exploratory stage.76 The PLA continues to identify
problems and refine the reform plans, albeit slowly.
The number of officers the PLA reported as having
graduated from joint courses over the past five years
is relatively small. The theaters are establishing joint
training and certification of officers, but the quality
of this program is unknown. Complex joint exercises
provide training and experience for joint commanders
and staff. But the military educational reforms have
continued for two decades or more, and the PLA
continues to report problems while acknowledging
some progress in reforms. Although the current
reorganization of military academies has met the 2020
reform goal, by the PLA’s admission, the cultivation
of joint talents will be a long process. Bureaucratic
inertia and resistance to change appear to continue to
permeate the PLA and retard reform efforts in military
education as well as training. Leadership will need
to intervene to move these military education and
76. “努力形成更高水平的人才培养体系” [Efforts to form a
higher-level talent training system of systems], PLA
daily, September 14, 2018, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap/
content/2018-09/14/content_215845.htm.
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training reforms significantly forward after some 20
years of limited results.
The ability of the PLA to conduct an advanced form
of system-of-systems and integrated, joint operations
will take time, but this does not mean the PLA does
not currently represent a lethal opponent. The PLA
will need to rely on a hybrid form of joint, coordinated
operations during this transition period while
integrated joint and system-of-systems operational
capabilities are incrementally added. The PLA should
prove a dangerous opponent to enemy forces that
are equal or inferior to its warfighting capabilities,
especially in limited conflicts of short duration. But
despite being capable of inflicting casualties on an
opponent, the PLA would likely face difficulties in
lengthy conflicts against an advanced military capable
of advanced joint operations.
Information Gaps
Although PLA publications outline reforms
for developing joint operational talent in military
academic institutions and improving the quality of
joint simulation and field training, many details are not
clear, including the degree of quality and effectiveness
of the reforms. Information gaps include:
• the extent of the elimination of corruption
and fraud hampering the implementation of
reforms and inhibiting the development of joint
commanders, staff, and unit capabilities;
• whether additional funding and resources are
provided for education and training;
• the quality of joint curriculums, course materials,
and online learning resources;

282

• the elimination of poor instructors and the
building up and retention of high-quality
joint faculty;
• the quality and accuracy of the assessment
and evaluation system for teachers, students,
and units;
• the issuance of detailed joint regulations on
command, coordination, and training;
• the extent of the development of officers who
have an in-depth knowledge of informationized
systems and warfare;
• the extent of innovation within military
educational institutions and development of
innovative, joint operational methods;
• the effectiveness of top-level design and
management of joint education and training by
CMC organizations and theaters, as well as the
degree of standardization of programs within
the PLA; and
• the effectiveness of plans to create a synergistic
effect by integrating military academic
institutions and unit training.
Implications for PLA Transformation
Successful implementation and continuing
refinement of reform efforts are critical for the
development of joint talents. Development of joint
talents throughout the PLA at the strategic, campaign,
and tactical levels is a key requirement for the
implementation of an integrated, joint operations
capability. The PLA attempts to address identified
operational requirements and problems. But, by the
PLA’s own admission, serious problems remain,
including corruption, bureaucratic inertia, a peacetime
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mentality, and a lack of combat experience. This
inability to expediently implement required military
educational and training reforms will extend the time
required to implement an advanced joint operations
capability. Leadership has eliminated the bureaucratic
obstacles that were delaying the creation of the joint
theater commands. Now, leadership needs to break
the impediments to high-quality military educational
and training reforms for PLA transformation to
be successful.
A fully developed, integrated, joint operations
capability would make the PLA a dangerous opponent
in both regional and global conflict as China’s interests
extend further abroad. Even if the development period
for a significant cohort of joint commanders and staff
is lengthy, incremental improvements in multiple
areas, including military education and training, will
gradually increase the PLA’s combat effectiveness as
the organization builds toward its goal of becoming
an advanced armed force.
The PLA is addressing the information revolution
in its cultivation of joint talent, improvements in
joint training, and modernization in general. The
cultivation of joint talent reforms is primarily
focused on catching up with and implementing the
information technology revolution in military affairs
and building an informationized warfare capability.
Now, PLA theorists are discussing the next revolution
in military affairs based on intelligent (智能化)
technologies, which they believe can have a significant
impact on all aspects of the military. These theorists
believe the intelligent technological revolution could
provide an opportunity to leapfrog in front of the
advanced militaries that have already incorporated

284

information
technologies.77
Although
military
educational institutions are beginning to incorporate
intelligent-technology issues into the classroom, the
focus remains primarily on informationization. The
PLA will need to catch up rapidly with the revolution
in military affairs based on information technologies
or risk falling behind in the new revolution.78

77. Xu Shiyong and Wang Jiasheng, “探寻智能化作战制胜
机理” [Exploring the winning mechanism of intelligent-based
operations], PLA daily, January 4, 2018, http://www.81.cn
/jfjbmap/content/2018-01/04/content_196178.htm.
78. Cai Yijie, Dong Dengkui, and Yang Fengyuan, “军校课
堂里的 ‘智能脉动’” [“Intelligent pulse” in the military academy
classroom], PLA daily, January 22, 2019, http://www.81.cn
/jfjbmap/content/2019-01/22/content_225884.htm.
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8. PLA FOREIGN TRAINING EXCHANGES:
MORE THAN MILITARY DIPLOMACY?
John Chen and James Mulvenon
The People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA’s) top leaders
recognize that the quality of its personnel is a vital
component of its efforts to become a more effective
fighting force and its accelerated preparations to fight
and win wars. This recognition was made clear in
the 19th Party Congress Work Report delivered by
President Xi Jinping in November 2017, in which he
called for the “strengthening of the military human
capital training system” (加强军事人才培养体系建设)
as part of the military’s renewed mandate to prepare
to fight and win wars.1 President Xi’s call to improve
the PLA’s personnel quickly filtered down through
various levels of the PLA: service-level party
committees (党委) charged with force construction
and personnel development issued specific documents
detailing how they plan to implement the Chairman’s
goals soon after the Work Report.2
Personnel training exchanges with foreign
countries are one mechanism by which the PLA is
attempting to improve its ability to fight and win
the next war. These training exchanges primarily
fall into two categories: sending personnel to “study
1. Xi Jinping, “决胜全面建成小康社会 夺取新时代中国特色
社会主义伟大胜利” [Comprehensively construct a moderately
prosperous society, seize the victory of a new era of socialism
with Chinese characteristics] (speech, 19th National Congress of
the Communist Party of China, Beijing, October 27, 2017).
2. “聚 焦 实 战 、 瞄 准 一 流 ， 建 设 高 素 质 新 型 飞 行 人 员 队
伍系列专题报道” [Special report focusing on realism, aiming
toward first-rate construction of high-quality new-type aviator
contingent], 空军报 [Air Force news], November 7, 2017.
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abroad” (留学) and sending personnel to participate
in “foreign training exercises” (中外联合军事演习).
Study abroad is referenced as a part of the definition
for officer training, and foreign training exercises are
defined in the “military diplomacy” (军事外交) section
of the most recent version of the PLA dictionary.3
Although the PLA regards both of these types of
training exchanges as elements of Chinese military
diplomacy, it also increasingly views the latter as one
of the most important ways in which it can prepare
its forces to fight and win. Participation in foreign
military competitions, like the International Military
Games, is thought to “leave profound impressions
that inevitably advance realistic training.”4 Other
foreign training exercises are credited with raising
the realism of maneuvers through “mutual learning
and absorption.”5
This discussion surveys the impact of foreign
training exchanges on the PLA’s accelerated
preparations to fight and win the next war, largely
focusing on foreign training exercise trends and
the personnel that participate in them. Although
study abroad opportunities are a unique component
3. 全军军事术语管理委员
[All-Military
Military
Terminology Management Committee], 中国人民解放军军
语 [People’s Liberation Army military terminology] (Beijing:
Academy of Military Sciences Press, 2011), 306, 1065.
4. Liang Pengfei and Wu Yuanjin, “莫斯科赛场：比金
牌重要的是收获” [Moscow competition ground: Gains more
important than gold medals], 解放军画报 [PLA pictorial],
September 19, 2016.
5. “Realistic training brand” is rendered as “实战化训练品
牌” in the original Chinese: and see Yang Zhen and Yang Jin, “
中巴空军在中国境内举行多兵（机）种朕合训练” [Chinese and
Pakistani air forces hold multi-branch (aircraft) joint training
inside China], 空军报 [Air Force news], September 11, 2017.
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of personnel development, the PLA’s expanded
participation in foreign training exercises and the
high-level directives ordering expanded participation
in these maneuvers suggest that foreign training
exercises will become increasingly prominent parts
of PLA personnel training. In the short term, foreign
training exercises offer PLA personnel unprecedented
opportunities to hone their skills in high-stress
environments, while potentially shielding them
from personnel disruptions caused by the latest
organizational reforms. In the long term, the gathering
of exercise data and benchmarking utility of these
exercises could eventually have profound impacts on
the command capabilities of PLA personnel and its
overall operational capabilities; although, there is little
open-source evidence to suggest the PLA is effectively
collecting or using exercise data at a macroscopic level
to improve its personnel.
The remainder of this discussion proceeds in
three parts. The first section describes the context and
evolution of PLA participation in foreign training
exercises by defining key terms, describing PLA
views on foreign training exercises, and documenting
larger trends in the PLA’s participation in foreign
training exercises. The second section examines PLA
participation in foreign training exercises from a
personnel standpoint, primarily focusing on preexercise personnel selection, command and control
during foreign training exercises, and post-exercise
review and dissemination of knowledge obtained. The
final section assesses the impact of foreign training
exercises on the PLA’s preparations to fight and win
and describes the future implications of increased PLA
participation in foreign training exercises.
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CONTEXT AND EVOLUTION OF PLA FOREIGN
TRAINING ACTIVITIES
The PLA uses a variety of terms to describe military
training (军事训练), which encompasses “education in
military theory and specialty knowledge, operational
skills instruction, and military maneuvers” and
includes training activities like drills (演练) and
exercises (演习).6 Drills are military maneuvers
carried out at the fendui (分队) level according to set
rules and led by a smaller number of directing and
coordinating personnel. Exercises are defined as
operational command and maneuver drills carried out
under the direction of an exercise director department
(导演部) (EDD), which is typically composed of the
exercise director (导演), coordinators, referees, and
technical support personnel.7 Exercises are considered
a “higher-level form of military training than a drill”
and the “highest form of military training.”8
Official PLA definitions of foreign training drills
and exercises are defined in anodyne terms that shed
little analytical light on the types or characteristics
of foreign training activities. But official military
media and top PLA leaders frequently group foreign
training activities into three categories: joint training
6. Management Committee, People’s Liberation Army
military terminology, 299, 311, 313.
7. Management Committee, People’s Liberation Army
military terminology, 313–14.
8. Lu Hui, “善学而立锻王牌” [Perfecting learning and
independently forging a trump card], 空军报 [Air Force news],
August 15, 2017; and Ning Yingqiu, “信息化条件下部队演习评
估组织与实施” [Organization and execution of unit assessment
under informatized conditions], 战士报 [Warrior news],
October 22, 2012.
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(联训), joint exercises (联演), and joint competitions
(联赛). Although PLA academics consider foreign
training exercises (translation shortened as “联演”) to
be higher-level and more complex undertakings than
foreign training (联训), no publicly available sources
authoritatively establish the PLA’s hierarchical view
of foreign training competitions. For the sake of clarity,
this discussion uses “foreign training activities” to
refer to all drills, training, exercises, and competitions
that involve foreign countries.9 Also regarding this
discussion, although US exercises with foreign
partners are referred to as combined maneuvers to
distinguish them from joint exercises that involve
more than one military service, the PLA uses “lianhe”
(联合) to refer to both joint maneuvers with more than
one service and maneuvers with foreign countries—
even if the latter involves only one PLA service. The
PLA uses “中外联合训练” or “中外联合演习” to refer
to foreign training drills and exercises as a result.
All of these various forms of military training
are governed by the 军事训练与考核大纲 (Outline
of military training and evaluation [OMTE]), a highlevel training guidance that sits atop a bevy of other
formal training documents. Formerly issued by the
General Staff Department, the OMTE lays out exercise
topics, conditions, content, standards, evaluation,
times, requirements, and the types of personnel and
units that participate in training exercises.10 Units and
services each have their own OMTEs that lay down
specific exercise and training requirements for their
9. Chu Yongzheng et al., 军事外交学 [Science of military]
(Beijing: National Defense University Press, 2015), 195.
10. Zhan Yu, 部队演习学 [Science of unit exercises], ed.
Yang Baoyou (Beijing: Academy of Military Sciences Press,
2009), 406.
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respective organizations, but all derive their basic
content from the General Staff Department OMTE.
The General Staff Department issued OMTEs in 2002,
2008, and 2018. Even though the exact contents of the
latest OMTE are not publicly available, each one has
stressed different points of emphasis for the PLA’s
training regimen. For instance, reserve unit training is
governed by the 预备役军事训练与考核大纲 (Reserve
Unit Outline of Military Training and Evaluation),
and each PLA service (including the former Second
Artillery Corps) appeared to have its own OMTEs.11
The latest iteration of the OMTE formalizes a
broader effort to learn and absorb successful training
methods from foreign militaries. This effort will rely
11. Sun Jiwei and Qian Xiaohu, “预备役部队：加速转型保
障打赢” [Reserve units: Accelerating transformation to support
victory], 军报记者 [Military correspondent], June 15, 2017,
http://jz.chinamil.com.cn/n2014/tp/content_7639886.htm (site
discontinued); Yin Xinye, Liu Chongchen, and Xu Xianchuan, “
有氧 + 无氧! 1个小时9个课目成为体能训练 “新常态” [Aerobic
and anaerobic: Nine subjects in one hour becomes new normal
for physical training], 军报记者 [Military correspondent], March
16, 2018, http://nb.81.cn/content/2018-03/16/content_7974685.
htm (site discontinued); Zhang Hongwei, “空军将心理训练内
容纳入飞行训练大纲” [Air Force adds psychological training to
aviation training outline], 解放军报 [PLA daily], April 14, 2015,
http://www.81.cn/jmywyl/2015-04/14/content_6441205.htm;
Chen Taofu, Zhang Rong, and Tao Shelan, “第二炮兵某导弹旅
发射一营：砺剑精武的导弹奇兵” [First battalion of a Second
Artillery missile brigade: Sharp and precise ambush troops],
中国新闻网 [China news service], December 23, 2010, http://
www.fxj.hunan.gov.cn/Article/ywkx/201012/1268.html
(site
discontinued); Ding Xiaofeng, Zhu Jinrong, and Wu Dengfeng,
“海军航空大学培养新型军事人才：起飞，向着未来战场” [Naval
Aviation College trains new aviation talent: Taking off toward
future battlegrounds], Xinhua, December 18, 2017, http://
www.81.cn/hj/2017-12/18/content_7871595.htm; and Dennis
Blasko, The Chinese Army Today (New York: Routledge, 2012), 176.
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in large part upon expanded PLA participation in
foreign training activities. Official reports indicate
the 2018 OMTE calls for an “expansion in foreign
training content,” and Central Military Commission
(CMC) Military Training Administration Department
(军委训练管理部) Director Li Huohui (黎火辉) noted in
February 2018 that the new OMTE stresses “absorbing
successful methods from foreign militaries.”12
Huohui also enumerated foreign training, exercises,
and competitions as important sources of advanced
theory and experiences the PLA ought to absorb into
its training.13 Much of this high-level validation is
reflected in scholarly thinking from high-level PLA
academics: some PLA theoreticians have explicitly
noted that foreign training activities are a way to “test
frontline military theory, learn from other countries’
experiences, and raise the warfighting capability of
[Chinese] units.”14 Also, PLA scholars argue that,
among other factors, the intensity of foreign training
exchanges is a critical component of accelerating the
cultivation of joint commanders.15
12. Bi Wenxiu and Li Pengfei, “新军事训练大纲都有暗内
容?” [What content is in the new outline of military training?],
解放军报 [PLA daily], June 15, 2017; and Liang Pengfei et al.,
“军委训练管理部领导就颁发新军事训练大纲有关情况答记者问”
[Head of the CMC Military Training Management Department
answers journalist questions regarding promulgation of
new outline of military training], 解放军报 [PLA daily],
February 1, 2018, http://www.mod.gov.cntopnews/2018-02/01/
content_4803908.htm.
13. Pengfei et al., “Head of the CMC Military Training
Management Department.”
14.

Yongzheng et al., Science of military diplomacy, 196–97.

15. Liu Wei, ed., 战区联合作战指挥 [Theater Joint
Operations Command] (Beijing: National Defense University
Press, 2016), 312.

295

Although the 2018 OMTE is the first high-level
expression of the training value the PLA derived from
foreign training activities, its arrival was preceded
by years of increased PLA participation in foreign
training activities of all kinds. The PLA’s participation
in foreign training activities has ballooned since the
first foreign training activity in 2002 (see table 8-1).16
Many of these exercises were small-scale maneuvers
focusing on anti-terrorism, disaster relief, and
special operations topics.17 In hindsight, the steady
expansion in frequency and types of exercises the PLA
participated in over the years suggests a measured
effort consistent with the PLA’s modus operandi.

16. Kenneth Allen et al., Chinese Military Diplomacy, 2003–
2016: Trends and Implications, China Strategic Perspectives no. 11
(Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, July 17,
2017), 29.
17. Dennis J. Blasko, “People’s Liberation Army and
People’s Armed Police Ground Exercises with Foreign Forces,
2002–2009,” in Roy Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell,
eds., The PLA At Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational
Capabilities of China’s Military (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies
Institute, US Army War College Press, 2010), 377–78.
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Table 8-1. PLA participation in foreign
military exercises

Number of Foreign Military Exercises
1
3
4
6
2
6
2
8
11
8
8
8
27
41
36

45
41
40
36
35

Number of Foreign Military Exercises

02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

30
27
25

20

15
11
10

8
6

5

3

2

1
0

2002

2003

8

8

8

2011

2012

2013

6

4

2004

2005

2006

2

2007

2008

2009

2010

2014

2015

2016

Aside from their training value, PLA academicians
also view foreign training activities as strategically
valuable tools of military diplomacy. Foreign training
can be used to “demonstrate joint military power and
intimidate opponents” as a part of “shaping effective
strategic deterrence” (展示联合军事实力, 震慑对手).18
Foreign training activities can also be used to
strengthen international military exchange and mutual
relations.19 At the strategic level, PLA theoreticians
believe military diplomatic activities (including
foreign training exercises and drills) can be used
to prevent, reduce, create, respond to, or intensify
crisis situations.20
The treatment of foreign training activities as a
military diplomatic matter extends beyond academic
literature into logistics and planning. As they involve
foreign contact, foreign training activities also require
a significant degree of coordination with foreign
18.

Yongzheng et al., Science of military diplomacy, 195.

19.

Yongzheng et al., Science of military diplomacy, 196.

20.

Yongzheng et al., Science of military diplomacy, 132–41.
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counterparts as well as within the highest levels of
the PLA itself. From an external standpoint, the PLA’s
participation in foreign training activities is subject to
the willingness of other nations to participate. From
an internal perspective, PLA participation in foreign
training activities falls to PLA organizations charged
with arranging training and foreign affairs. In the past,
the logistics of arranging foreign training activities
likely fell to two nominally co-equal corps leadergrade organizations: the General Staff Department
Military Training Department (总参谋部军事训练部),
which likely determined the internal details of PLA
participation in foreign training, and the Ministry of
National Defense Foreign Affairs Office (国防部外
事办公室), which coordinated efforts with foreign
participants. This dual chain of responsibility reflected
the PLA’s view of foreign training activities as a matter
of both military diplomacy and military training.
Although foreign training activities have been
characterized as military diplomatic efforts in the past,
the PLA increasingly regards foreign training activities
as realistic war exercises. Articles in PLA media outlets
routinely describe foreign training activities as ways
to increase the realism of PLA training.21 This shift in
emphasis is reflected at least partially in organizational
changes made during the 2015 PLA reforms, which
recast the General Staff Department Military Training
Department as the CMC Training Administration
Department and elevated the new entity to a theater
command deputy leader-grade organization, while
keeping the Ministry of National Defense Foreign
Affairs Office’s successor organization, the CMC
21. Dong Bin and Su Xiao, “实战空军 赛场磨硕战场打赢”
[Realistic combat Air Force: Competition grounds mill victory on
the battlefield], 空军报 [Air Force news], August 11, 2017.
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Office of International Military Cooperation (军委国际
军事合作办公室), as a corps leader-grade entity.22 This
change suggests the PLA’s training requirements may
play a larger role in determining the details of future
foreign training activities.
Other changes in the PLA may explain shifts in
its participation in foreign training activities. As the
dust settles from the 2015 PLA organizational reforms,
the PLA will likely continue to emphasize small-unit
participation in foreign training activities, especially
military competitions that focus more on individual
and small-unit skills and less on more complex and
demanding larger unit maneuvers. Author and PLA
expert Dennis Blasko contends that participation
in these military competitions may protect PLA
servicemembers from disruptions caused by ongoing
organizational reform.
PLA PERSONNEL IN FOREIGN TRAINING
EXERCISES
Despite the steadily increasing emphasis on
foreign training activities described above, the PLA
does not publish detailed information on the role of
foreign training activities in personnel training and
development. As a result, critical details on the role
of foreign training activities in career progression and
training cycles are not readily available. Nevertheless,
PLA writings on military diplomacy and military
exercises suggest the PLA’s selection process for
personnel bound for foreign training exercises,
22. Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Directory of PRC
Military Personalities, March 2015 (Washington, DC: DIA, 2015),
11, 28; and DIA, Directory of PRC Military Personalities, March 2016
(Washington, DC: DIA, 2016), 14, 16.
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command and control during these exercises, and
post-exercise assessment are heavily regulated and
controlled by the political work elements of the PLA.
The party committees and party branches (党支部)
of PLA units are the ultimate loci of authority for all
phases of a foreign training exercise that pertain to
personnel, including personnel selection, instruction,
command and control, and after-action assessments
and dissemination of knowledge.
Pre-Exercise Personnel Selection and Instruction
The PLA personnel who aspire to participate
in foreign training exercises are subject to multiple
selection and evaluations processes that appear to
be governed by broader overarching criteria but are
ultimately subject to approval by their respective
units. Although details on the selection and evaluation
process are difficult to obtain from publicly available
sources, PLA academic texts and handbooks reveal
general themes for personnel selection, and PLA
newspapers and official media detail some of the
practices used to select personnel for participation in
foreign training exercises.
Personnel Selection
The PLA selects its most well-rounded and
politically loyal personnel for foreign duty, including
foreign training exercises. One PLA academic text
lists five categories of ideal attributes for personnel
carrying out military diplomacy, including foreign
training exercises. Political attributes include a high
awareness of policy, political positions consistent with
the party line, and values of dialectical materialism;
military attributes call for a strong background in
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military theory, mastery of informatized warfare, and
joint warfare consciousness; administrative qualities
include knowledge of foreign languages and etiquette
as well as strong organizational and planning skills;
and cultural and physical qualities emphasize a wellrounded education and physical fitness.23
Sample PLA forms suggest that personnel applying
for any sort of foreign duty must obtain approval
from the party committee or political department of
a corps-level military organization or higher.24 The
因公出国（境）人员审查批件 (Foreign duty personnel
examination form) issued by the Cadre Department
of the former General Political Department
(总政治部干部部) asks for details on the applicant’s
political reliability and personal and work history, as
well as those of their family and romantic partners,
including:
• conditions of accession to the military;
• date of accession to Communist Party of China;
• foreign language proficiency;
• economic class of family pre- and post-1949;
• romantic partner’s name, age, education level,
birthplace, political leanings, current work and
status, and any domestic problems or issues;
• pre- and post-1949 résumé and whereabouts;
• party work history, including any service in any
level of party committee;
• any rewards or punishments outside or inside
the party, pre- or post-1949; and
• detailed political history of the applicant and
the applicant’s family including any arrests,
23.

Yongzheng et al., Science of military diplomacy, 264–73.

24. Yang Qi, 军事干部工作手册 [Military cadre work
handbook], ed. Su Shubo, Lin Cheng, and Yu Zhiyong (Beijing:
National Defense University Press, 2011), 110, 396.
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withdrawal from the party, or hidden political
affiliations.25
In practice, the operational conditions for personnel
selection appear to be up to the various PLA services
and units that contribute personnel to foreign training
activities. For instance, one regiment at a PLA Air
Force (PLAAF) flight training base supplied four pilots
for the Aviadarts 2017 military competition through
an unspecified selection process (考核选拔). Some
of these pilots had comparatively little experience,
but the regiment commander overruled their limited
experience and relied upon evaluation of their test
scores instead, sending them to the competition.26 The
PLAAF pilots selected to participate in that military
competition had to be under 35 years of age, the better
to develop future PLAAF aviators.27 Northern Theater
Command (TC) Navy personnel who later received
pre-exercise foreign affairs instruction had undergone
multiple levels of selection, including written tests,
interviews, and recommendations from their units.
The personnel were also evaluated on their overall
qualities and foreign language skills.28
Some of the personnel sent to participate in foreign
training activities have had extensive domestic training
experience, although the exact amount of domestic
training experience required for participation in foreign
training is unknown. Exercise directors frequently
25.

Yang Qi, Military cadre work handbook, 390–96.

26.

Dong and Su, “Realistic Combat Air Force.”

27.

Dong and Su, “Realistic Combat Air Force.”

28. Zhang Xinguang and Lai Yonglei, “北部战区海军组织
外事骨干培训” [Northern Theater Command Navy organizes
external affairs backbone training], 人民海军 [People’s Navy],
April 2, 2018.
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have extensive domestic exercise experience; for
instance, the director of the PLA contingent for
Peace Mission 2018 (和平使命-2018), Army Senior
Colonel Ma Qixian (马启贤), was previously head of
the Operational Training Division (作训处长) for the
42nd Group Army and had participated in domestic
cross-regional exercise Mission Action 2013B (使命行
动-2013B) as a division leader.29
Past experience in foreign training activities is also
a factor in the selection of PLA personnel for foreign
training activities, although some PLA services are
attempting to reduce the number of repeat participants
in these maneuvers. For instance, Air Force brigade
chief of staff and special aviator Wang Xiaojun
(王小军) participated in both the 2016 Aviadarts
competition in Russia and the 2017 China-Pakistan
exercises, and company commander Mao Xiaolong
(毛小龙) of the PLAAF airborne forces participated
in Peace Mission 2014 and underwent a selection
process in 2016 to lead PLAAF forces in an unspecified

29. Luo Shunyu and Pan Kai, “和平使命-2018’ 联合反恐
实兵实弹演习举行” [Peace Mission-2018 joint anti-terrorism
live fire exercise begins], 国防部网 [Ministry of Defense online],
August 30, 2018, http://www.mod.gov.cn/power/2018-08/30/
content_4823603.htm; Yue Huairang, “马启贤任西部战区联参
部参谋长助理，曾率部27小时千里奔袭” [Ma Qixian becomes
Western Theater Command Joint Staff Department assistant
to the chief of staff], Paper, August 25, 2018, https://www
.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_2380374; and Li Huamin and
Shi Binxin, “战场随时会变脸—’使命行动-2013B’ 跨区机动战役演
习见闻” [The battlefield can always change—Sights and sounds
from Mission Action 2013B Cross-Regional Movement Exercise],
Xinhua, October 18, 2013, http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2013-10/17
/content_2509499.htm.
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foreign training exercise.30 The 2018 International
Military Games (国际军事比赛-2018), however, saw
a number of PLA firsts: the PLA ground forces ruled
for the first time that no single unit may participate in
consecutive competitions in a row, and the proportion
of new personnel participating must be no less than
60 percent. The PLAAF airborne forces participating
in the games were selected according to a three-to-one
ratio of new soldiers to experienced ones.31
Participation in foreign training exercises and
drills is no longer necessarily restricted to activeduty, operational forces. Peace Mission 2014 marked
the first time a reserve unit participated in a foreign
training exercise.32 The unit was a fendui from
the All-Military Reserve Electromagnetic Spectrum
Management Center (全军预备役电磁频谱管理中心).
The 2018 International Military Games marked the
first time PLA military educational institutions sent
independent detachments to a foreign training exercise.
Personnel from the Army Armored Forces College
Noncommissioned Officer School (陆军装甲兵学院士
官学校) participated in a maintenance competition,
30. Wang Xiaofei, ed., “苦练精飞不负重托” [Hard training
and energetic flying deserve great trust], 空军报 [Air Force
news], November 7, 2017; and Fang Chao et al., “带头吹向 “冲
锋号” [The lead charges toward the bugle call], 空军报 [Air Force
news], May 4, 2018.
31. Liu Jimei and Li Yun, “‘国际军事比赛-2018’
中
的5个首次” [Five “firsts” in the 2018 International Military
Games], Xinhua, July 29, 2018, http://www.mod.gov.cn
/diplomacy/2018-07/29/content_4821072.htm.
32. Liu
Wanping,
“军地人才携手提升军事创新能力”
[Military and local human capital join hands to raise military
innovation capability], 解放军报 [PLA daily], September 5,
2014,
http://military.people.com.cn/n/2014/0905/c17246725607178.html.
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and a detachment from the Army Engineering College
Ordnance Noncommissioned Officer School (陆军
工程大学军械士官学校) participated in an ordnance
competition. All personnel participating in the
games were cadets headed for duty at various Army
units, and their trainers were instructors from their
respective schools.33
Pre-Exercise Instruction
Once selected for participation in a foreign
training exercise, PLA personnel undergo additional
preparation well before an actual exercise begins.
This instruction focuses on a variety of service- and
situation-specific topics and generally includes
briefings from intelligence experts, situational
simulations, additional foreign language training, and
reviews of PLA regulations and practices. For instance,
in March 2018, the Northern TC Navy organized a fiveday external affairs training session for 50 operational
unit staff members from Qingdao and Lushun. The
training focused on military external work (军队涉
外工作) and covered international relations, AsiaPacific maritime security trends, rules, and regulations
for external-facing military movements, media
communications and responses, escort command and
command of noncombatant evacuation operations for
overseas Chinese, military external affairs protocol
and etiquette, verbal military commands, cultural
differences between Chinese and foreign militaries,
and selected practical translations. The students
also simulated deck receptions, reporter receptions,

33.

Liu and Li, “Five ‘Firsts.’”
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warship tours, and driving away unidentified foreign
surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft.34
Although some of the topics addressed by
additional pre-exercise instruction are common across
the PLA, other topics vary by theater command and
service. In October 2016, the General Office of the
Southern TC Army Staff Department (南部战区陆军
参谋部办公室) reported that 30 students had been
listed in an external military affairs human resources
database (涉外军事人才库) after successfully passing
an external military affairs course. The course had been
set up specifically to address problems encountered
by Southern TC Army personnel engaged in foreign
training exercises with foreign military personnel
and contained material ranging from foreign
military small-unit tactics and theory to the overall
international security situation. Course students used
foreign languages to communicate with simulated
foreign troops during a simulated foreign drill.35
Some PLA personnel selected for foreign training
exercises spend extra time preparing for their
duties by working on their foreign language skills,
occasionally with the support of PLA instructors.
Before participating in Aviadarts 2017, one PLAAF
officer spent extra time studying English with an
emphasis on applicable phrases and terms to better
understand foreign flight training methods.36 The PLA
tacitly recognizes that English is the lingua franca for
foreign training exercises: PLAAF flight instructors
34.

Zhang and Lai, “Northern Theater Command Navy.”

35. Xu Yang and Peng Tian, “外事通 走向国际联训一线”
[Foreign affairs experts march toward international training
frontlines], 人民陆军 [People’s Army], November 19, 2016.
36.

Lu, “Perfecting learning.”
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have explicitly continued to render technical terms
in English without Chinese abbreviations partially to
better prepare PLAAF pilots for future participation in
foreign training exercises.37
Some pre-exercise preparation takes place in the
form of on-the-job instruction that continues en route
to the exercise location. In January 2017, the temporary
party branch (临时党支部) of the command post
(指挥所) of the 24th PLA Navy escort task force led
an education session on external affairs discipline.
The session included both combined and small-group
instruction on an external affairs document called
External Affairs Reference Materials (外事参考资料),
and personnel were briefed on the Ten Forbidden
Actions (十不准) for secrecy protection.38
Regardless of service- or unit-specific preparation,
all PLA personnel participating in foreign training
exercises are subject to political work regulations that
govern their behavior. For instance, regulation 61 of
the PLA Internal Affairs Regulations (中国人民解放军
内务条令) requires all PLA personnel on foreign duty
must respect international etiquette and regulations.39
Other regulations pertain to operational security: PLA
participants in foreign training exercises are forbidden
37. Long Bin and Chen Zhijin, “术语之变, 折射训练模式之
新” [Changes in technical language reflect new training methods],
空军报 [Air Force news], June 20, 2018.
38. Guo Can and Zhang Tengfei, “开展 ‘守纪律, 树形
象, 保安全’ 教育” [Developing “adhere to discipline, establish
forms, protect safety” education], 人民海军 [People’s Navy],
January 9, 2017.
39. Wang Jun, ed., “中国人民解放军内务条令（试行”
[PLA Internal Affairs Regulations (Provisional)], 解放军报 [PLA
daily], April 17, 2018, http://www.81.cn/jmywyl/2018-04/17
/content_8006090.htm.
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from independently visiting foreign military
bivouacs or installations, inviting foreign personnel
for unauthorized visits to PLA installations, holding
celebratory events, or otherwise privately establishing
relations with foreign military personnel.40
Command and Control of Foreign Training
Exercises
Command and control during foreign exercises
is executed by EDDs charged with setting exercise
parameters, executing the exercise, and evaluating
end results.41 These ad hoc command organizations
are usually led by staff officers responsible for training
at their regular units and manned by augmentees
from military educational institutions and logistics
and support personnel.42 The EDD resembles a deus
ex machina, able to determine the success or failure of
participating units thanks to its control over exercise
parameters and its role as the command element
(指挥部), regulation and control platform, and
exercise leader.43
As an ad hoc PLA leadership structure, the EDD
is required to establish a temporary party committee
(临时党委) or branch (党支部) to maintain party

40. 总政治部干部部 [Cadre Department of The General
Political Department], ed., 中国人民解放军军官手册 [PLA
officers’ handbook] (Beijing: Academy of Military Sciences Press,
2012), 60.
41. Zhan Yu, 部队演习学 [Science of unit exercises], ed.
Yang Baoyou (Beijing: Academy of Military Sciences Press, 2009),
112–13, 184–85.
42.

Zhan, Science of unit exercises, 191–94.

43.

Zhan, Science of unit exercises, 112–14.
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control over an exercise.44 Party committees refer
to party organizations in regiment-grade units and
above, and party branches refer to party organizations
in company-grade units. Much like any other
PLA organization, an EDD’s party organization is
comprised of key command personnel. The party
secretary and deputy party secretary are appointed
by a superordinate party organization, and the
committee itself is comprised of the EDD’s leadership
(likely the exercise director and deputy directors) and
subordinates one grade below (likely the personnel
responsible for each of the EDD’s various functional
groups). An EDD party committee may establish
subordinate party branches with approval from above,
and typically does not establish a standing committee
except under special circumstances.45
The most important elements of exercise decision
making are undertaken by EDD personnel in their
collective capacity as the EDD’s party committee. All
critical decisions must abide by the party concept of
democratic centralism (民主集中制), which emphasizes
collective leadership through collective deliberation
(集体讨论). In turn, collective deliberation requires that
the “collective knowledge, scientific policy-making,
and expeditious resolve of the Party committee be
given full play.”46 An EDD commander may handle a
matter independently, as is the case with commanders
in participating units, but must report their action to
the party committee after the fact.47
44. Management Committee, People’s Liberation Army
military terminology, 453, 458.
45.

Zhan, Science of unit exercises, 389–90.

46.

Zhan, Science of unit exercises, 390.

47.

Zhan, Science of unit exercises, 252, 390.
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From a personnel development standpoint,
the EDD is a proving ground for the PLA’s most
capable training instructors, who likely use
assignments to these organizations to demonstrate
their organizational mettle and command potential.
Orchestrating and coordinating multiple operational
units during military exercises represents the
pinnacle of complex military operations for PLA
commanders, the vast majority of whom have not
seen actual combat. This observation is especially
true for EDDs in foreign training exercises, which
face the additional stress of international scrutiny and
increasingly bear responsibility for both improving
PLA training methods by learning from foreign
counterparts and advancing national interests through
military diplomacy.
Many of the roles, responsibilities, and processes
described above apply to PLA EDD formations in
foreign training exercises. For instance, the Vostok2018 (东方-2018) exercises held in September 2018
featured a joint exercise director department (联合
导演部) picked from personnel from the CMC Joint
Staff Department and the Russian Armed Forces
General Staff Department upon their arrival at the
exercise location. These personnel were responsible
for “organization, command, and support work” for
participating troops, providing “real-time command
adjustments” for participating command organs,
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completing operational planning, and “coordinating
and commanding unit movements.”48
In addition to their regular prescribed duties,
EDDs in foreign training exercises are also apparently
responsible for directing and setting up ad hoc
command elements for subordinate participating
units. For instance, Vostok-2018 featured a four-tier
command structure: a CMC-level EDD (军委导演部),
a theater command joint campaign command
department (联合战役指挥部), a group army-level
campaign command post (集团军战役指挥所), and
command elements at the budui level. The theater
command-level command department was set up
on the order of the Sino-Russian joint EDD.49 Similar
command structures were established for Joint Sea2017 (联合海上-2017), which featured a Sino-Russian
EDD, along with a joint command department
(联合指挥部) and a command post for the surface
tactics group (海上战术群指挥所).50
Personnel reductions from the 2015 organizational
reforms appear to have had a direct impact on the
number of personnel the PLA sends to foreign
48. Fan Yongqiang, “‘东方-2018’
战略演习展开联合战
役指挥演练” [“Vostok-2018” strategic exercise develops joint
campaign command training], 解放军报 [PLA daily], September
13, 2018, http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2018/0913/c101
1-30290982.html; and Cai Pengcheng, “‘东方-2018’ 战略演习
联合战役实兵演练和沙场检阅举行” [“Vostok-2018” strategic
exercise joint campaign troop exercise and sand table review
begin], Xinhua, September 14, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com
/world/2018-09/13/c_1123424599.htm.
49.

Fan Yongqiang, “‘Vostok-2018’ strategic exercise.”

50. Ding Yubao, “‘海上联合-2017’ 下达演习作战任务并
展开图上推演” [“Joint Sea-2017” issues exercise operational
duties and opens map exercise], 人民海军 [People’s Navy],
September 20, 2017.
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training exchanges. One report indicated that in
2015, the PLAAF sent more than 100 personnel from
the military region air force, division, regiment, and
the air station (场站) levels to form the command
structure (指挥机构) for the Shaheen V China-Pakistan
drill. For the 2017 iteration (Shaheen VI), however, the
participating air force base and subordinate air force
brigade sent just under 50 personnel from the division
level (处) of the base and brigade command organs to
form a joint exercise office (联训办公室).51
The PLA officers selected to serve as exercise
directors for foreign training exercises are frequently
of varying grade and billet, which hints at a hierarchy
for these maneuvers (see table 8-2). Exercise directors
are designated by the exercise’s organizing authority:
exercises directly organized by the former General
Departments are directed by either the head of the
General Department or a designated staffer; exercises
organized by the General Departments and former
military regions or services are directed by military
region or service heads of training or department
heads; and exercises organized by corps-level units
are directed by corps-level heads of training or
department heads.52 Although these assignments
may be determined by exercise size or complexity,
some of these exercise directors may also be assigned
for reasons of strategic significance, assuming this
assignment system for exercise directors is still valid
after the 2015 PLA reforms.

51. Yang Songsong et al., “联训为石，磨利胜战之刃” [Joint
drill as grindstone, sharpening the sword of victory], 空军报 [Air
Force news], October 12, 2017.
52.

Zhan, Science of unit exercises, 189–90.
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Table 8-2. Exercise directors for selected recent
foreign training exercises
Name

Grade

Corps
Ma Qixian
DLDR
(马启贤) [1]
(Probable)

Rank

SCOL

Tian Zhong
TC DLDR VADM
(田中)[2]
Shao
Yuanming TC LDR
(邵元明)[3]

LGEN

Billet

Service or
Branch

Assistant to
Chief of Staff,
Army
Western TC
JSD
Deputy
Commander, Navy
PLAN
Deputy Chief Former
of Staff, CMC Second
JSD
Artillery

Probable
Exercise Organizing
Authority
Peace
Mission
2018

Western TC

Joint Sea
PLAN
2017
Vostok
2018

CMC JSD

The PLA EDDs increasingly coordinate exercise
plans in detail with foreign counterparts, especially
Pakistan and Russia, although the degree of combined
interaction varies. For example, PLAAF personnel
at Shaheen VI consulted with their Pakistani
counterparts in planning and selection of training
subjects (课目).53 All three ad hoc command elements
set up for Joint Sea-2017 were reportedly staffed with
both Chinese and Russian personnel, with substantive
duty exchanges at each command element. The SinoRussian EDD organized operational duty shift changes
(作战交班) and established an operational duty system
(作战值班制度) at the joint command department
to command forces, process information on
real-time exercise progress and air-sea intelligence,
and help Chinese and Russian officers plan
operational decisions.54
53.

Yang Songsong et al., “Joint drill as grindstone.”

54.

Ding, “‘Joint Sea-2017.’”
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Learning the Right Lessons: Assessment, Summary,
and Dissemination of Knowledge
Once a foreign training exercise concludes,
participating personnel are responsible for conducting
and participating in a post-exercise review process.
This review process is typically grouped into
assessment (评估) and summary (总结) phases, and
ultimately leads to the dissemination of knowledge
both inside and outside participating units. Postexercise assessment involves the collection and
organization of exercise performance data and is
typically carried out by the EDD and its supporting
information collection groups.55 Assessment data is
to be collected at the end of every drill, although the
data may be collected at the end of the exercise if
information collection personnel are widely dispersed
during the maneuvers.56 For domestic exercises,
assessment data is sorted based on drill problem,
operational capability, and unit maneuver and entered
into a unit exercise assessment system (部队演习评估
系统) that calculates scores for participating units.57
Data-driven assessment is meant to inform a postexercise summary and appraisal (总结讲评). After an
exercise is complete, the EDD party committee and
the party committees of the various participating
units hold party committee meetings (党委会) at their
respective command posts to arrange summary and
appraisal sessions. The exercise director and EDD
personnel collect information and materials as the unit
55. Ning, “Organization and execution of unit assessment”;
and Zhan, Science of unit exercises, 273.
56.

Zhan, Science of unit exercises, 285.

57.

Zhan Yu, Science of unit exercises, 287.
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leaves the exercise area and hold appraisal sessions
within the EDD, while commanders of participating
units hold their own summary and appraisal sessions.
For domestic exercises, the results of these sessions
are ultimately consolidated into a report that is
transmitted to the relevant superordinate units within
15 days of the summary and appraisal sessions. These
reports contain a brief account of the drill or exercise,
the overall progression of the training activity,
problems that emerged and the causes thereof, and
attachments of relevant assessment data.58
Generally speaking, there is almost no detailed
mention of the assessment phase in recent media,
which raises questions about what or if assessment
is carried out during and immediately after foreign
training exercises. For instance, reports from the 2017
Shaheen VI exercise remarked on an after-action
assessment phase but did not make clear whether or
not the assessment relied upon data gathered during
maneuvers. Another report noted the realistic war
requirements used for the Aviadarts 2017 military
competition would be incorporated into assessment
standards in the future, but did not specify if any
data-driven assessment took place to motivate such
future action.59
Summaries of foreign exercise performance,
however, are comparatively commonplace. Party
committees of units participating in foreign training
exercises take the lead in summarizing lessons learned
from foreign militaries. For instance, in August 2017,
58.

Zhan Yu, Science of unit exercises, 393–94.

59. Chen Quanmin, ed., 信息化条件下部队训练中政治
工作 [Political work during unit training under informatized
conditions] (Beijing: Academy of Military Sciences Press, 2010),
262–63, 267.
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the party committee of a combined arms brigade
from the 83rd Group Army began summarizing
training theory and practices immediately after the
brigade returned to base from its participation in the
2017 International Military Games, with the intent of
learning from foreign militaries to help advance PLA
training and equipment modernization. The resulting
after-action summary identified 38 concrete problems
encountered during the exercise.60
In some instances, PLA exercise participants hold
post-exercise assessments and summaries with foreign
partners. For Joint-Sea 2017, Russian and Chinese
personnel held an exercise summary and appraisal on
the final day of the exercise.61 Chinese and Pakistani
personnel participating in the 2017 Shaheen VI
exercise carried out a research-style air warfare results
assessment with their Pakistani counterparts after the
completion of the air-to-ground phase, in which one
PLA pilot claimed to have learned from his Pakistani
counterpart “a great deal of information that could not
be found in books.”62
Spreading the Wealth: Circulating Lessons Learned
Dissemination of knowledge and experience
gained during foreign training exercises appears to
60.

Dong and Su, “Realistic combat Air Force.”

61. Wang Zhen and Xu Shuitao, “国际赛场的 ‘得’ 与 ‘思’”
[Thoughts and gains at international competition grounds], 人民
陆军 [People’s Army], September 27, 2017.
62. Zhang Gang and Ding Yubao, “风云际会又一年—写
在中俄 ‘海上联合—2017’ 第二阶段演习结束之际” [Running into
clouds and wind for another year—Writings from the ending of
the second phase of the Sino-Russian Joint Sea-2017 exercise], 人
民海军 [People’s Navy], September 27, 2017.
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be arranged on an informal basis. Seminars, briefings,
and group instruction are common methods for
returned personnel to circulate lessons learned
within the broader PLA. Many of these efforts are
apparently undertaken at an individual level by
returned personnel.
Personnel returning from foreign training exercises
are sometimes asked to brief other personnel on their
experiences as a way to improve PLA self-study
(自主学习). In October 2017, aviators who participated
in China-Pakistan exercises were invited to a Southern
TC Air Force study session on a 2017 Air Force party
committee personnel document titled the 关于聚焦实
战、瞄准一流，建设高素质新型飞行人员队伍的意见
(Opinion on focusing on realistic warfare, aiming
toward building first-rate, high-quality aviator
personnel). The aviators then briefed members of a
Southern TC Air Force brigade on foreign military selfstudy theory and methods.63 More specific topics are
also addressed in seminars held within units that have
returned from foreign training activities: one October
2017 seminar in a Western TC Air Force brigade
reviewed aspects of the China-Pakistan Shaheen
VI drill, including mission planning, equipment
support, safety management, training research, and
technical support.64
Other methods for distributing knowledge within
the broader PLA appear to be undertaken individually
in smaller units, apparently with varying degrees
63. In Chinese, the “research-style air warfare results
assessment” is rendered as “研究式”空战效果评估.” See Yang
Songsong et al., “Joint drill as grindstone.”
64. Li Yixuan, Wei Jinxin, and Nong Yu, “自我驱动” 助力换
羽高飞” [“Self-drive” aids high flight], 空军报 [Air Force news],
November 7, 2017.
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of success. One infantry fighting vehicle company
commander in the PLAAF airborne forces noted
from foreign training experience that foreign forces
strongly emphasized various forms of night training.
The commander compiled his knowledge and led his
entire company in subject-based night training upon
his return to China. Initially his company struggled
with the training, until the commander expended
further effort to compile his knowledge in accordance
with the Four Ables (四会) into a Five-Step Training
Method (五步训练法), which eventually led to better
nighttime driving results. The Four Ables are the
ability to explain (会讲), ability to do (会做), ability
to teach (会教), and ability to conduct thought work
(会做思想工作). The Four Ables are frequently
cited as critical skills for PLA training instructors
and commanders.65
In some cases, the lessons and experiences of PLA
personnel who have participated in foreign training
activities are compiled into materials for broader
distribution within the PLA. In one instance, PLA
Army soldiers from a battalion reconnaissance platoon
of an unidentified brigade of the 41st Group Army
demonstrated some of the survival skills they learned
during the Kowari 2015 exercise conducted with the
United States and Australia during a post-exercise
review. The returned soldiers also participated in
a party committee meeting on training, where they
voiced their opinions and led several small groups
to facilitate learning. These soldiers later published a
practical training manual entitled 野战生存觅食20 法
(Twenty methods for field combat survival and
foraging) that was likely further disseminated among
65.

Yang et al., “Joint drill as grindstone.”
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the ranks.66 Kowari-2016 participants reportedly went
on inspection tours throughout China to supplement
existing survival learning materials with updated
information on weather and environment gleaned
from the following year’s iteration of the exercise.67
Although many of these post-exercise review
activities are apparently arranged ad hoc, some
indicators suggest parts of the PLA are routinizing
and expanding efforts to circulate knowledge obtained
from foreign training activities. In August 2018, a
PLA Navy Marine brigade held a group training
(群众性练兵) on special operations tactics that
featured instructors with experience in overseas
study, escort task force duty, and foreign training
exercises. These instructors passed on their knowledge
to 100-man teams selected from each company in the
brigade, each member of which then returned to their
respective companies to instruct their platoon and
squad noncommissioned officers as head instructors
(兵教头). These platoon and squad noncommissioned
officers then taught these special operations skills to
the rest of their enlisted men.68
66. Chen Dianhong and Li Yuanjun, “第 41 集团军某旅
参加中外联训官兵当上 “武教头” [Officers and soldiers from a
certain brigade of the 41st Group Army who attended foreign
training become head instructors], 解放军报 [PLA daily],
November 22, 2015, http://www.81.cn/jwgz/2015-11/22
/content_6779645.htm.
67. Wang Zhigang, Zhou Yusong, and Yao Jinjie, “走出国门,
在竞争与协作中获取成长” [Gaining maturity amid competition
and coordination upon leaving the country], 人民陆军 [People’s
Army], October 14, 2017.
68. Di Siyu and Cao Kexuan, “特战技能共享 训练成果固化”
[Sharing special warfare capability, solidifying training results],
解放军报 [PLA daily], August 10, 2018, http://military.people
.com.cn/n1/2018/0810/c1011-30220877.html.
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CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
Research into how the PLA conducts exercises
and specific reports on personnel engaged in foreign
training activities yields a number of preliminary
analytical conclusions about the role of these activities
in PLA personnel development.
First, the PLA appears likely to expand its
program of foreign training exercises, affording more
opportunities for first-time participants and expanding
the reach of lessons learned by PLA personnel. The
PLA has strong incentive to increase its participation
in these types of exercises: Foreign training exercises
represent one of the highest forms of practical military
learning for PLA personnel short of service in an
actual conflict, and they provide ample opportunity
for PLA personnel to test their command, control,
and coordination skills under stressful conditions
like close foreign scrutiny. The steady rise in PLA
foreign training exercises is likely a result of gradual
experimentation with foreign training, and high-level
directives like the 2018 OMTE that emphasize more
foreign training content virtually assure increased
participation, assuming continued willingness from
foreign counterparts. The PLA will continue to
increase the frequency and scope of its participation
in foreign training activities, albeit at a pace that
favors gradual expansion of topics and exposure for
its personnel over a sudden infusion of money and
rapidly expanded scope of topics.69
Second, the PLA places a particularly strong
emphasis on party control of foreign training
activities, especially given its view of them as tools
69.

Chen, Principles of military training, 202.
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of military diplomacy as well as high-level training.
Party control is manifested throughout the course of
a foreign training exercise, from personnel selection
controlled by party committees at corps-grade military
units and above, to command and coordination of a
given exercise through temporary party committees
established within exercise direction elements, to
post-exercise review through party committee-led
seminars, briefings, and other training activities.
Third, the command and control tasks required
of exercise direction personnel during exercises
place an enormous premium on organizational skills,
and the prodigious amount of administrative and
procedural work behind the orchestration of exercises
is apparently accomplished primarily by members
of PLA staff departments and augmentees from
military academic institutions. Some PLA academics
consider this arrangement problematic: In 2016, PLA
theoreticians argued that past cultivation of joint
operations commanders focused more on cultivating
staff personnel (参谋人员) rather than commanders
(指挥员), resulting in situations where commanders
were unable to command forces when separated from
their staff. During training, commanders frequently
relied too heavily upon staff members’ suggestions,
adjusted orders based upon pre-submitted staff
paperwork, and frequently drew conclusions using
already-prepared contingency options.70 These
deficiencies and others are among those identified in
the Five Cannots (五个不会), a set of command and
leadership deficiencies that realistic exercises are
partially meant to remediate.
70. Liu Wei, ed., 战区联合作战指挥 [Theater Joint
Operations Command] (Beijing: National Defense University
Press, 2016), 309.
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The implications of these initial conclusions
are potentially far-reaching and extend beyond
personnel development. Expansion of foreign training
exercises will call for a commensurate expansion in
the bureaucratic and organizational infrastructure
supporting them, and experiences derived from
foreign training exercises writ large may drive
more profound changes in PLA command and
exercise simulation.
Any sizable uptick in PLA foreign training activities
would put greater strain on the bureaucracy that
governs personnel participation and the integration of
lessons learned into the rest of the PLA. As more and
more personnel attend foreign training exercises, the
vetting system run by the PLA’s political work organs
will be expected to keep pace, on top of any lingering
adjustments to the 2015 organizational shake-up that
remain. The ability of the PLA’s political work system
to select and vet the appropriate number of personnel
remains an important but understudied determinant
of the PLA’s foreign training aspirations.
At the opposite end of foreign training exercises, the
PLA appears poised to implement training methods
that will greatly extend its ability to disseminate
lessons learned from foreign training exercises to the
rest of the force. Chief among the advanced methods
being implemented as part of the new-type military
talent cultivation system (三位一体新型军事人才培养
体系) advocated by Xi Jinping are online courses and
a cloud platform linked to the National University of
Defense Technology capable of supporting 300,000

322

online users.71 These resources will likely fuse with
other relevant network resources available at
the National University of Defense Technology,
including the Military Training Information Network
(军事训练信息网), which provides training-related
information resources to operational units and PLA
military academies.72
An increased tempo of foreign training exercises
may also challenge the command culture inherent
to the PLA’s identity as the armed wing of the
Communist Party of China. Although the collective
decision-making embodied by party committees
provides a lower-stakes command environment for
officers who might otherwise be reluctant to undertake
sole command responsibility, the PLA will continue to
stress quicker decision-making in anticipation of the
“compressed command cycle, simplified command
procedure, and increased command speed” that
characterize joint command in informatized local

71. Yu Qifeng, “破解 ‘五个不会’ 难题要从源头入手”
[Breaking the “Five Cannots” must start from the source], 解放
军报 [PLA daily], October 13, 2015, http://www.81.cn/jfjbmap
/content/2015-10/13/content_125880.htm.
72. Li Xiaoliang et al., “与时代同步 向一流迈进” [Surge
forward toward first-rate with the times], 军报记者 [Military
correspondent], December 22, 2017, http://jz.chinamil.com.cn
/n2014/tp/content_7880351.htm (site discontinued); and Zhao
Yanyan, ed., “做数字时代自主可控的先行者” [UCloud is digital
age independent, reliable forerunner], 国际在线 [International
online],
May
25,
2018,
http://it.gmw.cn/2018-05/25
/content_28962544.htm.
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war.73 Nevertheless, the PLA will face increasing
difficulty when attempting to complete its command
decision-making loop during exercises given the
overabundance of command responsibilities of EDD
personnel, a shift away from perceived overreliance
on staff officers, and the aftereffects of the 2015
personnel reduction. The convergence of these issues
may accelerate the adoption of technological decision
aids to help speed up command decision-making and
ease the administrative and cognitive workload on
PLA commanders.
One of the immediate implications of this
embrace of technology to aid decision-making is a
reinvigorated attempt to collect and use data from
training exercises, including foreign training exercises.
The demand for this data is already clear: the PLA’s
exercise assessments are nominally data-driven,
but past assessments have been described as overly
“manpower-reliant, informal, and unconvincing,” and
past exercise summaries have suffered from a lack of
objective, accurate data.74
If the PLA can collect and effectively use even
a fraction of the exercise performance data on its
systems and personnel that its textbooks call for, it
will be sitting atop a trove of information that could
make its war games and combat simulations much
more realistic. Some PLA theorists recognize that
73. “国防科学技术大学” [National University of Defense
Technology], 中国军网 [China military online], July 9, 2007,
http://www.mod.gov.cn/service/2007-07/09/content_4085889.
htm; and Management Committee, People’s Liberation Army
military terminology, 320.
74. Zhang Peigao, “论军队指挥改革” [On military
command revolution], 中国军事科学 [China military science] no.
1 (2016): 107.
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war games struggle to simulate human behavior
realistically, frequently failing to replicate realistic
opponents, translate broader concepts to more detailed
ones, or mimic actual force movements according to
actual human behavior, among others. These same
theorists regard the use of war-gaming systems as a
vehicle to research and develop smarter opposition
forces as a critical means of “breaking through the
‘intelligentized’ information systems bottleneck”
(突破信息系统智能瓶颈).75 Performance data collected
on PLA systems and personnel during foreign
training exercises could provide a baseline to help the
PLA objectively benchmark its forces against those of
other powers. This use of data could be particularly
applicable to foreign military competitions, which
explicitly pit PLA systems and personnel against those
of other countries under controlled conditions.
Foreign training exercises and drills will remain
an important means by which the PLA prepares
its personnel to fight and win the next war. In the
immediate term, these foreign training activities
provide unparalleled opportunities for PLA personnel
to test their military proficiency under high-stress
conditions without having to engage in actual combat.
In the longer term, PLA participation in foreign
training exercises may validate previously identified
problems in command responsibilities and drive
more profound change in how the PLA commands
its forces and trains its personnel through simulation
and modeling. Whether the PLA can actualize these
applications and more fully use the training and

75. Ning Yingqiu, “Organization and execution of unit
assessment.”
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personnel development value of these foreign training
exercises, however, remains to be seen.
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9. CHINA’S HUMAN CAPITAL ECOSYSTEM FOR
NETWORK WARFARE
Joe McReynolds and LeighAnn Luce
In recent years, the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) has carried out an ambitious reform agenda
across nearly every sector of its armed forces and
defense industry. The overarching aim of these
reforms is to build a force capable of winning
“informatized” wars through kinetic and information
operations supported by a modernized command,
control, communications, computers, intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance infrastructure. In late
2015, these reforms culminated in the creation of the
PLA Strategic Support Force (解放军战略支援部队)
(SSF) as a new information warfare force operating
independently of the PLA’s traditional services.
Examining the human capital ecosystem that
underlies the PLA’s development, acquisition, and
operational deployment of network weapons offers an
opportunity to better understand China’s information
warfare capabilities. The unique characteristics of
the information battlespace have arguably made the
human dimension more central to understanding
China’s development of network warfare capabilities
than is the case with the traditional land, air, sea, and
nuclear domains.
As of 2019, however, the personnel ecosystem
for information warfare operations is in a state of
greater flux than any other segment of the PLA. The
creation of the SSF was only the start of a long series of
organizational reforms. China’s elevation of militarycivil fusion (军民融合) (MCF) to the level of a national
strategy has led to the launch of new systematic
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initiatives which have broadened the SSF’s access
to civilian talent pools. The PLA is embarking on a
major push into civilian recruitment for both civilian
cadre and direct-recruit noncommissioned officer
(NCO) positions. Finally, the military’s technical
academic institutions that have historically focused
on network and electronic warfare research have been
completely reorganized. In short, the Chinese military
is embarking on a massive reordering of its human
capital ecosystem for information warfare.
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the PLA has carried out an
ambitious reform agenda across nearly every sector of
its armed forces and defense industry. The overarching
aim of these reforms is to build a force capable of
winning informatized wars through kinetic and
information operations supported by a modernized
command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence,
surveillance,
and
reconnaissance
infrastructure. In late 2015, these reforms culminated
in the creation of the SSF as a new information warfare
force operating independently of the PLA’s traditional
services, signaling that the question of how to achieve
superiority in the information domain—and, in
particular, the network domain—has become central
to the PLA’s strategic thinking and organizational
planning. Beyond the context of direct warfighting,
network attack and defense tools are being deployed
by both the PLA and China’s intelligence services for a
broad and sustained campaign of industrial espionage,
intelligence collection, influence operations, and
battlespace preparation.
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Despite network warfare’s centrality to the
PLA’s warfighting, doctrinal development, and
force planning, relatively little is known about the
development of network weapons such as zeroday exploits and supply chain penetration vectors,
including the people who create them. This lack of
knowledge is partially a reflection of the lack of opensource information available to analysts regarding the
development of network weapons when compared
with conventional weapons platforms, such as fighter
aircraft or naval platforms. But network weapons have
the potential to be every bit as decisive in a conflict
as conventional arms; in the words of one Chinese
defense industry scholar, they are “the sharp swords
of information warfare.”1
Examining the human capital ecosystem that
underlies the PLA’s development, acquisition, and
operational deployment of network weapons offers an
opportunity to better understand China’s information
warfare capabilities. The unique characteristics of
the information battlespace (including the network
domain, the electromagnetic domain, and the
psychological domain) have arguably made the
human dimension more central to understanding
China’s development of network warfare capabilities
than is the case with the traditional land, air, sea, and
nuclear domains. And due to the strong overlap in
skills and education between the network weapons
industry and the civilian information security
industry, the PLA’s recruiting of network weapons
personnel is more transparent to outside observers
than the PLA’s recruitment of other types of personnel.
1. Chen Yongsheng, 军事高技术与信息化武器装备 [Military
advanced technology and informatized weapons] (Beijing:
National Defense Industry Press, 2009), 373.
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If network weapons are in fact the “sharp swords” of
information warfare, much can be learned from
studying the bladesmiths.
As of 2019, however, the personnel ecosystem for
information warfare operations is in a state of greater
flux than that of any other segment of the PLA. The
creation of the SSF nearly four years ago was only the
start of a long series of organizational reforms, and
several key research institutes (RIs) were temporarily
housed under the SSF before being moved elsewhere.
China’s elevation of MCF to the level of a national
strategy has led to the launch of new systematic
initiatives that have broadened the avenues through
which the SSF can tap into civilian talent pools. The
PLA’s major push into civilian recruitment for both
civilian cadre and direct-recruit NCO positions has
also seen the phasing out of older approaches, such as
the National Defense Student program. The military’s
technical academic institutions that have historically
focused on network and electronic warfare research
have been completely reorganized under the SSF,
and the PLA’s broader reorganization of its academic
institutions has given organizations such as the
Academy of Military Sciences (均系科学院) (AMS)
new roles to play in military science and technology
research. The Chinese military is embarking on a
massive reordering of its human capital ecosystem
for information warfare that matches the scale of
its strategic and institutional reorganization of its
operational units.
This chapter begins with a brief explanation of
how differences between China’s information warfare
ecosystem and its traditional defense sectors influence
the needs of the SSF’s human capital ecosystem. These
unique characteristics influence the role that human

330

talent plays in the SSF’s research, development, and
acquisition (RD&A) processes; its operational units;
and its recruitment.
The chapter then examines the PLA’s in-house
recruiting pipeline for those who develop and operate
its network weapons, ranging from the demographic
makeup of recruits to the organizational structures
they occupy within the military. Particular emphasis is
given to the PLA Information Engineering University
(解放军信息工程大学) (IEU), which expanded last
year to become an umbrella institution encompassing
the former PLA University of Foreign Languages
(解放军外国语学院). The IEU, which has now been
established as the primary educational institution of
the SSF’s Network Systems Department (网络系统部)
(NSD), plays a key role in developing the NSD’s
human capital and network weapons. This chapter
also looks at the evolving interconnections between
civilian institutions and the PLA human talent
pipeline and addresses recruitment and research at
civilian universities, defense contracting by civilian
firms, interactions with Chinese hacker groups, and
talent discovery and retention challenges that arise as
the PLA is forced to compete with the private sector to
recruit highly skilled information security researchers.
The study concludes by assessing visible trends for
China’s network warfare human capital ecosystem,
including potential obstacles to further improvement,
institutional contradictions that have yet to be
settled, and the PLA’s shifting balance between the
recruitment of civilian talent and the recruitment of
military talent.
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UNIQUE CHARACTERISTICS OF NETWORK
WEAPONS SHAPING THE PLA’S HUMAN
CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS
Network weapons are in many ways as integral to
the modern peacetime and wartime operations of the
PLA as conventional weaponry. But network weapons
possess multiple unique characteristics that are difficult
to map onto the conventional Chinese defense RD&A
cycle. Several of these peculiarities directly shape the
human capital ecosystem underlying the development
of network weapons. First, PLA tool and exploit
developers and “trigger pullers” actively engaged
in computer network attack and computer network
exploitation do not come to their respective positions
from completely distinct career and educational
tracks, as is nearly universal in other military domains.
Although the precise division between these billets
within the PLA is not described in public writings, the
personnel who develop network attack tools and the
personnel who deploy them often work alongside one
another in specific military units. These billets appear
to share similar career tracks and emerge from the
same military and civilian educational institutions.
These commonalities are unheard of in other
defense sectors. Such a situation is akin to the
researchers and engineers responsible for producing
a fighter aircraft sharing military units, career tracks,
and educational backgrounds with the pilots who
fly them into combat. To account for the intertwined
educational and career paths of network weapons
development and operational personnel within the
PLA, this study attempts to examine the ecosystem
encompassing the two as an integrated whole.
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Second, the PLA does not acknowledge the
existence of any given network weapon it has
developed, and, until the creation of the SSF, it did
not acknowledge the existence of its network attack
forces. As a result, network weapons processes are
much less transparent than the processes of other
Chinese defense RD&A programs, as are the identities,
organizational structure, and career paths of the
personnel involved. In the absence of transparent
information regarding network weapon development,
one must piece together numerous disparate strands
of information to offer a meaningful picture of these
RD&A systems, and major gaps remain in opensource knowledge.
Third, network weapons are often modular in
nature and iteratively developed, carrying a short
shelf life if they are not constantly updated and
revised. Production and deployment proceeds rapidly
and continuously, with weapons being produced,
tested, modified, and repurposed on an ad-hoc basis,
defying the traditional Chinese defense RD&A life
cycle. A PLA Navy ship may expect to see many years
of active service, whereas a network weapon making
use of a particular zero-day exploit may have a useful
life span measured in days or even hours. Once in use,
whether by the PLA or another unrelated entity that
has independently discovered the same attack vector,
an adversary may detect the weapon and develop
countermeasures at any time. This time sensitivity
necessitates a far greater degree of organizational
proximity and career track overlap between weapon
developers and end users than is seen in other
defense sectors.
Fourth, the development of offensive network
weapons and the development of defensive
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information security technologies are intertwined
to a degree unseen in other defense sectors. Most
technologies that defend against conventional
weapons systems operate according to wellunderstood principles of ballistic physics; thus,
offensive and defensive technology developers have
very little interaction. Network defenses, by contrast,
must be constructed to function against never-beforeseen threat vectors, and the precise effects of malicious
code cannot be definitively known until the code
is executed. To build effective network defenses, a
nation-state must be at the forefront of predicting and
discovering network warfare threat vectors.
This natural intertwining of network attack
and defense research in turn influences the PLA’s
human capital needs and its interaction with the
civilian information security industry. Talented
researchers with a civilian information technology
(IT) or information security education can be directly
recruited into the military without a lengthy process
of reorientation toward defense technical work, and
civilian code and software can be integrated into attack
tool development. But this shared pool of recruits
results in the PLA directly competing with China’s far
more lucrative private sector for technical talent.
Fifth, network weapons frequently contain
an element of social engineering. Some attack
vectors may, for example, require an unsuspecting
adversary who receives an e-mail to click a link
to an infected website or to open a malicious file
attachment; this is known as “spear phishing.” As a
result, trained defense and intelligence linguists with
appropriate cultural and contextual knowledge exist
within the human capital ecosystem of network
weapons development.
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Finally, network weapons are heavily used for
peacetime espionage in addition to their military
capabilities. The same personnel, threat vector,
and operating infrastructure can even be used
simultaneously for both intelligence collection and
battlespace preparation operations. Though this
sharing of resources opens up strategic possibilities
for the PLA, it also creates unique command and
personnel challenges. PLA network warfare personnel
are poorly compensated compared to their privatesector counterparts, and foreign information security
analysts have identified numerous occasions where
PLA personnel appear to have “freelanced” by using
military infrastructure to collect intelligence for
outside clients.2
THE PLA’S INTERNAL HUMAN CAPITAL
ECOSYSTEM FOR NETWORK WARFARE
The PLA has historically contained several different
types of institutions engaged in both the development
of information weapons and the training of personnel
for information warfare, including operations units
such as technical reconnaissance bureaus (技术侦察局)
(TRBs), numbered research institutes (RIs), and
military academic institutions. Through the end of
the Hu Jintao era, this human capital ecosystem was
centered on the Central Military Commission, which
directly oversaw the National University of Defense
2. Pang Qingyun, “战略支援部队某部20余名在编现役干
部转改文职人员纪实” [More than 20 members of the Strategic
Support Force, who are in the process of converting from active
cadres to civilian personnel], 解放军报 [PLA daily], July 11, 2018,
http://military.workercn.cn/32821/201807/11/18071109031
7195.shtml; and Mandiant, APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber
Espionage Units (Alexandria, VA: Mandiant, February 18, 2013).
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Technology (国防科技大学) (NUDT) and the IEU,
and the former General Staff Department (总参谋部)
(GSD), which contained the information operationsfocused 3rd and 4th Departments (三部 and 四部)
(3PLA and 4PLA); the subordinate-numbered RIs
(such as the former GSD 56th, 57th, and 58th RIs); and
educational institutions with relevant portfolios, such
as the former PLA Electronic Engineering Institute
(解放军电子工程学院).
But in the aftermath of the creation of the SSF
and the reorganization of China’s military academic
institutions, the institutional landscape for the SSF’s
human capital ecosystem has shifted markedly. The
network attack-focused 4PLA in particular has been
carved up into its constituent parts, rather than being
transferred to the SSF wholesale. Many of 4PLA’s
operational units now reside within the SSF’s NSD,
but its former headquarters were reconstituted under
the Joint Staff Department as the new NetworkElectronic Bureau (网络电子局); this organization
is likely to oversee the management of network and
electronic warfare missions across the entire Chinese
military.3 Meanwhile, 4PLA’s primary educational
institute, the Electronic Engineering Institute, was
placed under the NUDT and transformed into the
Electronic Countermeasures Institute (国防科技大学电
子对抗学院), even as the IEU moved to the SSF NSD
and incorporated other educational institutions with
related areas of focus.
Perhaps the most unusual of the recent changes to
the SSF’s research and training ecosystem has been the
3. For a detailed discussion of the evidence on this point,
see John Costello and Joe McReynolds, China’s Strategic Support
Force: A Force for a New Era (Washington, DC: National Defense
University Press, 2018).

336

case of the GSD’s numbered RIs. Although the relevant
RIs moved to the SSF following its creation, in mid2017, several were moved back to the Central Military
Commission, where they are now located under the
AMS. The most notable of these is the former GSD
54th RI, which appears to have become the Network
Electronic Countermeasures Institute (网电对抗研
究所) under the AMS’s new Systems Engineering
Academy (军事科学院系统工程研究院). According to
Chinese media reports, AMS is now being positioned
as a leader in military scientific research for the whole
of the PLA, combining its traditional work on military
theory with defense science and technology research.4
This reorganization represents a dismantling of the
previously hard and fast divisions between the roles of
the AMS and the NUDT, as the latter maintains its focus
on both personnel training and core defense science
and technology research. Although PLA reporting
has portrayed this transition as fitting the PLA’s
need to more closely align and intertwine military
strategy with its science and technology development
efforts, the work of the numbered RIs has historically
been more granularly focused on applied research,
including engineering and capabilities testing.5
Indeed, even the RIs’ research projects launched after

4. Ma Haoliang, “建军90周年: 军校改革—三院校作龙头
引领新格局” [The army’s 90th anniversary: Military academy
reform—Three colleges and universities take the lead to guide
a new structure], Ta Kung Pao, July 29, 2017, http://news.
takungpao.com/mainland/focus/2017-07/3477971.html.
5. “军事科学院新领导班子亮相:
贺福初少将出任副院长”
[Academy of Military Science new leadership: Major General He
Fuchu becomes deputy director], 3g.163.com, n.d., https://3g.163.
com/all/article/CTL4O3OC0001899N.html (site discontinued).
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this transition appear to continue that focus.6 To be
fair, the PLA has designed the SSF from the start to
interface more closely with China’s strategic research
bodies, an intent exemplified by high-level personnel
moving in both directions between the AMS and
the SSF (including the SSF’s first commander, Gao
Jin). Nevertheless, this move appears unusual,
raising the possibility bureaucratic politics may have
played a significant role in shaping this round of the
PLA’s reforms.
Network Warfare Training at Defense Technical
Schools
No matter their location within the PLA, these
institutions attract human capital from multiple
sources, including straightforward PLA recruitment,
direct-recruit NCOs from civilian universities, and
civilian cadres. Although Chinese citizens with
relevant skill sets can participate in military work
in a variety of ways, the bulk of China’s network
warfare personnel nevertheless still progress
through a scientific and technical military academy,
whether their ultimate role within the system will be
operational or research-focused.
Therefore, examining the selection, cultivation, and
retention of information warfare talent is necessary,
beginning with the PLA academic system, including
defense technical schools such as the NUDT and IEU.
6. “中央军委装备发展部信息系统局关于2017年重大专项
第一批网上公开发布指南项目入围单位公告” [CMC Armament
Development Department’s Information Systems Bureau
announcement on the 2017 major projects first online published
guidelines for shortlisted units], Sohu, September 19, 2017,
http://www.sohu.com/a/192948967_465915.
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By understanding the academic tracks, incentive
structures, and recruiting policies for information
warfare personnel at the undergraduate, master’s,
and PhD levels, as well as retention and morale issues
within the SSF, one can gauge the current status of
China’s efforts to shape its workforce according to
the demands of modern information warfare and the
PLA’s strategic realignment.
Undergraduate programs are a focal point in the
PLA’s information warfare human capital ecosystem
for multiple reasons. Although undergraduates lack
the technical knowledge of graduate students, their
academic track assignments at this stage appear
to determine their future careers within the PLA,
including the crucial distinction of whether they
proceed down a command/operational career track
or a technical specialist one. Through their relatively
large numbers, graduates of these programs form the
backbone of the PLA’s network warfare workforce.
The PLA pays conscious attention to questions of
demographics in recruitment. Since 2014, the PLA’s
technical educational institutions have required that
new undergraduates be between 17 and 20 years
of age, except in the case of reserve officer trainees
and other special personnel. Many academic tracks
relevant to information warfare have historically only
accepted men, or accepted very few women, though
over the past few years some non-command tracks
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in network security have been opened to women.7
Nevertheless, the primary area of PLA education
with substantial female recruitment and relevance to
information operations remains the linguist specialist
track. PLA technical universities also attempt to
ensure a balance of regional representation, with the
necessary test scores required for entry varying from
province to province.8
Technical universities of the PLA also give
admissions preferences to those who possess
particularly desirable technical skills.9 Additional
credit is given in the admission of children of PLA
members, as well as students who have received
nationally recognized academic merit awards.10
Admitted students must pass a psychological exam,
which includes a Myers-Briggs personality typology,
with the score needed to pass the exam varying based

7. “青年学生政策答记者问” [Responses to reporter’s
questions on young student policies], Chinese People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) Strategic Support Force (SSF) Information
Engineering University (IEU) (website), n.d., http://zhaosheng
.plaieu.edu.cn/a/zhaoshengzhengce/2014/0528/323.html
(page deleted from site); and “2018军校招生计划” [2018 military
academy admissions program], AR Web, n.d., http://www.
xxyzh.net/zuoye/gk2018/2018军校招生计划.pdf.
8. “2013年信息工程大学全国录取分数线” [2013 PLA IEU
national admissions scores], 81.cn, April 23, 2014, http://www.81
.cn/rdzt/2014/0421bkjx/2014-04/23/content_5878152.htm.
9.

“Responses to reporter’s questions.”

10. “解放军电子工程学院2013年招生简章” [PLA EEI 2013
admissions guidelines], 81zbw, June 13, 2013, http://81zbw
.com/Article/jsyx/25561.html (site discontinued).
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on one’s personality type.11 Schools of the PLA also
ask for the political status of their incoming students,
which is essentially a recommendation that must be
transferred from their prior educational institution.
Generally speaking, incoming undergraduates do not
have to have actually joined the Communist Party of
China already; even a mere desire to join the party can
be indicated via relevant documents (入团志愿书).12
Contrary to reasonable expectations, the majority
of information warfare students at universities such
as the IEU have historically been civilian cadres
(文职干部) rather than PLA officers in training, who
then received unit assignments upon graduation.13
But, as discussed in greater detail below, the civilian
cadre system is being shut down and replaced by a
unified civilian personnel (文职人员) system, which
may soon dramatically alter the balance of the IEU’s
undergraduate population.
The NUDT’s core campus offers two noncommand academic tracks relevant to network
warfare: a software engineering (软件工程) track
devoted to training students in software development
and analysis for network warfare purposes and a
network engineering (网络工程) track devoted to
11. “研究生招生” [Graduate admissions], PLA SSF IEU,
n.d., http://zhaosheng.plaieu.edu.cn/channels/252.html; and
“军队院校招收学员体格检查标准”
[Physical
examination
standards for military academy recruitment], PLA SSF
IEU,
March
28,
2014,
https://web.archive.org/web
/20140807014940/http://zhaosheng.plaieu.edu.cn/a
/zhaoshengzhengce/2014/0328/309.html.
12. “2012级新生相关问题说明” [Relevant questions for 2012
students answered], PLA SSF IEU, March 20, 2014, https://web
.archive.org/web/20150222054248/http://zhaosheng.plaieu
.edu.cn/a/benkezhaosheng/2014/0320/283.html.
13.

“Responses to reporter’s questions.”
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understanding network technologies.14 The NUDT
Electronic Countermeasures Institute (formerly the
Electronic Engineering Institute), however, offers
a wider array of command (operations officer) and
non-command (technical officer) academic tracks.
Non-command technical officer tracks include
information engineering (信息工程), with a focus
on attacking and defending military networks, and
network engineering (网络工程), with a focus on
civilian network security.15 The institute’s commandoriented electronic warfare command and engineering
(电子对抗指挥与工程) track offers two foci: attacking
and defending communications networks and
attacking and defending information systems.
The IEU, by contrast, offers a different range of
career tracks and strives for a different demographic
mix. The IEU is unique among the major institutions
in that its non-command network engineering
(网络工程) track, which is explicitly devoted to
producing network attack and defense technical cadres
(网络攻防技术干部), admits both men and women.16
The IEU offers multiple command tracks, including
information security (信息安全) and information
engineering (信息工程), and a majority of the IEU’s
incoming freshmen officers are command officers
(指挥军官) rather than technical specialists.17
14. “非定向” [Undirected], Hebei International School,
n.d., http://www.sjz42.com/UpLoadFiles/Article/2014-6/2014
061011403955992.doc.
15.

“Undirected.”

16.

“Undirected.”

17. “2013年度青年学员招生计划” [2013 student youth
recruitment guidelines], PLA SSF IEU, March 20, 2014, https://
web.archive.org/web/20150222054525/http://zhaosheng
.plaieu.edu.cn/a/benkezhaosheng/2014/0320/285.html.
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Advanced education programs such as master’s
and PhD programs within PLA defense technical
universities also play a central role in the continuous
cultivation of the PLA’s information warfare research
community, both by conducting advanced research
themselves and by producing technical experts
who go on to inhabit the SSF and Central Military
Commission’s other relevant institutions. At the
graduate level, the PLA schools have established their
own unique avenues for attracting special network
warfare talents.
Support for PhD research on network warfare
at the NUDT is extensive, as the school is a leader
in network attack and defense research.18 The
school has received government funding for its
network attack and defense research at least as far
back as the beginning of the 10th Five Year Plan,
suggesting significant prioritization from the central
government.19 Historically, research published by
NUDT academics on network attack and defense has
generally been linked to its College of Computers,
College of Information Systems and Management,
and College of Electronic Engineering.20 The NUDT
takes PhD students specifically for network attack and
18. “学院介绍” [Introduction to the university], National
University of Defense Technology, June 28, 2010, https://web.
archive.org/web/20150928021924/http://www.nudt.edu.cn
/ArticleShow.asp?ID=40.
19. “国防科学技术大学2008年博士研究生招生简章” [NUDT
2008 PhD admissions guide], Hujiang, January 15, 2010, https://
www.hjenglish.com/new/p343403/.
20. See, for example, Liu Bo et al., “基于两阶段感染过
程分析的蠕虫传播模型SSI” [SSI, a worm propagation model
based on the analysis of the two-stage infection], 国防科技大学
学报 [Journal of National University of Defense Technology] 32,
no. 3 (2010).
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defense research within the College of Computers,
although students in a range of other NUDT schools
of also conduct relevant research.21
Within the College of Computers, the Network and
Information Security Laboratory (网络与信息安全研
究所) conducts extensive network attack and defense
research, including space-network research with
direct relevance to higher-level information warfare
applications.22 The NUDT’s PhD program does not
appear to be designed as a means of onboarding
civilian talent into the defense PhD system; applicants
must either be a fresh graduate of a military master’s
degree program or an active-duty PLA soldier who
has already obtained a master’s degree.23 The NUDT’s
total number of billets related to network attack and
defense has tripled over the past several years.24
The IEU, by contrast, has long had an allotment
of PhD positions specifically available to persons
without a military background, including full-ride
scholarships for students who have recently earned

21. “NUDT 2008 PhD admissions guide”; and “国防科学技
术大学2007年博士研究生招生简章” [NUDT 2007 PhD admissions
guide], Hotbei Information, n.d., https://www.hotbak.net
/key/国防科学技术大学2007年博士学位研究生招生简章考研教
育网.html.
22. “网络与信息安全研究所”
[Institute
of
Network
and Information Security], National University of Defense
Technology, updated June 28, 2010, http://web.archive.org
/web/20120209160356/http://www.nudt.edu.cn/ArticleShow
.asp?ID=46.
23.

“NUDT 2008 PhD admissions guide.”

24.

“Institute of Network and Information Security.”
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a master’s degree from Project 985 universities.25 In
addition to recruiting fresh master’s graduates and
active-duty soldiers, the IEU’s PhD program offers
admission to military personnel who have earned a
master’s degree at some point in the past and worked
six years or more in a field closely related to their
proposed PhD course of study.26
The IEU also has a special preferential recruitment
initiative for top talent that requires prospective
graduate students concretely demonstrate their
offensive network warfare skills in one of several
ways. These special avenues include earning a
third-place prize or higher at a Capture the Flag
information security competition, contributing a
new zero-day vulnerability to the China National
Vulnerability Database (国家漏洞库), or otherwise
achieving “breakthrough results” that demonstrate
“special expertise” in the field of network security.27
Generally speaking, active-duty officers are also
shown some leniency in quantitative assessments for

25. “解放军信息工程大学研究生院” [PLA IEU Graduate
Institute], PLA SSF IEU, n.d., http://zhaosheng.plaieu.edu
.cn/a/yanjiushengzhaosheng/2014/0225/304.html
(page deleted from site).
26.

“PLA IEU Graduate Institute.”

27. “网络空间安全学科硕士研究生特殊人才 选拔工作报名通知”
[Notice of registration for special talents selection for master
of science in cyberspace security], PLA SSF IEU, March 26,
2018,
http://web.archive.org/web/20180405050413/http://
zhaosheng.plaieu.edu.cn/contents/252/912.html.
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IEU graduate-level admissions compared to fresh
graduates of PLA educational institutions.28
Research institutes in the GSD, such as the
former 54th RI, the portfolio of which is relevant to
information warfare weapon development, also admit
graduate students and grant their own graduate
degrees. Although the RIs are more opaque in their
selection process and academic track offerings than
the PLA’s defense technical schools, they are known
to broadly follow the standard military school
application process, including completion of relevant
standardized exams.29
Admission to any PhD program at a defense
technical school or RI generally requires scoring
highly on a standardized entrance examination that
is separate from national graduate admissions testing
regimes and administered in-person over a two-day
period. The test’s contents are specific to the school
administering it.30 As with undergraduates, all PhD
applicants to the IEU and NUDT also must pass a
standard ideological checklist that contains criteria
such as good moral character, political reliability (this
appears to be a formal certification, with 政审材料
provided as evidence), and a clean legal record.31
28. “公布2014年博士研究生入学考试军人考生最低录取分
数线” [Announce the minimum admission scores for military
candidates for the 2014 PhD entrance exam], PLA SSF IEU,
March 28, 2014, http://web.archive.org/web/20140720151016
/http://zhaosheng.plaieu.edu.cn/a/yanjiushengzhaosh
eng/2014/0328/307.html.
29. “2014年中国人民解放军总参第56研究所考研成绩查询
入口” [2014 entrance examination results of the 56th Research
Institute of the People’s Liberation Army], Liuxue86, February
17, 2014, http://www.liuxue86.com/a/1916252.html.
30.

“PLA IEU Graduate Institute.”

31.

“PLA IEU Graduate Institute.”
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In addition to technical talent, many forms of
network operations require special support from
linguist personnel. In addition to teaching standard
technical English, a subject that is mandatory for the
software engineering and network security tracks,
the IEU’s Luoyang campus, formerly known as the
University of Foreign Languages, produces the bulk of
linguistic talent for SSF network weapon production
and deployment.32 The school has specific recruiting
quotas from individual provinces, as well as for
each foreign language’s academic track.33 The IEU’s
language training places its students on technical
officer tracks, rather than command or support
tracks.34 The IEU routinely hires foreign teachers to
conduct its students’ language training; although this
is not an uncommon practice for defense language
schools globally, the foreign nationals in question may
nevertheless effectively be training the soldiers who
will one day conduct espionage operations against
their home countries.35
Although the IEU’s Luoyang campus is preeminent
in this linguistic support role, it is not alone; the IEU’s
main campus has offered graduate linguistic training
dating back to before its merger with the University
of Foreign Languages, a program which appears to be
directly aimed at personnel who will be assisting SSF
32. John Pike, “Third Department,” Federation of American
Scientists, updated April 15, 2000, https://fas.org/irp/world
/china/pla/dept_3.htm.
33. “解放军外国语学院” [PLA University of Foreign
Languages], China Great Wall Internet, n.d., http://service.cgw
.cn/lywy/Show_Article.asp?unid=238 (site discontinued).
34.

“Undirected.”

35.

“PLA University of Foreign Languages.”
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NSD operations.36 In addition to specialized linguistic
support personnel, skill requirements listed in job
postings for information operations billets within the
SSF and TRBs appear to indicate that even technical
staff regularly use English-language skills in support
of their work.
Morale and Status of PLA Network Warfare
Personnel
Historically, one of the persistent challenges
the PLA has faced in cultivating human capital
for network warfare has been offering competitive
salaries, benefits, and working conditions to soldiers
with relevant skill sets. Unlike in many other domains
of warfare, the skills necessary to conduct and support
network operations are often (though not always)
highly valued in the Chinese private sector. As the
PLA has developed programs and reward systems
to attract and retain specialized talent, information
operations personnel have frequently been among the
most targeted for new initiatives. Although drawing
definitive conclusions about the morale of PLA
information operations personnel is difficult due to
the limited availability of public sources, personnel
in the former GSD 3PLA’s network warfare program
were seemingly unhappy during the Hu Jintao era,
a situation which a range of programs over the past
decade has attempted to rectify.

36. Xie Weibo, “2014年硕士研究生招生专业目录” [2014
master’s student specialization directory], PLA SSF IEU,
March 20, 2014, http://web.archive.org/web/20140720145959
/http://zhaosheng.plaieu.edu.cn/a/yanjiushengzhaosh
eng/2014/0320/290.html.
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One network weapons developer and graduate
of an IEU master’s program, Mr. Wang, who goes by
the Internet handle “Rocy Bird,” published a series of
firsthand accounts from 2006 to 2008 of the drudgery
and social isolation his work in an unnamed Shanghai
TRB entailed, attracting the attention of Chinese
netizens.37 Wang cited his finances as a particular
problem; although he was doing comparatively well
for himself relative to other members of the PLA of
his age, when compared with members of his school
cohort who entered the private sector, his wages were
paltry, particularly in light of Shanghai’s high cost of
living. Furthermore, Wang witnessed selfish largesse
by his superiors that undercut the PLA’s ostensible
ethos of sacrifice for the common good. As detailed
in the 2013 Mandiant report on PLA Unit 61398, prior
to the creation of the SSF, 3PLA TRB members would
sometimes seek out freelance side jobs in white-hat
and gray-hat software development to augment their
incomes, with some even turning to low-level criminal
activity and hacking activities to enrich themselves.
Perhaps in an attempt to counteract these negative
trends in morale, in 2011 the PLA introduced special
subsidies (技侦专业岗位津贴) for personnel holding
specialized technical reconnaissance positions
(技术侦察专业技术职务).This subsidy policy applied
to both military officers and civilian cadres working
in technical reconnaissance positions, reflecting the
prevalence at the time of civilian cadres (in addition to
PLA technical officers and NCOs) being employed in
these positions. Categories of work that qualified for
37. Barbara Demick, “China Hacker’s Angst Opens a
Window onto Cyber-Espionage,” Los Angeles Times, March 12,
2013,
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/mar/12/world/la-fgchina-hacking-20130313.
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subsidies included cryptanalysis, intelligence analysis,
scientific translation, signals and communications
intelligence, technical and development research,
technical reconnaissance equipment operation, and a
wide range of specializations in information security.
A system was also put in place for top-tier personnel
(一等标准的人员) to earn larger than normal subsidies,
provided they met stricter examination standards.
According to Wang, network warfare TRBs have
also offered year-end performance bonuses as an
additional financial incentive.38
These subsidies appear to continue in some form
under the SSF’s new recruitment system. The subsidies
have been offered for positions in units now directly
subordinate to the SSF and to information operations
personnel in military theaters and PLA Air Force
and Navy intelligence departments. During the Hu
era, subsidies for information operations personnel
in the PLA Air Force and Navy required a record to
be filed with the 3PLA, with the larger subsidies for
exceptional personnel requiring direct examination
and approval by 3PLA; whether a similar arrangement
persists under the SSF is unclear.39 Incentive payments
like these may take the form of “subsidies, bonuses,
or allowances” rather than salary to minimize the
soldiers’ tax burden because the Chinese tax system

38. “官兵生活待遇政策200问” [200 questions regarding
policy on officers’ living situation], China Military Online,
October 9, 2011, http://www.mod.gov.cn/service/2011-10/09
/content_4303211.htm.
39. “军人工资福利待遇政策, 干货真不少!” [Military wages
and benefits policy, it’s really not paltry!], Sohu, n.d., http://
www.sohu.com/a/232040248_181845 (site discontinued).
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differentiates between salary and other forms
of payment.40
The SSF has historically competed for personnel
with both the private sector and China’s civilian
government. Most notably, both the SSF NSD and
the Ministry of State Security (国家安全部) actively
recruit from a similar pool of talented undergraduates
at civilian scientific and technical schools with
relevant specialties.41 But during the Hu era, the 3PLA
seemingly developed a negative image among the
skilled students it was trying to attract. For example,
when a graduating technical student at Beijing
University of Posts and Telecommunications—a
civilian school with significant PLA ties—directly
requested advice on the relative merits of employment
with the PLA and the Ministry of State Security on a
university forum, the consensus among the student’s
peers was the Ministry of State Security position was
superior on multiple fronts. Because Ministry of State
Security employment is considered a civil service
position, it enables movement elsewhere within the
Chinese government that military enrollment does
not. According to students on the forum, former
military technical cadres, by contrast, generally faced
significant difficulty in applying for civil service
positions because their skill sets were not always
prized highly.42
Although the promise of a free education
ensured the PLA continued to produce an ample
40.

Demick, “China Hacker’s Angst.”

41.

“Military wages and benefits policy.”

42. Dennis Blasko, The Chinese Army Today: Tradition and
Transformation for the 21st Century, rev. ed. (Abingdon, UK:
Routledge, 2012), 63.
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supply of new technical talent through its dedicated
education pipelines, China’s military and civilian
leadership recognized this sense of disadvantage and
dissatisfaction posed longer-term retention challenges
for the PLA’s information operations institutions
because its officers and civilian cadres generally
possess skill sets that are valued in the private sector.
In recent years, SSF recruitment has attempted
to shift this perception by offering special perks for
technical personnel with advanced degrees, including
entering the PLA with a higher rank and benefits.43 But
perhaps the most radical shift toward grappling with
this problem directly has been the PLA’s transition
away from civilian cadres toward a new, unified
civilian personnel system. The new system, which
was brought into operation in summer 2018, seeks
to address this imbalance through multiple avenues,
including giving PLA civilian technical personnel
“the corresponding rights of state employees in
accordance with the law” and substantially increasing
their compensation relative to that of the old civilian
cadres.44 State media reporting on the system’s
creation suggests improving the SSF’s talent pipeline
was a major consideration in the system’s design.45
Combined with the SSF’s special recruitment
incentives, the new system appears to offer marginally
higher compensation for serving as civilian personnel
within the SSF than for taking up a civilian government
43. “国家安全部VS总参三部” [Ministry of National Security
vs. Three General Staff], Tianya Club, October 16, 2009, http://
bbs.tianya.cn/post-188-567594-1.shtml.
44.

“Ministry of National Security vs. Three General Staff.”

45. “战 略 支 援 部 队 直 接 接 收 研 究 生 入 伍 招 聘 信 息 ”[SSF
direct postgraduate recruitment information], Xi’An Jiaotong
University, n.d., http://info.xjtu.edu.cn/info/1017/19328.htm.
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post. Nevertheless, even articles in official Communist
Party of China media about former SSF civilian cadres
transitioning into the new system note they have
financially superior job opportunities in the private
sector.46 Because civilian cadres have the choice of
demobilization rather than conversion into the new
system if they so desire, a substantial outflow of SSF
personnel into the private sector may occur during
this transition period.
THE SSF AND CHINA’S CIVILIAN HUMAN
CAPITAL ECOSYSTEM
Over the decades, the PLA’s network warfare
programs have transitioned through several different
modes of engagement with the civilian economy,
in large part due to the bulk of China’s IT talent
being concentrated there. Early engagement with
the unreliable and often anarchic “patriotic hacker”
community gave rise to a lasting PLA commitment
to build up a more reliable human capital ecosystem,
including both the internal expansion of training and
research at the PLA’s educational institutions and
external engagement with private sector information
security companies. In the Xi Jinping era, both the
2013 elevation of MCF to the level of national strategy
equal to military and economic development and the
major military reforms launched at the end of 2015
have kicked off a new era of reshaping how the SSF

46. “战 略 支 援 部 队 面 向 社 会 公 开 招 考 文 职 人 员 政 策 宣
讲会” [SSF introduces policies for open recruitment from
society], Haitou global, July 18, 2018, https://xjh.haitou.cc
/article/642241.html.
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taps into civilian talent.47 From 2017 onward, these
reform processes have increasingly resulted in major
concrete changes, including the transition from the
civilian cadre (文职干部) and national defense student
(国防生) systems toward an emphasis on civilian
personnel recruitment (文职人员) and direct-recruit
NCOs (直招士官).
Overall, the center of gravity in the PLA’s human
talent pipeline for network operations has shifted over
the past decade toward formally integrating civilian
human capital on multiple levels, including research
and training collaboration with civilian companies and
universities, network warfare academic competitions
aiming to identify new talent, and recruitment
initiatives designed to attract top civilian technical
talent into the SSF.
Transition from Civilian Cadres to Civilian
Personnel Recruitment
Over the past year, the SSF has dramatically altered
its pathways for recruiting civilian talent to serve in
the PLA. Perhaps the change with the biggest impact
was the winding down of the PLA’s civilian cadres
(文职干部) program, which has historically been one
of the primary means of civilian technical specialists
entering the SSF as well as the PLA scientific and
technological research ecosystem more broadly. In
accordance with the Regulations on the Civil Service
47. “学习贯彻习近平强军思想
开创文职人员工作新局面”
[Studying and implementing Xi Jinping’s thought of
strengthening the army and creating a new situation for the work
of civilian personnel], Military–People’s Daily Online, January 24,
2018, http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2018/0124/c1011-29783
604.html.
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Cadres of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army
(中国人民解放军文职干部条例), civilian cadres in
the PLA were appointed as active service personnel,
wearing PLA uniforms and holding parallel civilian
grades and ranks that corresponded to the military
hierarchy.48 From the perspective of SSF personnel,
entering the civilian cadre system has meant a lifestyle
more akin to military service than civilian life.49
Separately from the system’s value to the SSF,
the civilian cadre system attracted strongly negative
attention from Chinese policy makers and the Chinese
media and public for the ways in which it enabled
mere artistic performers to advance to the level of
“singing generals.”50 Photos of civilian cadres with
luxury cars and other trappings of corrupt wealth
spread virally on the Chinese internet for years,
attracting direct condemnation from Xi Jinping. By
transitioning to a newly unified civilian personnel
(文职人员) system, China hopes to both improve the
SSF’s access to specialized human capital and excise
an embarrassing locus of waste and corruption.51
The PLA’s new civilian personnel system is
designed to accommodate a large expansion of the
48.

Qingyun, “More than 20 members.”

49. Bai Wangang, “军民融合的六大动因” [Six major
drivers of military-civil fusion], 国资报告 [State-owned assets
report],
2018,
http://www.cnki.com.cn/Article/CJFDTotal
-GZBG201804012.htm.
50. “再见, 文职干部, 谢谢你们” [Goodbye, civilian cadres,
thank you], Xw.qq, November 15, 2017, https://xw.qq.com
/cmsid/20171115A04WXU00 (page deleted from site).
51. Chen Han and Wang Jianyu, “军改动态：中共大规
模调整军队文职人员体系” [Military reform: The CCP’s largescale adjustment of the PLA’s civilian personnel system], Epoch
Times, November 11, 2017, http://www.epochtimes.com
/gb/17/11/10/n9827902.htm.
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PLA’s civilian specialist workforce in the coming
years. From a population of 40,000 in 2017, the
PLA hopes to soon employ over 200,000 civilian
personnel.52 The new Civilian Personnel Regulations
(文职人员条例) stipulate that these personnel will not
wear military uniforms or hold quasi-military ranks;
rather, they will enjoy the corresponding rights and
obligations of government employees.53 The new
system both expands the range of positions open to
civilian personnel and improves their compensation
to better attract and retain talent, with academics and
scientific researchers receiving especially preferential
treatment.54 Some special positions, including those
in “difficult and remote areas” or that otherwise
carry special hardships, will not even require civilian
personnel to be employed full-time with the military.
The new system also raises the recruitment age limit to
35 years old for junior technical positions and 45 years
old for mid-career positions. In wartime, regulatory
measures bring these civilian personnel into active
military service as necessary.55
Although civilian recruitment into various
components of the SSF and PLA TRBs has often been
achieved through ad-hoc methods, the new civilian
personnel system directs recruitment through a
unified portal somewhat akin to the United States’
52. Patrick Boehler, “No More Singing Generals and
Dancing Majors in Chinese Military: Xi Jinping,” South China
Morning Post, August 27, 2013, https://www.scmp.com/news
/china-insider/article/1299752/no-more-singing-generals-and
-dancing-majors-chinese-military-xi.
53.

“Studying and implementing Xi Jinping’s thought.”

54.

Han and Jianyu, “Military reform.”

55.

“Goodbye, civilian cadres.”
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USA Jobs: the Military Talent Network (军队人才网).56
In its inaugural year, the SSF is using the new
system to recruit 1,037 civilian professional and
technical personnel for posts in nearly 30 regions.
These personnel are primarily scientific research and
technology engineering talents, though the total figure
also includes specialties, such as academics, medical
services, and financial management.57
Civilian cadres now have the option of converting
to the new civilian personnel system or exiting the
military entirely. Although the percentage of civilian
cadres who will choose to continue their work under
the new system is not yet known, anecdotal reports
in state media note that some individual SSF units
have more than 20 civilian cadres who are making the
switch rather than leaving.58 Despite the improved
financial position of SSF civilian personnel, however,
official media reports note compensation is still below
that offered by IT firms in the Chinese private sector.
Reforms to SSF Recruitment Programs Targeting
Academia
Until its dissolution in 2017, the National Defense
Student or guofangsheng (国防生) program was one
of the major avenues for SSF (and 3PLA and 4PLA)
recruitment from civilian universities. The program
allowed students at civilian universities to matriculate
directly into the military, either by going on duty or
56.

“SSF introduces policies.”

57. “战略支援部队面向社会公开招考文职人员宣传公告”
[Strategic Support Force makes announcement to the public on
open recruitment of civil personnel], Sohu, July 16, 2018, http://
www.sohu.com/a/241546660_164555.
58.

Qingyun, “More than 20 members.”
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entering a defense technical graduate program. The
National Defense Student program was one of the
PLA’s first major concrete steps toward the stated
goal of selecting a much higher percentage of its
officer corps (eventually a majority) from civilian
university graduates.59
The National Defense Student system made multiple
efforts to attract and maintain high-quality recruits;
these efforts included special merit scholarships for
top-tier talent and preferential admission to graduate
study at PLA-linked universities.60 The program
also heavily emphasized the recruitment of students
at China’s prestigious Project 985 and Project 211
universities, while constricting enrollment from less
rigorous schools.61 Upon completion of the program
and receiving their unit assignments, national defense
students were assigned the same grade and rank as
comparably tracked graduates of the IEU and other
defense technical schools.62
Ultimately, the National Defense Student
program proved insufficient, and, in 2017, the PLA
finally decided to discontinue it to move into a new
phase of civilian talent recruitment.63 The program’s
scholarships were not substantial enough to alter
college graduates’ decision making about their future;
they only amounted to roughly 10,000 Chinese yuan
59.

“Responses to reporter’s questions.”

60.

“Responses to reporter’s questions.”

61.

“Responses to reporter’s questions.”

62.

“Responses to reporter’s questions.”

63. “2 0 1 7 年 起 不 再 从 普 通 高 中 毕 业 生 中 定 向 招 收 国 防
生” [Starting from 2017, we will no longer recruit national
defense students from ordinary high school graduates],
81.cn, May 26, 2017, http://www.81.cn/zggfs/2017-05/26
/content_7620030.htm.

358

per person per year.64 The program also suffered
from excessive attrition, as graduating students
failed to matriculate successfully into the PLA, and
problems of cultural fit, as national defense students
who entered directly into the military (as opposed
to a defense technical graduate program) suddenly
found themselves forced to adapt to military life
and combat the perception that they received
unearned advantages.65
But PLA recruitment from civilian universities was
never limited to national defense students. Even prior
to the creation of the SSF, 3PLA actively recruited
on multiple prominent technical campuses, offering
civilian students outside the National Defense Student
program the ability to enter the PLA as a lieutenant
(中尉).66 Public biographies of leaders of the former
3PLA and 4PLA sometimes reported their having
completed degrees as civilians at technical schools
prior to the creation of the National Defense Student
program, demonstrating the long-standing roots of
the practice.67
Moving forward, the PLA is taking a multipronged
approach to bringing human talent from academia
into the SSF programmatically. In addition to the
64.

“Responses to reporter’s questions.”

65. “國防生贖身記” [The redemption of the National Defense
Student program], Initium Media, September 23, 2016, https://
theinitium.com/article/20160923-mainland-paramilistudent/;
and Ying Yu Lin, “One Step Forward, One Step Back for
PLA Military Education,” The Jamestown Foundation,
April 24, 2018, https://jamestown.org/program/one-stepforward-one-step-back-for-pla-military-education/.
66.

“Ministry of National Security vs. Three General Staff.”

67. http://www.verydemo.com/demo_c318_i54871.html
(site discontinued).
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aforementioned shift from reliance on civilian cadres
to a civilian personnel system that is more accessible
to a range of applicants, the SSF has substantially
expanded its program for directly recruiting NCOs
into technical positions. In 2018, the SSF directly
recruited 570 NCOs for specialized technical positions,
sending them to a 13-week training course designed
to acclimatize them to military life and culture.68 The
recruits came from over 100 educational institutions
from across the country, with more than 40 percent
of them already possessing undergraduate degrees.
PLA media reporting on the shift emphasizes the
importance of tackling the challenges of cultural
fit and acclimation that previously bedeviled the
National Defense Student program.
Trends in SSF Recruitment at Civilian Universities
Although a substantial share of billets within
IEU graduate programs are reserved for personnel
already in the military, the overall ratio of military to

68. Lvzhe Dong Ge, “战略支援部队570名直招士官来了”
[570 Strategic Support Force direct recruits arrive], Ministry of
National Defense The People’s Republic of China, August 31, 2018,
http://www.mod.gov.cn/power/2018-08/31/content_4823
804.htm.

360

nonmilitary billets has shifted dramatically over time.69
One noteworthy trend is PLA academic institutions
have instituted regulations pushing these nonmilitary
recruits to enter at younger ages than their military
counterparts; this appears to be a part of a broader
effort to shift the demographic balance of the PLA’s
network warfare community in a younger direction.70
The PLA recognizes younger personnel tend to be
more technically proficient than senior officers from
previous eras and developing China’s information
operations capability will require a less hierarchical
approach to seniority than in other areas of military
development. The AMS 54th RI, for example,
reportedly instituted a policy years ago that 60 percent
of the institute’s projects be led by researchers under
35 years old.71
Beyond its generalized personnel intake practices,
the PLA has developed a range of smaller, specialized
programs designed to offer a tailored approach
69. “解 放 军 信 息 工 程 大 学 2 0 1 3 年 博 士 研 究 生 报 考 须
知” [Instructions for PLA IEU 2013 PhD candidates], Baidu
Wenku, December 7, 2012, http://wenku.baidu.com/
view/3ea518136bd97f192279e9b0.html;
“解放军信息工程大学
首招230名无军籍研究生” [PLA IEU recruits 230 nonmilitary
graduate students], China Net, n.d., http://henan.china.com.cn
/news/china/201209/387504LG2A.html (page deleted from
site); and “解放军信息工程大学2013年博士研究生招生简章” [2013
PhD admissions guide for PLA IEU], Yz.chsi.com.cn, n.d., http://
yz.chsi.com.cn/sch/viewBulletin--infoId-456641647,categoryId
-462794,schId-368312,mindex-12.dhtml (page delete from site).
70. http://job.bjut.edu.cn/bjutCms/html/main/
col22/2013-09/09/20130909114257218618917_1.html (site discontinued); and http://www.bjbys.net.cn/zp/sydwzp/262183
.shtml (site discontinued).
71. http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_89f0e1120102wzkc
.html (page deleted from site).
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to recruiting top-tier talent. The IEU has a special
program for the very highest talents operated through
its Graduate Student Recruitment Office (信息工程
大学研究生招生办公室), which brings several dozen
top research-focused undergraduates per year from
a range of China’s top civilian technical universities
directly into the IEU’s master’s programs based on
the recommendations of their host institutions and
without requiring them to pass the relevant exams
(免试硕士研究生).72 Applicants come exclusively
from China’s Project 985 and Project 211 universities;
prior to the abolition of the National Defense Student
program, nearly all of the selected students held that
designation as well.
Similarly, top students at technically focused
civilian universities may occasionally be chosen early in
their college career to serve in technical reconnaissance
units for a brief two-year compulsory service
(义务兵役) commitment; afterwards, they return to
campus and resume their academic coursework.73
From 2011 onward, those participating have received
incentives such as tuition reimbursement, student loan
repayment assistance, and subsidized tuition after
returning to campus in exchange for the disruption of
their studies, according to the Ministry of Education’s
Provisional Policy on Tuition Assistance, National
Student Loan Repayment, and Subsidies for College
72. PLA SSF IEU, n.d., http://zhaosheng.plaieu.edu.cn/a
/yanjiushengzhaosheng/2014/0320/292.html (page deleted
from site).
73. http://job.bjut.edu.cn/bjutCms/html
/main/col22/2013-09/09/20130909114257218618917_1.html
(site discontinued); and http://job.bjut.edu.cn/bjutCms/html
/main/col18/2013-09/09/20130909113424031666273_1.html
(site discontinued).
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Students Who Enter the Army for Compulsory
Military Service (应征入伍服义务兵役高等学校在
校生学费补偿国家助学贷款代偿及退役复学后学
费资助暂行办法).74
Senior researchers and leaders of military RIs inside
and outside of the SSF and focused on network warfare
interface directly with upcoming civilian talent by
serving part-time as PhD advisers within information
security, network engineering, and computer science
departments at top civilian technical universities.
To give one example, Guo Shize, a prominent senior
researcher at the AMS 54th RI, has served in the past
as a PhD adviser at the University of Science and
Technology of China, Beijing University of Posts and
Telecommunications, and Wuhan University.75 These
postings appear to serve both as a knowledge-sharing
mechanism and as a means of spotting prime talent
for PLA tasking and recruitment.
Another part of the PLA’s strategy for recruiting
talented information operations personnel involves
competitions designed to recognize students with
exceptional abilities. Since 2008, PLA military
academies have partnered with key civilian
universities to organize specialized competitions for
outstanding information security talent, with the
stated goal of aiding PLA recruitment. One of the
74. “2 0 1 2 年 高 校 毕 业 生 应 征 入 伍 预 征 工 作 启 动 ”
[2012 graduates entering into preenlistment work], Renren
Network, n.d., http://page.renren.com/601256018/note/84257
5659 (site discontinued).
75. “众多文艺界领导专家助阵中外首工美术馆”
[Leading
experts in literary and art circles helped Chinese and
foreign art museums], News.163, March 28, 2011, http://
web.archive.org/web/20190512143624/http://news.163.
com/11/0328/16/708FDCEF00014AEE.html.
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most prominent and long-running examples is the
National College Student Information Security Contest
(全国大学生信息安全比赛), which is led jointly
by military and civilian centers of excellence for
network attack and defense research, such as the
NUDT, Sichuan University, PLA Naval University
of Engineering, the IEU, the University of Electronic
Science and Technology of China, and the Beijing
University of Posts and Telecommunications.76 In both
its defensive focus and emphasis on talent discovery,
the contest is comparable to the US National Collegiate
Cyber Defense Competition.
Involvement of IT and Information Security
Companies in PLA Network Operations
The SSF, like its predecessors 3PLA and 4PLA, is
known to have established procedures in place for
contracting out research work to civilian entities,
including companies in the IT and information
security sectors. But China’s emphasis in recent years
on MCF appears to have strongly shifted institutional
momentum toward deeper integration, increasing
the funding and scope of cooperation opportunities
available to private-sector companies.
Although the minutiae of these procedures are
not publicly available, the resulting projects are often
publicly visible. Outside of the SSF, information
warfare research organizations such as the AMS 54th
RI have contracted out industry commissioned projects
(企事业委托项目 or 企事业单位委托项目) to civilian
companies and universities with the appropriate
76. 全国大学生信息安全竞赛 [National College Student
Information Security Contest (home page)], n.d., http://www
.ciscn.cn.
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research and development capacity. The scope of these
commissioned projects explicitly includes research
into network attack and defense technologies and may
serve as an important vehicle for using civilian human
capital in the service of network weapon creation.
A variety of civilian corporations and individuals
participate in PLA network weapon development,
whether by selling knowledge of exploits or developing
tools for the PLA’s use through these channels. But this
collaboration has not always been straightforward.
In the past, some top white-hat Chinese information
security researchers have expressed that they saw
significant disincentives to their firms taking on
military projects. By 2012, one of the world’s leading
information security exploit brokers noted the price
the Chinese government was willing to pay external
actors for zero-days and other exploits had fallen to
unusual lows, owing to both the sheer quantity of the
military’s internal research into network attack and
exploitation vectors and the high number of private
Chinese researchers selling (or giving, under threat
of prosecution) their findings exclusively to the PLA
defense and intelligence apparatus.77
Private-sector firms also found themselves at a
disadvantage in competing for PLA work against
research programs at civilian universities and the RIs
of state-owned defense conglomerates, such as China
Electronics Technology Group Corporation’s 54th RI
(中国电子科技集团公司第五十四研究所).78 Whereas a
civilian university may have many defense research
projects ongoing simultaneously, a civilian company
7 7 . h t t p://j p k c a . n u i s t . e du . c n/j s j k x z y/x s y j . h t m l
(site discontinued).
78. http://www.qlweekly.com/News/hot/201404/059327
.html (site discontinued)
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with no prior dealings with the PLA may see the high
fixed costs of compliance with PLA technical standards
and procurement practices, as well as the potential for
damage to the company’s reputation in international
markets, as strong factors weighing against entering
into a relationship with the military. But reforms to
the PLA’s procurement and contracting system carried
out under MCF policies appear to have been designed
to ameliorate these concerns. In addition to research
and development cooperation, SSF NSD units with
network attack missions have historically contracted
with outside IT companies for personnel training.79
Outside IT and information security companies also
frequently cultivate in-house information warfare
militia units, which appear designed for defensive
roles aimed at improving China’s critical infrastructure
resiliency in the event of war or crisis.80
Although rumors abound within the Chinese
information security community dating back to the
Jiang Zemin era of patriotic hackers such as the Green
Army collaborating with the PLA’s network warfare
units, such arrangements appear to be relics of the

79. Andy Greenberg, “Shopping for Zero-Days: A Price List
for Hackers’ Secret Software Exploits,” Forbes, March 23, 2012,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2012/03/23
/shopping-for-zero-days-an-price-list-for-hackers-secret
-software-exploits/.
80. “于明” [Yu Ming], Dalian University of Technology,
n.d., http://web.archive.org/web/20140608093313/http://gs1
.dlut.edu.cn/Supervisor/Front/dsxx/new/Default
.aspx?WebPageName=yuming; and Mark Stokes et al., The
Chinese People’s Liberation Army Signals Intelligence and Cyber
Reconnaissance Infrastructure (Arlington, VA: Project 2049
Institute, November 11, 2011).
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past, at least at the level of official policy.81 The more
talented and professional among the early generations
of Chinese hackers have gone on to found professional
information security consultancies and software
development studios (with the Green Army, for
example, transforming into the prominent information
security firm NSFOCUS). These companies can and do
contract with the PLA, but the PLA’s formal human
talent pipeline for information operations is now
mature and robust enough that the SSF has little need
for informal and unreliable irregulars.
Involvement of Civilian Universities in Network
Warfare Research and Development Programs
The PLA has a long history of contracting with
civilian science and technology universities for both
information warfare research projects and training
for their technical reconnaissance personnel. These
arrangements can be lucrative for the schools involved;
one university describes the “external resources” it
receives from its relationships with PLA TRBs as a
significant contribution to its budget that helps finance
the school’s growth plans.82
When defense projects are entrusted to civilian
universities, a distinction is made between vertical
national defense work projects (纵向国防军工项目),
which involve direct tasking to a civilian university
81. “《解放日报》关于《青鸟培养软件蓝领》的报道” [Report
in PLA daily on “Blue Bird” blue-team training software], Itbenet,
August 5, 2010, http://web.archive.org/web/20110604073522/
http://www.itbenet.com/news_view.asp?id=51.
82. Rob Sheldon and Joe McReynolds, “China’s Cyber
Militia System,” in China and Cybersecurity: Espionage, Strategy,
and Politics in the Digital Domain, ed. Jon Lindsay et al. (Oxford,
UK: Oxford University Press, 2015).
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handed down from the Central Military Commission,
a military service or branch, a defense conglomerate,
or a government ministry, and horizontal national
defense work projects (横向国防军工项目), which
involve a university assisting a military institution with
autonomous, self-directed research and development;
delegations of subprojects from institutions that have
been directly tasked with a parent project; and projects
at military institutions that have been delegated out to
the civilian sphere (军转民项目).83 Whether a project
is horizontal or vertical can influence how the project
is managed and the manner in which civil-military
collaboration takes place.
Although procedures vary slightly from school to
school, each civilian school generally has a National
Security and Military Scientific Project Management
Office (国防军工科研项目管理办公室 or 军工办)
that handles project management functions and
applications to receive military projects and liaisons
between civilian and military experts and scholars.84
Work is carried out in each school’s National Defense
Research and Production Base (国防军工科研生产基地)
or similar facilities that possess appropriate access
controls and the ability to store classified information.
In theory, at least, these work premises are supposed
to be sequestered from the school’s normal facilities,
with no project work taking place outside of them.
83. Shannon Van Sant, “China’s Freelance Hackers:
For Love of Country (and Proof That Propaganda Works),”
CBS News, July 15, 2013, http://www.cbsnews.com/news
/chinas-freelance-hackers-for-love-of-country-and-proof-that
-propaganda-works-57592999/.
84. Stokes et al., The Chinese People’s Liberation Army; and “
湘潭大学信息工程学院” [The College of Information Engineering
of Xiangtan University], n.d., https://www.xtu.edu.cn/.
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But guidelines for universities’ defense research
work emphasize knowledge transfer in addition
to strict adherence to project requirements, with
military and civilian researchers being exhorted to
organize both official and irregular technical seminars
and workshops in the “open spirit of scientific
research” and reject a “stove-piped, conservative and
closed” approach.85
This work is considered highly secretive, with all
personnel involved required to strictly abide by the
provisional regulations on Management of Classified
Personnel in the National Defense Science and
Technology Industry (国防科技工业涉密人员管理暂行
规定) issued in 2007.86 The use of the term “classified
personnel” in this context suggests civilian researchers
likely have to undergo some form of security
clearance investigation. Rumors suggest these cleared
researchers at civilian technical schools are also
sometimes tasked with reviewing the fruits of Chinese
cyber-enabled industrial espionage, providing subject
matter expertise on the value of the stolen information
and helping it be directed efficiently within the
Chinese science and technology ecosystem.
CONCLUSION
Over the past decade, the PLA has built up a
robust human talent ecosystem in support of its
network operations programs with the support of
85. “南 京 信 息 工 程 大 学 军 工 科 研 项 目 管 理 办 法 ”
[Administrative measures for military scientific research projects
of Nanjing University of Information Science and Technology],
Kjc.nuist.edu.cn, April 15, 2009, https://kjc.nuist.edu.cn
/info/1041/2786.htm.
86.

“Military scientific research projects.”
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senior PLA and political leaders. This ecosystem
integrates talent from a wide variety of sources and
no longer appears to rely on single points of failure.
Although this shift is partially a reflection of the
less capital- and infrastructure-intensive nature of
network weapon development when compared to
the creation of fighter aircraft or missile warheads,
it is nevertheless a considerable feat in the context of
the PLA’s ongoing struggles to modernize its defense
RD&A systems and defense industries. At present the
system is undergoing unprecedented evolution, with
nearly every center of gravity in the PLA’s information
operations human capital system undergoing dramatic
reform and restructuring.
Nevertheless, additional challenges remain.
Retention of the PLA’s network warfare workforce
is still a major challenge as opportunities for skilled
technology professionals in China’s private sector
continue to appear more attractive than those offered
by the military. Although the PLA is developing
new avenues for leveraging private-sector talent in
network weapon development, the massive scale of
the SSF’s information warfare programs requires a
more controlled and regularized workforce that can
only be properly maintained in-house.
Personnel turnover is not always uniformly
negative; older cadres may make room for members
of China’s younger generation of digital natives,
bringing with them modern technical skill sets and
innovative approaches. As the PLA’s information
warfare apparatus has become more regularized and
its members’ levels of professionalism and talent
have increased, however, losses due to low retention
become increasingly costly wastes of the PLA’s
training and educational investment. Beyond their

technical talents, PLA officers involved in network
warfare development possess important institutional
memory that will be crucial to maintain during this
period of transition. Whether the PLA’s bold new
initiatives will enable the organization to successfully
grapple with these challenges over the coming years
remains to be seen.
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10. ELLIS JOFFE AND THE FOUNDING
GENERATION OF PLA STUDIES: THOUGHTS
FOR YOUNGER SCHOLARS
Cynthia A. Watson
China scholars are extraordinarily lucky to have
had true intellectual giants open the field of People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) and China studies: James
Lilley, Ellis Joffe, Doak Barnett, Paul H. B. Godwin,
Allen Whiting, and Michel Oksenberg, to name a
handful. These individuals struggled with a period
when China played second fiddle to Soviet concerns.
China scholars owe these individuals a profound
debt, particularly as the community is losing them
to history at a rapid pace. The opportunities to
study on the ground were limited for a considerable
period. McCarthyism tied to the question of “Who
lost China?” hampered scholars’ careers and research
opportunities. Some of these researchers could not
believe as recently as the 1970s that the annual PLA
studies conference cohosted by the US Army War
College and the National Bureau of Asian Research
would be bursting at the seams with eager, young,
inquiring minds for the analytical ranks. The marvels
of the Internet and the explosion of interest of late,
leading to a panoply of younger scholars parlaying
their superb language skills into research and
spending considerable time on the ground with PLA
officers, has been a new development over the past
20 years. The work of the first generation, undertaken
in far different conditions, reminds China scholars
of the power of intellectual determination and sheer
commitment to study born of grit.
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Ellis Joffe played a special role in the founding of
the PLA studies community as one of those present at
“the creation,” literally and figuratively. He did not
live in the United States, but in Israel, where concerns
were not those of McCarthyism but of survival. The
Joffe family moved to Shanghai after the Russian
Revolution—as many other Jews did when their
welcome disappeared elsewhere—so Joffe grew up in
a household worried about survival. This coincided
with the PLA trying to outlast the Nationalists seeking
to eradicate it. Living in China during this period
provided Joffe with a deep knowledge of China’s
culture, modern history, and language, each essential
to his analytical approach to China and scholarship
in general. The author notes this cultural benefit
because so many scholars proudly taut their Mandarin
credentials yet lack the knowledge of Chinese culture
infusing Joffe’s analyses. Joffe also played a role in the
founding of the National Bureau of Asian Research
PLA conference series in 1990, participating in the
majority of the gatherings until his health failed late in
the first decade of this century.
A founder of early Israeli scholarship at Hebrew
University of Jerusalem, Joffe was central to the
study of civil-military relations in that closed Chinese
regime. Writing at a time few scholars, particularly
in the United States, concentrated their work on the
connections between the Maoist Communist Party
and the weak PLA, he took on this task over several
decades to determine the nature of the tensions and
the implications for China’s future.1 His work was
1. See Ellis Joffe, Party and Army: Professionalism and Political
Control in the Chinese Officer Corps, 1949–1964 (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1965); and Ellis Joffe, The Chinese Army
after Mao (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987).
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careful, detailed, and central to that generation’s
appreciation of the evolving Chinese state. Some of
his more interesting work concentrated on the period
after Mao Zedong’s death, when China’s new path,
as a result of the Four Modernizations, held many
questions for analysts.2 Joffe’s work appeared widely
in international journals and publications, such as his
1987 The Chinese Army after Mao, published by Harvard
University Press.3 Although reviewers did not always
concur with his analyses, their respect for the value of
his work was virtually universal.
Joffe was an extraordinarily perceptive analyst
of Chinese intentions and the ways in which China
intended to use the PLA to achieve its goals. Joffe’s
concluding essay “Shaping China’s Next Generation
of Military Leaders: For What Kind of Army?”
in the 2007 conference volume The “People” in the
PLA: Recruitment, Training, and Education in China’s
Military raised points about the PLA’s evolution
which sound somewhat the same today, such as the
effects the ongoing reforms would have on the PLA.4
Additionally, Joffe wondered whether the PLA would
have a greater role in global aspirations (power
projection) or concerns closer to home. Written as
Chen Sui-bian’s second, tumultuous term in Taiwan
concluded, Joffe underestimated, as did many
2. Ellis Joffe, “Party-Army Relations in China: Retrospect
and Prospect,” China Quarterly 146 (June 1996): 299–314.
3.

Joffe, Chinese Army after Mao.

4. Ellis Joffe, “Shaping China’s Next Generation of Military
Leaders: For What Kind of Army?” in The “People” in the PLA:
Recruitment, Training, and Education in China’s Military, ed. Roy
Kamphausen, Andrew Scobell, and Travis Tanner (Carlisle, PA:
Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press, 2008),
353–88.
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scholars and politicians, the probability of increased
tensions over Taiwan. He may have underestimated
because he did not factor in the increased mainland
anxieties at a time when concerns over Taiwan were
seemingly subsiding, or because he fell prey to the
geographic imperative that seemed powerful (to
this analyst, at least) as the relationship progressed.
Certainly the frustration Beijing expressed repeatedly
between 2000 and 2006 as Chen’s tenure developed
along paths the mainland found frightening led Joffe
to recognize China was developing a PLA with the
primary objective of thwarting any declaration of de
jure independence.
China in 2007, as Joffe wrote, was definitely behind
the United States in military capability, although the
modernization that began after the 1995–96 Taiwan
Strait crises was well underway, as Bernard Cole’s
and Dennis Blasko’s analyses and conference papers
from this and other scholarly convocations indicated.5
Studies more recently have shown the growing
emphases on not merely acquiring newer platforms,
such as submarines, but in elevating the quality of
leadership, organization, and administration. Much
of this change appears to mirror reforms taken in the
United States years ago, but they are decided changes
from what was once an armed force primarily reliant
on numbers of men under arms. Joffe considered these
factors as part of the fabric of the PLA’s culture and
the interplay between it and the Communist Party of
China (CPC).
5. Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy
Enters the Twenty-First Century (Annapolis, MD: US Naval
Institute Press, 2001); and Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army
Today: Tradition and Transformation for the 21st Century (London:
Routledge, 2006).
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Joffe’s essay appeared as the PLA still felt stung
by its inability to project a Chinese humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief role in regional rescue
efforts following the disastrous 2004 Indonesian
tsunami. Simultaneously, much of the world began
refocusing on shifting balances of world power, which
was embodied by PLA behavior in the East and South
China Seas.
“Refocusing” emphasizes embracing a more
comprehensive approach to analyzing the PLA,
rather than counting numbers of aircraft or men and
women under arms. This emphasis dramatically
reinforces Joffe’s point that China’s determination
of military rightsizing springs from determining
the interests it seeks to defend, as one would expect
from a discussion on achieving a rightsized military.
Many of the military analyses of the People’s Republic
of China today arguably consider only the hard
numbers of increased Chinese hardware—particularly
ships—rather than the across-the-board assessment
of increased capabilities and responsibilities and
overall military reforms within the PLA. Although
the number of ships and aircraft increased and their
sophistication improved over the past decade, the
national interests China seeks to defend around
the world also have increased substantially. As the
United States learns daily, those global requirements
create opportunities and challenges which the PLA
will confront, regardless of its size. Joffe’s reminder
to consider all of these factors is an important one too
many discussions seem to ignore today, particularly
with the breathy headlines typical of much analysis
in the news.
Additionally, Joffe’s assessment of relative
capabilities between the United States and China
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predated the jarring reality of the 2008 natural
disasters (winter snows in January and the massive
earthquake in May), which illustrated the PLA’s lack
of strategic lift and logistics capability either to secure
the homeland or respond to humanitarian assistance
and disaster relief for the Chinese people. The PLA
leadership had to confront this challenge as China
sought to increase its global role as a modern power
while also trying to respond to domestic crises.
A considerable portion of Joffe’s essay considered
China as a great power, with an understanding
of the PLA as an avenue for realizing that greatpower status. In particular, he opined that the PLA
would be extremely unlikely to achieve some of its
deepest aspirations “for generations,” but that has
proven a surprisingly—and for some disturbingly—
underestimation of China’s transformative powers
for its armed forces.6 Although many press articles
and analyses note China’s advancement in military
capabilities across the board over the past 20 years,
careful listening also provides acknowledgment by
many interlocutors that China is still quite a long way
from achieving the great-power capability it believes

6.

Joffe, “Shaping China’s Next Generation,” 363.
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the PLA needs.7 As noted below, PLA leadership
recognizes that as China has progressed, the steps
have been frustrating at times because the challenges
of advancing technology may not coincide with the
country’s ambitions. Joffe would easily recognize
the importance of a PLA expanding its navy and
air force, reworking its Rocket Force, and crafting a
support staff, yet facing massive pushback from the
largest branch, the ground forces, which experienced
the same bureaucratic budget fights all militaries do
around the world. Meanwhile, the CPC is increasingly
asking China’s military to support the party’s global
ambitions as a great player.
Joffe accurately anticipated China’s aggressive
moves to build armed forces commensurate with those
of a great power. PLA activities in the past generation
indicate China is the most important permanent
member of the Asian security landscape, calling into
question how important the United States’ role is in
comparison; at the least, it is no longer as militarily
untouchable as it was a decade ago. Joffe anticipated
this shift in his analyses and encouraged China
7. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to
Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s
Republic of China 2018 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense,
May 16, 2018); Bill Gertz, “China Rapidly Building Advanced
Arms for Use against US,” Washington Free Beacon, May 11,
2018, https://freebeacon.com/national-security/china-rapidly
-building-advanced-arms-use-u-s/; Dennis J. Blasko, “China’s
Military Spending: A ChinaFile Conversation,” ChinaFile,
March
6,
2018,
http://www.chinafile.com/conversation
/chinas-military-spending; and Michael D. Swaine, “The PLA
Navy’s Strategic Transformation to the ‘Far Seas’: How Far,
How Threatening, and What’s to Be Done?,” in Going Global? The
People’s Navy in a Time of Strategic Transformation (Newport, RI:
China Maritime Studies Institute, 2019).
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scholars over the years to recognize this likelihood
while remembering the CPC’s intention to keep the
PLA under its control, rather than as a military focused
entirely on capability regardless of CPC control. The
CPC does not believe the source of China’s power is
the PLA; rather, the PLA is—as Joffe would remind
China scholars—a manifestation of the CPC’s ability
to raise China from the depths of a century-and-a-half
of humiliation. The CPC intends to keep the military
at its disposal to retain China’s hard-earned return to
status. This professionally competent but ideologically
subservient body may have grown since Joffe’s
passing in 2010, but its core role in Chinese society has
not changed.
Much ink over the past 10 years has raised questions
about PLA desires to thwart US naval activity in
protection of Taiwan and expand China’s ability to
dominate in maritime disputes in the East and South
China Seas. China has engaged in anti-access/area
denial activities in the South China Sea, where Beijing
literally built islands on coral and rock formations and
low-tide elevation areas. These transformations on
and beneath the surface of the sea accompanied the
more aggressive actions of a newly expanded PLA
Navy, which sought to prevent the stifling of China’s
increasing maritime activities along its long coastline,
as well as in littoral and extra-regional waters. The
new PLA Navy has a greater number of highly capable
surface vessels and submarines in its fleet. This
increase in Chinese maritime power, accompanied by
coast guard and other maritime assets, has resulted in
a celebration of enhanced Chinese power and status
at the same time the US Navy, traditionally seen
as dominant in those waters, is being stretched by
continuing global requirements.
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Similar PLA Navy activities have occurred in the
East China Sea, where maritime disputes with Japan
over rock formations in the Senkaku Islands illustrate
pride and prowess more intense than has been seen
for the past 100 years or more. The activities of the
PLA Navy in these waters, along with efforts in 2010
to interfere with US intelligence ships off the Chinese
coast, show a professional military confidence that
had been lacking, but is now on display as part of the
post-2008 China, one proud of both its Olympics and
its economic power.
One major change in PLA dynamics Joffe did not
directly address was China’s perception, so vocally
argued a decade ago, that the United States sought to
“keep China down.” The growing nationalism was
supported by a stronger PLA with greater capability
after the sustained increases in the defense budget
resulting from a stronger overall Chinese economy.
Although they are well beyond the focus of this
chapter, PLA responses to reconnaissance flights over
the South China Sea, for example, invariably invoke
the cry that the US Navy is infringing on China’s
sovereignty. Although many US analysts reject this
assessment on the grounds China has no right to
occupy and control either the land features or the
air space in that part of the ocean, Beijing’s response
consistently reflects a profound sense of injustice.
Although the CPC may use this sense of injustice to
bludgeon foreigners, the increasing sense over the past
decade among PLA officers has been that the primary
US goal in the region is to deny them the pride of
national transformation, forcing instead an implied
continuation of the humiliation so hated in China.
Certainly, the PLA’s capabilities have improved
substantially and progressively since Joffe wrote
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the 2007 piece, but the long-term frustration has not
evaporated as the United States continues as the
PLA’s bête noire in PLA eyes. Joffe might well have
pondered the events that would have to occur for the
PLA to change its opinion that the US policy toward
China is one of containment.
Joffe’s analyses of the PLA were always mindful
of the reality that it is as much a force for the CPC to
govern as a defensive force for the Chinese nation.
As such, he might not have specifically identified a
number of the transformative changes over the past
decade, but they would not have surprised him. He
most likely would have urged China scholars to
recognize that the context of relations between the
CPC and PLA called for such steps as part of the
former’s retention of control over the latter.
In particular, the PLA reforms of the past three years
have been in keeping with the demand reiterated by Xi
Jinping that the gun serve the CPC. The PLA reforms, a
clear shift toward US-style management of the armed
forces as part of the greater emphasis on a modern,
information-based military, continue the willingness
of the Chinese government to pursue steps directly
or indirectly mimicking US actions over the past halfcentury. The PLA reforms, moving from military
regions to theaters and recasting the administrative
approach of leadership, do not precisely mirror the
reforms of the US military in 1947, 1958, or 1986, but
they illustrate the importance of redirecting the levels
of administration into an organization more able to
carry out war when confronted with that requirement.
PLA reforms also coincide with the widely proclaimed
anti-corruption campaign of Fifth-Generation General
Secretary Xi Jinping as a method of reconsolidating the
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CPC’s central role as the arbitrator of Chinese society,
including the PLA.
The corruption investigations targeting PLA senior
leadership over the past five years further indicate
the continuing determination by CPC elders to exert
power over the armed forces. Joffe’s work reminds
China scholars that this exertion of power dates to the
founding of the CPC in the 1920s. The dual approach
Xi initiated with the anti-corruption monitoring and a
substantial modernization under the 2015 PLA reforms
unequivocally returned power over the military to the
hands of the CPC, quashing rogue or even revisionist
elements in the PLA itself, a trend Joffe would have
anticipated. His work reminds China scholars of the
PLA’s political nature, both past and present.
The cyber and space domains in their PLA
dimensions offer a new twist to Joffe’s interpretations
as traditional PLA power has moved into new
arenas. His analyses of the PLA extending the
CPC’s predominant role in Chinese society did not
emphasize cyber or space domains, both of which
are now considerably more important than in his
time. The PLA role in this transformation of the force
is consistent with prior Chinese activities, however,
which have attempted to leapfrog generations of
development to put China on par with outsiders,
usually the United States. Cyber developments over
the past decade have particularly brought the need to
blend newer technology with traditional forms of state
control over information; these are seen both as a threat
to Chinese interests as well as a new tool for the PLA
(and state). As James Mulvenon has frequently noted,

385

these changes also present possible threats to China.8
Although Joffe certainly heard many scholars ponder
the possible openings cyber presented the PLA in
exploiting the vulnerabilities of others, he understood
those same tools invariably pose challenges to China.
Finally, Joffe’s approach was a gentle reminder that
China, with the CPC in control, is an important player
in the international system and will use its military
to protect the governing regime’s hold on power.
Perhaps because he lived in a society daily confronting
serious existential challenges, his analysis of the PLA,
the CPC, and China itself was matter-of-fact. His
assessments did not try to sell an ideological position;
rather, they considered the implications of data.
Joffe saw the need to study the PLA because it was
a valuable tool with which the Chinese leadership
could achieve its goals, but that did not mean it was the
ultimate threat in the world. That narrow distinction,
often lost of late in the flurry of stories about rising PLA
capabilities, may miss the reality which he so often
brought China scholars back to: in using the PLA in
the current context, China confronts challenges as well
as opportunities. Joffe might well have asked Western
leaders, had they attended these conferences, whether
the benefits of various interactions with China led to
outcomes consistent with the levels of anxiety so often
associated with our current assessments of the PLA.
Rephrased as a question, are the risks of a rising PLA
resulting from enhanced overall Chinese power more
important than the resulting benefits of intercourse
with China?

8. Dr. James C. Mulvenon, interview by the author,
March 2017.

386

In short, Joffe anticipated many aspects of the
current bilateral military-to-military relationship,
yet underestimated the power of some trends. His
profound knowledge of China’s culture, however,
gave him a superb understanding of the dynamics
that predominantly did come to pass. Today’s
younger scholars would be well served to recall these
deep cultural and historic feelings of China as the new
generation of analysts ponder the knowledge they
need to conduct accurate analyses.
One of the most central concepts in Judaism, Joffe
would remind China scholars, is that of l’dor vador,
words repeated on Yom Kippur to remind Jews of
the importance of passing down knowledge from one
generation to another. By reconsidering the exquisite
analytical role Joffe played in this field, the National
Bureau of Asian Research and the US Army War
College are indeed passing this knowledge from one
generation to another. Ellis Joffe would offer us China
scholars a broad smile in return.
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